Publish GHSA-6q4m-7476-932w

This commit is contained in:
advisory-database[bot]
2025-02-18 22:43:43 +00:00
parent 53436a8626
commit 67ac07b710
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
{
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"id": "GHSA-6q4m-7476-932w",
"modified": "2023-11-20T22:18:24Z",
"modified": "2025-02-18T22:42:28Z",
"published": "2023-03-13T20:43:33Z",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-27581"
],
"summary": "github-slug-action vulnerable to arbitrary code execution",
"details": "### Impact\n\nThis action uses the `github.head_ref` parameter in an insecure way. \n\nThis vulnerability can be triggered by any user on GitHub on any workflow using the action on pull requests. They just need to create a pull request with a branch name, which can contain the attack payload. (Note that first-time PR requests will not be run - but the attacker can submit a valid PR before submitting an invalid PR). This can be used to execute code on the GitHub runners (potentially use it for crypto-mining, and waste your resources) and to exfiltrate any secrets you use in the CI pipeline.\n\n### Patches\n\n> Pass the variable as an environment variable and then use the environment variable instead of substituting it directly.\n\nPatched action is available on tag **v4**, tag **v4.4.1**, and any tag beyond.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo workaround is available if impacted, please upgrade the version\n\n> ️ **v3** and **v4** are compatibles.\n\n### References\n\n[Here](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input/) is a set of blog posts by Github's security team explaining this issue.\n\n### Thanks\n\nThanks to the team of researchers from Purdue University, who are working on finding vulnerabilities in CI/CD configurations of open-source software. Their tool detected this security vulnerability.\n\n",
"details": "### Impact\n\nThis action uses the `github.head_ref` parameter in an insecure way. \n\nThis vulnerability can be triggered by any user on GitHub on any workflow using the action on pull requests. They just need to create a pull request with a branch name, which can contain the attack payload. (Note that first-time PR requests will not be run - but the attacker can submit a valid PR before submitting an invalid PR). This can be used to execute code on the GitHub runners (potentially use it for crypto-mining, and waste your resources) and to exfiltrate any secrets you use in the CI pipeline.\n\n### Patches\n\n> Pass the variable as an environment variable and then use the environment variable instead of substituting it directly.\n\nPatched action is available on tag **v4**, tag **v4.4.1**, and any tag beyond.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo workaround is available if impacted, please upgrade the version\n\n> ️ **v3** and **v4** are compatibles.\n\n### References\n\n[Here](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input/) is a set of blog posts by Github's security team explaining this issue.\n\n### Thanks\n\nThanks to the team of researchers from Purdue University, who are working on finding vulnerabilities in CI/CD configurations of open-source software. Their tool detected this security vulnerability.",
"severity": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",