diff --git a/advisories/github-reviewed/2023/03/GHSA-6q4m-7476-932w/GHSA-6q4m-7476-932w.json b/advisories/github-reviewed/2023/03/GHSA-6q4m-7476-932w/GHSA-6q4m-7476-932w.json
index f157b7183fe..f086a7beb5a 100644
--- a/advisories/github-reviewed/2023/03/GHSA-6q4m-7476-932w/GHSA-6q4m-7476-932w.json
+++ b/advisories/github-reviewed/2023/03/GHSA-6q4m-7476-932w/GHSA-6q4m-7476-932w.json
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 {
   "schema_version": "1.4.0",
   "id": "GHSA-6q4m-7476-932w",
-  "modified": "2023-11-20T22:18:24Z",
+  "modified": "2025-02-18T22:42:28Z",
   "published": "2023-03-13T20:43:33Z",
   "aliases": [
     "CVE-2023-27581"
   ],
   "summary": "github-slug-action vulnerable to arbitrary code execution",
-  "details": "### Impact\n\nThis action uses the `github.head_ref` parameter in an insecure way. \n\nThis vulnerability can be triggered by any user on GitHub on any workflow using the action on pull requests. They just need to create a pull request with a branch name, which can contain the attack payload. (Note that first-time PR requests will not be run - but the attacker can submit a valid PR before submitting an invalid PR).  This can be used to execute code on the GitHub runners (potentially use it for crypto-mining, and waste your resources) and to exfiltrate any secrets you use in the CI pipeline.\n\n### Patches\n\n> Pass the variable as an environment variable and then use the environment variable instead of substituting it directly.\n\nPatched action is available on tag **v4**, tag **v4.4.1**, and any tag beyond.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo workaround is available if impacted, please upgrade the version\n\n> ℹ️ **v3** and **v4** are compatibles.\n\n### References\n\n[Here](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input/) is a set of blog posts by Github's security team explaining this issue.\n\n### Thanks\n\nThanks to the team of researchers from Purdue University, who are working on finding vulnerabilities in CI/CD configurations of open-source software. Their tool detected this security vulnerability.\n\n",
+  "details": "### Impact\n\nThis action uses the `github.head_ref` parameter in an insecure way. \n\nThis vulnerability can be triggered by any user on GitHub on any workflow using the action on pull requests. They just need to create a pull request with a branch name, which can contain the attack payload. (Note that first-time PR requests will not be run - but the attacker can submit a valid PR before submitting an invalid PR).  This can be used to execute code on the GitHub runners (potentially use it for crypto-mining, and waste your resources) and to exfiltrate any secrets you use in the CI pipeline.\n\n### Patches\n\n> Pass the variable as an environment variable and then use the environment variable instead of substituting it directly.\n\nPatched action is available on tag **v4**, tag **v4.4.1**, and any tag beyond.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo workaround is available if impacted, please upgrade the version\n\n> ℹ️ **v3** and **v4** are compatibles.\n\n### References\n\n[Here](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input/) is a set of blog posts by Github's security team explaining this issue.\n\n### Thanks\n\nThanks to the team of researchers from Purdue University, who are working on finding vulnerabilities in CI/CD configurations of open-source software. Their tool detected this security vulnerability.",
   "severity": [
     {
       "type": "CVSS_V3",