* dev:
selinux: validate constraint expression attr and op at load time
selinux: compute the IMA configuration settings string length once at boot
selinux: replace strlcat() with seq_buf in selinux_ima_collect_state()
selinux: suppress warning flood for retired DCCP netlink messages
selinux: tighten type validation during policy load
selinux: drop unnecessary goto and label from avc_alloc_node()
selinux: convert int flags to bool flags in ss/services.c
selinux: clean up selinuxfs resources on init failure
selinux: hooks: use kmalloc() to allocate path buffer
security_get_permissions() maps an inherited common's permissions into
an array sized by the class's own permissions.nprim, but class_read()
takes that nprim verbatim from the policy image and never checks that it
covers the common. A class that inherits a common of N permissions while
declaring a smaller nprim is accepted, and on load the common's
permissions are written past the class-sized array -- an out-of-bounds
heap write.
Reject a class whose permission count is below its inherited common's.
Well-formed policies, where the class count already includes the
inherited permissions, are unaffected.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 55fcf09b3f ("selinux: add support for querying object classes and permissions from the running policy")
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
perm_read() bounds a permission value by SEL_VEC_MAX but never by the
nprim of the owning class or common, which is taken verbatim from the
policy image. security_get_permissions() then writes perms[value - 1]
into an nprim-sized kcalloc() array, so a class declaring fewer
permissions than its largest permission value drives an out-of-bounds
heap write. The top-level symbol tables are validated this way; the
nested per-class permission table is not.
Reject a permission whose value exceeds nprim, which is already set when
perm_read() runs. Well-formed policies are unaffected.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 55fcf09b3f ("selinux: add support for querying object classes and permissions from the running policy")
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: tweak comment for line length]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
commit
17b5758bf3 ("apparmor: Initial support for compressed policies")
added the ability for apparmor to load compressed policy, unfortunately
it did not add a config option or select CONFIG_ZSTD_DECOMPRESS
which it depends on, leading to the following build failure
apparmorfs.c makes calls into zstd_*() even when
CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY is not set, causing
build errors:
/usr/bin/ld.bfd: security/apparmor/apparmorfs.o: in function `policy_update':
apparmorfs.c:(.text+0x1307): undefined reference to `zstd_get_frame_header'
/usr/bin/ld.bfd: apparmorfs.c:(.text+0x1359): undefined reference to `zstd_dctx_workspace_bound'
/usr/bin/ld.bfd: apparmorfs.c:(.text+0x13f7): undefined reference to `zstd_init_dctx'
/usr/bin/ld.bfd: apparmorfs.c:(.text+0x140c): undefined reference to `zstd_decompress_dctx'
/usr/bin/ld.bfd: apparmorfs.c:(.text+0x1411): undefined reference to `zstd_is_error'
Add a new config option to enable compress policy loading as using
the existing CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY is in appropriate
as that is about retaining loaded policy so that it can be introspected
at a later date.
Fixes: 17b5758bf3 ("apparmor: Initial support for compressed policies")
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Warning: security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c:501 function parameter 'compressed_data' not described in 'aa_get_data_from_compressed'
Warning: security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c:501 function parameter 'compressed_data' not described in 'aa_get_data_from_compressed'
Warning: security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c:501 function parameter 'compressed_data' not described in 'aa_get_data_from_compressed'
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202607240144.4iqulDF1-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
read_cons_helper() validates the expression type and stack depth
of each constraint node but leaves e->attr and e->op unchecked,
so a policy with an invalid operator or attribute value is
accepted at load and only detected when the constraint is evaluated.
constraint_expr_eval() handles such unrecognized cases with BUG()
so the first permission check that reaches such a node oopses in
the context of the checking process or panics with panic_on_oops.
Reject these expresssions when the policy is loaded, matching what
the libsepol validator already does.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
keyring_get_key_chunk() loads description bytes into the index chunk low
address first, while keyring_diff_objects() numbers the first differing
bit from the low end and folds the absolute byte index into the level
without removing the inline-prefix offset the level already carries.
The two disagree on byte order and bit position, so the array can be
told two keys first differ at a bit that does not differ in the chunk
the walker uses, letting crafted descriptions collide into one node.
Load the chunk in the order keyring_diff_objects() assumes and drop the
inline-prefix length when folding the byte index into the level. This
only changes the in-memory ordering used to place keys within a keyring;
add, search and read of non-colliding keys are unaffected.
Fixes: f771fde820 ("keys: Simplify key description management")
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260719161505.2423935-3-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
For description-level chunks keyring_get_key_chunk() advances the read
pointer by level * sizeof(long) past the inline prefix but only
bounds-checks the prefix, so a long enough key description is read past
its kmemdup(desc, desc_len + 1) allocation. Compute the full byte
offset and bounds-check the description against it before reading.
The walk only reaches a description-level chunk when two keys collide
through the hash, x, type and domain_tag chunks, so this is reached from
an unprivileged add_key(2) with a crafted pair of same-type keys whose
index hashes collide; KASAN reports a slab-out-of-bounds read.
Fixes: f771fde820 ("keys: Simplify key description management")
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260719161505.2423935-2-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Two correctness and type-hygiene issues exist in the DCP trusted keys
implementation.
First, trusted_dcp_unseal() reads p->key_len from a user-supplied blob
without checking if it exceeds MAX_KEY_SIZE. If a crafted blob provides a
payload_len larger than 128, the subsequent do_aead_crypto() call writes
past the end of the p->key array into the adjacent p->blob buffer within
the same struct trusted_key_payload -- the caller's own input, not
unrelated kernel memory. While not exploitable, this violates strict array
bounds and triggers static analyzers. Fix this by adding a validation
check against MIN_KEY_SIZE and MAX_KEY_SIZE immediately after reading the
length, matching the checks already done in trusted_core.c.
Second, calc_blob_len() calculates a sum in size_t that truncates to
unsigned int on 64-bit platforms. Because the DCP hardware is only present
on 32-bit i.MX SoC platforms, size_t and unsigned int are functionally
equivalent in production, making this truncation harmless in practice.
Nevertheless, updating the return type to size_t (and subsequently updating
'blen' in the seal/unseal paths) resolves type-narrowing warnings and
improves overall code hygiene.
Fixes: 2e8a0f40a3 ("KEYS: trusted: Introduce NXP DCP-backed trusted keys")
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Derepas <fabrice.derepas@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Reviewed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260719163939.3624767-1-fabrice.derepas@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
sock_is_scoped() dereferences other->sk_socket->file->f_cred to read the
peer's Landlock domain when evaluating
LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET, without first checking that the
peer has a backing socket and file. hook_unix_find() performs the same
dereference for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX and does guard it.
Guard it here too and treat a peer with no backing file, such as a
kernel socket created by sock_create_kern(), as unscoped.
This is defensive hardening, not a fix for a reachable bug. The
unix_stream_connect() and unix_may_send() hooks run with the peer held
under unix_state_lock() and only after the AF_UNIX core has excluded
SOCK_DEAD, and no in-tree code binds a file-less AF_UNIX socket to an
abstract address, so other->sk_socket->file is always valid at these
call sites today.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260703152750.2022878-1-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Make use of the audit_log_n_untrustedstring() function to simplify the
code in aa_label_xaudit().
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore:
"A single SELinux patch to correct a problem with the overlayfs mmap()
and mprotect() fixes from earlier this year where we inadvertenly
included an additional SELinux execmem permission check on some
operations"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20260717' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix incorrect execmem checks on overlayfs
Pull landlock fix from Mickaël Salaün:
"This fixes TCP Fast Open support, specific test environments, and doc
warnings"
* tag 'landlock-7.2-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux:
selftests/landlock: Skip scoped_signal subtest with MSG_OOB if not available
selftests/landlock: Fix screwed up pointers in the scoped_signal_test
landlock: Update formatting
landlock: Fix kernel-doc for the nested quiet layer flag
selftests/landlock: Add test for TCP fast open
landlock: Fix TCP Fast Open connection bypass
selinux_ima_collect_state() builds a string of the current SELinux
configuration settings. The string lists each setting as a name and
one digit. The length of the string therefore never changes, but is
still recomputed on every call.
Add selinux_ima_config_len_init() to compute the length once during
selinux_init(). Update selinux_ima_collect_state() to use the stored
length.
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/df755e0282dab3b932d19aceab71b7d7@paul-moore.com
Signed-off-by: Ian Bridges <icb@fastmail.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The commit fixing the overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks
failed to skip the execmem check in __file_map_prot_check() for the case
where the "mounter check" is being performed. This check should be
performed only against the credentials of the task that is calling
mmap()/mprotect(), since it doesn't pertain to the file itself, but
rather just gates the ability of the calling task to get an executable
memory mapping in general.
The purpose of the "mounter check" is to guard against using an
overlayfs mount to gain file access that would otherwise be denied to
the mounter. For execmem this is not relevant, as there is no further
file access granted based on it (notice that the file's context is not
used as the target in the check), so checking it also against the
mounter credentials would be incorrect.
Fix this by passing a boolean to [__]file_map_prot_check() and
selinux_mmap_file_common() that indicates if we are doing the "mounter
check" and skiping the execmem check in that case. Since this boolean
also indicates if we use current_cred() or the mounter cred as the
subject, also remove the "cred" argument from these functions and
determine it based on the boolean and the file struct.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 82544d36b1 ("selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In preparation for removing the deprecated strlcat() API[1], replace the
strscpy()/strlcat() chain in selinux_ima_collect_state() with a struct
seq_buf, which tracks the write position and remaining space internally.
Each field is written with seq_buf_printf() using a "=%d;" format, which
removes the open-coded "=1;"/"=0;" constants. The seven per-append
WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len) truncation checks are replaced by a single
seq_buf_has_overflowed() check after the string is built.
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/370 [1]
Signed-off-by: Ian Bridges <icb@fastmail.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When deploying linux-6.18.y stable kernel to production servers, we
observed kernel dmesg being flooded with SELinux warnings when running
`ss -l`:
SELinux: unrecognized netlink message: protocol=4 nlmsg_type=19 \
sclass=netlink_tcpdiag_socket pid=188945 comm=ss
The root cause is that DCCP support was retired in
commit 2a63dd0edf ("net: Retire DCCP socket."). Consequently,
DCCPDIAG_GETSOCK was removed from nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms. This causes
nlmsg_perm() to return -EINVAL, triggering the SELinux warning for every
`ss -l` invocation [0].
Use pr_warn_once() for the retired DCCPDIAG_GETSOCK to prevent message
flooding.
Link: https://github.com/iproute2/iproute2/blob/main/misc/ss.c#L3901 [0]
Fixes: 2a63dd0edf ("net: Retire DCCP socket.")
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Mark Brown
Paul Moore
Bryam VargasandPaul Moore
John Johansen
Stephen SmalleyandPaul Moore
Baruch SiachandJohn Johansen
Michael BommaritoandJarkko Sakkinen
Fabrice DerepasandJarkko Sakkinen
Mickaël Salaün
Linus Torvalds
Ian BridgesandPaul Moore
Tetsuo HandaandJohn Johansen
Ondrej MosnacekandPaul Moore
Yafang ShaoandPaul Moore