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selinux: reject a permission value exceeding the class permission count
perm_read() bounds a permission value by SEL_VEC_MAX but never by the
nprim of the owning class or common, which is taken verbatim from the
policy image. security_get_permissions() then writes perms[value - 1]
into an nprim-sized kcalloc() array, so a class declaring fewer
permissions than its largest permission value drives an out-of-bounds
heap write. The top-level symbol tables are validated this way; the
nested per-class permission table is not.
Reject a permission whose value exceeds nprim, which is already set when
perm_read() runs. Well-formed policies are unaffected.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 55fcf09b3f ("selinux: add support for querying object classes and permissions from the running policy")
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: tweak comment for line length]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -1175,6 +1175,9 @@ static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *f
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rc = -EINVAL;
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if (perdatum->value < 1 || perdatum->value > SEL_VEC_MAX)
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goto bad;
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/* indexes an nprim-sized array in security_get_permissions() */
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if (perdatum->value > s->nprim)
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goto bad;
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rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
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if (rc)
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