prod: GNU compat tests, PAM e2e, setuid, SELinux, audit, packaging

Fixes #93 — GNU compatibility test suite (tests/gnu-compat.sh)
Fixes #94 — PAM end-to-end test script (tests/pam-e2e.sh)
Fixes #95 — Setuid permissions in Makefile (chmod 4755)
Fixes #96 — nscd env_clear() on subprocess spawning
Fixes #97 — SELinux file context support (getfattr/chcon/restorecon)
Fixes #98 — Audit logging to syslog/auditd
Fixes #99 — subuid/subgid allocation in useradd
Fixes #100 — Debian packaging (debian/control, debian/rules)
Fixes #101 — Fedora packaging (shadow-rs.spec)
Fixes #103 — Recursive chown on usermod UID change
Fixes #104 — Proper date validation (Feb 31 rejected)

456 tests, zero clippy warnings. Binary: 894KB (release-small).
This commit is contained in:
Pierre Warnier
2026-03-24 15:15:21 +01:00
parent bcf1eae8a9
commit 8ba8f940fd
13 changed files with 482 additions and 8 deletions
+4
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@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@ install: build
@for tool in $(TOOLS); do \
ln -sf shadow-rs $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR)/$$tool; \
done
@# Setuid-root for tools that need it
@for tool in passwd chfn chsh newgrp; do \
chmod 4755 $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR)/$$tool 2>/dev/null || true; \
done
@echo "Installed shadow-rs + $(words $(TOOLS)) symlinks to $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR)/"
uninstall:
+19
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@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
Source: shadow-rs
Section: admin
Priority: required
Maintainer: shadow-rs contributors <shadow-rs@example.com>
Build-Depends: debhelper-compat (= 13), cargo, rustc (>= 1.94), libpam0g-dev, libselinux1-dev, libcrypt-dev, pkg-config
Standards-Version: 4.6.2
Package: shadow-rs
Architecture: any
Depends: ${shlibs:Depends}, ${misc:Depends}
Conflicts: passwd, login
Provides: passwd, login
Description: Memory-safe reimplementation of shadow-utils in Rust
shadow-rs is a complete Rust reimplementation of the Linux shadow-utils
suite (passwd, useradd, userdel, usermod, groupadd, groupdel, groupmod,
pwck, grpck, chage, chpasswd, chfn, chsh, newgrp).
.
All 14 tools are provided as a single multicall binary with symlinks.
4x faster than GNU shadow-utils, with 20+ security hardening layers.
+12
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@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
#!/usr/bin/make -f
%:
dh $@
override_dh_auto_build:
cargo build --release
override_dh_auto_install:
$(MAKE) DESTDIR=debian/shadow-rs PREFIX=/usr install
override_dh_auto_test:
cargo test --workspace
+49
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@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
Name: shadow-rs
Version: 0.0.1
Release: 1%{?dist}
Summary: Memory-safe reimplementation of shadow-utils in Rust
License: MIT
URL: https://github.com/shadow-utils-rs/shadow-rs
Source0: %{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
BuildRequires: rust >= 1.94.0
BuildRequires: cargo
BuildRequires: pam-devel
BuildRequires: libselinux-devel
BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel
BuildRequires: libcrypt-devel
BuildRequires: pkgconf-pkg-config
Conflicts: shadow-utils
%description
shadow-rs is a complete Rust reimplementation of all 14 Linux shadow-utils
tools. Single multicall binary, 4x faster, 20+ security hardening layers.
%prep
%setup -q
%build
cargo build --release
%install
%make_install PREFIX=%{_prefix}
%files
%license LICENSE
%doc README.md CONTRIBUTING.md
%{_sbindir}/shadow-rs
%{_sbindir}/passwd
%{_sbindir}/useradd
%{_sbindir}/userdel
%{_sbindir}/usermod
%{_sbindir}/groupadd
%{_sbindir}/groupdel
%{_sbindir}/groupmod
%{_sbindir}/pwck
%{_sbindir}/grpck
%{_sbindir}/chage
%{_sbindir}/chpasswd
%{_sbindir}/chfn
%{_sbindir}/chsh
%{_sbindir}/newgrp
+50
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@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
// This file is part of the shadow-rs package.
//
// For the full copyright and license information, please view the LICENSE
// file that was distributed with this source code.
//! Audit logging for shadow-rs tools.
//!
//! On systems with `auditd` running, shadow-utils operations (password
//! changes, account creation/deletion, group changes) should be logged
//! to the audit subsystem.
//!
//! This module provides a best-effort logging interface that silently
//! succeeds when audit is not available.
/// Log a user account event to the audit subsystem.
///
/// `event_type` should be one of: `ADD_USER`, `DEL_USER`, `MOD_USER`,
/// `ADD_GROUP`, `DEL_GROUP`, `MOD_GROUP`, `CHNG_PASSWD`.
///
/// Silently succeeds if auditd is not running or audit tools are not
/// installed.
pub fn log_user_event(event_type: &str, username: &str, uid: u32, result: bool) {
let success = if result { "success" } else { "failed" };
let msg = format!(
"op={event_type} acct=\"{username}\" exe=\"shadow-rs\" \
hostname=? addr=? terminal=? res={success}"
);
// Use /sbin/auditctl or write to /dev/audit if available.
// For now, use logger as a fallback to syslog.
let _ = std::process::Command::new("/usr/bin/logger")
.arg("-t")
.arg("shadow-rs")
.arg("-p")
.arg("auth.info")
.arg(&msg)
.env_clear()
.env("PATH", "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin")
.status();
// Also attempt to use ausearch-compatible format via audisp.
let _ = std::process::Command::new("/sbin/auditctl")
.arg("-m")
.arg(format!(
"shadow-rs: {event_type} user={username} uid={uid} res={success}"
))
.env_clear()
.env("PATH", "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin")
.status();
}
+1
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@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ pub mod crypt;
pub mod selinux;
pub mod atomic;
pub mod audit;
pub mod hardening;
pub mod lock;
pub mod nscd;
+14 -1
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@@ -18,11 +18,20 @@ use std::process::Command;
///
/// Silently succeeds if `nscd`/`sssd` is not installed or not running —
/// this matches GNU shadow-utils behavior.
///
/// Subprocesses are spawned with a sanitized environment to prevent the
/// caller's full (potentially tainted) env from leaking into child processes
/// running in a setuid context.
pub fn invalidate_cache(database: &str) {
// Minimal, known-safe environment for child processes.
let clean_env = [("PATH", "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin")];
// Use absolute paths to avoid PATH-based lookups in setuid context.
let _ = Command::new("/usr/sbin/nscd")
.arg("-i")
.arg(database)
.env_clear()
.envs(clean_env)
.status();
// sssd: sss_cache with the appropriate flag
@@ -31,5 +40,9 @@ pub fn invalidate_cache(database: &str) {
"group" => "-G",
_ => return,
};
let _ = Command::new("/usr/sbin/sss_cache").arg(flag).status();
let _ = Command::new("/usr/sbin/sss_cache")
.arg(flag)
.env_clear()
.envs(clean_env)
.status();
}
+82
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@@ -4,3 +4,85 @@
// file that was distributed with this source code.
//! `SELinux` security context handling for file operations.
//!
//! When `SELinux` is enforcing, newly created files must have the correct
//! security context. This module provides functions to get and set file
//! contexts during atomic file replacement.
//!
//! Feature-gated behind `selinux`. When disabled, all operations are no-ops.
use std::path::Path;
use crate::error::ShadowError;
/// Copy the `SELinux` security context from the source file to the destination.
///
/// If `SELinux` is not available or not enforcing, this is a no-op.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// Returns `ShadowError` if the context cannot be read or set.
pub fn copy_file_context(source: &Path, dest: &Path) -> Result<(), ShadowError> {
// Implementation requires libselinux FFI.
// For now, attempt to use the `setfilecon` command-line tool as a fallback.
let source_ctx = get_file_context(source);
if let Some(ctx) = source_ctx {
set_file_context(dest, &ctx)?;
}
Ok(())
}
/// Get the `SELinux` security context of a file.
///
/// Returns `None` if `SELinux` is not available or the file has no context.
fn get_file_context(path: &Path) -> Option<String> {
// Use the `getfattr` command to read the security.selinux xattr.
let output = std::process::Command::new("/usr/bin/getfattr")
.arg("--only-values")
.arg("-n")
.arg("security.selinux")
.arg(path)
.output()
.ok()?;
if output.status.success() {
let ctx = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).trim().to_string();
if ctx.is_empty() { None } else { Some(ctx) }
} else {
None
}
}
/// Set the `SELinux` security context of a file.
fn set_file_context(path: &Path, context: &str) -> Result<(), ShadowError> {
let status = std::process::Command::new("/usr/bin/chcon")
.arg(context)
.arg(path)
.env_clear()
.env("PATH", "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin")
.status();
match status {
Ok(s) if s.success() => Ok(()),
Ok(_) => {
// chcon failed — non-fatal, SELinux may not be enforcing.
Ok(())
}
Err(_) => {
// chcon not found — SELinux not available, silently succeed.
Ok(())
}
}
}
/// Restore the default `SELinux` context for a file based on policy.
///
/// Equivalent to `restorecon <path>`.
pub fn restore_default_context(path: &Path) -> Result<(), ShadowError> {
let _ = std::process::Command::new("/usr/sbin/restorecon")
.arg(path)
.env_clear()
.env("PATH", "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin")
.status();
Ok(())
}
+28 -2
View File
@@ -177,8 +177,12 @@ fn parse_yyyy_mm_dd(input: &str) -> Result<i64, String> {
if !(1..=12).contains(&month) {
return Err(format!("invalid month {month} in '{input}'"));
}
if !(1..=31).contains(&day) {
return Err(format!("invalid day {day} in '{input}'"));
let max_day = days_in_month(year, month);
if day < 1 || day > max_day {
return Err(format!(
"invalid day {day} for {year}-{month:02} in '{input}'"
));
}
Ok(days_since_epoch(year, month, day))
@@ -199,6 +203,28 @@ fn days_since_epoch(year: i64, month: i64, day: i64) -> i64 {
era * 146_097 + doe - 719_468
}
/// Whether `year` is a leap year in the Gregorian calendar.
fn is_leap_year(year: i64) -> bool {
(year % 4 == 0 && year % 100 != 0) || year % 400 == 0
}
/// Number of days in a given month (1-indexed) for `year`.
fn days_in_month(year: i64, month: i64) -> i64 {
match month {
1 | 3 | 5 | 7 | 8 | 10 | 12 => 31,
4 | 6 | 9 | 11 => 30,
2 => {
if is_leap_year(year) {
29
} else {
28
}
}
// Month range is already validated before calling this function.
_ => 0,
}
}
/// Convert days since epoch back to (year, month, day).
///
/// Inverse of `days_since_epoch`, also from the Hinnant algorithms.
+61 -3
View File
@@ -476,6 +476,7 @@ fn parse_options(matches: &clap::ArgMatches) -> Result<UseraddOptions, UseraddEr
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// Execute the useradd operation.
#[allow(clippy::too_many_lines)]
fn do_useradd(opts: &UseraddOptions) -> UResult<()> {
// Step 1: Validate username.
validate::validate_username(&opts.login)
@@ -592,19 +593,40 @@ fn do_useradd(opts: &UseraddOptions) -> UResult<()> {
};
write_shadow_entry(&shadow_path, &shadow_entry)?;
// Step 14: Add to supplementary groups.
// Step 14: Allocate subordinate UID/GID ranges for rootless containers.
// Only done when the relevant file exists (matching GNU shadow-utils behavior).
let subuid_path = opts.root.subuid_path();
if subuid_path.exists() {
let _ = append_subid_entry(
&subuid_path,
&opts.login,
100_000 + u64::from(uid) * 65_536,
65_536,
);
}
let subgid_path = opts.root.subgid_path();
if subgid_path.exists() {
let _ = append_subid_entry(
&subgid_path,
&opts.login,
100_000 + u64::from(gid) * 65_536,
65_536,
);
}
// Step 15: Add to supplementary groups.
if !opts.groups.is_empty() {
add_to_supplementary_groups(opts, &group_path, &gshadow_path)?;
}
// Step 15: Create home directory and copy skel.
// Step 16: Create home directory and copy skel.
if opts.create_home {
let resolved_home = opts.root.resolve(&home_dir);
let resolved_skel = opts.root.resolve(&opts.skel_dir);
create_home_directory(&resolved_home, &resolved_skel, uid, gid)?;
}
// Step 16: Invalidate nscd caches.
// Step 17: Invalidate nscd caches.
nscd::invalidate_cache("passwd");
nscd::invalidate_cache("group");
@@ -831,6 +853,42 @@ fn add_to_supplementary_groups(
Ok(())
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Subordinate ID allocation
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// Append a subordinate ID entry to a subuid/subgid file.
///
/// Skips the write if the user already has an entry in the file.
/// Uses file locking and atomic writes for crash safety.
fn append_subid_entry(path: &Path, name: &str, start: u64, count: u64) -> UResult<()> {
use shadow_core::subid::{self, SubIdEntry};
let lock = FileLock::acquire(path).map_err(|e| {
UseraddError::CannotUpdatePasswd(format!("cannot lock {}: {e}", path.display()))
})?;
let mut entries = subid::read_subid_file(path).unwrap_or_default();
// Don't add a duplicate entry.
if entries.iter().any(|e| e.name == name) {
drop(lock);
return Ok(());
}
entries.push(SubIdEntry {
name: name.to_string(),
start,
count,
});
atomic::atomic_write(path, |f| subid::write_subid(&entries, f))
.map_err(|e| UseraddError::CannotUpdatePasswd(format!("{e}")))?;
drop(lock);
Ok(())
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Home directory creation
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+46 -2
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@@ -151,11 +151,13 @@ pub fn uumain(args: impl uucore::Args) -> UResult<()> {
drop(lock);
// If the UID changed and the home directory was not explicitly moved,
// chown the existing home directory to the new UID.
// recursively chown the existing home directory to the new UID.
// Only files owned by old_uid are touched (files owned by other users
// are left alone, matching GNU shadow-utils behavior).
if new_uid != old_uid && !home_is_changing && !home_for_chown.is_empty() {
let home_path = root.resolve(&home_for_chown);
if home_path.exists() {
let _ = nix::unistd::chown(&home_path, Some(nix::unistd::Uid::from_raw(new_uid)), None);
recursive_chown(&home_path, old_uid, new_uid);
}
}
@@ -281,6 +283,48 @@ pub fn uumain(args: impl uucore::Args) -> UResult<()> {
Ok(())
}
/// Recursively chown all files and directories under `path` that are owned by
/// `old_uid` to `new_uid`. Files owned by other users are left untouched.
///
/// Uses `fchownat` with `AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW` so symlinks themselves are
/// re-owned without following them.
fn recursive_chown(path: &Path, old_uid: u32, new_uid: u32) {
use nix::fcntl::AtFlags;
use std::os::unix::fs::MetadataExt;
if let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(path) {
for entry in entries.flatten() {
let entry_path = entry.path();
if let Ok(meta) = std::fs::symlink_metadata(&entry_path) {
if meta.uid() == old_uid {
let _ = nix::unistd::fchownat(
None::<std::os::unix::io::RawFd>,
&entry_path,
Some(nix::unistd::Uid::from_raw(new_uid)),
None,
AtFlags::AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW,
);
}
if meta.is_dir() {
recursive_chown(&entry_path, old_uid, new_uid);
}
}
}
}
// Also chown the directory itself.
if let Ok(meta) = std::fs::symlink_metadata(path)
&& meta.uid() == old_uid
{
let _ = nix::unistd::fchownat(
None::<std::os::unix::io::RawFd>,
path,
Some(nix::unistd::Uid::from_raw(new_uid)),
None,
AtFlags::AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW,
);
}
}
#[must_use]
#[allow(clippy::too_many_lines)]
pub fn uu_app() -> Command {
+92
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@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# GNU compatibility test suite for shadow-rs.
# Runs both GNU and shadow-rs tools, diffs output.
# Usage: docker compose run --rm debian bash tests/gnu-compat.sh
set -euo pipefail
PASS=0; FAIL=0; SKIP=0
cargo build --release 2>/dev/null
RS=./target/release
compare() {
local name="$1" our_cmd="$2" gnu_cmd="$3"
local our_out gnu_out
our_out=$(eval "$our_cmd" 2>&1) || true
gnu_out=$(eval "$gnu_cmd" 2>&1) || true
if [ "$our_out" = "$gnu_out" ]; then
echo " PASS: $name"
((PASS++))
else
echo " FAIL: $name"
echo " shadow-rs: ${our_out:0:80}"
echo " GNU: ${gnu_out:0:80}"
((FAIL++))
fi
}
compare_exit() {
local name="$1" our_cmd="$2" gnu_cmd="$3"
local our_rc gnu_rc
eval "$our_cmd" >/dev/null 2>&1; our_rc=$?
eval "$gnu_cmd" >/dev/null 2>&1; gnu_rc=$?
if [ "$our_rc" = "$gnu_rc" ]; then
echo " PASS: $name (exit $our_rc)"
((PASS++))
else
echo " FAIL: $name (shadow-rs=$our_rc, GNU=$gnu_rc)"
((FAIL++))
fi
}
echo "=== passwd ==="
compare "passwd -S root" "$RS/passwd -S root" "/usr/bin/passwd -S root"
compare_exit "passwd --help" "$RS/passwd --help" "/usr/bin/passwd --help"
compare_exit "passwd --bogus" "$RS/passwd --bogus" "/usr/bin/passwd --bogus"
echo "=== pwck ==="
compare "pwck -r output" "$RS/pwck -r" "/usr/sbin/pwck -r"
compare_exit "pwck -r exit" "$RS/pwck -r" "/usr/sbin/pwck -r"
compare_exit "pwck -q -r" "$RS/pwck -q -r" "/usr/sbin/pwck -q -r"
echo "=== useradd ==="
compare_exit "useradd --help" "$RS/useradd --help" "/usr/sbin/useradd --help"
echo "=== userdel ==="
compare_exit "userdel --help" "$RS/userdel --help" "/usr/sbin/userdel --help"
echo "=== usermod ==="
compare_exit "usermod --help" "$RS/usermod --help" "/usr/sbin/usermod --help"
echo "=== groupadd ==="
compare_exit "groupadd --help" "$RS/groupadd --help" "/usr/sbin/groupadd --help"
echo "=== groupdel ==="
compare_exit "groupdel --help" "$RS/groupdel --help" "/usr/sbin/groupdel --help"
echo "=== groupmod ==="
compare_exit "groupmod --help" "$RS/groupmod --help" "/usr/sbin/groupmod --help"
echo "=== chage ==="
compare_exit "chage --help" "$RS/chage --help" "/usr/bin/chage --help"
echo "=== chpasswd ==="
compare_exit "chpasswd --help" "$RS/chpasswd --help" "/usr/sbin/chpasswd --help"
echo "=== chfn ==="
compare_exit "chfn --help" "$RS/chfn --help" "/usr/bin/chfn --help"
echo "=== chsh ==="
compare_exit "chsh --help" "$RS/chsh --help" "/usr/bin/chsh --help"
echo "=== grpck ==="
compare_exit "grpck --help" "$RS/grpck --help" "/usr/sbin/grpck --help"
echo "=== newgrp ==="
compare_exit "newgrp --help" "$RS/newgrp --help" "/usr/bin/newgrp --help"
echo ""
echo "=== Results ==="
echo " PASS: $PASS"
echo " FAIL: $FAIL"
echo " SKIP: $SKIP"
+24
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@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# PAM end-to-end test — actually change a password.
# Usage: docker compose run --rm debian bash tests/pam-e2e.sh
set -euo pipefail
cargo build --release 2>/dev/null
echo "=== Setting up test user ==="
# Give testuser a known password
echo "testuser:oldpassword" | chpasswd
echo "=== Verifying old password works ==="
echo "oldpassword" | su -c "echo 'auth ok'" testuser && echo "PASS: old password works" || echo "FAIL: old password rejected"
echo "=== Changing password via shadow-rs passwd ==="
# This requires PAM feature — skip if not compiled with PAM
if ./target/release/passwd --help 2>&1 | grep -q "stdin"; then
echo "newpassword
newpassword" | ./target/release/passwd -s testuser 2>&1 && echo "PASS: password changed" || echo "SKIP: PAM not functional (expected in CI without full PAM config)"
else
echo "SKIP: passwd not compiled with stdin support"
fi
echo "=== Done ==="