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2212 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Linus Torvalds
|
55e6be657b |
Merge branch 'for-5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup
Pull cgroup changes from Tejun Heo: "The only notable change is Vipin's new misc cgroup controller. This implements generic support for resources which can be controlled by simply counting and limiting the number of resource instances - ie there's X number of these on the system and this cgroup subtree can have upto Y of those. The first user is the address space IDs used for virtual machine memory encryption and expected future usages are similar - niche hardware features with concrete resource limits and simple usage models" * 'for-5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup: cgroup: use tsk->in_iowait instead of delayacct_is_task_waiting_on_io() cgroup/cpuset: fix typos in comments cgroup: misc: mark dummy misc_cg_res_total_usage() static inline svm/sev: Register SEV and SEV-ES ASIDs to the misc controller cgroup: Miscellaneous cgroup documentation. cgroup: Add misc cgroup controller |
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Linus Torvalds
|
57fa2369ab |
Merge tag 'cfi-v5.13-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull CFI on arm64 support from Kees Cook: "This builds on last cycle's LTO work, and allows the arm64 kernels to be built with Clang's Control Flow Integrity feature. This feature has happily lived in Android kernels for almost 3 years[1], so I'm excited to have it ready for upstream. The wide diffstat is mainly due to the treewide fixing of mismatched list_sort prototypes. Other things in core kernel are to address various CFI corner cases. The largest code portion is the CFI runtime implementation itself (which will be shared by all architectures implementing support for CFI). The arm64 pieces are Acked by arm64 maintainers rather than coming through the arm64 tree since carrying this tree over there was going to be awkward. CFI support for x86 is still under development, but is pretty close. There are a handful of corner cases on x86 that need some improvements to Clang and objtool, but otherwise works well. Summary: - Clean up list_sort prototypes (Sami Tolvanen) - Introduce CONFIG_CFI_CLANG for arm64 (Sami Tolvanen)" * tag 'cfi-v5.13-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: arm64: allow CONFIG_CFI_CLANG to be selected KVM: arm64: Disable CFI for nVHE arm64: ftrace: use function_nocfi for ftrace_call arm64: add __nocfi to __apply_alternatives arm64: add __nocfi to functions that jump to a physical address arm64: use function_nocfi with __pa_symbol arm64: implement function_nocfi psci: use function_nocfi for cpu_resume lkdtm: use function_nocfi treewide: Change list_sort to use const pointers bpf: disable CFI in dispatcher functions kallsyms: strip ThinLTO hashes from static functions kthread: use WARN_ON_FUNCTION_MISMATCH workqueue: use WARN_ON_FUNCTION_MISMATCH module: ensure __cfi_check alignment mm: add generic function_nocfi macro cfi: add __cficanonical add support for Clang CFI |
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Linus Torvalds
|
7e4910b9ac |
Merge tag 'seccomp-v5.13-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull seccomp updates from Kees Cook: - Fix "cacheable" typo in comments (Cui GaoSheng) - Fix CONFIG for /proc/$pid/status Seccomp_filters (Kenta.Tada@sony.com) * tag 'seccomp-v5.13-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: seccomp: Fix "cacheable" typo in comments seccomp: Fix CONFIG tests for Seccomp_filters |
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 Sami Tolvanen
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cf68fffb66 |
add support for Clang CFI
This change adds support for Clang’s forward-edge Control Flow Integrity (CFI) checking. With CONFIG_CFI_CLANG, the compiler injects a runtime check before each indirect function call to ensure the target is a valid function with the correct static type. This restricts possible call targets and makes it more difficult for an attacker to exploit bugs that allow the modification of stored function pointers. For more details, see: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ControlFlowIntegrity.html Clang requires CONFIG_LTO_CLANG to be enabled with CFI to gain visibility to possible call targets. Kernel modules are supported with Clang’s cross-DSO CFI mode, which allows checking between independently compiled components. With CFI enabled, the compiler injects a __cfi_check() function into the kernel and each module for validating local call targets. For cross-module calls that cannot be validated locally, the compiler calls the global __cfi_slowpath_diag() function, which determines the target module and calls the correct __cfi_check() function. This patch includes a slowpath implementation that uses __module_address() to resolve call targets, and with CONFIG_CFI_CLANG_SHADOW enabled, a shadow map that speeds up module look-ups by ~3x. Clang implements indirect call checking using jump tables and offers two methods of generating them. With canonical jump tables, the compiler renames each address-taken function to <function>.cfi and points the original symbol to a jump table entry, which passes __cfi_check() validation. This isn’t compatible with stand-alone assembly code, which the compiler doesn’t instrument, and would result in indirect calls to assembly code to fail. Therefore, we default to using non-canonical jump tables instead, where the compiler generates a local jump table entry <function>.cfi_jt for each address-taken function, and replaces all references to the function with the address of the jump table entry. Note that because non-canonical jump table addresses are local to each component, they break cross-module function address equality. Specifically, the address of a global function will be different in each module, as it's replaced with the address of a local jump table entry. If this address is passed to a different module, it won’t match the address of the same function taken there. This may break code that relies on comparing addresses passed from other components. CFI checking can be disabled in a function with the __nocfi attribute. Additionally, CFI can be disabled for an entire compilation unit by filtering out CC_FLAGS_CFI. By default, CFI failures result in a kernel panic to stop a potential exploit. CONFIG_CFI_PERMISSIVE enables a permissive mode, where the kernel prints out a rate-limited warning instead, and allows execution to continue. This option is helpful for locating type mismatches, but should only be enabled during development. Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408182843.1754385-2-samitolvanen@google.com |
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 Kees Cook
|
39218ff4c6 |
stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
This provides the ability for architectures to enable kernel stack base address offset randomization. This feature is controlled by the boot param "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off", with its default value set by CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT. This feature is based on the original idea from the last public release of PaX's RANDKSTACK feature: https://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/randkstack.txt All the credit for the original idea goes to the PaX team. Note that the design and implementation of this upstream randomize_kstack_offset feature differs greatly from the RANDKSTACK feature (see below). Reasoning for the feature: This feature aims to make harder the various stack-based attacks that rely on deterministic stack structure. We have had many such attacks in past (just to name few): https://jon.oberheide.org/files/infiltrate12-thestackisback.pdf https://jon.oberheide.org/files/stackjacking-infiltrate11.pdf https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/06/exploiting-recursion-in-linux-kernel_20.html As Linux kernel stack protections have been constantly improving (vmap-based stack allocation with guard pages, removal of thread_info, STACKLEAK), attackers have had to find new ways for their exploits to work. They have done so, continuing to rely on the kernel's stack determinism, in situations where VMAP_STACK and THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK_STRUCT were not relevant. For example, the following recent attacks would have been hampered if the stack offset was non-deterministic between syscalls: https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/bitstream/10216/125357/2/374717.pdf (page 70: targeting the pt_regs copy with linear stack overflow) https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2020/02/15/CVE-2019-18683.html (leaked stack address from one syscall as a target during next syscall) The main idea is that since the stack offset is randomized on each system call, it is harder for an attack to reliably land in any particular place on the thread stack, even with address exposures, as the stack base will change on the next syscall. Also, since randomization is performed after placing pt_regs, the ptrace-based approach[1] to discover the randomized offset during a long-running syscall should not be possible. Design description: During most of the kernel's execution, it runs on the "thread stack", which is pretty deterministic in its structure: it is fixed in size, and on every entry from userspace to kernel on a syscall the thread stack starts construction from an address fetched from the per-cpu cpu_current_top_of_stack variable. The first element to be pushed to the thread stack is the pt_regs struct that stores all required CPU registers and syscall parameters. Finally the specific syscall function is called, with the stack being used as the kernel executes the resulting request. The goal of randomize_kstack_offset feature is to add a random offset after the pt_regs has been pushed to the stack and before the rest of the thread stack is used during the syscall processing, and to change it every time a process issues a syscall. The source of randomness is currently architecture-defined (but x86 is using the low byte of rdtsc()). Future improvements for different entropy sources is possible, but out of scope for this patch. Further more, to add more unpredictability, new offsets are chosen at the end of syscalls (the timing of which should be less easy to measure from userspace than at syscall entry time), and stored in a per-CPU variable, so that the life of the value does not stay explicitly tied to a single task. As suggested by Andy Lutomirski, the offset is added using alloca() and an empty asm() statement with an output constraint, since it avoids changes to assembly syscall entry code, to the unwinder, and provides correct stack alignment as defined by the compiler. In order to make this available by default with zero performance impact for those that don't want it, it is boot-time selectable with static branches. This way, if the overhead is not wanted, it can just be left turned off with no performance impact. The generated assembly for x86_64 with GCC looks like this: ... ffffffff81003977: 65 8b 05 02 ea 00 7f mov %gs:0x7f00ea02(%rip),%eax # 12380 <kstack_offset> ffffffff8100397e: 25 ff 03 00 00 and $0x3ff,%eax ffffffff81003983: 48 83 c0 0f add $0xf,%rax ffffffff81003987: 25 f8 07 00 00 and $0x7f8,%eax ffffffff8100398c: 48 29 c4 sub %rax,%rsp ffffffff8100398f: 48 8d 44 24 0f lea 0xf(%rsp),%rax ffffffff81003994: 48 83 e0 f0 and $0xfffffffffffffff0,%rax ... As a result of the above stack alignment, this patch introduces about 5 bits of randomness after pt_regs is spilled to the thread stack on x86_64, and 6 bits on x86_32 (since its has 1 fewer bit required for stack alignment). The amount of entropy could be adjusted based on how much of the stack space we wish to trade for security. My measure of syscall performance overhead (on x86_64): lmbench: /usr/lib/lmbench/bin/x86_64-linux-gnu/lat_syscall -N 10000 null randomize_kstack_offset=y Simple syscall: 0.7082 microseconds randomize_kstack_offset=n Simple syscall: 0.7016 microseconds So, roughly 0.9% overhead growth for a no-op syscall, which is very manageable. And for people that don't want this, it's off by default. There are two gotchas with using the alloca() trick. First, compilers that have Stack Clash protection (-fstack-clash-protection) enabled by default (e.g. Ubuntu[3]) add pagesize stack probes to any dynamic stack allocations. While the randomization offset is always less than a page, the resulting assembly would still contain (unreachable!) probing routines, bloating the resulting assembly. To avoid this, -fno-stack-clash-protection is unconditionally added to the kernel Makefile since this is the only dynamic stack allocation in the kernel (now that VLAs have been removed) and it is provably safe from Stack Clash style attacks. The second gotcha with alloca() is a negative interaction with -fstack-protector*, in that it sees the alloca() as an array allocation, which triggers the unconditional addition of the stack canary function pre/post-amble which slows down syscalls regardless of the static branch. In order to avoid adding this unneeded check and its associated performance impact, architectures need to carefully remove uses of -fstack-protector-strong (or -fstack-protector) in the compilation units that use the add_random_kstack() macro and to audit the resulting stack mitigation coverage (to make sure no desired coverage disappears). No change is visible for this on x86 because the stack protector is already unconditionally disabled for the compilation unit, but the change is required on arm64. There is, unfortunately, no attribute that can be used to disable stack protector for specific functions. Comparison to PaX RANDKSTACK feature: The RANDKSTACK feature randomizes the location of the stack start (cpu_current_top_of_stack), i.e. including the location of pt_regs structure itself on the stack. Initially this patch followed the same approach, but during the recent discussions[2], it has been determined to be of a little value since, if ptrace functionality is available for an attacker, they can use PTRACE_PEEKUSR/PTRACE_POKEUSR to read/write different offsets in the pt_regs struct, observe the cache behavior of the pt_regs accesses, and figure out the random stack offset. Another difference is that the random offset is stored in a per-cpu variable, rather than having it be per-thread. As a result, these implementations differ a fair bit in their implementation details and results, though obviously the intent is similar. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/2236FBA76BA1254E88B949DDB74E612BA4BC57C1@IRSMSX102.ger.corp.intel.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20190329081358.30497-1-elena.reshetova@intel.com/ [3] https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/ubuntu-devel/2019-June/040741.html Co-developed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401232347.2791257-4-keescook@chromium.org |
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 Vipin Sharma
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a72232eabd |
cgroup: Add misc cgroup controller
The Miscellaneous cgroup provides the resource limiting and tracking
mechanism for the scalar resources which cannot be abstracted like the
other cgroup resources. Controller is enabled by the CONFIG_CGROUP_MISC
config option.
A resource can be added to the controller via enum misc_res_type{} in
the include/linux/misc_cgroup.h file and the corresponding name via
misc_res_name[] in the kernel/cgroup/misc.c file. Provider of the
resource must set its capacity prior to using the resource by calling
misc_cg_set_capacity().
Once a capacity is set then the resource usage can be updated using
charge and uncharge APIs. All of the APIs to interact with misc
controller are in include/linux/misc_cgroup.h.
Miscellaneous controller provides 3 interface files. If two misc
resources (res_a and res_b) are registered then:
misc.capacity
A read-only flat-keyed file shown only in the root cgroup. It shows
miscellaneous scalar resources available on the platform along with
their quantities::
$ cat misc.capacity
res_a 50
res_b 10
misc.current
A read-only flat-keyed file shown in the non-root cgroups. It shows
the current usage of the resources in the cgroup and its children::
$ cat misc.current
res_a 3
res_b 0
misc.max
A read-write flat-keyed file shown in the non root cgroups. Allowed
maximum usage of the resources in the cgroup and its children.::
$ cat misc.max
res_a max
res_b 4
Limit can be set by::
# echo res_a 1 > misc.max
Limit can be set to max by::
# echo res_a max > misc.max
Limits can be set more than the capacity value in the misc.capacity
file.
Signed-off-by: Vipin Sharma <vipinsh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
|
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 Kenta.Tada@sony.com
|
64bdc02440 |
seccomp: Fix CONFIG tests for Seccomp_filters
Strictly speaking, seccomp filters are only used
when CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER.
This patch fixes the condition to enable "Seccomp_filters"
in /proc/$pid/status.
Signed-off-by: Kenta Tada <Kenta.Tada@sony.com>
Fixes:
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Linus Torvalds
|
50eb842fe5 |
Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)
Merge misc fixes from Andrew Morton: "28 patches. Subsystems affected by this series: mm (memblock, pagealloc, hugetlb, highmem, kfence, oom-kill, madvise, kasan, userfaultfd, memcg, and zram), core-kernel, kconfig, fork, binfmt, MAINTAINERS, kbuild, and ia64" * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (28 commits) zram: fix broken page writeback zram: fix return value on writeback_store mm/memcg: set memcg when splitting page mm/memcg: rename mem_cgroup_split_huge_fixup to split_page_memcg and add nr_pages argument ia64: fix ptrace(PTRACE_SYSCALL_INFO_EXIT) sign ia64: fix ia64_syscall_get_set_arguments() for break-based syscalls mm/userfaultfd: fix memory corruption due to writeprotect kasan: fix KASAN_STACK dependency for HW_TAGS kasan, mm: fix crash with HW_TAGS and DEBUG_PAGEALLOC mm/madvise: replace ptrace attach requirement for process_madvise include/linux/sched/mm.h: use rcu_dereference in in_vfork() kfence: fix reports if constant function prefixes exist kfence, slab: fix cache_alloc_debugcheck_after() for bulk allocations kfence: fix printk format for ptrdiff_t linux/compiler-clang.h: define HAVE_BUILTIN_BSWAP* MAINTAINERS: exclude uapi directories in API/ABI section binfmt_misc: fix possible deadlock in bm_register_write mm/highmem.c: fix zero_user_segments() with start > end hugetlb: do early cow when page pinned on src mm mm: use is_cow_mapping() across tree where proper ... |
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 Masahiro Yamada
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ea29b20a82 |
init/Kconfig: make COMPILE_TEST depend on HAS_IOMEM
I read the commit log of the following two: - |
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Masahiro Yamada
|
ce6ed1c4c9 |
kbuild: rebuild GCC plugins when the compiler is upgraded
Linus reported a build error due to the GCC plugin incompatibility
when the compiler is upgraded. [1]
GCC plugins are tied to a particular GCC version. So, they must be
rebuilt when the compiler is upgraded.
This seems to be a long-standing flaw since the initial support of
GCC plugins.
Extend commit
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Masahiro Yamada
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a6aaeb8411 |
kbuild: fix UNUSED_KSYMS_WHITELIST for Clang LTO
Commit |
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Linus Torvalds
|
8b83369ddc |
Merge tag 'riscv-for-linus-5.12-mw0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux
Pull RISC-V updates from Palmer Dabbelt:
"A handful of new RISC-V related patches for this merge window:
- A check to ensure drivers are properly using uaccess. This isn't
manifesting with any of the drivers I'm currently using, but may
catch errors in new drivers.
- Some preliminary support for the FU740, along with the HiFive
Unleashed it will appear on.
- NUMA support for RISC-V, which involves making the arm64 code
generic.
- Support for kasan on the vmalloc region.
- A handful of new drivers for the Kendryte K210, along with the DT
plumbing required to boot on a handful of K210-based boards.
- Support for allocating ASIDs.
- Preliminary support for kernels larger than 128MiB.
- Various other improvements to our KASAN support, including the
utilization of huge pages when allocating the KASAN regions.
We may have already found a bug with the KASAN_VMALLOC code, but it's
passing my tests. There's a fix in the works, but that will probably
miss the merge window.
* tag 'riscv-for-linus-5.12-mw0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux: (75 commits)
riscv: Improve kasan population by using hugepages when possible
riscv: Improve kasan population function
riscv: Use KASAN_SHADOW_INIT define for kasan memory initialization
riscv: Improve kasan definitions
riscv: Get rid of MAX_EARLY_MAPPING_SIZE
soc: canaan: Sort the Makefile alphabetically
riscv: Disable KSAN_SANITIZE for vDSO
riscv: Remove unnecessary declaration
riscv: Add Canaan Kendryte K210 SD card defconfig
riscv: Update Canaan Kendryte K210 defconfig
riscv: Add Kendryte KD233 board device tree
riscv: Add SiPeed MAIXDUINO board device tree
riscv: Add SiPeed MAIX GO board device tree
riscv: Add SiPeed MAIX DOCK board device tree
riscv: Add SiPeed MAIX BiT board device tree
riscv: Update Canaan Kendryte K210 device tree
dt-bindings: add resets property to dw-apb-timer
dt-bindings: fix sifive gpio properties
dt-bindings: update sifive uart compatible string
dt-bindings: update sifive clint compatible string
...
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 Florian Fainelli
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dd23e8098f |
initramfs: panic with memory information
On systems with large amounts of reserved memory we may fail to successfully complete unpack_to_rootfs() and be left with: Kernel panic - not syncing: write error this is not too helpful to understand what happened, so let's wrap the panic() calls with a surrounding show_mem() such that we have a chance of understanding the memory conditions leading to these allocation failures. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: replace macro with C function] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210114231517.1854379-1-f.fainelli@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Cc: Barret Rhoden <brho@google.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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 Sumit Garg
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d54ce6158e |
kgdb: fix to kill breakpoints on initmem after boot
Currently breakpoints in kernel .init.text section are not handled correctly while allowing to remove them even after corresponding pages have been freed. Fix it via killing .init.text section breakpoints just prior to initmem pages being freed. Doug: "HW breakpoints aren't handled by this patch but it's probably not such a big deal". Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210224081652.587785-1-sumit.garg@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Suggested-by: Doug Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Acked-by: Doug Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Acked-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Tested-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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 Bhaskar Chowdhury
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f9c8bc4604 |
init/Kconfig: fix a typo in CC_VERSION_TEXT help text
s/compier/compiler/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210224223325.29099-1-unixbhaskar@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Bhaskar Chowdhury <unixbhaskar@gmail.com> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Masahiro Yamada
|
073a9ecb3a |
init/version.c: remove Version_<LINUX_VERSION_CODE> symbol
This code hunk creates a Version_<LINUX_VERSION_CODE> symbol if CONFIG_KALLSYMS is disabled. For example, building the kernel v5.10 for allnoconfig creates the following symbol: $ nm vmlinux | grep Version_ c116b028 B Version_330240 There is no in-tree user of this symbol. Commit |
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 Vijayanand Jitta
|
e1fdc40334 |
lib: stackdepot: add support to disable stack depot
Add a kernel parameter stack_depot_disable to disable stack depot. So that stack hash table doesn't consume any memory when stack depot is disabled. The use case is CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER without page_owner=on. Without this patch, stackdepot will consume the memory for the hashtable. By default, it's 8M which is never trivial. With this option, in CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER configured system, page_owner=off, stack_depot_disable in kernel command line, we could save the wasted memory for the hashtable. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix CONFIG_STACKDEPOT=n build] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1611749198-24316-2-git-send-email-vjitta@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Vinayak Menon <vinmenon@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Vijayanand Jitta <vjitta@codeaurora.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Yogesh Lal <ylal@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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 Alexander Potapenko
|
0ce20dd840 |
mm: add Kernel Electric-Fence infrastructure
Patch series "KFENCE: A low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector", v7. This adds the Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE) infrastructure. KFENCE is a low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector of heap use-after-free, invalid-free, and out-of-bounds access errors. This series enables KFENCE for the x86 and arm64 architectures, and adds KFENCE hooks to the SLAB and SLUB allocators. KFENCE is designed to be enabled in production kernels, and has near zero performance overhead. Compared to KASAN, KFENCE trades performance for precision. The main motivation behind KFENCE's design, is that with enough total uptime KFENCE will detect bugs in code paths not typically exercised by non-production test workloads. One way to quickly achieve a large enough total uptime is when the tool is deployed across a large fleet of machines. KFENCE objects each reside on a dedicated page, at either the left or right page boundaries. The pages to the left and right of the object page are "guard pages", whose attributes are changed to a protected state, and cause page faults on any attempted access to them. Such page faults are then intercepted by KFENCE, which handles the fault gracefully by reporting a memory access error. Guarded allocations are set up based on a sample interval (can be set via kfence.sample_interval). After expiration of the sample interval, the next allocation through the main allocator (SLAB or SLUB) returns a guarded allocation from the KFENCE object pool. At this point, the timer is reset, and the next allocation is set up after the expiration of the interval. To enable/disable a KFENCE allocation through the main allocator's fast-path without overhead, KFENCE relies on static branches via the static keys infrastructure. The static branch is toggled to redirect the allocation to KFENCE. The KFENCE memory pool is of fixed size, and if the pool is exhausted no further KFENCE allocations occur. The default config is conservative with only 255 objects, resulting in a pool size of 2 MiB (with 4 KiB pages). We have verified by running synthetic benchmarks (sysbench I/O, hackbench) and production server-workload benchmarks that a kernel with KFENCE (using sample intervals 100-500ms) is performance-neutral compared to a non-KFENCE baseline kernel. KFENCE is inspired by GWP-ASan [1], a userspace tool with similar properties. The name "KFENCE" is a homage to the Electric Fence Malloc Debugger [2]. For more details, see Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst added in the series -- also viewable here: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/google/kasan/kfence/Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst [1] http://llvm.org/docs/GwpAsan.html [2] https://linux.die.net/man/3/efence This patch (of 9): This adds the Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE) infrastructure. KFENCE is a low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector of heap use-after-free, invalid-free, and out-of-bounds access errors. KFENCE is designed to be enabled in production kernels, and has near zero performance overhead. Compared to KASAN, KFENCE trades performance for precision. The main motivation behind KFENCE's design, is that with enough total uptime KFENCE will detect bugs in code paths not typically exercised by non-production test workloads. One way to quickly achieve a large enough total uptime is when the tool is deployed across a large fleet of machines. KFENCE objects each reside on a dedicated page, at either the left or right page boundaries. The pages to the left and right of the object page are "guard pages", whose attributes are changed to a protected state, and cause page faults on any attempted access to them. Such page faults are then intercepted by KFENCE, which handles the fault gracefully by reporting a memory access error. To detect out-of-bounds writes to memory within the object's page itself, KFENCE also uses pattern-based redzones. The following figure illustrates the page layout: ---+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+--- | xxxxxxxxx | O : | xxxxxxxxx | : O | xxxxxxxxx | | xxxxxxxxx | B : | xxxxxxxxx | : B | xxxxxxxxx | | x GUARD x | J : RED- | x GUARD x | RED- : J | x GUARD x | | xxxxxxxxx | E : ZONE | xxxxxxxxx | ZONE : E | xxxxxxxxx | | xxxxxxxxx | C : | xxxxxxxxx | : C | xxxxxxxxx | | xxxxxxxxx | T : | xxxxxxxxx | : T | xxxxxxxxx | ---+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+--- Guarded allocations are set up based on a sample interval (can be set via kfence.sample_interval). After expiration of the sample interval, a guarded allocation from the KFENCE object pool is returned to the main allocator (SLAB or SLUB). At this point, the timer is reset, and the next allocation is set up after the expiration of the interval. To enable/disable a KFENCE allocation through the main allocator's fast-path without overhead, KFENCE relies on static branches via the static keys infrastructure. The static branch is toggled to redirect the allocation to KFENCE. To date, we have verified by running synthetic benchmarks (sysbench I/O, hackbench) that a kernel compiled with KFENCE is performance-neutral compared to the non-KFENCE baseline. For more details, see Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst (added later in the series). [elver@google.com: fix parameter description for kfence_object_start()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201106092149.GA2851373@elver.google.com [elver@google.com: avoid stalling work queue task without allocations] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CADYN=9J0DQhizAGB0-jz4HOBBh+05kMBXb4c0cXMS7Qi5NAJiw@mail.gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201110135320.3309507-1-elver@google.com [elver@google.com: fix potential deadlock due to wake_up()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/000000000000c0645805b7f982e4@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210104130749.1768991-1-elver@google.com [elver@google.com: add option to use KFENCE without static keys] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210111091544.3287013-1-elver@google.com [elver@google.com: add missing copyright and description headers] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210118092159.145934-1-elver@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201103175841.3495947-2-elver@google.com Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de> Co-developed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Joern Engel <joern@purestorage.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Linus Torvalds
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6fbd6cf85a |
Merge tag 'kbuild-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild
Pull Kbuild updates from Masahiro Yamada:
- Fix false-positive build warnings for ARCH=ia64 builds
- Optimize dictionary size for module compression with xz
- Check the compiler and linker versions in Kconfig
- Fix misuse of extra-y
- Support DWARF v5 debug info
- Clamp SUBLEVEL to 255 because stable releases 4.4.x and 4.9.x
exceeded the limit
- Add generic syscall{tbl,hdr}.sh for cleanups across arches
- Minor cleanups of genksyms
- Minor cleanups of Kconfig
* tag 'kbuild-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: (38 commits)
initramfs: Remove redundant dependency of RD_ZSTD on BLK_DEV_INITRD
kbuild: remove deprecated 'always' and 'hostprogs-y/m'
kbuild: parse C= and M= before changing the working directory
kbuild: reuse this-makefile to define abs_srctree
kconfig: unify rule of config, menuconfig, nconfig, gconfig, xconfig
kconfig: omit --oldaskconfig option for 'make config'
kconfig: fix 'invalid option' for help option
kconfig: remove dead code in conf_askvalue()
kconfig: clean up nested if-conditionals in check_conf()
kconfig: Remove duplicate call to sym_get_string_value()
Makefile: Remove # characters from compiler string
Makefile: reuse CC_VERSION_TEXT
kbuild: check the minimum linker version in Kconfig
kbuild: remove ld-version macro
scripts: add generic syscallhdr.sh
scripts: add generic syscalltbl.sh
arch: syscalls: remove $(srctree)/ prefix from syscall tables
arch: syscalls: add missing FORCE and fix 'targets' to make if_changed work
gen_compile_commands: prune some directories
kbuild: simplify access to the kernel's version
...
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Linus Torvalds
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4c48faba5b |
Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)
Merge misc updates from Andrew Morton: "A few small subsystems and some of MM. 172 patches. Subsystems affected by this patch series: hexagon, scripts, ntfs, ocfs2, vfs, and mm (slab-generic, slab, slub, debug, pagecache, swap, memcg, pagemap, mprotect, mremap, page-reporting, vmalloc, kasan, pagealloc, memory-failure, hugetlb, vmscan, z3fold, compaction, mempolicy, oom-kill, hugetlbfs, and migration)" * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (172 commits) mm/migrate: remove unneeded semicolons hugetlbfs: remove unneeded return value of hugetlb_vmtruncate() hugetlbfs: fix some comment typos hugetlbfs: correct some obsolete comments about inode i_mutex hugetlbfs: make hugepage size conversion more readable hugetlbfs: remove meaningless variable avoid_reserve hugetlbfs: correct obsolete function name in hugetlbfs_read_iter() hugetlbfs: use helper macro default_hstate in init_hugetlbfs_fs hugetlbfs: remove useless BUG_ON(!inode) in hugetlbfs_setattr() hugetlbfs: remove special hugetlbfs_set_page_dirty() mm/hugetlb: change hugetlb_reserve_pages() to type bool mm, oom: fix a comment in dump_task() mm/mempolicy: use helper range_in_vma() in queue_pages_test_walk() numa balancing: migrate on fault among multiple bound nodes mm, compaction: make fast_isolate_freepages() stay within zone mm/compaction: fix misbehaviors of fast_find_migrateblock() mm/compaction: correct deferral logic for proactive compaction mm/compaction: remove duplicated VM_BUG_ON_PAGE !PageLocked mm/compaction: remove rcu_read_lock during page compaction z3fold: simplify the zhdr initialization code in init_z3fold_page() ... |
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 Vlastimil Babka
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fe2cce15d6 |
mm, slub: remove slub_memcg_sysfs boot param and CONFIG_SLUB_MEMCG_SYSFS_ON
The boot param and config determine the value of memcg_sysfs_enabled,
which is unused since commit
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Linus Torvalds
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c4fbde84fe |
Merge tag 'sfi-removal-5.12-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm
Pull Simple Firmware Interface (SFI) support removal from Rafael Wysocki: "Drop support for depercated platforms using SFI, drop the entire support for SFI that has been long deprecated too and make some janitorial changes on top of that (Andy Shevchenko)" * tag 'sfi-removal-5.12-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm: x86/platform/intel-mid: Update Copyright year and drop file names x86/platform/intel-mid: Remove unused header inclusion in intel-mid.h x86/platform/intel-mid: Drop unused __intel_mid_cpu_chip and Co. x86/platform/intel-mid: Get rid of intel_scu_ipc_legacy.h x86/PCI: Describe @reg for type1_access_ok() x86/PCI: Get rid of custom x86 model comparison sfi: Remove framework for deprecated firmware cpufreq: sfi-cpufreq: Remove driver for deprecated firmware media: atomisp: Remove unused header mfd: intel_msic: Remove driver for deprecated platform x86/apb_timer: Remove driver for deprecated platform x86/platform/intel-mid: Remove unused leftovers (vRTC) x86/platform/intel-mid: Remove unused leftovers (msic) x86/platform/intel-mid: Remove unused leftovers (msic_thermal) x86/platform/intel-mid: Remove unused leftovers (msic_power_btn) x86/platform/intel-mid: Remove unused leftovers (msic_gpio) x86/platform/intel-mid: Remove unused leftovers (msic_battery) x86/platform/intel-mid: Remove unused leftovers (msic_ocd) x86/platform/intel-mid: Remove unused leftovers (msic_audio) platform/x86: intel_scu_wdt: Drop mistakenly added const |
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Linus Torvalds
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a555bdd0c5 |
Kbuild: enable TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS again, with some guarding
In commit
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Linus Torvalds
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5cf0fd591f |
Kbuild: disable TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS option
The removal of EXPORT_UNUSED_SYMBOL() in commit |
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Linus Torvalds
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21a6ab2131 |
Merge tag 'modules-for-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jeyu/linux
Pull module updates from Jessica Yu:
- Retire EXPORT_UNUSED_SYMBOL() and EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL_FUTURE(). These
export types were introduced between 2006 - 2008. All the of the
unused symbols have been long removed and gpl future symbols were
converted to gpl quite a long time ago, and I don't believe these
export types have been used ever since. So, I think it should be safe
to retire those export types now (Christoph Hellwig)
- Refactor and clean up some aged code cruft in the module loader
(Christoph Hellwig)
- Build {,module_}kallsyms_on_each_symbol only when livepatching is
enabled, as it is the only caller (Christoph Hellwig)
- Unexport find_module() and module_mutex and fix the last module
callers to not rely on these anymore. Make module_mutex internal to
the module loader (Christoph Hellwig)
- Harden ELF checks on module load and validate ELF structures before
checking the module signature (Frank van der Linden)
- Fix undefined symbol warning for clang (Fangrui Song)
- Fix smatch warning (Dan Carpenter)
* tag 'modules-for-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jeyu/linux:
module: potential uninitialized return in module_kallsyms_on_each_symbol()
module: remove EXPORT_UNUSED_SYMBOL*
module: remove EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL_FUTURE
module: move struct symsearch to module.c
module: pass struct find_symbol_args to find_symbol
module: merge each_symbol_section into find_symbol
module: remove each_symbol_in_section
module: mark module_mutex static
kallsyms: only build {,module_}kallsyms_on_each_symbol when required
kallsyms: refactor {,module_}kallsyms_on_each_symbol
module: use RCU to synchronize find_module
module: unexport find_module and module_mutex
drm: remove drm_fb_helper_modinit
powerpc/powernv: remove get_cxl_module
module: harden ELF info handling
module: Ignore _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_ when warning for undefined symbols
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