Clean up markdown lists

2026-05-22 17:12:49 -07:00 · 2020-01-17 02:13:07 -05:00
parent 712a2829e7
commit 10ec43c775
11 changed files with 79 additions and 79 deletions
@@ -8,12 +8,12 @@ be run.

 Each sandbox has its own isolated instance of:

-*   The **Sentry**, A user-space kernel that runs the container and intercepts
-    and responds to system calls made by the application.
+* The **Sentry**, A user-space kernel that runs the container and intercepts
+  and responds to system calls made by the application.

 Each container running in the sandbox has its own isolated instance of:

-*   A **Gofer** which provides file system access to the container.
+* A **Gofer** which provides file system access to the container.

 ![gVisor architecture diagram](../Sentry-Gofer.png "gVisor architecture diagram")

@@ -32,9 +32,9 @@ are written in [C][clang], which is well-suited to interfacing with hardware but
 often prone to security issues. In order to exploit these issues, a typical attack
 might involve some combination of the following:

-1.  Opening or creating some combination of files, sockets or other descriptors.
-1.  Passing crafted, malicious arguments, structures or packets.
-1.  Racing with multiple threads in order to hit specific code paths.
+1. Opening or creating some combination of files, sockets or other descriptors.
+1. Passing crafted, malicious arguments, structures or packets.
+1. Racing with multiple threads in order to hit specific code paths.

 For example, for the [Dirty Cow][dirtycow] privilege escalation bug, an
 application would open a specific file in `/proc` or use a specific `ptrace`
@@ -140,15 +140,15 @@ filesystem attributes) and not underlying host system resources.
 While the sandbox virtualizes many operations for the application, we limit the
 sandbox's own interactions with the host to the following high-level operations:

-1.  Communicate with a Gofer process via a connected socket. The sandbox may
-    receive new file descriptors from the Gofer process, corresponding to opened
-    files. These files can then be read from and written to by the sandbox.
-1.  Make a minimal set of host system calls. The calls do not include the
-    creation of new sockets (unless host networking mode is enabled) or opening
-    files. The calls include duplication and closing of file descriptors,
-    synchronization, timers and signal management.
-1.  Read and write packets to a virtual ethernet device. This is not required if
-    host networking is enabled (or networking is disabled).
+1. Communicate with a Gofer process via a connected socket. The sandbox may
+   receive new file descriptors from the Gofer process, corresponding to opened
+   files. These files can then be read from and written to by the sandbox.
+1. Make a minimal set of host system calls. The calls do not include the
+   creation of new sockets (unless host networking mode is enabled) or opening
+   files. The calls include duplication and closing of file descriptors,
+   synchronization, timers and signal management.
+1. Read and write packets to a virtual ethernet device. This is not required if
+   host networking is enabled (or networking is disabled).

 ### System ABI, Side Channels and Other Vectors

@@ -173,32 +173,32 @@ less likely to exploit or override these controls through other means.
 For gVisor development, there are several engineering principles that are
 employed in order to ensure that the system meets its design goals.

-1.  No system call is passed through directly to the host. Every supported call
-    has an independent implementation in the Sentry, that is unlikely to suffer
-    from identical vulnerabilities that may appear in the host. This has the
-    consequence that all kernel features used by applications require an
-    implementation within the Sentry.
-1.  Only common, universal functionality is implemented. Some filesystems,
-    network devices or modules may expose specialized functionality to user
-    space applications via mechanisms such as extended attributes, raw sockets
-    or ioctls. Since the Sentry is responsible for implementing the full system
-    call surface, we do not implement or pass through these specialized APIs.
-1.  The host surface exposed to the Sentry is minimized. While the system call
-    surface is not trivial, it is explicitly enumerated and controlled. The
-    Sentry is not permitted to open new files, create new sockets or do many
-    other interesting things on the host.
+1. No system call is passed through directly to the host. Every supported call
+   has an independent implementation in the Sentry, that is unlikely to suffer
+   from identical vulnerabilities that may appear in the host. This has the
+   consequence that all kernel features used by applications require an
+   implementation within the Sentry.
+1. Only common, universal functionality is implemented. Some filesystems,
+   network devices or modules may expose specialized functionality to user
+   space applications via mechanisms such as extended attributes, raw sockets
+   or ioctls. Since the Sentry is responsible for implementing the full system
+   call surface, we do not implement or pass through these specialized APIs.
+1. The host surface exposed to the Sentry is minimized. While the system call
+   surface is not trivial, it is explicitly enumerated and controlled. The
+   Sentry is not permitted to open new files, create new sockets or do many
+   other interesting things on the host.

 Additionally, we have practical restrictions that are imposed on the project to
 minimize the risk of Sentry exploitability. For example:

-1.  Unsafe code is carefully controlled. All unsafe code is isolated in files
-    that end with "unsafe.go", in order to facilitate validation and auditing.
-    No file without the unsafe suffix may import the unsafe package.
-1.  No CGo is allowed. The Sentry must be a pure Go binary.
-1.  External imports are not generally allowed within the core packages. Only
-    limited external imports are used within the setup code. The code available
-    inside the Sentry is carefully controlled, to ensure that the above rules
-    are effective.
+1. Unsafe code is carefully controlled. All unsafe code is isolated in files
+   that end with "unsafe.go", in order to facilitate validation and auditing.
+   No file without the unsafe suffix may import the unsafe package.
+1. No CGo is allowed. The Sentry must be a pure Go binary.
+1. External imports are not generally allowed within the core packages. Only
+   limited external imports are used within the setup code. The code available
+   inside the Sentry is carefully controlled, to ensure that the above rules
+   are effective.

 Finally, we recognize that security is a process, and that vigilance is
 critical. Beyond our security disclosure process, the Sentry is fuzzed
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ repositories have their own guidelines and processes for contributing. See the

 The project maintains two mailing lists:

-*   [gvisor-users][gvisor-users] for accouncements and general discussion.
-*   [gvisor-dev][gvisor-dev] for development and contribution.
+* [gvisor-users][gvisor-users] for accouncements and general discussion.
+* [gvisor-dev][gvisor-dev] for development and contribution.
 
 We also have a [chat room hosted on Gitter][gitter-chat].

@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ This page shows you how to deploy a sample [WordPress][wordpress] site using

 Take the following steps to enable the Kubernetes Engine API:

-1.  Visit the [Kubernetes Engine page][project-selector] in the Google Cloud
-    Platform Console.
-1.  Create or select a project.
+1. Visit the [Kubernetes Engine page][project-selector] in the Google Cloud
+   Platform Console.
+1. Create or select a project.

 ### Creating a node pool with gVisor enabled

@@ -89,12 +89,12 @@ order to communicate to the DNS server. runsc network is isolated from the
 host and cannot access the DNS server on the host network without breaking the
 sandbox isolation. There are a few different workarounds you can try:

-*   Use default bridge network with `--link` to connect containers. Default
-    bridge doesn't use embedded DNS.
-*   Use [`--network=host`][host-net] option in runsc, however beware that it will
-    use the host network stack and is less secure.
-*   Use IPs instead of container names.
-*   Use [Kubernetes][k8s]. Container name lookup works fine in Kubernetes.
+* Use default bridge network with `--link` to connect containers. Default
+  bridge doesn't use embedded DNS.
+* Use [`--network=host`][host-net] option in runsc, however beware that it will
+  use the host network stack and is less secure.
+* Use IPs instead of container names.
+* Use [Kubernetes][k8s]. Container name lookup works fine in Kubernetes.

 [security-model]: /docs/architecture_guide/security/
 [old-linux]: /docs/user_guide/networking/#gso
@@ -83,19 +83,19 @@ docker start --checkpoint --checkpoint-dir=<directory> <container>

 ### Issues Preventing Compatibility with Docker

-*   **[Moby #37360][leave-running]:** Docker version 18.03.0-ce and earlier hangs
-    when checkpointing and does not create the checkpoint. To successfully use
-    this feature, install a custom version of docker-ce from the moby repository.
-    This issue is caused by an improper implementation of the `--leave-running`
-    flag. This issue is fixed in newer releases.
-*   **Docker does not support restoration into new containers:** Docker currently
-    expects the container which created the checkpoint to be the same container
-    used to restore which is not possible in runsc. When Docker supports container
-    migration and therefore restoration into new containers, this will be the
-    flow.
-*   **[Moby #37344][checkpoint-dir]:** Docker does not currently support the
-    `--checkpoint-dir` flag but this will be required when restoring from a
-    checkpoint made in another container.
+- **[Moby #37360][leave-running]:** Docker version 18.03.0-ce and earlier hangs
+  when checkpointing and does not create the checkpoint. To successfully use
+  this feature, install a custom version of docker-ce from the moby repository.
+  This issue is caused by an improper implementation of the `--leave-running`
+  flag. This issue is fixed in newer releases.
+- **Docker does not support restoration into new containers:** Docker currently
+  expects the container which created the checkpoint to be the same container
+  used to restore which is not possible in runsc. When Docker supports container
+  migration and therefore restoration into new containers, this will be the
+  flow.
+- **[Moby #37344][checkpoint-dir]:** Docker does not currently support the
+  `--checkpoint-dir` flag but this will be required when restoring from a
+  checkpoint made in another container.

 [leave-running]: https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/37360
 [checkpoint-dir]: https://github.com/moby/moby/issues/37344
@@ -40,10 +40,10 @@ The following applications/images have been tested:

 Most common utilities work. Note that:

-*   Some tools, such as `tcpdump` and old versions of `ping`, require explicitly
-    enabling raw sockets via the unsafe `--net-raw` runsc flag.
-*   Different Docker images can behave differently. For example, Alpine Linux and
-    Ubuntu have different `ip` binaries.
+* Some tools, such as `tcpdump` and old versions of `ping`, require explicitly
+  enabling raw sockets via the unsafe `--net-raw` runsc flag.
+* Different Docker images can behave differently. For example, Alpine Linux and
+  Ubuntu have different `ip` binaries.

 Specific tools include:

@@ -106,9 +106,9 @@ Then restart docker to refresh the runtime options. While the container is runni
 execute `runsc debug` to collect profile information and save to a file. Here are
 the options available:

-*   **--profile-heap:** Generates heap profile to the speficied file.
-*   **--profile-cpu:** Enables CPU profiler, waits for `--profile-delay` seconds 
-    and generates CPU profile to the speficied file.
+* **--profile-heap:** Generates heap profile to the speficied file.
+* **--profile-cpu:** Enables CPU profiler, waits for `--profile-delay` seconds 
+  and generates CPU profile to the speficied file.

 For example:

@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ sudo runsc --root /var/run/docker/runtime-runsc-prof/moby debug --profile-heap=/
 sudo runsc --root /var/run/docker/runtime-runsc-prof/moby debug --profile-cpu=/tmp/cpu.prof --profile-delay=30 63254c6ab3a6989623fa1fb53616951eed31ac605a2637bb9ddba5d8d404b35b
 ```

-The resulting files can be opened using `go tool pprof` or [pprof][pprof]. The examples 
+The resulting files can be opened using `go tool pprof` or [pprof][]. The examples 
 below create image file (`.svg`) with the heap profile and writes the top 
 functions using CPU to the console:

@@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ Based on the release type, you will need to substitute `${DIST}` below, using
 one of:

 * `master`: For HEAD.
-* `nightly: For nightly releases.
-* `release: For the latest release.
-* `${yyyymmdd}: For a specific releases (see above).
+* `nightly`: For nightly releases.
+* `release`: For the latest release.
+* `${yyyymmdd}`: For a specific releases (see above).

 The repository for the release you wish to install should be added:

@@ -58,10 +58,10 @@ If you are using a virtual machine you will need to make sure that nested
 virtualization is configured. Here are links to documents on how to set up
 nested virtualization in several popular environments:

-*   Google Cloud: [Enabling Nested Virtualization for VM Instances][nested-gcp]
-*   Microsoft Azure: [How to enable nested virtualization in an Azure VM][nested-azure]
-*   VirtualBox: [Nested Virtualization][nested-virtualbox]
-*   KVM: [Nested Guests][nested-kvm]
+* Google Cloud: [Enabling Nested Virtualization for VM Instances][nested-gcp]
+* Microsoft Azure: [How to enable nested virtualization in an Azure VM][nested-azure]
+* VirtualBox: [Nested Virtualization][nested-virtualbox]
+* KVM: [Nested Guests][nested-kvm]

 ### Configuring Docker

@@ -7,6 +7,6 @@ gVisor can be used with Docker, Kubernetes, or directly using `runsc` with
 crafted OCI spec for your container. Use the links below to see detailed
 instructions for each of them:

-*   [Docker](./docker/): The quickest and easiest way to get started.
-*   [Kubernetes](./kubernetes/): Isolate Pods in your K8s cluster with gVisor.
-*   [OCI](./oci/): Expert mode. Customize gVisor for your environment.
+* [Docker](./docker/): The quickest and easiest way to get started.
+* [Kubernetes](./kubernetes/): Isolate Pods in your K8s cluster with gVisor.
+* [OCI](./oci/): Expert mode. Customize gVisor for your environment.