Publish Advisories

GHSA-5xgj-pmjj-gw49 GHSA-h3pq-667x-r789
2026-05-22 18:04:22 -07:00 · 2024-07-15 18:34:55 +00:00
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+{
+  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
+  "id": "GHSA-5xgj-pmjj-gw49",
+  "modified": "2024-07-15T18:32:22Z",
+  "published": "2024-07-15T18:32:22Z",
+  "aliases": [
+
+  ],
+  "summary": "RISC Zero zkVM notes on zero-knowledge",
+  "details": "RISC Zero zkVM was designed from its inception to provide three main guarantees:\n1. *Computational integrity*: that a given software program executed correctly.\n2. *Succinctness*: that the proof of execution does not grow in relation to the program being executed.\n3. *Zero Knowledge*: that details of the program execution are not visible within the proof of program execution.\n\nUlrich Habock and Al Kindi have released [new research] that indicates that several STARK implementations -including our RISC Zero zkVM- do not meet the requirements to assert the specific property of zero knowledge provably. \n\nWhile a vast majority of real-world applications that leverage RISC Zero zkVM or similar systems depend primarily on computational integrity and succinctness, a subset of applications critically depend on the privacy guarantees provided by zero-knowledge; and for those use cases, users are cautioned to understand the research and make informed decisions based on the risks outlined in using an impacted system.\n\nAlthough the maintainers are not aware of any attacks that can take advantage of this potential weakness, they are working to proactively address this discovery as quickly as possible. \n\n[new research]: https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1037",
+  "severity": [
+
+  ],
+  "affected": [
+    {
+      "package": {
+        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
+        "name": "risc0-zkvm"
+      },
+      "ranges": [
+        {
+          "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
+          "events": [
+            {
+              "introduced": "0"
+            },
+            {
+              "last_affected": "1.0.2"
+            }
+          ]
+        }
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "references": [
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0/security/advisories/GHSA-5xgj-pmjj-gw49"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1037"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "PACKAGE",
+      "url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0"
+    }
+  ],
+  "database_specific": {
+    "cwe_ids": [
+
+    ],
+    "severity": "LOW",
+    "github_reviewed": true,
+    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-07-15T18:32:22Z",
+    "nvd_published_at": null
+  }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
+  "id": "GHSA-h3pq-667x-r789",
+  "modified": "2024-07-15T18:33:22Z",
+  "published": "2024-07-15T18:33:22Z",
+  "aliases": [
+    "CVE-2024-40631"
+  ],
+  "summary": "Plate media plugins has a XSS in media embed element when using custom URL parsers",
+  "details": "### Impact\nEditors that use `MediaEmbedElement` and pass custom `urlParsers` to the `useMediaState` hook may be vulnerable to XSS if a custom parser allows `javascript:`, `data:` or `vbscript:` URLs to be embedded. Editors that do not use `urlParsers` and instead consume the `url` property directly may also be vulnerable if the URL is not sanitised.\n\nThe default parsers `parseTwitterUrl` and `parseVideoUrl` are not affected.\n\nExamples of vulnerable code:\n\n```tsx\nconst { embed } = useMediaState({\n  urlParsers: [\n    // Custom parser that does not use an allowlist or validate the URL protocol\n    (url) => ({ url }),\n  ],\n});\n\nreturn (\n  <iframe\n    src={embed!.url}\n    // ...\n  />\n);\n```\n\n```tsx\nconst { url } = useMediaState();\n\nreturn (\n  <iframe\n    // url property used directly from useMediaState() with no sanitisation\n    src={url}\n    // ...\n  />\n);\n```\n\n\n```tsx\nconst { url } = element;\n\nreturn (\n  <iframe\n    // url property used directly from element with no sanitisation\n    src={url}\n    // ...\n  />\n);\n```\n\n### Patches\n`@udecode/plate-media` 36.0.10 resolves this issue by only allowing HTTP and HTTPS URLs during parsing. This affects only the `embed` property returned from `useMediaState`.\n\nIn addition, the `url` property returned from `useMediaState` has been renamed to `unsafeUrl` to indicate that it has not been sanitised. The `url` property on `element` is also unsafe, but has not been renamed. If you're using either of these properties directly, you will still need to validate the URL yourself.\n\n### Workarounds\nEnsure that any custom `urlParsers` do not allow `javascript:`, `data:` or `vbscript:` URLs to be returned in the `url` property of their return values.\n\nIf `url` is consumed directly, validate the URL protocol before passing it to the `iframe` element.\n\n### References\nHow to verify the protocol of a URL: https://stackoverflow.com/a/43467144",
+  "severity": [
+    {
+      "type": "CVSS_V3",
+      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "CVSS_V4",
+      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
+    }
+  ],
+  "affected": [
+    {
+      "package": {
+        "ecosystem": "npm",
+        "name": "@udecode/plate-media"
+      },
+      "ranges": [
+        {
+          "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
+          "events": [
+            {
+              "introduced": "0"
+            },
+            {
+              "fixed": "36.0.10"
+            }
+          ]
+        }
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "references": [
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/udecode/plate/security/advisories/GHSA-h3pq-667x-r789"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/udecode/plate/commit/1bc0971774fbfb770780c9bdb94746a6f0f196a0"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "PACKAGE",
+      "url": "https://github.com/udecode/plate"
+    }
+  ],
+  "database_specific": {
+    "cwe_ids": [
+      "CWE-79"
+    ],
+    "severity": "HIGH",
+    "github_reviewed": true,
+    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-07-15T18:33:22Z",
+    "nvd_published_at": null
+  }
+}