Add support for sending a value N between 1 and ULONG_MAX to the IMA
original measurement interface. This value represents the number of
measurements that should be deleted from the current measurements list. In
this case, measurements are staged in an internal non-user visible list,
and immediately deleted.
This staging method allows the remote attestation agents to easily separate
the measurements that were verified (staged and deleted) from those that
weren't due to the race between taking a TPM quote and reading the
measurements list.
In order to minimize the locking time of ima_extend_list_mutex, deleting
N records is realized by doing a lockless walk in the current measurements
list to determine the N-th entry to cut, to cut the current measurements
list under the lock, and by deleting the excess records after releasing the
lock.
Flushing the hash table is not supported for N records, since it would
require removing the N records one by one from the hash table under the
ima_extend_list_mutex lock, which would increase the locking time.
Link: https://github.com/linux-integrity/linux/issues/1
Co-developed-by: Steven Chen <chenste@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Chen <chenste@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
During staging and delete, measurements are not completely deallocated.
Their entry digest portion is kept and is still reachable with the hash
table to detect duplicate records. If the number of records is significant,
this reduces the memory saving benefit of staging.
Some users might be interested in achieving the best memory saving (the
measurements are completely deallocated) at the cost of having duplicate
records across the staged measurement lists. Duplicate records are still
avoided within the current measurement list.
Introduce the new kernel option ima_flush_htable to decide whether or not
the digests of staged measurement records are flushed from the hash table,
when they are deleted, to achieve the maximum memory saving.
When the option is enabled, replace the old hash table with a new one,
by calling ima_alloc_replace_htable(), and completely delete the
measurements records.
Note: This code derives from the Alt-IMA Huawei project, whose license is
GPL-2.0 OR MIT.
Link: https://github.com/linux-integrity/linux/issues/1
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Introduce the ability of staging the IMA measurement list and deleting them
with a prompt.
Staging means moving the current measurement list records to a separate
location, and allowing users to read and delete it. This causes the current
measurement list to be emptied (since records were moved) and new
measurements to be added on the empty list. Staging can be done only once
at a time. In the event of kexec(), staging is aborted and staged records
will be carried over to the new kernel.
Introduce ascii_runtime_measurements_<algo>_staged and
binary_runtime_measurements_<algo>_staged interfaces to access and delete
the measurements.
Use 'echo A > <IMA _staged interface>' and
'echo D > <IMA _staged interface>' to respectively stage and delete the
entire measurements list. Locking of these interfaces is also mediated with
a call to _ima_measurements_open() and with ima_measurements_release().
Implement the staging functionality by introducing the new global
measurements list ima_measurements_staged, and ima_queue_stage() and
ima_queue_staged_delete_all() to respectively move measurements from the
current measurements list to the staged one, and to move staged
measurements to the ima_measurements_trim list for deletion. Introduce
ima_queue_delete() to delete the measurements.
Staging is forbidden after measurement is suspended, and between staging
and deleting, so that walking the staged and current measurements list can
be done locklessly in ima_dump_measurement_list(). Strict ordering of
suspending and dumping is enforced by two reboot notifiers with different
priority. Refusing to delete staged measurements also signals to user space
that those measurements are already carried over to the secondary kernel,
so that it does not save them twice.
Finally, introduce the BINARY_STAGED and BINARY_FULL binary measurements
list types, to maintain the counters and the binary size of staged
measurements and the full measurements list (including records that were
staged). BINARY still represents the current binary measurements list.
Use the binary size for the BINARY + BINARY_STAGED types in
ima_add_kexec_buffer(), since both measurements list types are copied to
the secondary kernel during kexec. Use BINARY_FULL in
ima_measure_kexec_event(), to generate a critical data record.
It should be noted that the BINARY_FULL counter is not passed through
kexec. Thus, the number of records included in the kexec critical data
records refers to the records since the critical data records generated
from the previous kexec event.
Note: This code derives from the Alt-IMA Huawei project, whose license is
GPL-2.0 OR MIT.
Link: https://github.com/linux-integrity/linux/issues/1
Suggested-by: Gregory Lumen <gregorylumen@linux.microsoft.com> (staging revert)
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Introduce ima_dump_measurement() to simplify the code of
ima_dump_measurement_list() and to avoid repeating the
ima_dump_measurement() code block if iteration occurs on multiple lists.
No functional change: only code moved to a separate function.
Link: https://github.com/linux-integrity/linux/issues/1
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Introduce the ima_measure_users counter, to implement a semaphore-like
locking scheme where the binary and ASCII measurements list interfaces can
be concurrently opened by multiple readers, or alternatively by a single
writer. In addition, allow the same writer to open the other interfaces for
write or read/write, so that it can see the same measurement state across
all the interfaces.
A semaphore cannot be used because the kernel cannot return to user space
with a lock held.
Introduce the ima_measure_lock() and ima_measure_unlock() primitives, to
respectively lock/unlock the interfaces (safely with the ima_measure_users
counter, without holding a lock).
Finally, introduce _ima_measurements_open() to lock the interface before
seq_open(), and call it from ima_measurements_open() and
ima_ascii_measurements_open(). And, introduce ima_measurements_release(),
to unlock the interface.
Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN if the interface is opened for write (not possible
for the current measurements interfaces, since they only have read
permission).
No functional changes: multiple readers are allowed as before.
Link: https://github.com/linux-integrity/linux/issues/1
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Introduce _ima_measurements_start() and _ima_measurements_next(), renamed
from ima_measurements_start() and ima_measurements_next(), to include the
list head as an additional parameter, so that iteration on different lists
can be implemented by calling those functions.
No functional change: ima_measurements_start() and ima_measurements_next()
pass the ima_measurements list head, used before. They become wrappers for
the new functions.
Link: https://github.com/linux-integrity/linux/issues/1
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Make binary_runtime_size as an array, to have separate counters per binary
measurements list type. Currently, define the BINARY type for the existing
binary measurements list.
Introduce ima_update_binary_runtime_size() to facilitate updating a
binary_runtime_size value with a given binary measurement list type.
Also add the binary measurements list type parameter to
ima_get_binary_runtime_size(), to retrieve the desired value. Retrieving
the value is now done under the ima_extend_list_mutex, since there can be
concurrent updates.
No functional change (except for the mutex usage, that fixes the
concurrency issue): the BINARY array element is equivalent to the old
binary_runtime_size.
Link: https://github.com/linux-integrity/linux/issues/1
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Make ima_num_records as an array, to have separate counters per binary
measurements list type. Currently, define the BINARY type for the existing
binary measurements list.
No functional change: the BINARY type is equivalent to the value without
the array.
Link: https://github.com/linux-integrity/linux/issues/1
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The IMA hash table is a fixed-size array of hlist_head buckets:
struct hlist_head ima_htable[IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE];
IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE is (1 << IMA_HASH_BITS) = 1024 buckets, each a
struct hlist_head (one pointer, 8 bytes on 64-bit). That is 8 KiB allocated
in BSS for every kernel, regardless of whether IMA is ever used, and
regardless of how many measurements are actually made.
Replace the fixed-size array with a RCU-protected pointer to a dynamically
allocated array that is initialized in ima_init_htable(), which is called
from ima_init() during early boot. ima_init_htable() calls the static
function ima_alloc_replace_htable() which, other than initializing the hash
table the first time, can also hot-swap the existing hash table with a
blank one.
The allocation in ima_alloc_replace_htable() uses kcalloc() so the buckets
are zero-initialised (equivalent to HLIST_HEAD_INIT { .first = NULL }).
Callers of ima_alloc_replace_htable() must call synchronize_rcu() and free
the returned hash table.
Finally, access the hash table with rcu_dereference() in
ima_lookup_digest_entry() (reader side) and with
rcu_dereference_protected() in ima_add_digest_entry() (writer side).
No functional change: bucket count, hash function, and all locking remain
identical.
Link: https://github.com/linux-integrity/linux/issues/1
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The ima_h_table structure is a collection of IMA measurement list
metadata - number of records in the IMA measurement list, number of
integrity violations, and a hash table containing the IMA template data
hash, needed to prevent measurement list record duplication.
Removing records from the measurement list needs to be reflected in the
hash table. As a pre-req to removing records from the measurement list,
separate those counters from the hash table, remove the ima_h_table
structure, and just replace the hash table pointer.
Finally, rename ima_show_htable_value(), ima_show_htable_violations()
and ima_htable_violations_ops respectively to ima_show_counter(),
ima_show_num_violations() and ima_num_violations_ops.
Link: https://github.com/linux-integrity/linux/issues/1
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
evm_read_xattrs() allocates size + 1 bytes, fills them from the list of
enabled xattrs, and then passes strlen(temp) to
simple_read_from_buffer(). When no configured xattrs are enabled, the
fill loop stores nothing and temp[0] remains uninitialized, so strlen()
reads beyond initialized memory.
Explicitly terminate the buffer after allocation, use snprintf() for
each formatted line, and pass the accumulated length, without risk of
truncation, to simple_read_from_buffer().
Fixes: fa516b66a1 ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs")
Signed-off-by: Pengpeng Hou <pengpeng@iscas.ac.cn>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Add support for sigv3 signature verification using ML-DSA in pure mode.
When a sigv3 signature is verified, first check whether the key to use
for verification is an ML-DSA key and therefore uses a hashless signature
verification scheme. The hashless signature verification method uses the
ima_file_id structure directly for signature verification rather than
its digest.
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Kamlesh Kumar <kam@juniper.net>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Refactor asymmetric_verify for reusability. Have it call
asymmetric_verify_common with the signature verification key and the
public_key structure as parameters. sigv3 support for ML-DSA will need to
check the public key type first to decide how to do the signature
verification and therefore will have these parameters available for
calling asymmetric_verify_common.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Kamlesh Kumar <kam@juniper.net>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Check that the algo parameter passed to calc_file_id_hash is within valid
range. Do this in asymmetric_verify_v3 since this value will also be passed
to a hashless signature verification function from here.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Kamlesh Kumar <kam@juniper.net>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Check for a NULL pointer returned by asymmetric_key_public_key and return
-ENOKEY in this case.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Kamlesh Kumar <kam@juniper.net>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
During early boot, the filesystem is read-only and any changes
to xattrs are not allowed. This fails in case of ext4 because
changing xattr starts an ext4 transaction which fails with the
following warning.
WARNING: fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c:75 at ext4_journal_check_start+0x63/0xa0 [ext4], CPU#1: systemd-sysroot/561
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 561 Comm: systemd-sysroot Not tainted 6.19.12-1-default #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) openSUSE Tumbleweed c2dfc3c9d9f6f1233251c5d4410574fe82a348ee
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022
RIP: 0010:ext4_journal_check_start+0x63/0xa0 [ext4]
Call Trace:
__ext4_journal_start_sb+0x3e/0x180 [ext4 6d025f3bc52c89a957b89a89d211fadf5e9434e1]
ext4_xattr_set+0x104/0x150 [ext4 6d025f3bc52c89a957b89a89d211fadf5e9434e1]
__vfs_setxattr+0x9a/0xd0
__vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x76/0x1f0
ima_appraise_measurement+0x23e/0xe40
ima_d_path+0x5a/0xd0
process_measurement+0xb29/0xc40
? copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x21/0xe0
? fscrypt_file_open+0xc0/0xe0
? ext4_file_open+0x60/0x490 [ext4 6d025f3bc52c89a957b89a89d211fadf5e9434e1]
? bpf_prog_31efb7c56239148b_restrict_filesystems+0xab/0x126
? __bpf_prog_exit+0x23/0xd0
? __bpf_tramp_exit+0xd/0x50
? bpf_trampoline_6442530367+0x9f/0xea
ima_file_check+0x57/0x80
security_file_post_open+0x50/0xf0
path_openat+0x493/0x1650
do_filp_open+0xc7/0x170
Detect the state of the file early and return the error.
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
ima_get_hash_algo() only recognizes version 2 signatures when the xattr
type is EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG. Since sigv3 signatures also use
EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG as the xattr type, version 3 must be accepted as
well to correctly determine the hash algorithm.
Additionally, ima_validate_rule() does not include IMA_SIGV3_REQUIRED in
the allowed flags bitmask for MODULE_CHECK, KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, and
KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK hook functions. As a result, policy rules with
"appraise_type=sigv3" are rejected for these functions.
Add version 3 to the accepted versions in ima_get_hash_algo() for
EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG, and add IMA_SIGV3_REQUIRED to the allowed flags
for MODULE_CHECK, KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, and KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK in
ima_validate_rule().
Signed-off-by: Kamlesh Kumar <kam@juniper.net>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: de4c44a7f5 ("ima: add support to require IMA sigv3 signatures")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"There are two main changes, one feature removal, some code cleanup,
and a number of bug fixes.
Main changes:
- Detecting secure boot mode was limited to IMA. Make detecting
secure boot mode accessible to EVM and other LSMs
- IMA sigv3 support was limited to fsverity. Add IMA sigv3 support
for IMA regular file hashes and EVM portable signatures
Remove:
- Remove IMA support for asychronous hash calculation originally
added for hardware acceleration
Cleanup:
- Remove unnecessary Kconfig CONFIG_MODULE_SIG and CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
tests
- Add descriptions of the IMA atomic flags
Bug fixes:
- Like IMA, properly limit EVM "fix" mode
- Define and call evm_fix_hmac() to update security.evm
- Fallback to using i_version to detect file change for filesystems
that do not support STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE
- Address missing kernel support for configured (new) TPM hash
algorithms
- Add missing crypto_shash_final() return value"
* tag 'integrity-v7.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
evm: Enforce signatures version 3 with new EVM policy 'bit 3'
integrity: Allow sigv3 verification on EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG
ima: add support to require IMA sigv3 signatures
ima: add regular file data hash signature version 3 support
ima: Define asymmetric_verify_v3() to verify IMA sigv3 signatures
ima: remove buggy support for asynchronous hashes
integrity: Eliminate weak definition of arch_get_secureboot()
ima: Add code comments to explain IMA iint cache atomic_flags
ima_fs: Correctly create securityfs files for unsupported hash algos
ima: check return value of crypto_shash_final() in boot aggregate
ima: Define and use a digest_size field in the ima_algo_desc structure
powerpc/ima: Drop unnecessary check for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
ima: efi: Drop unnecessary check for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG/CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
ima: fallback to using i_version to detect file change
evm: fix security.evm for a file with IMA signature
s390: Drop unnecessary CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
evm: Don't enable fix mode when secure boot is enabled
integrity: Make arch_ima_get_secureboot integrity-wide
Pull module updates from Sami Tolvanen:
"Kernel symbol flags:
- Replace the separate *_gpl symbol sections (__ksymtab_gpl and
__kcrctab_gpl) with a unified symbol table and a new __kflagstab
section.
This section stores symbol flags, such as the GPL-only flag, as an
8-bit bitset for each exported symbol. This is a cleanup that
simplifies symbol lookup in the module loader by avoiding table
fragmentation and will allow a cleaner way to add more flags later
if needed.
Module signature UAPI:
- Move struct module_signature to the UAPI headers to allow reuse by
tools outside the kernel proper, such as kmod and
scripts/sign-file.
This also renames a few constants for clarity and drops unused
signature types as preparation for hash-based module integrity
checking work that's in progress.
Sysfs:
- Add a /sys/module/<module>/import_ns sysfs attribute to show the
symbol namespaces imported by loaded modules.
This makes it easier to verify driver API access at runtime on
systems that care about such things (e.g. Android).
Cleanups and fixes:
- Force sh_addr to 0 for all sections in module.lds. This prevents
non-zero section addresses when linking modules with 'ld.bfd -r',
which confused elfutils.
- Fix a memory leak of charp module parameters on module unload when
the kernel is configured with CONFIG_SYSFS=n.
- Override the -EEXIST error code returned by module_init() to
userspace. This prevents confusion with the errno reserved by the
module loader to indicate that a module is already loaded.
- Simplify the warning message and drop the stack dump on positive
returns from module_init().
- Drop unnecessary extern keywords from function declarations and
synchronize parse_args() arguments with their implementation"
* tag 'modules-7.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/modules/linux: (23 commits)
module: Simplify warning on positive returns from module_init()
module: Override -EEXIST module return
documentation: remove references to *_gpl sections
module: remove *_gpl sections from vmlinux and modules
module: deprecate usage of *_gpl sections in module loader
module: use kflagstab instead of *_gpl sections
module: populate kflagstab in modpost
module: add kflagstab section to vmlinux and modules
module: define ksym_flags enumeration to represent kernel symbol flags
selftests/bpf: verify_pkcs7_sig: Use 'struct module_signature' from the UAPI headers
sign-file: use 'struct module_signature' from the UAPI headers
tools uapi headers: add linux/module_signature.h
module: Move 'struct module_signature' to UAPI
module: Give MODULE_SIG_STRING a more descriptive name
module: Give 'enum pkey_id_type' a more specific name
module: Drop unused signature types
extract-cert: drop unused definition of PKEY_ID_PKCS7
docs: symbol-namespaces: mention sysfs attribute
module: expose imported namespaces via sysfs
module: Remove extern keyword from param prototypes
...
Pull crypto library updates from Eric Biggers:
- Migrate more hash algorithms from the traditional crypto subsystem to
lib/crypto/
Like the algorithms migrated earlier (e.g. SHA-*), this simplifies
the implementations, improves performance, enables further
simplifications in calling code, and solves various other issues:
- AES CBC-based MACs (AES-CMAC, AES-XCBC-MAC, and AES-CBC-MAC)
- Support these algorithms in lib/crypto/ using the AES library
and the existing arm64 assembly code
- Reimplement the traditional crypto API's "cmac(aes)",
"xcbc(aes)", and "cbcmac(aes)" on top of the library
- Convert mac80211 to use the AES-CMAC library. Note: several
other subsystems can use it too and will be converted later
- Drop the broken, nonstandard, and likely unused support for
"xcbc(aes)" with key lengths other than 128 bits
- Enable optimizations by default
- GHASH
- Migrate the standalone GHASH code into lib/crypto/
- Integrate the GHASH code more closely with the very similar
POLYVAL code, and improve the generic GHASH implementation to
resist cache-timing attacks and use much less memory
- Reimplement the AES-GCM library and the "gcm" crypto_aead
template on top of the GHASH library. Remove "ghash" from the
crypto_shash API, as it's no longer needed
- Enable optimizations by default
- SM3
- Migrate the kernel's existing SM3 code into lib/crypto/, and
reimplement the traditional crypto API's "sm3" on top of it
- I don't recommend using SM3, but this cleanup is worthwhile
to organize the code the same way as other algorithms
- Testing improvements:
- Add a KUnit test suite for each of the new library APIs
- Migrate the existing ChaCha20Poly1305 test to KUnit
- Make the KUnit all_tests.config enable all crypto library tests
- Move the test kconfig options to the Runtime Testing menu
- Other updates to arch-optimized crypto code:
- Optimize SHA-256 for Zhaoxin CPUs using the Padlock Hash Engine
- Remove some MD5 implementations that are no longer worth keeping
- Drop big endian and voluntary preemption support from the arm64
code, as those configurations are no longer supported on arm64
- Make jitterentropy and samples/tsm-mr use the crypto library APIs
* tag 'libcrypto-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux: (66 commits)
lib/crypto: arm64: Assume a little-endian kernel
arm64: fpsimd: Remove obsolete cond_yield macro
lib/crypto: arm64/sha3: Remove obsolete chunking logic
lib/crypto: arm64/sha512: Remove obsolete chunking logic
lib/crypto: arm64/sha256: Remove obsolete chunking logic
lib/crypto: arm64/sha1: Remove obsolete chunking logic
lib/crypto: arm64/poly1305: Remove obsolete chunking logic
lib/crypto: arm64/gf128hash: Remove obsolete chunking logic
lib/crypto: arm64/chacha: Remove obsolete chunking logic
lib/crypto: arm64/aes: Remove obsolete chunking logic
lib/crypto: Include <crypto/utils.h> instead of <crypto/algapi.h>
lib/crypto: aesgcm: Don't disable IRQs during AES block encryption
lib/crypto: aescfb: Don't disable IRQs during AES block encryption
lib/crypto: tests: Migrate ChaCha20Poly1305 self-test to KUnit
lib/crypto: sparc: Drop optimized MD5 code
lib/crypto: mips: Drop optimized MD5 code
lib: Move crypto library tests to Runtime Testing menu
crypto: sm3 - Remove 'struct sm3_state'
crypto: sm3 - Remove the original "sm3_block_generic()"
crypto: sm3 - Remove sm3_base.h
...
Enable the configuration of EVM so that it requires that asymmetric
signatures it accepts are of version 3 (sigv3). To enable this, introduce
bit 3 (value 0x0008) that the user may write to EVM's securityfs policy
configuration file 'evm' for sigv3 enforcement.
Mention bit 3 in the documentation.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Allow sigv3 verification on EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG on RSA, ECDSA,
ECRDSA, and SM2 signatures.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Defining a policy rule with the "appraise_type=imasig" option allows
either v2 or v3 signatures. Defining an IMA appraise rule with the
"appraise_type=sigv3" option requires a file sigv3 signature.
Define a new appraise type: IMA_SIGV3_REQUIRED
Example: appraise func=BPRM_CHECK appraise_type=sigv3
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Instead of directly verifying the signature of a file data hash,
signature v3 verifies the signature of the ima_file_id structure
containing the file data hash.
To disambiguate the signature usage, the ima_file_id structure also
includes the hash algorithm and the type of data (e.g. regular file
hash or fs-verity root hash).
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Roberto SassuandMimi Zohar
Pengpeng HouandMimi Zohar
Stefan BergerandMimi Zohar
Goldwyn RodriguesandMimi Zohar
Kamlesh KumarandMimi Zohar
Linus Torvalds