Merge tag 'integrity-v7.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity

Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "There are two main changes, one feature removal, some code cleanup,
  and a number of bug fixes.

  Main changes:
   - Detecting secure boot mode was limited to IMA. Make detecting
     secure boot mode accessible to EVM and other LSMs
   - IMA sigv3 support was limited to fsverity. Add IMA sigv3 support
     for IMA regular file hashes and EVM portable signatures

  Remove:
   - Remove IMA support for asychronous hash calculation originally
     added for hardware acceleration

  Cleanup:
   - Remove unnecessary Kconfig CONFIG_MODULE_SIG and CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
     tests
   - Add descriptions of the IMA atomic flags

  Bug fixes:
   - Like IMA, properly limit EVM "fix" mode
   - Define and call evm_fix_hmac() to update security.evm
   - Fallback to using i_version to detect file change for filesystems
     that do not support STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE
   - Address missing kernel support for configured (new) TPM hash
     algorithms
   - Add missing crypto_shash_final() return value"

* tag 'integrity-v7.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  evm: Enforce signatures version 3 with new EVM policy 'bit 3'
  integrity: Allow sigv3 verification on EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG
  ima: add support to require IMA sigv3 signatures
  ima: add regular file data hash signature version 3 support
  ima: Define asymmetric_verify_v3() to verify IMA sigv3 signatures
  ima: remove buggy support for asynchronous hashes
  integrity: Eliminate weak definition of arch_get_secureboot()
  ima: Add code comments to explain IMA iint cache atomic_flags
  ima_fs: Correctly create securityfs files for unsupported hash algos
  ima: check return value of crypto_shash_final() in boot aggregate
  ima: Define and use a digest_size field in the ima_algo_desc structure
  powerpc/ima: Drop unnecessary check for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
  ima: efi: Drop unnecessary check for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG/CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
  ima: fallback to using i_version to detect file change
  evm: fix security.evm for a file with IMA signature
  s390: Drop unnecessary CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
  evm: Don't enable fix mode when secure boot is enabled
  integrity: Make arch_ima_get_secureboot integrity-wide

Documentation/ABI/testing/evm

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ Description:
 		2	  Permit modification of EVM-protected metadata at
 			  runtime. Not supported if HMAC validation and
 			  creation is enabled (deprecated).
+		3	  Require asymmetric signatures to be version 3
 		31	  Disable further runtime modification of EVM policy
 		===	  ==================================================
 

Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy

@@ -53,10 +53,7 @@ Description:
 			    where 'imasig' is the original or the signature
 				format v2.
 			    where 'modsig' is an appended signature,
-			    where 'sigv3' is the signature format v3. (Currently
-				limited to fsverity digest based signatures
-				stored in security.ima xattr. Requires
-				specifying "digest_type=verity" first.)
+			    where 'sigv3' is the signature format v3.
 
 			appraise_flag:= [check_blacklist] (deprecated)
 			Setting the check_blacklist flag is no longer necessary.
@@ -186,6 +183,11 @@ Description:
 			appraise func=BPRM_CHECK digest_type=verity \
 				appraise_type=sigv3
 
+		Example of a regular IMA file hash 'appraise' rule requiring
+		signature version 3 format stored in security.ima xattr.
+
+			appraise func=BPRM_CHECK appraise_type=sigv3
+
 		All of these policy rules could, for example, be constrained
 		either based on a filesystem's UUID (fsuuid) or based on LSM
 		labels.

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -2410,23 +2410,6 @@ Kernel parameters
 			[IMA] Define a custom template format.
 			Format: { "field1|...|fieldN" }
 
-	ima.ahash_minsize= [IMA] Minimum file size for asynchronous hash usage
-			Format: <min_file_size>
-			Set the minimal file size for using asynchronous hash.
-			If left unspecified, ahash usage is disabled.
-
-			ahash performance varies for different data sizes on
-			different crypto accelerators. This option can be used
-			to achieve the best performance for a particular HW.
-
-	ima.ahash_bufsize= [IMA] Asynchronous hash buffer size
-			Format: <bufsize>
-			Set hashing buffer size. Default: 4k.
-
-			ahash performance varies for different chunk sizes on
-			different crypto accelerators. This option can be used
-			to achieve best performance for particular HW.
-
 	ima=		[IMA] Enable or disable IMA
 			Format: { "off" | "on" }
 			Default: "on"

MAINTAINERS

@@ -12732,6 +12732,7 @@ R:	Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
 L:	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
 S:	Supported
 T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git
+F:	include/linux/secure_boot.h
 F:	security/integrity/
 F:	security/integrity/ima/
 

arch/Kconfig

@@ -1839,4 +1839,7 @@ config ARCH_WANTS_PRE_LINK_VMLINUX
 config ARCH_HAS_CPU_ATTACK_VECTORS
 	bool
 
+config HAVE_ARCH_GET_SECUREBOOT
+	def_bool EFI
+
 endmenu

arch/powerpc/Kconfig

@@ -1058,6 +1058,7 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT
 	depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY
 	imply IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
 	select PSERIES_PLPKS if PPC_PSERIES
+	select HAVE_ARCH_GET_SECUREBOOT
 	help
 	  Systems with firmware secure boot enabled need to define security
 	  policies to extend secure boot to the OS. This config allows a user

arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c

@@ -7,11 +7,6 @@
 #include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <asm/secure_boot.h>
 
-bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
-{
-	return is_ppc_secureboot_enabled();
-}
-
 /*
  * The "secure_rules" are enabled only on "secureboot" enabled systems.
  * These rules verify the file signatures against known good values.
@@ -63,8 +58,7 @@ static const char *const secure_and_trusted_rules[] = {
 const char *const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
 {
 	if (is_ppc_secureboot_enabled()) {
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG))
-			set_module_sig_enforced();
+		set_module_sig_enforced();
 
 		if (is_ppc_trustedboot_enabled())
 			return secure_and_trusted_rules;

arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
  */
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/of.h>
+#include <linux/secure_boot.h>
 #include <linux/string_choices.h>
 #include <asm/secure_boot.h>
 
@@ -44,6 +45,11 @@ out:
 	return enabled;
 }
 
+bool arch_get_secureboot(void)
+{
+	return is_ppc_secureboot_enabled();
+}
+
 bool is_ppc_trustedboot_enabled(void)
 {
 	struct device_node *node;

arch/s390/Kconfig

@@ -80,7 +80,6 @@ config S390
 	#
 	# Note: keep this list sorted alphabetically
 	#
-	imply IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
 	select ALTERNATE_USER_ADDRESS_SPACE
 	select ARCH_32BIT_USTAT_F_TINODE
 	select ARCH_CORRECT_STACKTRACE_ON_KRETPROBE
@@ -181,6 +180,7 @@ config S390
 	select GENERIC_IOREMAP if PCI
 	select HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
+	select HAVE_ARCH_GET_SECUREBOOT
 	select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
 	select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL_RELATIVE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN

arch/s390/kernel/Makefile

@@ -71,7 +71,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR)	+= stackprotector.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE)	+= machine_kexec_file.o kexec_image.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE)	+= kexec_elf.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CERT_STORE)	+= cert_store.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT)	+= ima_arch.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS)	+= perf_event.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS)	+= perf_cpum_cf.o perf_cpum_sf.o

arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-
-#include <linux/ima.h>
-#include <asm/boot_data.h>
-
-bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
-{
-	return ipl_secure_flag;
-}
-
-const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
-{
-	return NULL;
-}

arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include <linux/crash_dump.h>
 #include <linux/debug_locks.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/secure_boot.h>
 #include <asm/asm-extable.h>
 #include <asm/machine.h>
 #include <asm/diag.h>
@@ -2387,6 +2388,11 @@ void __no_stack_protector s390_reset_system(void)
 	diag_amode31_ops.diag308_reset();
 }
 
+bool arch_get_secureboot(void)
+{
+	return ipl_secure_flag;
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE
 
 int ipl_report_add_component(struct ipl_report *report, struct kexec_buf *kbuf,

arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h

@@ -401,9 +401,9 @@ extern int __init efi_memmap_split_count(efi_memory_desc_t *md,
 extern void __init efi_memmap_insert(struct efi_memory_map *old_memmap,
 				     void *buf, struct efi_mem_range *mem);
 
-extern enum efi_secureboot_mode __x86_ima_efi_boot_mode(void);
+enum efi_secureboot_mode __x86_efi_boot_mode(void);
 
-#define arch_ima_efi_boot_mode	__x86_ima_efi_boot_mode()
+#define arch_efi_boot_mode __x86_efi_boot_mode()
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_RUNTIME_MAP
 int efi_get_runtime_map_size(void);

arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c

@@ -920,7 +920,7 @@ umode_t efi_attr_is_visible(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *attr, int n)
 	return attr->mode;
 }
 
-enum efi_secureboot_mode __x86_ima_efi_boot_mode(void)
+enum efi_secureboot_mode __x86_efi_boot_mode(void)
 {
 	return boot_params.secure_boot;
 }

include/linux/evm.h

@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 					     const char *xattr_name,
 					     void *xattr_value,
 					     size_t xattr_value_len);
+int evm_fix_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+		 const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len);
 int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 			    const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr *xattrs,
 			    int *xattr_count);
@@ -51,6 +53,12 @@ static inline enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 {
 	return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 }
+
+static inline int evm_fix_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+			       const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
 #endif
 
 static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,

include/linux/ima.h

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
+#include <linux/secure_boot.h>
 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 struct linux_binprm;
 
@@ -73,14 +74,8 @@ int ima_validate_range(phys_addr_t phys, size_t size);
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
-extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void);
 extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void);
 #else
-static inline bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
-{
-	return false;
-}
-
 static inline const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
 {
 	return NULL;

include/linux/secure_boot.h

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2026 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Author: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_SECURE_BOOT_H
+#define _LINUX_SECURE_BOOT_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_GET_SECUREBOOT
+/*
+ * Returns true if the platform secure boot is enabled.
+ * Returns false if disabled or not supported.
+ */
+bool arch_get_secureboot(void);
+#else
+static inline bool arch_get_secureboot(void) { return false; }
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_SECURE_BOOT_H */

security/integrity/Makefile

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o
 integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_PPC_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \
                                      platform_certs/load_powerpc.o \
                                      platform_certs/keyring_handler.o
+integrity-$(CONFIG_EFI) += efi_secureboot.o
 # The relative order of the 'ima' and 'evm' LSMs depends on the order below.
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= ima/
 obj-$(CONFIG_EVM)			+= evm/

security/integrity/digsig.c

@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ static struct key *integrity_keyring_from_id(const unsigned int id)
 }
 
 int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
-			    const char *digest, int digestlen)
+			    const char *digest, int digestlen, u8 algo)
 {
 	struct key *keyring;
 
@@ -76,9 +76,11 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 		return digsig_verify(keyring, sig + 1, siglen - 1, digest,
 				     digestlen);
 	case 2: /* regular file data hash based signature */
-	case 3: /* struct ima_file_id data based signature */
 		return asymmetric_verify(keyring, sig, siglen, digest,
-					 digestlen);
+					    digestlen);
+	case 3: /* struct ima_file_id data based signature */
+		return asymmetric_verify_v3(keyring, sig, siglen, digest,
+					    digestlen, algo);
 	}
 
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;

security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c

@@ -131,3 +131,62 @@ out:
 	pr_debug("%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
 	return ret;
 }
+
+/*
+ * calc_file_id_hash - calculate the hash of the ima_file_id struct data
+ * @type: xattr type [enum evm_ima_xattr_type]
+ * @algo: hash algorithm [enum hash_algo]
+ * @digest: pointer to the digest to be hashed
+ * @hash: (out) pointer to the hash
+ *
+ * IMA signature version 3 disambiguates the data that is signed by
+ * indirectly signing the hash of the ima_file_id structure data.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int calc_file_id_hash(enum evm_ima_xattr_type type,
+			     enum hash_algo algo, const u8 *digest,
+			     struct ima_max_digest_data *hash)
+{
+	struct ima_file_id file_id = {.hash_type = type, .hash_algorithm = algo};
+	size_t digest_size = hash_digest_size[algo];
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	size_t file_id_size;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (type != IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG && type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG &&
+	    type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[algo], 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+	memcpy(file_id.hash, digest, digest_size);
+
+	/* Calculate the ima_file_id struct hash on the portion used. */
+	file_id_size = sizeof(file_id) - (HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE - digest_size);
+
+	hash->hdr.algo = algo;
+	hash->hdr.length = digest_size;
+	rc = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, (const u8 *)&file_id, file_id_size,
+				     hash->digest);
+
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int asymmetric_verify_v3(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, int siglen,
+			 const char *data, int datalen, u8 algo)
+{
+	struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)sig;
+	struct ima_max_digest_data hash;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = calc_file_id_hash(hdr->type, algo, data, &hash);
+	if (rc)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return asymmetric_verify(keyring, sig, siglen, hash.digest,
+				 hash.hdr.length);
+}