Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"There are two main changes, one feature removal, some code cleanup,
and a number of bug fixes.
Main changes:
- Detecting secure boot mode was limited to IMA. Make detecting
secure boot mode accessible to EVM and other LSMs
- IMA sigv3 support was limited to fsverity. Add IMA sigv3 support
for IMA regular file hashes and EVM portable signatures
Remove:
- Remove IMA support for asychronous hash calculation originally
added for hardware acceleration
Cleanup:
- Remove unnecessary Kconfig CONFIG_MODULE_SIG and CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
tests
- Add descriptions of the IMA atomic flags
Bug fixes:
- Like IMA, properly limit EVM "fix" mode
- Define and call evm_fix_hmac() to update security.evm
- Fallback to using i_version to detect file change for filesystems
that do not support STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE
- Address missing kernel support for configured (new) TPM hash
algorithms
- Add missing crypto_shash_final() return value"
* tag 'integrity-v7.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
evm: Enforce signatures version 3 with new EVM policy 'bit 3'
integrity: Allow sigv3 verification on EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG
ima: add support to require IMA sigv3 signatures
ima: add regular file data hash signature version 3 support
ima: Define asymmetric_verify_v3() to verify IMA sigv3 signatures
ima: remove buggy support for asynchronous hashes
integrity: Eliminate weak definition of arch_get_secureboot()
ima: Add code comments to explain IMA iint cache atomic_flags
ima_fs: Correctly create securityfs files for unsupported hash algos
ima: check return value of crypto_shash_final() in boot aggregate
ima: Define and use a digest_size field in the ima_algo_desc structure
powerpc/ima: Drop unnecessary check for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
ima: efi: Drop unnecessary check for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG/CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
ima: fallback to using i_version to detect file change
evm: fix security.evm for a file with IMA signature
s390: Drop unnecessary CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
evm: Don't enable fix mode when secure boot is enabled
integrity: Make arch_ima_get_secureboot integrity-wide
Commit b5ca117365 ("ima: prevent kexec_load syscall based on runtime
secureboot flag") and commit 268a784049 ("s390/kexec_file: Disable
kexec_load when IPLed secure") disabled the kexec_load syscall based
on the secureboot mode. Commit 9e2b4be377 ("ima: add a new CONFIG
for loading arch-specific policies") needed to detect the secure boot
mode, not to load an IMA architecture specific policy. Since there is
the new CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT, drop
CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT for s390.
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Egorenkov <egorenar@linux.ibm.com>
[Vasily Gorbik: Fix missing arch_get_secureboot() prototype warning]
link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/c00-01.ttbfdx5@ub.hpns/
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Since compat is gone there is only a 64 bit vdso left.
Remove the superfluous "64" suffix everywhere.
Reviewed-by: Jens Remus <jremus@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
All the code is 64 bit, therefore remove the superfluous suffix.
Reviewed-by: Jens Remus <jremus@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Stackprotector support was previously unavailable on s390 because by
default compilers generate code which is not suitable for the kernel:
the canary value is accessed via thread local storage, where the address
of thread local storage is within access registers 0 and 1.
Using those registers also for the kernel would come with a significant
performance impact and more complicated kernel entry/exit code, since
access registers contents would have to be exchanged on every kernel entry
and exit.
With the upcoming gcc 16 release new compiler options will become available
which allow to generate code suitable for the kernel. [1]
Compiler option -mstack-protector-guard=global instructs gcc to generate
stackprotector code that refers to a global stackprotector canary value via
symbol __stack_chk_guard. Access to this value is guaranteed to occur via
larl and lgrl instructions.
Furthermore, compiler option -mstack-protector-guard-record generates a
section containing all code addresses that reference the canary value.
To allow for per task canary values the instructions which load the address
of __stack_chk_guard are patched so they access a lowcore field instead: a
per task canary value is available within the task_struct of each task, and
is written to the per-cpu lowcore location on each context switch.
Also add sanity checks and debugging option to be consistent with other
kernel code patching mechanisms.
Full debugging output can be enabled with the following kernel command line
options:
debug_stackprotector
bootdebug
ignore_loglevel
earlyprintk
dyndbg="file stackprotector.c +p"
Example debug output:
stackprot: 0000021e402d4eda: c010005a9ae3 -> c01f00070240
where "<insn address>: <old insn> -> <new insn>".
[1] gcc commit 0cd1f03939d5 ("s390: Support global stack protector")
Reviewed-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
There shouldn't be any 31 bit code around anymore that matters.
Remove the compat layer support required to run 31 bit code.
Reason for removal is code simplification and reduced test effort.
Note that this comes without any deprecation warnings added to config
options, or kernel messages, since most likely those would be ignored
anyway.
If it turns out there is still a reason to keep the compat layer this
can be reverted at any time in the future.
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Rename perf_pai_crypto.c to perf_pai.c. The new perf_pai.c
contains both PAI device drivers:
- pai_crypto for PAI crypto counter set
- pai_ext for PAI NNPA counter set
The rename reflects this common driver supporting both PMUs.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Polensky <japo@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Combine PAI cryptography and PAI extension (NNPA) PMUs in one driver.
Remove file perf_pai_ext.c and registration of PMU "pai_ext"
from perf_pai_crypto.c.
Includes:
- Shared alloc/free and sched_task handling
- NNPA events with exclude_kernel enforced, exclude_user rejected
- Setup CR0 bits for both PMUs
Signed-off-by: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Polensky <japo@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
The current assumption is that kernel code is always executed with access
key zero, which means that storage key protection does not apply.
However this assumption is not correct: cmpxchg_user_key() may be executed
with a non-zero key; if then the storage key of the page which belongs to
the cmpxchg_user_key() code contains a key with fetch-protection enabled
the result is a protection exception.
For several performance optimizations storage keys are not initialized on
system boot. To keep these optimizations add infrastructure which allows to
define code ranges within functions which are executed with a non-default
key. When such code is executed such functions must explicitly call
skey_regions_initialize().
This will initialize all storage keys belonging to such code ranges in a
way that no protection exceptions happen when the code is executed with a
non-default access key.
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
The extra-y syntax is deprecated. Instead, use always-$(KBUILD_BUILTIN),
which behaves equivalently.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Schier <n.schier@avm.de>
Retrieve electrical power readings for resources in a computing
environment via diag 0x324. diag 0x324 stores the power readings in the
power information block (pib).
Provide power readings from pib via diag324 ioctl interface. diag324
ioctl provides new pib to the user only if the threshold time has passed
since the last call. Otherwise, cache data is returned. When there are
no active readers, cleanup of pib buffer is performed.
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sumanth Korikkar <sumanthk@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Displays the query (fc=0) and query authentication information (fc=127)
as binary in sysfs per CPACF instruction. Files are located in
/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpacf/. These information can be fetched via
asm already except for PCKMO because this instruction is privileged. To
offer a unified interface all CPACF instructions will have this
information displayed in sysfs in files <instruction>_query_raw and
<instruction>_query_auth_info_raw.
A new tool introduced into s390-tools called cpacfinfo will use this
information to convert and display in human readable form.
Suggested-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
When LPAR is in vertical polarization, CPUs get different polarization
values, namely vertical high, vertical medium and vertical low. These
values represent the likelyhood of the CPU getting physical runtime.
Vertical high CPUs will always get runtime and others get varying
runtime depending on the load the CEC is under.
Vertical high and vertical medium CPUs are considered the CPUs which the
current LPAR has the entitlement to run on. The vertical lows are on the
other hand are borrowed CPUs which would only be given to the LPAR by
hipervisor when the other LPARs are not utilizing them.
Using the CPU capacities, hint linux scheduler when it should prioritise
vertical high and vertical medium CPUs over vertical low CPUs.
By tracking various system statistics hiperdispatch determines when to
adjust cpu capacities.
After each adjustment, rebuilding of scheduler domains is necessary to
notify the scheduler about capacity changes but since this operation is
costly it should be done as sparsely as possible.
Acked-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Co-developed-by: Tobias Huschle <huschle@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tobias Huschle <huschle@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mete Durlu <meted@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
When a warning track interrupt is received, the kernel has only a very
limited amount of time to make sure, that the CPU can be yielded as
gracefully as possible before being pre-empted by the hypervisor.
The interrupt handler for the wti therefore unparks a kernel thread
which has being created on boot re-using the CPU hotplug kernel thread
infrastructure. These threads exist per CPU and are assigned the
highest possible real-time priority. This makes sure, that said threads
will execute as soon as possible as the scheduler should pre-empt any
other running user tasks to run the real-time thread.
Furthermore, the interrupt handler disables all I/O interrupts to
prevent additional interrupt processing on the soon-preempted CPU.
Interrupt handlers are likely to take kernel locks, which in the worst
case, will be kept while the interrupt handler is pre-empted from itself
underlying physical CPU. In that case, all tasks or interrupt handlers
on other CPUs would have to wait for the pre-empted CPU being dispatched
again. By preventing further interrupt processing, this risk is
minimized.
Once the CPU gets dispatched again, the real-time kernel thread regains
control, reenables interrupts and parks itself again.
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mete Durlu <meted@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tobias Huschle <huschle@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Removing the CONFIG_PROTECTED_VIRTUALIZATION_GUEST ifdefs and config
option as well as CONFIG_KVM ifdefs in uv files.
Having this configurable has been more of a pain than a help.
It's time to remove the ifdefs and the config option.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Since commit c98d2ecae0 ("s390/mm: Uncouple physical vs virtual address
spaces") the kernel image and module area are within the same 4GB area.
This eliminates the need of a custom insn slot allocator for kprobes within
the kernel image, since standard module_alloc() allocated pages are
sufficient for PC relative instructions with a signed 32 bit offset.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Using __builtin_return_address(n) might return undefined values
when used with values of n outside of the stack. This was noticed
when __builtin_return_address() was called in ftrace on top level
functions like the interrupt handlers.
As this behaviour cannot be fixed, use the s390 stack unwinder and
remove the ftrace compilation flags for unwind_bc.c and stacktrace.c
to prevent the unwinding function polluting function traces.
Another advantage is that this also works with clang.
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Nathan reported below building error:
=====
$ curl -LSso .config https://git.alpinelinux.org/aports/plain/community/linux-edge/config-edge.armv7
$ make -skj"$(nproc)" ARCH=arm CROSS_COMPILE=arm-linux-gnueabi- olddefconfig all
..
arm-linux-gnueabi-ld: arch/arm/kernel/machine_kexec.o: in function `arch_crash_save_vmcoreinfo':
machine_kexec.c:(.text+0x488): undefined reference to `vmcoreinfo_append_str'
====
On architecutres, like arm, s390, ppc, sh, function
arch_crash_save_vmcoreinfo() is located in machine_kexec.c and it can
only be compiled in when CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE=y.
That's not right because arch_crash_save_vmcoreinfo() is used to export
arch specific vmcoreinfo. CONFIG_VMCORE_INFO is supposed to control its
compiling in. However, CONFIG_VMVCORE_INFO could be independent of
CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE, e.g CONFIG_PROC_KCORE=y will select CONFIG_VMVCORE_INFO.
Or CONFIG_KEXEC/CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE is set while CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP is
not set, it will report linking error.
So, on arm, s390, ppc and sh, move arch_crash_save_vmcoreinfo out to
a new file vmcore_info.c. Let CONFIG_VMCORE_INFO decide if compiling in
arch_crash_save_vmcoreinfo().
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove stray newlines at eof]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240129135033.157195-3-bhe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240126045551.GA126645@dev-arch.thelio-3990X/T/#u
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Klara Modin <klarasmodin@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
Cc: Pingfan Liu <piliu@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
The length of the facility list accessed when interpretively executing
STFLE is the same as the hosts facility list (in case of format-0)
The memory following the facility list doesn't need to be accessible.
The current VSIE implementation accesses a fixed length that exceeds the
guest/host facility list length and can therefore wrongly inject a
validity intercept.
Instead, find out the host facility list length by running STFLE and
copy only as much as necessary when shadowing.
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nina Schoetterl-Glausch <nsg@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231219140854.1042599-3-nsg@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <20231219140854.1042599-3-nsg@linux.ibm.com>
Control register handling has nothing to do with low level SMP code.
Move it to a separate file.
Reviewed-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Make machine_kexec.o and relocate_kernel.o depend on
CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE option as other architectures do.
Still generate machine_kexec_reloc.o unconditionally,
since arch_kexec_do_relocs() function is neded by the
decompressor.
Suggested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Enable receiving the user-defined certificates from the s390x
hypervisor via new diagnose 0x320 calls, and make them available to the
Linux root user as 'cert_store_key' type keys in a so-called
'cert_store' keyring.
New user-space interfaces:
/sys/firmware/cert_store/refresh
Writing to this attribute re-fetches certificates via DIAG 0x320
/sys/firmware/cert_store/cs_status
Reading from this attribute returns either of:
"uninitialized"
If no certificate has been retrieved yet
"ok"
If certificates have been successfully retrieved
"failed (<number>)"
If certificate retrieval failed with reason code <number>
New debug trace areas:
/sys/kernel/debug/s390dbf/cert_store_msg
/sys/kernel/debug/s390dbf/cert_store_hexdump
Usage example:
To initiate request for certificates available to the system as root:
$ echo 1 > /sys/firmware/cert_store/refresh
Upon success the '/sys/firmware/cert_store/cs_status' contains
the value 'ok'.
$ cat /sys/firmware/cert_store/cs_status
ok
Get the ID of the keyring 'cert_store':
$ keyctl search @us keyring cert_store
OR
$ keyctl link @us @s; keyctl request keyring cert_store
Obtain list of IDs of certificates:
$ keyctl rlist <cert_store keyring ID>
Display certificate content as hex-dump:
$ keyctl read <certificate ID>
Read certificate contents as binary data:
$ keyctl pipe <certificate ID> >cert_data
Display certificate description:
$ keyctl describe <certificate ID>
The certificate description has the following format:
<64 bytes certificate name in EBCDIC> ':'
<certificate index as obtained from hypervisor> ':'
<certificate store token obtained from hypervisor>
The certificate description in /proc/keys has certificate name
represented in ASCII.
Users can read but cannot update the content of the certificate.
Signed-off-by: Anastasia Eskova <anastasia.eskova@ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
