Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

  IMA:
   - provide ">" and "<" operators for fowner/uid/euid rules

  KEYS:
   - add a system blacklist keyring

   - add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, exposes keyring link restriction
     functionality to userland via keyctl()

  LSM:
   - harden LSM API with __ro_after_init

   - add prlmit security hook, implement for SELinux

   - revive security_task_alloc hook

  TPM:
   - implement contextual TPM command 'spaces'"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (98 commits)
  tpm: Fix reference count to main device
  tpm_tis: convert to using locality callbacks
  tpm: fix handling of the TPM 2.0 event logs
  tpm_crb: remove a cruft constant
  keys: select CONFIG_CRYPTO when selecting DH / KDF
  apparmor: Make path_max parameter readonly
  apparmor: fix parameters so that the permission test is bypassed at boot
  apparmor: fix invalid reference to index variable of iterator line 836
  apparmor: use SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK
  security/apparmor/lsm.c: set debug messages
  apparmor: fix boolreturn.cocci warnings
  Smack: Use GFP_KERNEL for smk_netlbl_mls().
  smack: fix double free in smack_parse_opts_str()
  KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH
  KEYS: Keyring asymmetric key restrict method with chaining
  KEYS: Restrict asymmetric key linkage using a specific keychain
  KEYS: Add a lookup_restriction function for the asymmetric key type
  KEYS: Add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING
  KEYS: Consistent ordering for __key_link_begin and restrict check
  KEYS: Add an optional lookup_restriction hook to key_type
  ...

Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt

@@ -311,3 +311,54 @@ Functions are provided to register and unregister parsers:
 
 Parsers may not have the same name.  The names are otherwise only used for
 displaying in debugging messages.
+
+
+=========================
+KEYRING LINK RESTRICTIONS
+=========================
+
+Keyrings created from userspace using add_key can be configured to check the
+signature of the key being linked.
+
+Several restriction methods are available:
+
+ (1) Restrict using the kernel builtin trusted keyring
+
+     - Option string used with KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING:
+       - "builtin_trusted"
+
+     The kernel builtin trusted keyring will be searched for the signing
+     key. The ca_keys kernel parameter also affects which keys are used for
+     signature verification.
+
+ (2) Restrict using the kernel builtin and secondary trusted keyrings
+
+     - Option string used with KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING:
+       - "builtin_and_secondary_trusted"
+
+     The kernel builtin and secondary trusted keyrings will be searched for the
+     signing key. The ca_keys kernel parameter also affects which keys are used
+     for signature verification.
+
+ (3) Restrict using a separate key or keyring
+
+     - Option string used with KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING:
+       - "key_or_keyring:<key or keyring serial number>[:chain]"
+
+     Whenever a key link is requested, the link will only succeed if the key
+     being linked is signed by one of the designated keys. This key may be
+     specified directly by providing a serial number for one asymmetric key, or
+     a group of keys may be searched for the signing key by providing the
+     serial number for a keyring.
+
+     When the "chain" option is provided at the end of the string, the keys
+     within the destination keyring will also be searched for signing keys.
+     This allows for verification of certificate chains by adding each
+     cert in order (starting closest to the root) to one keyring.
+
+In all of these cases, if the signing key is found the signature of the key to
+be linked will be verified using the signing key.  The requested key is added
+to the keyring only if the signature is successfully verified.  -ENOKEY is
+returned if the parent certificate could not be found, or -EKEYREJECTED is
+returned if the signature check fails or the key is blacklisted.  Other errors
+may be returned if the signature check could not be performed.

Documentation/security/keys.txt

@@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are:
 
        long keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, struct keyctl_dh_params *params,
 		   char *buffer, size_t buflen,
-		   void *reserved);
+		   struct keyctl_kdf_params *kdf);
 
      The params struct contains serial numbers for three keys:
 
@@ -844,18 +844,61 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are:
      public key.  If the base is the remote public key, the result is
      the shared secret.
 
-     The reserved argument must be set to NULL.
+     If the parameter kdf is NULL, the following applies:
 
-     The buffer length must be at least the length of the prime, or zero.
+	 - The buffer length must be at least the length of the prime, or zero.
 
-     If the buffer length is nonzero, the length of the result is
-     returned when it is successfully calculated and copied in to the
-     buffer. When the buffer length is zero, the minimum required
-     buffer length is returned.
+	 - If the buffer length is nonzero, the length of the result is
+	   returned when it is successfully calculated and copied in to the
+	   buffer. When the buffer length is zero, the minimum required
+	   buffer length is returned.
+
+     The kdf parameter allows the caller to apply a key derivation function
+     (KDF) on the Diffie-Hellman computation where only the result
+     of the KDF is returned to the caller. The KDF is characterized with
+     struct keyctl_kdf_params as follows:
+
+	 - char *hashname specifies the NUL terminated string identifying
+	   the hash used from the kernel crypto API and applied for the KDF
+	   operation. The KDF implemenation complies with SP800-56A as well
+	   as with SP800-108 (the counter KDF).
+
+	 - char *otherinfo specifies the OtherInfo data as documented in
+	   SP800-56A section 5.8.1.2. The length of the buffer is given with
+	   otherinfolen. The format of OtherInfo is defined by the caller.
+	   The otherinfo pointer may be NULL if no OtherInfo shall be used.
 
      This function will return error EOPNOTSUPP if the key type is not
      supported, error ENOKEY if the key could not be found, or error
-     EACCES if the key is not readable by the caller.
+     EACCES if the key is not readable by the caller. In addition, the
+     function will return EMSGSIZE when the parameter kdf is non-NULL
+     and either the buffer length or the OtherInfo length exceeds the
+     allowed length.
+
+ (*) Restrict keyring linkage
+
+       long keyctl(KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, key_serial_t keyring,
+		   const char *type, const char *restriction);
+
+     An existing keyring can restrict linkage of additional keys by evaluating
+     the contents of the key according to a restriction scheme.
+
+     "keyring" is the key ID for an existing keyring to apply a restriction
+     to. It may be empty or may already have keys linked. Existing linked keys
+     will remain in the keyring even if the new restriction would reject them.
+
+     "type" is a registered key type.
+
+     "restriction" is a string describing how key linkage is to be restricted.
+     The format varies depending on the key type, and the string is passed to
+     the lookup_restriction() function for the requested type.  It may specify
+     a method and relevant data for the restriction such as signature
+     verification or constraints on key payload. If the requested key type is
+     later unregistered, no keys may be added to the keyring after the key type
+     is removed.
+
+     To apply a keyring restriction the process must have Set Attribute
+     permission and the keyring must not be previously restricted.
 
 ===============
 KERNEL SERVICES
@@ -1032,10 +1075,7 @@ payload contents" for more information.
 	struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
 				  const struct cred *cred,
 				  key_perm_t perm,
-				  int (*restrict_link)(struct key *,
-						       const struct key_type *,
-						       unsigned long,
-						       const union key_payload *),
+				  struct key_restriction *restrict_link,
 				  unsigned long flags,
 				  struct key *dest);
 
@@ -1047,20 +1087,23 @@ payload contents" for more information.
     KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA in flags if the keyring shouldn't be accounted
     towards the user's quota).  Error ENOMEM can also be returned.
 
-    If restrict_link not NULL, it should point to a function that will be
-    called each time an attempt is made to link a key into the new keyring.
-    This function is called to check whether a key may be added into the keying
-    or not.  Callers of key_create_or_update() within the kernel can pass
-    KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION to suppress the check.  An example of using
-    this is to manage rings of cryptographic keys that are set up when the
-    kernel boots where userspace is also permitted to add keys - provided they
-    can be verified by a key the kernel already has.
+    If restrict_link is not NULL, it should point to a structure that contains
+    the function that will be called each time an attempt is made to link a
+    key into the new keyring.  The structure may also contain a key pointer
+    and an associated key type.  The function is called to check whether a key
+    may be added into the keyring or not.  The key type is used by the garbage
+    collector to clean up function or data pointers in this structure if the
+    given key type is unregistered.  Callers of key_create_or_update() within
+    the kernel can pass KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION to suppress the check.
+    An example of using this is to manage rings of cryptographic keys that are
+    set up when the kernel boots where userspace is also permitted to add keys
+    - provided they can be verified by a key the kernel already has.
 
     When called, the restriction function will be passed the keyring being
-    added to, the key flags value and the type and payload of the key being
-    added.  Note that when a new key is being created, this is called between
-    payload preparsing and actual key creation.  The function should return 0
-    to allow the link or an error to reject it.
+    added to, the key type, the payload of the key being added, and data to be
+    used in the restriction check.  Note that when a new key is being created,
+    this is called between payload preparsing and actual key creation.  The
+    function should return 0 to allow the link or an error to reject it.
 
     A convenience function, restrict_link_reject, exists to always return
     -EPERM to in this case.
@@ -1445,6 +1488,15 @@ The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory:
      	 The authorisation key.
 
 
+ (*) struct key_restriction *(*lookup_restriction)(const char *params);
+
+     This optional method is used to enable userspace configuration of keyring
+     restrictions. The restriction parameter string (not including the key type
+     name) is passed in, and this method returns a pointer to a key_restriction
+     structure containing the relevant functions and data to evaluate each
+     attempted key link operation. If there is no match, -EINVAL is returned.
+
+
 ============================
 REQUEST-KEY CALLBACK SERVICE
 ============================

certs/Kconfig

@@ -64,4 +64,22 @@ config SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 	  those keys are not blacklisted and are vouched for by a key built
 	  into the kernel or already in the secondary trusted keyring.
 
+config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
+	bool "Provide system-wide ring of blacklisted keys"
+	depends on KEYS
+	help
+	  Provide a system keyring to which blacklisted keys can be added.
+	  Keys in the keyring are considered entirely untrusted.  Keys in this
+	  keyring are used by the module signature checking to reject loading
+	  of modules signed with a blacklisted key.
+
+config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST
+	string "Hashes to be preloaded into the system blacklist keyring"
+	depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
+	help
+	  If set, this option should be the filename of a list of hashes in the
+	  form "<hash>", "<hash>", ... .  This will be included into a C
+	  wrapper to incorporate the list into the kernel.  Each <hash> should
+	  be a string of hex digits.
+
 endmenu

certs/Makefile

@@ -3,6 +3,12 @@
 #
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += system_keyring.o system_certificates.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist.o
+ifneq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST),"")
+obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist_hashes.o
+else
+obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist_nohashes.o
+endif
 
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING),y)
 

certs/blacklist.c

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+/* System hash blacklist.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "blacklist: "fmt
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include "blacklist.h"
+
+static struct key *blacklist_keyring;
+
+/*
+ * The description must be a type prefix, a colon and then an even number of
+ * hex digits.  The hash is kept in the description.
+ */
+static int blacklist_vet_description(const char *desc)
+{
+	int n = 0;
+
+	if (*desc == ':')
+		return -EINVAL;
+	for (; *desc; desc++)
+		if (*desc == ':')
+			goto found_colon;
+	return -EINVAL;
+
+found_colon:
+	desc++;
+	for (; *desc; desc++) {
+		if (!isxdigit(*desc))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		n++;
+	}
+
+	if (n == 0 || n & 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The hash to be blacklisted is expected to be in the description.  There will
+ * be no payload.
+ */
+static int blacklist_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	if (prep->datalen > 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void blacklist_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+}
+
+static void blacklist_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
+{
+	seq_puts(m, key->description);
+}
+
+static struct key_type key_type_blacklist = {
+	.name			= "blacklist",
+	.vet_description	= blacklist_vet_description,
+	.preparse		= blacklist_preparse,
+	.free_preparse		= blacklist_free_preparse,
+	.instantiate		= generic_key_instantiate,
+	.describe		= blacklist_describe,
+};
+
+/**
+ * mark_hash_blacklisted - Add a hash to the system blacklist
+ * @hash - The hash as a hex string with a type prefix (eg. "tbs:23aa429783")
+ */
+int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)
+{
+	key_ref_t key;
+
+	key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true),
+				   "blacklist",
+				   hash,
+				   NULL,
+				   0,
+				   ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+				    KEY_USR_VIEW),
+				   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
+				   KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN);
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		pr_err("Problem blacklisting hash (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(key));
+		return PTR_ERR(key);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * is_hash_blacklisted - Determine if a hash is blacklisted
+ * @hash: The hash to be checked as a binary blob
+ * @hash_len: The length of the binary hash
+ * @type: Type of hash
+ */
+int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len, const char *type)
+{
+	key_ref_t kref;
+	size_t type_len = strlen(type);
+	char *buffer, *p;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	buffer = kmalloc(type_len + 1 + hash_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	p = memcpy(buffer, type, type_len);
+	p += type_len;
+	*p++ = ':';
+	bin2hex(p, hash, hash_len);
+	p += hash_len * 2;
+	*p = 0;
+
+	kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true),
+			      &key_type_blacklist, buffer);
+	if (!IS_ERR(kref)) {
+		key_ref_put(kref);
+		ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+	}
+
+	kfree(buffer);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(is_hash_blacklisted);
+
+/*
+ * Intialise the blacklist
+ */
+static int __init blacklist_init(void)
+{
+	const char *const *bl;
+
+	if (register_key_type(&key_type_blacklist) < 0)
+		panic("Can't allocate system blacklist key type\n");
+
+	blacklist_keyring =
+		keyring_alloc(".blacklist",
+			      KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0),
+			      current_cred(),
+			      (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+			      KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
+			      KEY_USR_SEARCH,
+			      KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
+			      KEY_FLAG_KEEP,
+			      NULL, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(blacklist_keyring))
+		panic("Can't allocate system blacklist keyring\n");
+
+	for (bl = blacklist_hashes; *bl; bl++)
+		if (mark_hash_blacklisted(*bl) < 0)
+			pr_err("- blacklisting failed\n");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring.
+ */
+device_initcall(blacklist_init);

certs/blacklist.h

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+
+extern const char __initdata *const blacklist_hashes[];

certs/blacklist_hashes.c

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+#include "blacklist.h"
+
+const char __initdata *const blacklist_hashes[] = {
+#include CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST
+	, NULL
+};

certs/blacklist_nohashes.c

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#include "blacklist.h"
+
+const char __initdata *const blacklist_hashes[] = {
+	NULL
+};

certs/system_keyring.c

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/cred.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
 #include <keys/system_keyring.h>
 #include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
@@ -32,11 +33,13 @@ extern __initconst const unsigned long system_certificate_list_size;
  * Restrict the addition of keys into a keyring based on the key-to-be-added
  * being vouched for by a key in the built in system keyring.
  */
-int restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted(struct key *keyring,
+int restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted(struct key *dest_keyring,
 				     const struct key_type *type,
-				     const union key_payload *payload)
+				     const union key_payload *payload,
+				     struct key *restriction_key)
 {
-	return restrict_link_by_signature(builtin_trusted_keys, type, payload);
+	return restrict_link_by_signature(dest_keyring, type, payload,
+					  builtin_trusted_keys);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
@@ -49,20 +52,40 @@ int restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted(struct key *keyring,
  * keyrings.
  */
 int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted(
-	struct key *keyring,
+	struct key *dest_keyring,
 	const struct key_type *type,
-	const union key_payload *payload)
+	const union key_payload *payload,
+	struct key *restrict_key)
 {
 	/* If we have a secondary trusted keyring, then that contains a link
 	 * through to the builtin keyring and the search will follow that link.
 	 */
 	if (type == &key_type_keyring &&
-	    keyring == secondary_trusted_keys &&
+	    dest_keyring == secondary_trusted_keys &&
 	    payload == &builtin_trusted_keys->payload)
 		/* Allow the builtin keyring to be added to the secondary */
 		return 0;
 
-	return restrict_link_by_signature(secondary_trusted_keys, type, payload);
+	return restrict_link_by_signature(dest_keyring, type, payload,
+					  secondary_trusted_keys);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Allocate a struct key_restriction for the "builtin and secondary trust"
+ * keyring. Only for use in system_trusted_keyring_init().
+ */
+static __init struct key_restriction *get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(void)
+{
+	struct key_restriction *restriction;
+
+	restriction = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_restriction), GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	if (!restriction)
+		panic("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring restriction\n");
+
+	restriction->check = restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted;
+
+	return restriction;
 }
 #endif
 
@@ -91,7 +114,7 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)
 			       KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH |
 			       KEY_USR_WRITE),
 			      KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
-			      restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted,
+			      get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(),
 			      NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(secondary_trusted_keys))
 		panic("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring\n");

crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
 #include "asymmetric_keys.h"
 
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
@@ -451,15 +452,100 @@ static void asymmetric_key_destroy(struct key *key)
 	asymmetric_key_free_kids(kids);
 }
 
+static struct key_restriction *asymmetric_restriction_alloc(
+	key_restrict_link_func_t check,
+	struct key *key)
+{
+	struct key_restriction *keyres =
+		kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_restriction), GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	if (!keyres)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	keyres->check = check;
+	keyres->key = key;
+	keyres->keytype = &key_type_asymmetric;
+
+	return keyres;
+}
+
+/*
+ * look up keyring restrict functions for asymmetric keys
+ */
+static struct key_restriction *asymmetric_lookup_restriction(
+	const char *restriction)
+{
+	char *restrict_method;
+	char *parse_buf;
+	char *next;
+	struct key_restriction *ret = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	if (strcmp("builtin_trusted", restriction) == 0)
+		return asymmetric_restriction_alloc(
+			restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted, NULL);
+
+	if (strcmp("builtin_and_secondary_trusted", restriction) == 0)
+		return asymmetric_restriction_alloc(
+			restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted, NULL);
+
+	parse_buf = kstrndup(restriction, PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!parse_buf)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	next = parse_buf;
+	restrict_method = strsep(&next, ":");
+
+	if ((strcmp(restrict_method, "key_or_keyring") == 0) && next) {
+		char *key_text;
+		key_serial_t serial;
+		struct key *key;
+		key_restrict_link_func_t link_fn =
+			restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring;
+		bool allow_null_key = false;
+
+		key_text = strsep(&next, ":");
+
+		if (next) {
+			if (strcmp(next, "chain") != 0)
+				goto out;
+
+			link_fn = restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain;
+			allow_null_key = true;
+		}
+
+		if (kstrtos32(key_text, 0, &serial) < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		if ((serial == 0) && allow_null_key) {
+			key = NULL;
+		} else {
+			key = key_lookup(serial);
+			if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+				ret = ERR_CAST(key);
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+
+		ret = asymmetric_restriction_alloc(link_fn, key);
+		if (IS_ERR(ret))
+			key_put(key);
+	}
+
+out:
+	kfree(parse_buf);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = {
-	.name		= "asymmetric",
-	.preparse	= asymmetric_key_preparse,
-	.free_preparse	= asymmetric_key_free_preparse,
-	.instantiate	= generic_key_instantiate,
-	.match_preparse	= asymmetric_key_match_preparse,
-	.match_free	= asymmetric_key_match_free,
-	.destroy	= asymmetric_key_destroy,
-	.describe	= asymmetric_key_describe,
+	.name			= "asymmetric",
+	.preparse		= asymmetric_key_preparse,
+	.free_preparse		= asymmetric_key_free_preparse,
+	.instantiate		= generic_key_instantiate,
+	.match_preparse		= asymmetric_key_match_preparse,
+	.match_free		= asymmetric_key_match_free,
+	.destroy		= asymmetric_key_destroy,
+	.describe		= asymmetric_key_describe,
+	.lookup_restriction	= asymmetric_lookup_restriction,
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_asymmetric);
 

crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ struct pkcs7_signed_info {
 	struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Signing certificate (in msg->certs) */
 	unsigned	index;
 	bool		unsupported_crypto;	/* T if not usable due to missing crypto */
+	bool		blacklisted;
 
 	/* Message digest - the digest of the Content Data (or NULL) */
 	const void	*msgdigest;

crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c

@@ -190,6 +190,18 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 			 x509->subject,
 			 x509->raw_serial_size, x509->raw_serial);
 		x509->seen = true;
+
+		if (x509->blacklisted) {
+			/* If this cert is blacklisted, then mark everything
+			 * that depends on this as blacklisted too.
+			 */
+			sinfo->blacklisted = true;
+			for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer)
+				p->blacklisted = true;
+			pr_debug("- blacklisted\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+
 		if (x509->unsupported_key)
 			goto unsupported_crypto_in_x509;
 
@@ -357,17 +369,19 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
  *
  *  (*) -EBADMSG if some part of the message was invalid, or:
  *
- *  (*) -ENOPKG if none of the signature chains are verifiable because suitable
- *	crypto modules couldn't be found, or:
+ *  (*) 0 if no signature chains were found to be blacklisted or to contain
+ *	unsupported crypto, or:
  *
- *  (*) 0 if all the signature chains that don't incur -ENOPKG can be verified
- *	(note that a signature chain may be of zero length), or:
+ *  (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a blacklisted key was encountered, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) -ENOPKG if none of the signature chains are verifiable because suitable
+ *	crypto modules couldn't be found.
  */
 int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 		 enum key_being_used_for usage)
 {
 	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
-	int enopkg = -ENOPKG;
+	int actual_ret = -ENOPKG;
 	int ret;
 
 	kenter("");
@@ -412,6 +426,8 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 
 	for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
 		ret = pkcs7_verify_one(pkcs7, sinfo);
+		if (sinfo->blacklisted && actual_ret == -ENOPKG)
+			actual_ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
 		if (ret < 0) {
 			if (ret == -ENOPKG) {
 				sinfo->unsupported_crypto = true;
@@ -420,11 +436,11 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 			kleave(" = %d", ret);
 			return ret;
 		}
-		enopkg = 0;
+		actual_ret = 0;
 	}
 
-	kleave(" = %d", enopkg);
-	return enopkg;
+	kleave(" = %d", actual_ret);
+	return actual_ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_verify);
 

crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c

@@ -56,9 +56,10 @@ __setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
 
 /**
  * restrict_link_by_signature - Restrict additions to a ring of public keys
- * @trust_keyring: A ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert.
+ * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
  * @type: The type of key being added.
  * @payload: The payload of the new key.
+ * @trust_keyring: A ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert.
  *
  * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring.  If one of
  * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the
@@ -69,9 +70,10 @@ __setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
  * signature check fails or the key is blacklisted and some other error if
  * there is a matching certificate but the signature check cannot be performed.
  */
-int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *trust_keyring,
+int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
 			       const struct key_type *type,
-			       const union key_payload *payload)
+			       const union key_payload *payload,
+			       struct key *trust_keyring)
 {
 	const struct public_key_signature *sig;
 	struct key *key;
@@ -106,3 +108,156 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *trust_keyring,
 	key_put(key);
 	return ret;
 }
+
+static bool match_either_id(const struct asymmetric_key_ids *pair,
+			    const struct asymmetric_key_id *single)
+{
+	return (asymmetric_key_id_same(pair->id[0], single) ||
+		asymmetric_key_id_same(pair->id[1], single));
+}
+
+static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring,
+				 const struct key_type *type,
+				 const union key_payload *payload,
+				 struct key *trusted, bool check_dest)
+{
+	const struct public_key_signature *sig;
+	struct key *key = NULL;
+	int ret;
+
+	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	if (!dest_keyring)
+		return -ENOKEY;
+	else if (dest_keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (!trusted && !check_dest)
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	sig = payload->data[asym_auth];
+	if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1])
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	if (trusted) {
+		if (trusted->type == &key_type_keyring) {
+			/* See if we have a key that signed this one. */
+			key = find_asymmetric_key(trusted, sig->auth_ids[0],
+						  sig->auth_ids[1], false);
+			if (IS_ERR(key))
+				key = NULL;
+		} else if (trusted->type == &key_type_asymmetric) {
+			const struct asymmetric_key_ids *signer_ids;
+
+			signer_ids = asymmetric_key_ids(trusted);
+
+			/*
+			 * The auth_ids come from the candidate key (the
+			 * one that is being considered for addition to
+			 * dest_keyring) and identify the key that was
+			 * used to sign.
+			 *
+			 * The signer_ids are identifiers for the
+			 * signing key specified for dest_keyring.
+			 *
+			 * The first auth_id is the preferred id, and
+			 * the second is the fallback. If only one
+			 * auth_id is present, it may match against
+			 * either signer_id. If two auth_ids are
+			 * present, the first auth_id must match one
+			 * signer_id and the second auth_id must match
+			 * the second signer_id.
+			 */
+			if (!sig->auth_ids[0] || !sig->auth_ids[1]) {
+				const struct asymmetric_key_id *auth_id;
+
+				auth_id = sig->auth_ids[0] ?: sig->auth_ids[1];
+				if (match_either_id(signer_ids, auth_id))
+					key = __key_get(trusted);
+
+			} else if (asymmetric_key_id_same(signer_ids->id[1],
+							  sig->auth_ids[1]) &&
+				   match_either_id(signer_ids,
+						   sig->auth_ids[0])) {
+				key = __key_get(trusted);
+			}
+		} else {
+			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (check_dest && !key) {
+		/* See if the destination has a key that signed this one. */
+		key = find_asymmetric_key(dest_keyring, sig->auth_ids[0],
+					  sig->auth_ids[1], false);
+		if (IS_ERR(key))
+			key = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!key)
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	ret = key_validate(key);
+	if (ret == 0)
+		ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
+
+	key_put(key);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring - Restrict additions to a ring of public
+ * keys using the restrict_key information stored in the ring.
+ * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
+ * @type: The type of key being added.
+ * @payload: The payload of the new key.
+ * @trusted: A key or ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert.
+ *
+ * Check the new certificate only against the key or keys passed in the data
+ * parameter. If one of those is the signing key and validates the new
+ * certificate, then mark the new certificate as being ok to link.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we
+ * couldn't find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list,
+ * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, and some other error if
+ * there is a matching certificate but the signature check cannot be
+ * performed.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring(struct key *dest_keyring,
+				    const struct key_type *type,
+				    const union key_payload *payload,
+				    struct key *trusted)
+{
+	return key_or_keyring_common(dest_keyring, type, payload, trusted,
+				     false);
+}
+
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain - Restrict additions to a ring of
+ * public keys using the restrict_key information stored in the ring.
+ * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
+ * @type: The type of key being added.
+ * @payload: The payload of the new key.
+ * @trusted: A key or ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert.
+ *
+ * Check the new certificate only against the key or keys passed in the data
+ * parameter. If one of those is the signing key and validates the new
+ * certificate, then mark the new certificate as being ok to link.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we
+ * couldn't find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list,
+ * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, and some other error if
+ * there is a matching certificate but the signature check cannot be
+ * performed.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain(struct key *dest_keyring,
+					  const struct key_type *type,
+					  const union key_payload *payload,
+					  struct key *trusted)
+{
+	return key_or_keyring_common(dest_keyring, type, payload, trusted,
+				     true);
+}

crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h

@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ struct x509_certificate {
 	bool		self_signed;		/* T if self-signed (check unsupported_sig too) */
 	bool		unsupported_key;	/* T if key uses unsupported crypto */
 	bool		unsupported_sig;	/* T if signature uses unsupported crypto */
+	bool		blacklisted;
 };
 
 /*

crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c

@@ -84,6 +84,16 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
 		goto error_2;
 	might_sleep();
 	ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, sig->digest);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_2;
+
+	ret = is_hash_blacklisted(sig->digest, sig->digest_size, "tbs");
+	if (ret == -EKEYREJECTED) {
+		pr_err("Cert %*phN is blacklisted\n",
+		       sig->digest_size, sig->digest);
+		cert->blacklisted = true;
+		ret = 0;
+	}
 
 error_2:
 	kfree(desc);
@@ -186,6 +196,11 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 			 cert->sig->pkey_algo, cert->sig->hash_algo);
 	}
 
+	/* Don't permit addition of blacklisted keys */
+	ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+	if (cert->blacklisted)
+		goto error_free_cert;
+
 	/* Propose a description */
 	sulen = strlen(cert->subject);
 	if (cert->raw_skid) {

drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ menuconfig TCG_TPM
 	tristate "TPM Hardware Support"
 	depends on HAS_IOMEM
 	select SECURITYFS
+	select CRYPTO
 	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
 	---help---
 	  If you have a TPM security chip in your system, which
@@ -135,7 +136,7 @@ config TCG_XEN
 
 config TCG_CRB
 	tristate "TPM 2.0 CRB Interface"
-	depends on X86 && ACPI
+	depends on ACPI
 	---help---
 	  If you have a TPM security chip that is compliant with the
 	  TCG CRB 2.0 TPM specification say Yes and it will be accessible

drivers/char/tpm/Makefile

@@ -3,7 +3,8 @@
 #
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) += tpm.o
 tpm-y := tpm-interface.o tpm-dev.o tpm-sysfs.o tpm-chip.o tpm2-cmd.o \
-		tpm1_eventlog.o tpm2_eventlog.o
+	 tpm-dev-common.o tpmrm-dev.o tpm1_eventlog.o tpm2_eventlog.o \
+         tpm2-space.o
 tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o tpm_acpi.o
 tpm-$(CONFIG_OF) += tpm_of.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_CORE) += tpm_tis_core.o

drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/i2c.c

@@ -111,6 +111,13 @@ static const struct st33zp24_phy_ops i2c_phy_ops = {
 	.recv = st33zp24_i2c_recv,
 };
 
+static const struct acpi_gpio_params lpcpd_gpios = { 1, 0, false };
+
+static const struct acpi_gpio_mapping acpi_st33zp24_gpios[] = {
+	{ "lpcpd-gpios", &lpcpd_gpios, 1 },
+	{},
+};
+
 static int st33zp24_i2c_acpi_request_resources(struct i2c_client *client)
 {
 	struct tpm_chip *chip = i2c_get_clientdata(client);
@@ -118,10 +125,14 @@ static int st33zp24_i2c_acpi_request_resources(struct i2c_client *client)
 	struct st33zp24_i2c_phy *phy = tpm_dev->phy_id;
 	struct gpio_desc *gpiod_lpcpd;
 	struct device *dev = &client->dev;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = acpi_dev_add_driver_gpios(ACPI_COMPANION(dev), acpi_st33zp24_gpios);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	/* Get LPCPD GPIO from ACPI */
-	gpiod_lpcpd = devm_gpiod_get_index(dev, "TPM IO LPCPD", 1,
-					   GPIOD_OUT_HIGH);
+	gpiod_lpcpd = devm_gpiod_get(dev, "lpcpd", GPIOD_OUT_HIGH);
 	if (IS_ERR(gpiod_lpcpd)) {
 		dev_err(&client->dev,
 			"Failed to retrieve lpcpd-gpios from acpi.\n");
@@ -268,8 +279,14 @@ static int st33zp24_i2c_probe(struct i2c_client *client,
 static int st33zp24_i2c_remove(struct i2c_client *client)
 {
 	struct tpm_chip *chip = i2c_get_clientdata(client);
+	int ret;
 
-	return st33zp24_remove(chip);
+	ret = st33zp24_remove(chip);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	acpi_dev_remove_driver_gpios(ACPI_COMPANION(&client->dev));
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static const struct i2c_device_id st33zp24_i2c_id[] = {

drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/spi.c

@@ -230,6 +230,13 @@ static const struct st33zp24_phy_ops spi_phy_ops = {
 	.recv = st33zp24_spi_recv,
 };
 
+static const struct acpi_gpio_params lpcpd_gpios = { 1, 0, false };
+
+static const struct acpi_gpio_mapping acpi_st33zp24_gpios[] = {
+	{ "lpcpd-gpios", &lpcpd_gpios, 1 },
+	{},
+};
+
 static int st33zp24_spi_acpi_request_resources(struct spi_device *spi_dev)
 {
 	struct tpm_chip *chip = spi_get_drvdata(spi_dev);
@@ -237,10 +244,14 @@ static int st33zp24_spi_acpi_request_resources(struct spi_device *spi_dev)
 	struct st33zp24_spi_phy *phy = tpm_dev->phy_id;
 	struct gpio_desc *gpiod_lpcpd;
 	struct device *dev = &spi_dev->dev;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = acpi_dev_add_driver_gpios(ACPI_COMPANION(dev), acpi_st33zp24_gpios);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	/* Get LPCPD GPIO from ACPI */
-	gpiod_lpcpd = devm_gpiod_get_index(dev, "TPM IO LPCPD", 1,
-					   GPIOD_OUT_HIGH);
+	gpiod_lpcpd = devm_gpiod_get(dev, "lpcpd", GPIOD_OUT_HIGH);
 	if (IS_ERR(gpiod_lpcpd)) {
 		dev_err(dev, "Failed to retrieve lpcpd-gpios from acpi.\n");
 		phy->io_lpcpd = -1;
@@ -385,8 +396,14 @@ static int st33zp24_spi_probe(struct spi_device *dev)
 static int st33zp24_spi_remove(struct spi_device *dev)
 {
 	struct tpm_chip *chip = spi_get_drvdata(dev);
+	int ret;
 
-	return st33zp24_remove(chip);
+	ret = st33zp24_remove(chip);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	acpi_dev_remove_driver_gpios(ACPI_COMPANION(&dev->dev));
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static const struct spi_device_id st33zp24_spi_id[] = {

drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/st33zp24.c

@@ -117,9 +117,9 @@ static u8 st33zp24_status(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 /*
  * check_locality if the locality is active
  * @param: chip, the tpm chip description
- * @return: the active locality or -EACCESS.
+ * @return: true if LOCALITY0 is active, otherwise false
  */
-static int check_locality(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+static bool check_locality(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 {
 	struct st33zp24_dev *tpm_dev = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev);
 	u8 data;
@@ -129,9 +129,9 @@ static int check_locality(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	if (status && (data &
 		(TPM_ACCESS_ACTIVE_LOCALITY | TPM_ACCESS_VALID)) ==
 		(TPM_ACCESS_ACTIVE_LOCALITY | TPM_ACCESS_VALID))
-		return tpm_dev->locality;
+		return true;
 
-	return -EACCES;
+	return false;
 } /* check_locality() */
 
 /*
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ static int request_locality(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	long ret;
 	u8 data;
 
-	if (check_locality(chip) == tpm_dev->locality)
+	if (check_locality(chip))
 		return tpm_dev->locality;
 
 	data = TPM_ACCESS_REQUEST_USE;
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static int request_locality(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 
 	/* Request locality is usually effective after the request */
 	do {
-		if (check_locality(chip) >= 0)
+		if (check_locality(chip))
 			return tpm_dev->locality;
 		msleep(TPM_TIMEOUT);
 	} while (time_before(jiffies, stop));