Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/bonzini/tags/for-upstream-sev' into staging

* Migrate MSR_SMI_COUNT (Liran)
* Update kernel headers (Gerd, myself)
* SEV support (Brijesh)

I have not tested non-x86 compilation, but I reordered the SEV patches
so that all non-x86-specific changes go first to catch any possible
issues (which weren't there anyway :)).

# gpg: Signature made Tue 13 Mar 2018 16:37:06 GMT
# gpg:                using RSA key BFFBD25F78C7AE83
# gpg: Good signature from "Paolo Bonzini <bonzini@gnu.org>"
# gpg:                 aka "Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>"
# Primary key fingerprint: 46F5 9FBD 57D6 12E7 BFD4  E2F7 7E15 100C CD36 69B1
#      Subkey fingerprint: F133 3857 4B66 2389 866C  7682 BFFB D25F 78C7 AE83

* remotes/bonzini/tags/for-upstream-sev: (22 commits)
  sev/i386: add sev_get_capabilities()
  sev/i386: qmp: add query-sev-capabilities command
  sev/i386: qmp: add query-sev-launch-measure command
  sev/i386: hmp: add 'info sev' command
  cpu/i386: populate CPUID 0x8000_001F when SEV is active
  sev/i386: add migration blocker
  sev/i386: finalize the SEV guest launch flow
  sev/i386: add support to LAUNCH_MEASURE command
  target/i386: encrypt bios rom
  sev/i386: add command to encrypt guest memory region
  sev/i386: add command to create launch memory encryption context
  sev/i386: register the guest memory range which may contain encrypted data
  sev/i386: add command to initialize the memory encryption context
  include: add psp-sev.h header file
  sev/i386: qmp: add query-sev command
  target/i386: add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) object
  kvm: introduce memory encryption APIs
  kvm: add memory encryption context
  docs: add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)
  machine: add memory-encryption option
  ...

Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
This commit is contained in:
Peter Maydell
2018-03-15 16:49:30 +00:00
46 changed files with 2653 additions and 420 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_SOFTMMU) += accel.o
obj-y += kvm/
obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += kvm/
obj-$(CONFIG_TCG) += tcg/
obj-y += stubs/
+2 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += kvm-all.o
obj-y += kvm-all.o
obj-$(call lnot,$(CONFIG_SEV)) += sev-stub.o
+39
View File
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
#include "qemu/event_notifier.h"
#include "trace.h"
#include "hw/irq.h"
#include "sysemu/sev.h"
#include "hw/boards.h"
@@ -103,6 +104,10 @@ struct KVMState
#endif
KVMMemoryListener memory_listener;
QLIST_HEAD(, KVMParkedVcpu) kvm_parked_vcpus;
/* memory encryption */
void *memcrypt_handle;
int (*memcrypt_encrypt_data)(void *handle, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len);
};
KVMState *kvm_state;
@@ -138,6 +143,26 @@ int kvm_get_max_memslots(void)
return s->nr_slots;
}
bool kvm_memcrypt_enabled(void)
{
if (kvm_state && kvm_state->memcrypt_handle) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
int kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len)
{
if (kvm_state->memcrypt_handle &&
kvm_state->memcrypt_encrypt_data) {
return kvm_state->memcrypt_encrypt_data(kvm_state->memcrypt_handle,
ptr, len);
}
return 1;
}
static KVMSlot *kvm_get_free_slot(KVMMemoryListener *kml)
{
KVMState *s = kvm_state;
@@ -1636,6 +1661,20 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms)
kvm_state = s;
/*
* if memory encryption object is specified then initialize the memory
* encryption context.
*/
if (ms->memory_encryption) {
kvm_state->memcrypt_handle = sev_guest_init(ms->memory_encryption);
if (!kvm_state->memcrypt_handle) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
kvm_state->memcrypt_encrypt_data = sev_encrypt_data;
}
ret = kvm_arch_init(ms, s);
if (ret < 0) {
goto err;
+26
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
/*
* QEMU SEV stub
*
* Copyright Advanced Micro Devices 2018
*
* Authors:
* Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
*
* This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or later.
* See the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
*
*/
#include "qemu/osdep.h"
#include "qemu-common.h"
#include "sysemu/sev.h"
int sev_encrypt_data(void *handle, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len)
{
abort();
}
void *sev_guest_init(const char *id)
{
return NULL;
}
+10
View File
@@ -105,6 +105,16 @@ int kvm_on_sigbus(int code, void *addr)
return 1;
}
bool kvm_memcrypt_enabled(void)
{
return false;
}
int kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len)
{
return 1;
}
#ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
int kvm_irqchip_add_msi_route(KVMState *s, int vector, PCIDevice *dev)
{
+1
View File
@@ -63,3 +63,4 @@ CONFIG_PXB=y
CONFIG_ACPI_VMGENID=y
CONFIG_FW_CFG_DMA=y
CONFIG_I2C=y
CONFIG_SEV=$(CONFIG_KVM)
+1
View File
@@ -63,3 +63,4 @@ CONFIG_PXB=y
CONFIG_ACPI_VMGENID=y
CONFIG_FW_CFG_DMA=y
CONFIG_I2C=y
CONFIG_SEV=$(CONFIG_KVM)
+109
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is a feature found on AMD processors.
SEV is an extension to the AMD-V architecture which supports running encrypted
virtual machine (VMs) under the control of KVM. Encrypted VMs have their pages
(code and data) secured such that only the guest itself has access to the
unencrypted version. Each encrypted VM is associated with a unique encryption
key; if its data is accessed to a different entity using a different key the
encrypted guests data will be incorrectly decrypted, leading to unintelligible
data.
The key management of this feature is handled by separate processor known as
AMD secure processor (AMD-SP) which is present in AMD SOCs. Firmware running
inside the AMD-SP provide commands to support common VM lifecycle. This
includes commands for launching, snapshotting, migrating and debugging the
encrypted guest. Those SEV command can be issued via KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP
ioctls.
Launching
---------
Boot images (such as bios) must be encrypted before guest can be booted.
MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl provides commands to encrypt the images :LAUNCH_START,
LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, LAUNCH_MEASURE and LAUNCH_FINISH. These four commands
together generate a fresh memory encryption key for the VM, encrypt the boot
images and provide a measurement than can be used as an attestation of the
successful launch.
LAUNCH_START is called first to create a cryptographic launch context within
the firmware. To create this context, guest owner must provides guest policy,
its public Diffie-Hellman key (PDH) and session parameters. These inputs
should be treated as binary blob and must be passed as-is to the SEV firmware.
The guest policy is passed as plaintext and hypervisor may able to read it
but should not modify it (any modification of the policy bits will result
in bad measurement). The guest policy is a 4-byte data structure containing
several flags that restricts what can be done on running SEV guest.
See KM Spec section 3 and 6.2 for more details.
The guest policy can be provided via the 'policy' property (see below)
# ${QEMU} \
sev-guest,id=sev0,policy=0x1...\
Guest owners provided DH certificate and session parameters will be used to
establish a cryptographic session with the guest owner to negotiate keys used
for the attestation.
The DH certificate and session blob can be provided via 'dh-cert-file' and
'session-file' property (see below
# ${QEMU} \
sev-guest,id=sev0,dh-cert-file=<file1>,session-file=<file2>
LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA encrypts the memory region using the cryptographic context
created via LAUNCH_START command. If required, this command can be called
multiple times to encrypt different memory regions. The command also calculates
the measurement of the memory contents as it encrypts.
LAUNCH_MEASURE command can be used to retrieve the measurement of encrypted
memory. This measurement is a signature of the memory contents that can be
sent to the guest owner as an attestation that the memory was encrypted
correctly by the firmware. The guest owner may wait to provide the guest
confidential information until it can verify the attestation measurement.
Since the guest owner knows the initial contents of the guest at boot, the
attestation measurement can be verified by comparing it to what the guest owner
expects.
LAUNCH_FINISH command finalizes the guest launch and destroy's the cryptographic
context.
See SEV KM API Spec [1] 'Launching a guest' usage flow (Appendix A) for the
complete flow chart.
To launch a SEV guest
# ${QEMU} \
-machine ...,memory-encryption=sev0 \
-object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=1
Debugging
-----------
Since memory contents of SEV guest is encrypted hence hypervisor access to the
guest memory will get a cipher text. If guest policy allows debugging, then
hypervisor can use DEBUG_DECRYPT and DEBUG_ENCRYPT commands access the guest
memory region for debug purposes. This is not supported in QEMU yet.
Snapshot/Restore
-----------------
TODO
Live Migration
----------------
TODO
References
-----------------
AMD Memory Encryption whitepaper:
http://amd-dev.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf
Secure Encrypted Virutualization Key Management:
[1] http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM API_Specification.pdf
KVM Forum slides:
http://www.linux-kvm.org/images/7/74/02x08A-Thomas_Lendacky-AMDs_Virtualizatoin_Memory_Encryption_Technology.pdf
AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual:
http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24593.pdf
SME is section 7.10
SEV is section 15.34
+16
View File
@@ -867,6 +867,22 @@ Display the amount of initially allocated and present hotpluggable (if
enabled) memory in bytes.
ETEXI
#if defined(TARGET_I386)
{
.name = "sev",
.args_type = "",
.params = "",
.help = "show SEV information",
.cmd = hmp_info_sev,
},
#endif
STEXI
@item info sev
@findex info sev
Show SEV information.
ETEXI
STEXI
@end table
ETEXI
+1
View File
@@ -143,5 +143,6 @@ void hmp_info_ramblock(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict);
void hmp_hotpluggable_cpus(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict);
void hmp_info_vm_generation_id(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict);
void hmp_info_memory_size_summary(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict);
void hmp_info_sev(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict);
#endif
+22
View File
@@ -334,6 +334,22 @@ static bool machine_get_enforce_config_section(Object *obj, Error **errp)
return ms->enforce_config_section;
}
static char *machine_get_memory_encryption(Object *obj, Error **errp)
{
MachineState *ms = MACHINE(obj);
return g_strdup(ms->memory_encryption);
}
static void machine_set_memory_encryption(Object *obj, const char *value,
Error **errp)
{
MachineState *ms = MACHINE(obj);
g_free(ms->memory_encryption);
ms->memory_encryption = g_strdup(value);
}
void machine_class_allow_dynamic_sysbus_dev(MachineClass *mc, const char *type)
{
strList *item = g_new0(strList, 1);
@@ -612,6 +628,12 @@ static void machine_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
&error_abort);
object_class_property_set_description(oc, "enforce-config-section",
"Set on to enforce configuration section migration", &error_abort);
object_class_property_add_str(oc, "memory-encryption",
machine_get_memory_encryption, machine_set_memory_encryption,
&error_abort);
object_class_property_set_description(oc, "memory-encryption",
"Set memory encyption object to use", &error_abort);
}
static void machine_class_base_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
+13
View File
@@ -113,6 +113,8 @@ static void pc_system_flash_init(MemoryRegion *rom_memory)
pflash_t *system_flash;
MemoryRegion *flash_mem;
char name[64];
void *flash_ptr;
int ret, flash_size;
sector_bits = 12;
sector_size = 1 << sector_bits;
@@ -169,6 +171,17 @@ static void pc_system_flash_init(MemoryRegion *rom_memory)
if (unit == 0) {
flash_mem = pflash_cfi01_get_memory(system_flash);
pc_isa_bios_init(rom_memory, flash_mem, size);
/* Encrypt the pflash boot ROM */
if (kvm_memcrypt_enabled()) {
flash_ptr = memory_region_get_ram_ptr(flash_mem);
flash_size = memory_region_size(flash_mem);
ret = kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data(flash_ptr, flash_size);
if (ret) {
error_report("failed to encrypt pflash rom");
exit(1);
}
}
}
}
}
+1
View File
@@ -243,6 +243,7 @@ struct MachineState {
bool suppress_vmdesc;
bool enforce_config_section;
bool enable_graphics;
char *memory_encryption;
ram_addr_t ram_size;
ram_addr_t maxram_size;
@@ -594,6 +594,7 @@
#define BTN_DPAD_RIGHT 0x223
#define KEY_ALS_TOGGLE 0x230 /* Ambient light sensor */
#define KEY_ROTATE_LOCK_TOGGLE 0x231 /* Display rotation lock */
#define KEY_BUTTONCONFIG 0x240 /* AL Button Configuration */
#define KEY_TASKMANAGER 0x241 /* AL Task/Project Manager */
+11
View File
@@ -18,10 +18,21 @@
/*
* The event structure itself
* Note that __USE_TIME_BITS64 is defined by libc based on
* application's request to use 64 bit time_t.
*/
struct input_event {
#if (HOST_LONG_BITS != 32 || !defined(__USE_TIME_BITS64)) && !defined(__KERNEL)
struct timeval time;
#define input_event_sec time.tv_sec
#define input_event_usec time.tv_usec
#else
__kernel_ulong_t __sec;
__kernel_ulong_t __usec;
#define input_event_sec __sec
#define input_event_usec __usec
#endif
uint16_t type;
uint16_t code;
int32_t value;
+18 -12
View File
@@ -622,15 +622,19 @@
* safely.
*/
#define PCI_EXP_DEVCAP2 36 /* Device Capabilities 2 */
#define PCI_EXP_DEVCAP2_COMP_TMOUT_DIS 0x00000010 /* Completion Timeout Disable supported */
#define PCI_EXP_DEVCAP2_ARI 0x00000020 /* Alternative Routing-ID */
#define PCI_EXP_DEVCAP2_ATOMIC_ROUTE 0x00000040 /* Atomic Op routing */
#define PCI_EXP_DEVCAP2_ATOMIC_COMP64 0x00000100 /* Atomic 64-bit compare */
#define PCI_EXP_DEVCAP2_ATOMIC_COMP32 0x00000080 /* 32b AtomicOp completion */
#define PCI_EXP_DEVCAP2_ATOMIC_COMP64 0x00000100 /* 64b AtomicOp completion */
#define PCI_EXP_DEVCAP2_ATOMIC_COMP128 0x00000200 /* 128b AtomicOp completion */
#define PCI_EXP_DEVCAP2_LTR 0x00000800 /* Latency tolerance reporting */
#define PCI_EXP_DEVCAP2_OBFF_MASK 0x000c0000 /* OBFF support mechanism */
#define PCI_EXP_DEVCAP2_OBFF_MSG 0x00040000 /* New message signaling */
#define PCI_EXP_DEVCAP2_OBFF_WAKE 0x00080000 /* Re-use WAKE# for OBFF */
#define PCI_EXP_DEVCTL2 40 /* Device Control 2 */
#define PCI_EXP_DEVCTL2_COMP_TIMEOUT 0x000f /* Completion Timeout Value */
#define PCI_EXP_DEVCTL2_COMP_TMOUT_DIS 0x0010 /* Completion Timeout Disable */
#define PCI_EXP_DEVCTL2_ARI 0x0020 /* Alternative Routing-ID */
#define PCI_EXP_DEVCTL2_ATOMIC_REQ 0x0040 /* Set Atomic requests */
#define PCI_EXP_DEVCTL2_ATOMIC_EGRESS_BLOCK 0x0080 /* Block atomic egress */
@@ -966,26 +970,28 @@
/* Downstream Port Containment */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_CAP 4 /* DPC Capability */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_IRQ 0x1f /* DPC Interrupt Message Number */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_CAP_RP_EXT 0x20 /* Root Port Extensions for DPC */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_CAP_POISONED_TLP 0x40 /* Poisoned TLP Egress Blocking Supported */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_CAP_SW_TRIGGER 0x80 /* Software Triggering Supported */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_RP_PIO_LOG_SIZE 0xF00 /* RP PIO log size */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_IRQ 0x001F /* Interrupt Message Number */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_CAP_RP_EXT 0x0020 /* Root Port Extensions */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_CAP_POISONED_TLP 0x0040 /* Poisoned TLP Egress Blocking Supported */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_CAP_SW_TRIGGER 0x0080 /* Software Triggering Supported */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_RP_PIO_LOG_SIZE 0x0F00 /* RP PIO Log Size */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_CAP_DL_ACTIVE 0x1000 /* ERR_COR signal on DL_Active supported */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_CTL 6 /* DPC control */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_CTL_EN_NONFATAL 0x02 /* Enable trigger on ERR_NONFATAL message */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_CTL_INT_EN 0x08 /* DPC Interrupt Enable */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_CTL_EN_NONFATAL 0x0002 /* Enable trigger on ERR_NONFATAL message */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_CTL_INT_EN 0x0008 /* DPC Interrupt Enable */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_STATUS 8 /* DPC Status */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_STATUS_TRIGGER 0x01 /* Trigger Status */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_STATUS_INTERRUPT 0x08 /* Interrupt Status */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_RP_BUSY 0x10 /* Root Port Busy */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_STATUS_TRIGGER 0x0001 /* Trigger Status */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_STATUS_TRIGGER_RSN 0x0006 /* Trigger Reason */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_STATUS_INTERRUPT 0x0008 /* Interrupt Status */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_RP_BUSY 0x0010 /* Root Port Busy */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_STATUS_TRIGGER_RSN_EXT 0x0060 /* Trig Reason Extension */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_SOURCE_ID 10 /* DPC Source Identifier */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_RP_PIO_STATUS 0x0C /* RP PIO Status */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_RP_PIO_MASK 0x10 /* RP PIO MASK */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_RP_PIO_MASK 0x10 /* RP PIO Mask */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_RP_PIO_SEVERITY 0x14 /* RP PIO Severity */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_RP_PIO_SYSERROR 0x18 /* RP PIO SysError */
#define PCI_EXP_DPC_RP_PIO_EXCEPTION 0x1C /* RP PIO Exception */
@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@
* Steering */
#define VIRTIO_NET_F_CTRL_MAC_ADDR 23 /* Set MAC address */
#define VIRTIO_NET_F_SPEED_DUPLEX 63 /* Device set linkspeed and duplex */
#ifndef VIRTIO_NET_NO_LEGACY
#define VIRTIO_NET_F_GSO 6 /* Host handles pkts w/ any GSO type */
#endif /* VIRTIO_NET_NO_LEGACY */
@@ -76,6 +78,17 @@ struct virtio_net_config {
uint16_t max_virtqueue_pairs;
/* Default maximum transmit unit advice */
uint16_t mtu;
/*
* speed, in units of 1Mb. All values 0 to INT_MAX are legal.
* Any other value stands for unknown.
*/
uint32_t speed;
/*
* 0x00 - half duplex
* 0x01 - full duplex
* Any other value stands for unknown.
*/
uint8_t duplex;
} QEMU_PACKED;
/*
+1 -1
View File
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ struct vring_avail {
__virtio16 ring[];
};
/* u32 is used here for ids for padding reasons. */
/* uint32_t is used here for ids for padding reasons. */
struct vring_used_elem {
/* Index of start of used descriptor chain. */
__virtio32 id;
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2012-2016 VMware, Inc. All rights reserved.
*
@@ -51,12 +52,14 @@
#define PVRDMA_UVERBS_ABI_VERSION 3 /* ABI Version. */
#define PVRDMA_UAR_HANDLE_MASK 0x00FFFFFF /* Bottom 24 bits. */
#define PVRDMA_UAR_QP_OFFSET 0 /* QP doorbell. */
#define PVRDMA_UAR_QP_SEND BIT(30) /* Send bit. */
#define PVRDMA_UAR_QP_RECV BIT(31) /* Recv bit. */
#define PVRDMA_UAR_QP_SEND (1 << 30) /* Send bit. */
#define PVRDMA_UAR_QP_RECV (1 << 31) /* Recv bit. */
#define PVRDMA_UAR_CQ_OFFSET 4 /* CQ doorbell. */
#define PVRDMA_UAR_CQ_ARM_SOL BIT(29) /* Arm solicited bit. */
#define PVRDMA_UAR_CQ_ARM BIT(30) /* Arm bit. */
#define PVRDMA_UAR_CQ_POLL BIT(31) /* Poll bit. */
#define PVRDMA_UAR_CQ_ARM_SOL (1 << 29) /* Arm solicited bit. */
#define PVRDMA_UAR_CQ_ARM (1 << 30) /* Arm bit. */
#define PVRDMA_UAR_CQ_POLL (1 << 31) /* Poll bit. */
#define PVRDMA_UAR_SRQ_OFFSET 8 /* SRQ doorbell. */
#define PVRDMA_UAR_SRQ_RECV (1 << 30) /* Recv bit. */
enum pvrdma_wr_opcode {
PVRDMA_WR_RDMA_WRITE,
+17
View File
@@ -231,6 +231,23 @@ int kvm_destroy_vcpu(CPUState *cpu);
*/
bool kvm_arm_supports_user_irq(void);
/**
* kvm_memcrypt_enabled - return boolean indicating whether memory encryption
* is enabled
* Returns: 1 memory encryption is enabled
* 0 memory encryption is disabled
*/
bool kvm_memcrypt_enabled(void);
/**
* kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data: encrypt the memory range
*
* Return: 1 failed to encrypt the range
* 0 succesfully encrypted memory region
*/
int kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len);
#ifdef NEED_CPU_H
#include "cpu.h"

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