dnf5 does not download filelists metadata by default anymore as this
consists of a pretty big chunk of the repository metadata. Let's make
sure the filelists metadata doesn't have to be downloaded by dnf5 by
removing any usage of file provides from our package lists.
This returns an FD that can be used to temporarily inhibit the automatic
locking on system suspend behavior of homed. As long as the FD is open,
LockAllHomes() won't lock that home directory on suspend. This allows
desktop environments to implement custom more complicated behavior
20-systemd-ssh-generator.conf expands SSHCONFDIR, which is bogus when we
build with -Dsshconfdir=no. Similarly, avoid expanding SSHDCONFDIR in
20-systemd-userdb.conf when building with -Dsshconfdir=no.
Follow-up 6c7fc5d5f2.
knot v3.2 and later does this by default. knot v3.1 still has the default set to
10, but it also introduced a warning that the default will be changed to 0 in
later versions, so it effectively complains about its own default, which then
fails the config check. Let's just set the value explicitly to zero to avoid
that.
~# knotc --version
knotc (Knot DNS), version 3.1.6
~# grep nsec3-iterations test/knot-data/knot.conf || echo nope
nope
~# knotc -c /build/test/knot-data/knot.conf conf-check
warning: config, policy[auto_rollover_nsec3].nsec3-iterations defaults to 10, since version 3.2 the default becomes 0
Configuration is valid
Follow-up to 0652cf8e7b.
Previously, unit_{start,stop,reload} would call the low-level cgroup
unfreeze function whenever a unit was started, stopped, or reloaded. It
did so with no error checking. This call would ultimately recurse up the
cgroup tree, and unfreeze all the parent cgroups of the unit, unless an
error occurred (in which case I have no idea what would happen...)
After the freeze/thaw rework in a previous commit, this can no longer
work. If we recursively thaw the parent cgroups of the unit, there may
be sibling units marked as PARENT_FROZEN which will no longer actually
have frozen parents. Fixing this is a lot more complicated than simply
disallowing start/stop/reload on a frozen unit
Fixes https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/15849
This commit overhauls the way freeze/thaw works recursively:
First, it introduces new FreezerActions that are like the existing
FREEZE and THAW but indicate that the action was initiated by a parent
unit. We also refactored the code to pass these FreezerActions through
the whole call stack so that we can make use of them. FreezerState was
extended similarly, to be able to differentiate between a unit that's
frozen manually and a unit that's frozen because a parent is frozen.
Next, slices were changed to check recursively that all their child
units can be frozen before it attempts to freeze them. This is different
from the previous behavior, that would just check if the unit's type
supported freezing at all. This cleans up the code, and also ensures
that the behavior of slices corresponds to the unit's actual ability
to be frozen
Next, we make it so that if you FREEZE a slice, it'll PARENT_FREEZE
all of its children. Similarly, if you THAW a slice it will PARENT_THAW
its children.
Finally, we use the new states available to us to refactor the code
that actually does the cgroup freezing. The code now looks at the unit's
existing freezer state and the action being requested, and decides what
next state is most appropriate. Then it puts the unit in that state.
For instance, a RUNNING unit with a request to PARENT_FREEZE will
put the unit into the PARENT_FREEZING state. As another example, a
FROZEN unit who's parent is also FROZEN will transition to
PARENT_FROZEN in response to a request to THAW.
Fixes https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/30640
Fixes https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/15850
So far credentials are a concept for system services only: to encrypt or
decrypt credential you must be privileged, as only then you can access
the TPM and the host key.
Let's break this up a bit: let's add a "user-scoped" credential, that
are specific to users. Internally this works by adding another step to
the acquisition of the symmetric encryption key for the credential: if a
"user-scoped" credential is used we'll generate an symmetric encryption
key K as usual, but then we'll use it to calculate
K' = HMAC(K, flags || uid || machine-id || username)
and then use the resulting K' as encryption key instead. This basically
includes the (public) user's identity in the encryption key, ensuring
that only if the right user credentials are specified the correct key
can be acquired.
