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https://github.com/Dasharo/systemd.git
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Merge pull request #12059 from poettering/nspawn-typos
some typo and other fixes result of the OCI nspawn merge
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@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ int have_effective_cap(int value) {
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if (cap_get_flag(cap, value, CAP_EFFECTIVE, &fv) < 0)
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return -errno;
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else
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return fv == CAP_SET;
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return fv == CAP_SET;
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}
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unsigned long cap_last_cap(void) {
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@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ unsigned long cap_last_cap(void) {
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if (p > 63) /* Safety for the future: if one day the kernel learns more than 64 caps,
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* then we are in trouble (since we, as much userspace and kernel space
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* store capability masks in uint64_t types. Let's hence protect
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* store capability masks in uint64_t types). Let's hence protect
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* ourselves against that and always cap at 63 for now. */
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p = 63;
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@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ unsigned long cap_last_cap(void) {
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}
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/* fall back to syscall-probing for pre linux-3.2 */
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p = (unsigned long) CAP_LAST_CAP;
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p = MIN((unsigned long) CAP_LAST_CAP, 63U);
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if (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ, p) < 0) {
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@@ -107,13 +107,13 @@ int capability_update_inherited_set(cap_t caps, uint64_t set) {
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}
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int capability_ambient_set_apply(uint64_t set, bool also_inherit) {
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unsigned long i;
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_cleanup_cap_free_ cap_t caps = NULL;
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unsigned long i;
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int r;
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/* Add the capabilities to the ambient set. */
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if (also_inherit) {
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int r;
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caps = cap_get_proc();
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if (!caps)
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return -errno;
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@@ -272,16 +272,12 @@ int capability_bounding_set_drop_usermode(uint64_t keep) {
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}
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int drop_privileges(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, uint64_t keep_capabilities) {
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_cleanup_cap_free_ cap_t d = NULL;
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unsigned i, j = 0;
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int r;
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/* Unfortunately we cannot leave privilege dropping to PID 1
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* here, since we want to run as user but want to keep some
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* capabilities. Since file capabilities have been introduced
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* this cannot be done across exec() anymore, unless our
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* binary has the capability configured in the file system,
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* which we want to avoid. */
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/* Unfortunately we cannot leave privilege dropping to PID 1 here, since we want to run as user but
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* want to keep some capabilities. Since file capabilities have been introduced this cannot be done
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* across exec() anymore, unless our binary has the capability configured in the file system, which
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* we want to avoid. */
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if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) < 0)
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return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to change group ID: %m");
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@@ -290,7 +286,9 @@ int drop_privileges(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, uint64_t keep_capabilities) {
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if (r < 0)
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return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to drop auxiliary groups list: %m");
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/* Ensure we keep the permitted caps across the setresuid() */
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/* Ensure we keep the permitted caps across the setresuid(). Note that we do this even if we actually
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* don't want to keep any capabilities, since we want to be able to drop them from the bounding set
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* too, and we can only do that if we have capabilities. */
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if (prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 1) < 0)
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return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to enable keep capabilities flag: %m");
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@@ -300,18 +298,21 @@ int drop_privileges(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, uint64_t keep_capabilities) {
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if (prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 0) < 0)
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return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to disable keep capabilities flag: %m");
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/* Drop all caps from the bounding set, except the ones we want */
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/* Drop all caps from the bounding set (as well as the inheritable/permitted/effective sets), except
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* the ones we want to keep */
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r = capability_bounding_set_drop(keep_capabilities, true);
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if (r < 0)
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return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to drop capabilities: %m");
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/* Now upgrade the permitted caps we still kept to effective caps */
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d = cap_init();
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if (!d)
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return log_oom();
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if (keep_capabilities) {
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if (keep_capabilities != 0) {
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cap_value_t bits[u64log2(keep_capabilities) + 1];
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_cleanup_cap_free_ cap_t d = NULL;
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unsigned i, j = 0;
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d = cap_init();
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if (!d)
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return log_oom();
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for (i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(bits); i++)
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if (keep_capabilities & (1ULL << i))
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@@ -320,7 +321,7 @@ int drop_privileges(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, uint64_t keep_capabilities) {
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/* use enough bits */
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assert(i == 64 || (keep_capabilities >> i) == 0);
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/* don't use too many bits */
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assert(keep_capabilities & (1ULL << (i - 1)));
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assert(keep_capabilities & (UINT64_C(1) << (i - 1)));
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if (cap_set_flag(d, CAP_EFFECTIVE, j, bits, CAP_SET) < 0 ||
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cap_set_flag(d, CAP_PERMITTED, j, bits, CAP_SET) < 0)
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@@ -515,8 +516,8 @@ int capability_quintet_enforce(const CapabilityQuintet *q) {
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/* Now, let's enforce the caps for the first time. Note that this is where we acquire
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* caps in any of the sets we currently don't have. We have to do this before
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* droppoing the bounding caps below, since at that point we can never acquire new
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* caps in inherited/permitted/effective anymore, but only lose them.*/
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* dropping the bounding caps below, since at that point we can never acquire new
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* caps in inherited/permitted/effective anymore, but only lose them. */
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if (cap_set_proc(modified ?: c) < 0)
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return -errno;
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}
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@@ -847,8 +847,10 @@ static int mount_inaccessible(const char *dest, CustomMount *m) {
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return m->graceful ? 0 : r;
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r = mount_verbose(m->graceful ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_ERR, NULL, where, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY|MS_REMOUNT, NULL);
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if (r < 0)
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if (r < 0) {
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umount_verbose(where);
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return m->graceful ? 0 : r;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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@@ -238,11 +238,13 @@ static int help(void) {
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if (r < 0)
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return log_oom();
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printf("%s [OPTIONS...] [PATH] [ARGUMENTS...]\n\n"
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printf("%1$s [OPTIONS...] [PATH] [ARGUMENTS...]\n\n"
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"Spawn a command or OS in a light-weight container.\n\n"
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" -h --help Show this help\n"
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" --version Print version string\n"
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" -q --quiet Do not show status information\n"
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" --settings=BOOLEAN Load additional settings from .nspawn file\n\n"
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"%3$sImage:%4$s\n"
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" -D --directory=PATH Root directory for the container\n"
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" --template=PATH Initialize root directory from template directory,\n"
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" if missing\n"
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@@ -250,22 +252,35 @@ static int help(void) {
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" remove it after exit\n"
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" -i --image=PATH File system device or disk image for the container\n"
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" --oci-bundle=PATH OCI bundle directory\n"
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" --read-only Mount the root directory read-only\n"
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" --volatile[=MODE] Run the system in volatile mode\n"
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" --root-hash=HASH Specify verity root hash\n"
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" --pivot-root=PATH[:PATH]\n"
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" Pivot root to given directory in the container\n\n"
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"%3$sExecution:%4$s\n"
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" -a --as-pid2 Maintain a stub init as PID1, invoke binary as PID2\n"
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" -b --boot Boot up full system (i.e. invoke init)\n"
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" --chdir=PATH Set working directory in the container\n"
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" --pivot-root=PATH[:PATH]\n"
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" Pivot root to given directory in the container\n"
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" -u --user=USER Run the command under specified user or uid\n"
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" -E --setenv=NAME=VALUE Pass an environment variable to PID 1\n"
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" -u --user=USER Run the command under specified user or UID\n"
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" --kill-signal=SIGNAL Select signal to use for shutting down PID 1\n"
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" --notify-ready=BOOLEAN Receive notifications from the child init process\n\n"
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"%3$sSystem Identity:%4$s\n"
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" -M --machine=NAME Set the machine name for the container\n"
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" --hostname=NAME Override the hostname for the container\n"
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" --uuid=UUID Set a specific machine UUID for the container\n"
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" --uuid=UUID Set a specific machine UUID for the container\n\n"
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"%3$sProperties:%4$s\n"
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" -S --slice=SLICE Place the container in the specified slice\n"
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" --property=NAME=VALUE Set scope unit property\n"
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" --register=BOOLEAN Register container as machine\n"
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" --keep-unit Do not register a scope for the machine, reuse\n"
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" the service unit nspawn is running in\n\n"
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"%3$sUser Namespacing:%4$s\n"
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" -U --private-users=pick Run within user namespace, autoselect UID/GID range\n"
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" --private-users[=UIDBASE[:NUIDS]]\n"
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" Similar, but with user configured UID/GID range\n"
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" --private-users-chown Adjust OS tree ownership to private UID/GID range\n"
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" --private-users-chown Adjust OS tree ownership to private UID/GID range\n\n"
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"%3$sNetworking:%4$s\n"
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" --private-network Disable network in container\n"
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" --network-interface=INTERFACE\n"
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" Assign an existing network interface to the\n"
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@@ -290,29 +305,33 @@ static int help(void) {
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" Set network namespace to the one represented by\n"
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" the specified kernel namespace file node\n"
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" -p --port=[PROTOCOL:]HOSTPORT[:CONTAINERPORT]\n"
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" Expose a container IP port on the host\n"
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" Expose a container IP port on the host\n\n"
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"%3$sSecurity:%4$s\n"
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" --capability=CAP In addition to the default, retain specified\n"
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" capability\n"
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" --drop-capability=CAP Drop the specified capability from the default set\n"
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" --no-new-privileges Set PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS flag for container payload\n"
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" --system-call-filter=LIST|~LIST\n"
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" Permit/prohibit specific system calls\n"
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" -Z --selinux-context=SECLABEL\n"
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" Set the SELinux security context to be used by\n"
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" processes in the container\n"
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" -L --selinux-apifs-context=SECLABEL\n"
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" Set the SELinux security context to be used by\n"
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" API/tmpfs file systems in the container\n"
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" --capability=CAP In addition to the default, retain specified\n"
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" capability\n"
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" --drop-capability=CAP Drop the specified capability from the default set\n"
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" --system-call-filter=LIST|~LIST\n"
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" Permit/prohibit specific system calls\n"
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" API/tmpfs file systems in the container\n\n"
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"%3$sResources:%4$s\n"
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" --rlimit=NAME=LIMIT Set a resource limit for the payload\n"
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" --oom-score-adjust=VALUE\n"
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" Adjust the OOM score value for the payload\n"
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" --cpu-affinity=CPUS Adjust the CPU affinity of the container\n"
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" --kill-signal=SIGNAL Select signal to use for shutting down PID 1\n"
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" --link-journal=MODE Link up guest journal, one of no, auto, guest, \n"
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" host, try-guest, try-host\n"
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" -j Equivalent to --link-journal=try-guest\n"
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" --personality=ARCH Pick personality for this container\n\n"
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"%3$sIntegration:%4$s\n"
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" --resolv-conf=MODE Select mode of /etc/resolv.conf initialization\n"
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" --timezone=MODE Select mode of /etc/localtime initialization\n"
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" --read-only Mount the root directory read-only\n"
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" --link-journal=MODE Link up guest journal, one of no, auto, guest, \n"
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" host, try-guest, try-host\n"
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" -j Equivalent to --link-journal=try-guest\n\n"
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"%3$sMounts:%4$s\n"
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" --bind=PATH[:PATH[:OPTIONS]]\n"
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" Bind mount a file or directory from the host into\n"
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" the container\n"
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@@ -325,21 +344,15 @@ static int help(void) {
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" Create an overlay mount from the host to \n"
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" the container\n"
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" --overlay-ro=PATH[:PATH...]:PATH\n"
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" Similar, but creates a read-only overlay mount\n"
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" -E --setenv=NAME=VALUE Pass an environment variable to PID 1\n"
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" --register=BOOLEAN Register container as machine\n"
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" --keep-unit Do not register a scope for the machine, reuse\n"
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" the service unit nspawn is running in\n"
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" --volatile[=MODE] Run the system in volatile mode\n"
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" --settings=BOOLEAN Load additional settings from .nspawn file\n"
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" --notify-ready=BOOLEAN Receive notifications from the child init process\n"
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" Similar, but creates a read-only overlay mount\n\n"
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"%3$sInput/Output:%4$s\n"
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" --console=MODE Select how stdin/stdout/stderr and /dev/console are\n"
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" set up for the container.\n"
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" -P --pipe Equivalent to --console=pipe\n"
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"\nSee the %s for details.\n"
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"\nSee the %2$s for details.\n"
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, program_invocation_short_name
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, link
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);
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, ansi_underline(), ansi_normal());
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return 0;
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}
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@@ -215,11 +215,32 @@ static void test_set_ambient_caps(void) {
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assert_se(prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET, CAP_CHOWN, 0, 0) == 1);
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}
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static void test_ensure_cap_64bit(void) {
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_cleanup_free_ char *content = NULL;
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unsigned long p = 0;
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int r;
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r = read_one_line_file("/proc/sys/kernel/cap_last_cap", &content);
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if (r == -ENOENT) /* kernel pre 3.2 */
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return;
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assert_se(r >= 0);
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assert_se(safe_atolu(content, &p) >= 0);
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/* If caps don't fit into 64bit anymore, we have a problem, fail the test. */
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assert_se(p <= 63);
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/* Also check for the header definition */
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assert_se(CAP_LAST_CAP <= 63);
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}
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int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
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bool run_ambient;
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test_setup_logging(LOG_INFO);
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test_ensure_cap_64bit();
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test_last_cap_file();
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test_last_cap_probe();
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