Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (71 commits)
  SELinux: inode_doinit_with_dentry drop no dentry printk
  SELinux: new permission between tty audit and audit socket
  SELinux: open perm for sock files
  smack: fixes for unlabeled host support
  keys: make procfiles per-user-namespace
  keys: skip keys from another user namespace
  keys: consider user namespace in key_permission
  keys: distinguish per-uid keys in different namespaces
  integrity: ima iint radix_tree_lookup locking fix
  TOMOYO: Do not call tomoyo_realpath_init unless registered.
  integrity: ima scatterlist bug fix
  smack: fix lots of kernel-doc notation
  TOMOYO: Don't create securityfs entries unless registered.
  TOMOYO: Fix exception policy read failure.
  SELinux: convert the avc cache hash list to an hlist
  SELinux: code readability with avc_cache
  SELinux: remove unused av.decided field
  SELinux: more careful use of avd in avc_has_perm_noaudit
  SELinux: remove the unused ae.used
  SELinux: check seqno when updating an avc_node
  ...

Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+What:		security/ima/policy
+Date:		May 2008
+Contact:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+Description:
+		The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity
+		Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash
+		values of executables and other sensitive system files
+		loaded into the run-time of this system.  At runtime,
+		the policy can be constrained based on LSM specific data.
+		Policies are loaded into the securityfs file ima/policy
+		by opening the file, writing the rules one at a time and
+		then closing the file.  The new policy takes effect after
+		the file ima/policy is closed.
+
+		rule format: action [condition ...]
+
+		action: measure | dont_measure
+		condition:= base | lsm
+			base:	[[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [uid=]]
+			lsm:	[[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
+				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
+
+		base: 	func:= [BPRM_CHECK][FILE_MMAP][INODE_PERMISSION]
+			mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC]
+			fsmagic:= hex value
+			uid:= decimal value
+		lsm:  	are LSM specific
+
+		default policy:
+			# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
+			# SYSFS_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
+			# DEBUGFS_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
+			# TMPFS_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
+			# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
+
+			measure func=BPRM_CHECK
+			measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
+			measure func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ uid=0
+
+		The default policy measures all executables in bprm_check,
+		all files mmapped executable in file_mmap, and all files
+		open for read by root in inode_permission.
+
+		Examples of LSM specific definitions:
+
+		SELinux:
+			# SELINUX_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0xF97CFF8C
+
+			dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
+			dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t
+			measure subj_user=system_u func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ
+			measure subj_role=system_r func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ
+
+		Smack:
+			measure subj_user=_ func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ

Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ parameter is applicable:
 	FB	The frame buffer device is enabled.
 	HW	Appropriate hardware is enabled.
 	IA-64	IA-64 architecture is enabled.
+	IMA     Integrity measurement architecture is enabled.
 	IOSCHED	More than one I/O scheduler is enabled.
 	IP_PNP	IP DHCP, BOOTP, or RARP is enabled.
 	ISAPNP	ISA PnP code is enabled.
@@ -902,6 +903,15 @@ and is between 256 and 4096 characters. It is defined in the file
 	ihash_entries=	[KNL]
 			Set number of hash buckets for inode cache.
 
+	ima_audit=	[IMA]
+			Format: { "0" | "1" }
+			0 -- integrity auditing messages. (Default)
+			1 -- enable informational integrity auditing messages.
+
+	ima_hash=	[IMA]
+			Formt: { "sha1" | "md5" }
+			default: "sha1"
+
 	in2000=		[HW,SCSI]
 			See header of drivers/scsi/in2000.c.
 

MAINTAINERS

@@ -2216,6 +2216,11 @@ M:	stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de
 L:	linux1394-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
 S:	Maintained
 
+INTEGRITY MEASUREMENT ARCHITECTURE (IMA)
+P:	Mimi Zohar
+M:	zohar@us.ibm.com
+S:	Supported
+
 IMS TWINTURBO FRAMEBUFFER DRIVER
 L:	linux-fbdev-devel@lists.sourceforge.net (moderated for non-subscribers)
 S:	Orphan
@@ -3844,6 +3849,7 @@ M:	jmorris@namei.org
 L:	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 L:	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (suggested Cc:)
 T:	git kernel.org:pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6.git
+W:	http://security.wiki.kernel.org/
 S:	Supported
 
 SECURITY CONTACT
@@ -4285,6 +4291,19 @@ L:	tlan-devel@lists.sourceforge.net (subscribers-only)
 W:	http://sourceforge.net/projects/tlan/
 S:	Maintained
 
+TOMOYO SECURITY MODULE
+P:	Kentaro Takeda
+M:	takedakn@nttdata.co.jp
+P:	Tetsuo Handa
+M:	penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
+L:	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (kernel issues)
+L:	tomoyo-users-en@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for developers and users in English)
+L:	tomoyo-dev@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for developers in Japanese)
+L:	tomoyo-users@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for users in Japanese)
+W:	http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/
+T:	quilt http://svn.sourceforge.jp/svnroot/tomoyo/trunk/2.2.x/tomoyo-lsm/patches/
+S:	Maintained
+
 TOSHIBA ACPI EXTRAS DRIVER
 P:	John Belmonte
 M:	toshiba_acpi@memebeam.org

drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 #include <linux/miscdevice.h>
 #include <linux/platform_device.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/tpm.h>
 
 enum tpm_timeout {
 	TPM_TIMEOUT = 5,	/* msecs */
@@ -123,6 +124,147 @@ static inline void tpm_write_index(int base, int index, int value)
 	outb(index, base);
 	outb(value & 0xFF, base+1);
 }
+struct tpm_input_header {
+	__be16	tag;
+	__be32	length;
+	__be32	ordinal;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+struct tpm_output_header {
+	__be16	tag;
+	__be32	length;
+	__be32	return_code;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+struct	stclear_flags_t {
+	__be16	tag;
+	u8	deactivated;
+	u8	disableForceClear;
+	u8	physicalPresence;
+	u8	physicalPresenceLock;
+	u8	bGlobalLock;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+struct	tpm_version_t {
+	u8	Major;
+	u8	Minor;
+	u8	revMajor;
+	u8	revMinor;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+struct	tpm_version_1_2_t {
+	__be16	tag;
+	u8	Major;
+	u8	Minor;
+	u8	revMajor;
+	u8	revMinor;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+struct	timeout_t {
+	__be32	a;
+	__be32	b;
+	__be32	c;
+	__be32	d;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+struct duration_t {
+	__be32	tpm_short;
+	__be32	tpm_medium;
+	__be32	tpm_long;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+struct permanent_flags_t {
+	__be16	tag;
+	u8	disable;
+	u8	ownership;
+	u8	deactivated;
+	u8	readPubek;
+	u8	disableOwnerClear;
+	u8	allowMaintenance;
+	u8	physicalPresenceLifetimeLock;
+	u8	physicalPresenceHWEnable;
+	u8	physicalPresenceCMDEnable;
+	u8	CEKPUsed;
+	u8	TPMpost;
+	u8	TPMpostLock;
+	u8	FIPS;
+	u8	operator;
+	u8	enableRevokeEK;
+	u8	nvLocked;
+	u8	readSRKPub;
+	u8	tpmEstablished;
+	u8	maintenanceDone;
+	u8	disableFullDALogicInfo;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+typedef union {
+	struct	permanent_flags_t perm_flags;
+	struct	stclear_flags_t	stclear_flags;
+	bool	owned;
+	__be32	num_pcrs;
+	struct	tpm_version_t	tpm_version;
+	struct	tpm_version_1_2_t tpm_version_1_2;
+	__be32	manufacturer_id;
+	struct timeout_t  timeout;
+	struct duration_t duration;
+} cap_t;
+
+struct	tpm_getcap_params_in {
+	__be32	cap;
+	__be32	subcap_size;
+	__be32	subcap;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+struct	tpm_getcap_params_out {
+	__be32	cap_size;
+	cap_t	cap;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+struct	tpm_readpubek_params_out {
+	u8	algorithm[4];
+	u8	encscheme[2];
+	u8	sigscheme[2];
+	u8	parameters[12]; /*assuming RSA*/
+	__be32	keysize;
+	u8	modulus[256];
+	u8	checksum[20];
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+typedef union {
+	struct	tpm_input_header in;
+	struct	tpm_output_header out;
+} tpm_cmd_header;
+
+#define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20
+struct tpm_pcrread_out {
+	u8	pcr_result[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+struct tpm_pcrread_in {
+	__be32	pcr_idx;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+struct tpm_pcrextend_in {
+	__be32	pcr_idx;
+	u8	hash[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+typedef union {
+	struct	tpm_getcap_params_out getcap_out;
+	struct	tpm_readpubek_params_out readpubek_out;
+	u8	readpubek_out_buffer[sizeof(struct tpm_readpubek_params_out)];
+	struct	tpm_getcap_params_in getcap_in;
+	struct	tpm_pcrread_in	pcrread_in;
+	struct	tpm_pcrread_out	pcrread_out;
+	struct	tpm_pcrextend_in pcrextend_in;
+} tpm_cmd_params;
+
+struct tpm_cmd_t {
+	tpm_cmd_header	header;
+	tpm_cmd_params	params;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+ssize_t	tpm_getcap(struct device *, __be32, cap_t *, const char *);
 
 extern void tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *);
 extern void tpm_gen_interrupt(struct tpm_chip *);

fs/compat.c

@@ -1402,6 +1402,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
 	retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
 	if (retval < 0)
 		goto out_free;
+	current->in_execve = 1;
 
 	retval = -ENOMEM;
 	bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds();
@@ -1454,6 +1455,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
 		goto out;
 
 	/* execve succeeded */
+	current->in_execve = 0;
 	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
 	acct_update_integrals(current);
 	free_bprm(bprm);
@@ -1470,6 +1472,7 @@ out_file:
 	}
 
 out_unlock:
+	current->in_execve = 0;
 	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
 
 out_free:

fs/exec.c

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/tsacct_kern.h>
 #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
@@ -127,6 +128,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uselib, const char __user *, library)
 				 MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC | MAY_OPEN);
 	if (error)
 		goto exit;
+	error = ima_path_check(&nd.path, MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC | MAY_OPEN);
+	if (error)
+		goto exit;
 
 	file = nameidata_to_filp(&nd, O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE);
 	error = PTR_ERR(file);
@@ -672,6 +676,9 @@ struct file *open_exec(const char *name)
 		goto out_path_put;
 
 	err = inode_permission(nd.path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_OPEN);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_path_put;
+	err = ima_path_check(&nd.path, MAY_EXEC | MAY_OPEN);
 	if (err)
 		goto out_path_put;
 
@@ -1182,6 +1189,9 @@ int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm,struct pt_regs *regs)
 	struct linux_binfmt *fmt;
 
 	retval = security_bprm_check(bprm);
+	if (retval)
+		return retval;
+	retval = ima_bprm_check(bprm);
 	if (retval)
 		return retval;
 
@@ -1284,6 +1294,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
 	retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
 	if (retval < 0)
 		goto out_free;
+	current->in_execve = 1;
 
 	retval = -ENOMEM;
 	bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds();
@@ -1337,6 +1348,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
 		goto out;
 
 	/* execve succeeded */
+	current->in_execve = 0;
 	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
 	acct_update_integrals(current);
 	free_bprm(bprm);
@@ -1355,6 +1367,7 @@ out_file:
 	}
 
 out_unlock:
+	current->in_execve = 0;
 	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
 
 out_free:

fs/file_table.c

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/eventpoll.h>
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
@@ -279,6 +280,7 @@ void __fput(struct file *file)
 	if (file->f_op && file->f_op->release)
 		file->f_op->release(inode, file);
 	security_file_free(file);
+	ima_file_free(file);
 	if (unlikely(S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev != NULL))
 		cdev_put(inode->i_cdev);
 	fops_put(file->f_op);

fs/inode.c

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/hash.h>
 #include <linux/swap.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
 #include <linux/cdev.h>
 #include <linux/bootmem.h>
@@ -147,13 +148,13 @@ struct inode *inode_init_always(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *inode)
 	inode->i_cdev = NULL;
 	inode->i_rdev = 0;
 	inode->dirtied_when = 0;
-	if (security_inode_alloc(inode)) {
-		if (inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode)
-			inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode(inode);
-		else
-			kmem_cache_free(inode_cachep, (inode));
-		return NULL;
-	}
+
+	if (security_inode_alloc(inode))
+		goto out_free_inode;
+
+	/* allocate and initialize an i_integrity */
+	if (ima_inode_alloc(inode))
+		goto out_free_security;
 
 	spin_lock_init(&inode->i_lock);
 	lockdep_set_class(&inode->i_lock, &sb->s_type->i_lock_key);
@@ -189,6 +190,15 @@ struct inode *inode_init_always(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *inode)
 	inode->i_mapping = mapping;
 
 	return inode;
+
+out_free_security:
+	security_inode_free(inode);
+out_free_inode:
+	if (inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode)
+		inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode(inode);
+	else
+		kmem_cache_free(inode_cachep, (inode));
+	return NULL;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_init_always);
 

fs/namei.c

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
@@ -850,6 +851,8 @@ static int __link_path_walk(const char *name, struct nameidata *nd)
 		if (err == -EAGAIN)
 			err = inode_permission(nd->path.dentry->d_inode,
 					       MAY_EXEC);
+		if (!err)
+			err = ima_path_check(&nd->path, MAY_EXEC);
  		if (err)
 			break;
 
@@ -1509,6 +1512,11 @@ int may_open(struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
 	error = inode_permission(inode, acc_mode);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
+
+	error = ima_path_check(path,
+			       acc_mode & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC));
+	if (error)
+		return error;
 	/*
 	 * An append-only file must be opened in append mode for writing.
 	 */

include/linux/audit.h

@@ -36,7 +36,8 @@
  * 1500 - 1599 kernel LSPP events
  * 1600 - 1699 kernel crypto events
  * 1700 - 1799 kernel anomaly records
- * 1800 - 1999 future kernel use (maybe integrity labels and related events)
+ * 1800 - 1899 kernel integrity events
+ * 1900 - 1999 future kernel use
  * 2000 is for otherwise unclassified kernel audit messages (legacy)
  * 2001 - 2099 unused (kernel)
  * 2100 - 2199 user space anomaly records
@@ -125,6 +126,12 @@
 #define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG    1799
 #define AUDIT_ANOM_PROMISCUOUS      1700 /* Device changed promiscuous mode */
 #define AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND            1701 /* Process ended abnormally */
+#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA	    1800 /* Data integrity verification */
+#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA    1801 /* Metadata integrity verification */
+#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS	    1802 /* Integrity enable status */
+#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH	    1803 /* Integrity HASH type */
+#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR	    1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
+#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* policy rule */
 
 #define AUDIT_KERNEL		2000	/* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
 

include/linux/ima.h

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_IMA_H
+#define _LINUX_IMA_H
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+struct linux_binprm;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
+extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+extern int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
+extern void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
+extern int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask);
+extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
+extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
+extern void ima_shm_check(struct file *file);
+
+#else
+static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_shm_check(struct file *file)
+{
+	return;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_H */
+#endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */

include/linux/sched.h

@@ -1175,6 +1175,8 @@ struct task_struct {
 	/* ??? */
 	unsigned int personality;
 	unsigned did_exec:1;
+	unsigned in_execve:1;	/* Tell the LSMs that the process is doing an
+				 * execve */
 	pid_t pid;
 	pid_t tgid;
 

include/linux/tpm.h

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2004,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Leendert van Doorn <leendert@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Dave Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
+ * Debora Velarde <dvelarde@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * Maintained by: <tpmdd_devel@lists.sourceforge.net>
+ *
+ * Device driver for TCG/TCPA TPM (trusted platform module).
+ * Specifications at www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ */
+#ifndef __LINUX_TPM_H__
+#define __LINUX_TPM_H__
+
+/*
+ * Chip num is this value or a valid tpm idx
+ */
+#define	TPM_ANY_NUM 0xFFFF
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM)
+
+extern int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf);
+extern int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash);
+#endif
+#endif

ipc/shm.c

@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include <linux/nsproxy.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/ipc_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
@@ -383,6 +384,7 @@ static int newseg(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct ipc_params *params)
 	error = PTR_ERR(file);
 	if (IS_ERR(file))
 		goto no_file;
+	ima_shm_check(file);
 
 	id = ipc_addid(&shm_ids(ns), &shp->shm_perm, ns->shm_ctlmni);
 	if (id < 0) {
@@ -887,6 +889,7 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg, ulong *raddr)
 	file = alloc_file(path.mnt, path.dentry, f_mode, &shm_file_operations);
 	if (!file)
 		goto out_free;
+	ima_shm_check(file);
 
 	file->private_data = sfd;
 	file->f_mapping = shp->shm_file->f_mapping;

kernel/user.c

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 
 struct user_namespace init_user_ns = {
 	.kref = {
-		.refcount	= ATOMIC_INIT(1),
+		.refcount	= ATOMIC_INIT(2),
 	},
 	.creator = &root_user,
 };

mm/mmap.c

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
 #include <linux/profile.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
@@ -1047,6 +1048,9 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 	}
 
 	error = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, 0);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+	error = ima_file_mmap(file, prot);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 

mm/shmem.c

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/swap.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 
 static struct vfsmount *shm_mnt;
 
@@ -2665,6 +2666,7 @@ int shmem_zero_setup(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	if (IS_ERR(file))
 		return PTR_ERR(file);
 
+	ima_shm_check(file);
 	if (vma->vm_file)
 		fput(vma->vm_file);
 	vma->vm_file = file;

security/Kconfig

@@ -55,7 +55,8 @@ config SECURITYFS
 	bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
 	help
 	  This will build the securityfs filesystem.  It is currently used by
-	  the TPM bios character driver.  It is not used by SELinux or SMACK.
+	  the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider.  It is
+	  not used by SELinux or SMACK.
 
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
@@ -134,6 +135,9 @@ config SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
 
 source security/selinux/Kconfig
 source security/smack/Kconfig
+source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
+
+source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
 
 endmenu
 

security/Makefile

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS)			+= keys/
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)	+= selinux
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)        += tomoyo
 
 # always enable default capabilities
 obj-y		+= commoncap.o
@@ -15,5 +16,10 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS)		+= inode.o
 # Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly.
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)		+= tomoyo/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG)		+= root_plug.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)		+= device_cgroup.o
+
+# Object integrity file lists
+subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= integrity/ima
+obj-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= integrity/ima/built-in.o