Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2023-11-03' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor

Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen: "This adds initial support for mediating io_uring and userns creation. Adds a new restriction that tightens the use of change_profile, and a couple of optimizations to reduce performance bottle necks that have been found when retrieving the current task's secid and allocating work buffers. The majority of the patch set continues cleaning up and simplifying the code (fixing comments, removing now dead functions, and macros etc). Finally there are 4 bug fixes, with the regression fix having had a couple months of testing. Features: - optimize retrieving current task secid - add base io_uring mediation - add base userns mediation - improve buffer allocation - allow restricting unprivilege change_profile Cleanups: - Fix kernel doc comments - remove unused declarations - remove unused functions - remove unneeded #ifdef - remove unused macros - mark fns static - cleanup fn with unused return values - cleanup audit data - pass cred through to audit data - refcount the pdb instead of using duplicates - make SK_CTX macro an inline fn - some comment cleanups Bug fixes: - fix regression in mount mediation - fix invalid refenece - use passed in gfp flags - advertise avaiability of extended perms and disconnected.path" * tag 'apparmor-pr-2023-11-03' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: (39 commits) apparmor: Fix some kernel-doc comments apparmor: Fix one kernel-doc comment apparmor: Fix some kernel-doc comments apparmor: mark new functions static apparmor: Fix regression in mount mediation apparmor: cache buffers on percpu list if there is lock contention apparmor: add io_uring mediation apparmor: add user namespace creation mediation apparmor: allow restricting unprivileged change_profile apparmor: advertise disconnected.path is available apparmor: refcount the pdb apparmor: provide separate audit messages for file and policy checks apparmor: pass cred through to audit info. apparmor: rename audit_data->label to audit_data->subj_label apparmor: combine common_audit_data and apparmor_audit_data apparmor: rename SK_CTX() to aa_sock and make it an inline fn apparmor: Optimize retrieving current task secid apparmor: remove unused functions in policy_ns.c/.h apparmor: remove unneeded #ifdef in decompress_zstd() apparmor: fix invalid reference on profile->disconnected ...
2026-03-06 15:25:10 -08:00 · 2023-11-03 09:48:17 -10:00
parent 136cc1e1f5 6cede10161
commit 6bdfe2d88b
32 changed files with 1333 additions and 845 deletions
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ static ssize_t policy_update(u32 mask, const char __user *buf, size_t size,
 	/* high level check about policy management - fine grained in
 	 * below after unpack
 	 */
-	error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, ns, mask);
+	error = aa_may_manage_policy(current_cred(), label, ns, mask);
 	if (error)
 		goto end_section;

@@ -486,7 +486,8 @@ static ssize_t profile_remove(struct file *f, const char __user *buf,
 	/* high level check about policy management - fine grained in
 	 * below after unpack
 	 */
-	error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, ns, AA_MAY_REMOVE_POLICY);
+	error = aa_may_manage_policy(current_cred(), label, ns,
+				     AA_MAY_REMOVE_POLICY);
 	if (error)
 		goto out;

@@ -618,23 +619,23 @@ static void profile_query_cb(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,

 	if (profile_unconfined(profile))
 		return;
-	if (rules->file.dfa && *match_str == AA_CLASS_FILE) {
-		state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file.dfa,
-					 rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE],
+	if (rules->file->dfa && *match_str == AA_CLASS_FILE) {
+		state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file->dfa,
+					 rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE],
 					 match_str + 1, match_len - 1);
 		if (state) {
 			struct path_cond cond = { };

-			tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(rules->file), state, &cond));
+			tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(rules->file, state, &cond));
 		}
-	} else if (rules->policy.dfa) {
+	} else if (rules->policy->dfa) {
 		if (!RULE_MEDIATES(rules, *match_str))
 			return;	/* no change to current perms */
-		state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy.dfa,
-					 rules->policy.start[0],
+		state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa,
+					 rules->policy->start[0],
 					 match_str, match_len);
 		if (state)
-			tmp = *aa_lookup_perms(&rules->policy, state);
+			tmp = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state);
 	}
 	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp);
 	aa_perms_accum_raw(perms, &tmp);
@@ -1095,7 +1096,7 @@ static int seq_profile_attach_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
 	struct aa_profile *profile = labels_profile(label);
 	if (profile->attach.xmatch_str)
 		seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", profile->attach.xmatch_str);
-	else if (profile->attach.xmatch.dfa)
+	else if (profile->attach.xmatch->dfa)
 		seq_puts(seq, "<unknown>\n");
 	else
 		seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", profile->base.name);
@@ -1314,7 +1315,6 @@ SEQ_RAWDATA_FOPS(compressed_size);

 static int decompress_zstd(char *src, size_t slen, char *dst, size_t dlen)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
 	if (slen < dlen) {
 		const size_t wksp_len = zstd_dctx_workspace_bound();
 		zstd_dctx *ctx;
@@ -1341,7 +1341,6 @@ cleanup:
 		kvfree(wksp);
 		return ret;
 	}
-#endif

 	if (dlen < slen)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -1806,7 +1805,8 @@ static int ns_mkdir_op(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
 	int error;

 	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
-	error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, NULL, AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY);
+	error = aa_may_manage_policy(current_cred(), label, NULL,
+				     AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY);
 	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
@@ -1855,7 +1855,8 @@ static int ns_rmdir_op(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 	int error;

 	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
-	error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, NULL, AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY);
+	error = aa_may_manage_policy(current_cred(), label, NULL,
+				     AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY);
 	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
@@ -2339,10 +2340,16 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_domain[] = {
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("post_nnp_subset",	1),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("computed_longest_left",	1),
 	AA_SFS_DIR("attach_conditions",		aa_sfs_entry_attach),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("disconnected.path",            1),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("version", "1.2"),
 	{ }
 };

+static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_unconfined[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_profile", 1),
+	{ }
+};
+
 static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_versions[] = {
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v5",	1),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v6",	1),
@@ -2352,11 +2359,15 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_versions[] = {
 	{ }
 };

+#define PERMS32STR "allow deny subtree cond kill complain prompt audit quiet hide xindex tag label"
 static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_policy[] = {
 	AA_SFS_DIR("versions",			aa_sfs_entry_versions),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("set_load",		1),
 	/* number of out of band transitions supported */
 	AA_SFS_FILE_U64("outofband",		MAX_OOB_SUPPORTED),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_U64("permstable32_version",	1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("permstable32", PERMS32STR),
+	AA_SFS_DIR("unconfined_restrictions",   aa_sfs_entry_unconfined),
 	{ }
 };

@@ -2368,6 +2379,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_mount[] = {
 static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_ns[] = {
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("profile",		1),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("pivot_root",	0),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", "userns_create"),
 	{ }
 };

@@ -2382,6 +2394,12 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_query[] = {
 	AA_SFS_DIR("label",			aa_sfs_entry_query_label),
 	{ }
 };
+
+static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_io_uring[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", "sqpoll override_creds"),
+	{ }
+};
+
 static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_features[] = {
 	AA_SFS_DIR("policy",			aa_sfs_entry_policy),
 	AA_SFS_DIR("domain",			aa_sfs_entry_domain),
@@ -2395,6 +2413,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_features[] = {
 	AA_SFS_DIR("ptrace",			aa_sfs_entry_ptrace),
 	AA_SFS_DIR("signal",			aa_sfs_entry_signal),
 	AA_SFS_DIR("query",			aa_sfs_entry_query),
+	AA_SFS_DIR("io_uring",			aa_sfs_entry_io_uring),
 	{ }
 };

--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -58,8 +58,8 @@ static const char *const aa_class_names[] = {
 	"io_uring",
 	"module",
 	"lsm",
-	"unknown",
-	"unknown",
+	"namespace",
+	"io_uring",
 	"unknown",
 	"unknown",
 	"unknown",
@@ -85,37 +85,36 @@ static const char *const aa_class_names[] = {
 /**
 * audit_pre() - core AppArmor function.
 * @ab: audit buffer to fill (NOT NULL)
- * @ca: audit structure containing data to audit (NOT NULL)
+ * @va: audit structure containing data to audit (NOT NULL)
 *
- * Record common AppArmor audit data from @sa
+ * Record common AppArmor audit data from @va
 */
-static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
+static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 {
-	struct common_audit_data *sa = ca;
+	struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad_of_va(va);

 	if (aa_g_audit_header) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor=\"%s\"",
-				 aa_audit_type[aad(sa)->type]);
+				 aa_audit_type[ad->type]);
 	}

-	if (aad(sa)->op) {
-		audit_log_format(ab, " operation=\"%s\"", aad(sa)->op);
-	}
+	if (ad->op)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " operation=\"%s\"", ad->op);

-	if (aad(sa)->class)
+	if (ad->class)
 		audit_log_format(ab, " class=\"%s\"",
-				 aad(sa)->class <= AA_CLASS_LAST ?
-				 aa_class_names[aad(sa)->class] :
+				 ad->class <= AA_CLASS_LAST ?
+				 aa_class_names[ad->class] :
 				 "unknown");

-	if (aad(sa)->info) {
-		audit_log_format(ab, " info=\"%s\"", aad(sa)->info);
-		if (aad(sa)->error)
-			audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", aad(sa)->error);
+	if (ad->info) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " info=\"%s\"", ad->info);
+		if (ad->error)
+			audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", ad->error);
 	}

-	if (aad(sa)->label) {
-		struct aa_label *label = aad(sa)->label;
+	if (ad->subj_label) {
+		struct aa_label *label = ad->subj_label;

 		if (label_isprofile(label)) {
 			struct aa_profile *profile = labels_profile(label);
@@ -134,42 +133,44 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
 		}
 	}

-	if (aad(sa)->name) {
+	if (ad->name) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
-		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->name);
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->name);
 	}
 }

 /**
 * aa_audit_msg - Log a message to the audit subsystem
- * @sa: audit event structure (NOT NULL)
+ * @type: audit type for the message
+ * @ad: audit event structure (NOT NULL)
 * @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL)
 */
-void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa,
+void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
 		  void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *))
 {
-	aad(sa)->type = type;
-	common_lsm_audit(sa, audit_pre, cb);
+	ad->type = type;
+	common_lsm_audit(&ad->common, audit_pre, cb);
 }

 /**
 * aa_audit - Log a profile based audit event to the audit subsystem
 * @type: audit type for the message
 * @profile: profile to check against (NOT NULL)
- * @sa: audit event (NOT NULL)
+ * @ad: audit event (NOT NULL)
 * @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL)
 *
 * Handle default message switching based off of audit mode flags
 *
 * Returns: error on failure
 */
-int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
+int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile,
+	     struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
 	     void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *))
 {
 	AA_BUG(!profile);

 	if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO) {
-		if (likely(!aad(sa)->error)) {
+		if (likely(!ad->error)) {
 			if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
 				return 0;
 			type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
@@ -181,24 +182,24 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
 	if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET ||
 	    (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED &&
 	     AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET_DENIED))
-		return aad(sa)->error;
+		return ad->error;

 	if (KILL_MODE(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED)
 		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;

-	aad(sa)->label = &profile->label;
+	ad->subj_label = &profile->label;

-	aa_audit_msg(type, sa, cb);
+	aa_audit_msg(type, ad, cb);

-	if (aad(sa)->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
+	if (ad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
 		(void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL,
-			sa->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK && sa->u.tsk ?
-				    sa->u.tsk : current);
+			ad->common.type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK &&
+			ad->common.u.tsk ? ad->common.u.tsk : current);

-	if (aad(sa)->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED)
-		return complain_error(aad(sa)->error);
+	if (ad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED)
+		return complain_error(ad->error);

-	return aad(sa)->error;
+	return ad->error;
 }

 struct aa_audit_rule {
--- a/security/apparmor/capability.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c
@@ -38,8 +38,8 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct audit_cache, audit_cache);

 /**
 * audit_cb - call back for capability components of audit struct
- * @ab - audit buffer   (NOT NULL)
- * @va - audit struct to audit data from  (NOT NULL)
+ * @ab: audit buffer   (NOT NULL)
+ * @va: audit struct to audit data from  (NOT NULL)
 */
 static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 {
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)

 /**
 * audit_caps - audit a capability
- * @sa: audit data
+ * @ad: audit data
 * @profile: profile being tested for confinement (NOT NULL)
 * @cap: capability tested
 * @error: error code returned by test
@@ -59,9 +59,9 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 * Do auditing of capability and handle, audit/complain/kill modes switching
 * and duplicate message elimination.
 *
- * Returns: 0 or sa->error on success,  error code on failure
+ * Returns: 0 or ad->error on success,  error code on failure
 */
-static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile,
+static int audit_caps(struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, struct aa_profile *profile,
 		      int cap, int error)
 {
 	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile,
 	struct audit_cache *ent;
 	int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;

-	aad(sa)->error = error;
+	ad->error = error;

 	if (likely(!error)) {
 		/* test if auditing is being forced */
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile,
 	}
 	put_cpu_var(audit_cache);

-	return aa_audit(type, profile, sa, audit_cb);
+	return aa_audit(type, profile, ad, audit_cb);
 }

 /**
@@ -109,12 +109,12 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile,
 * @profile: profile being enforced    (NOT NULL, NOT unconfined)
 * @cap: capability to test if allowed
 * @opts: CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated
- * @sa: audit data (MAY BE NULL indicating no auditing)
+ * @ad: audit data (MAY BE NULL indicating no auditing)
 *
 * Returns: 0 if allowed else -EPERM
 */
 static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
-			   unsigned int opts, struct common_audit_data *sa)
+			   unsigned int opts, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
 						    typeof(*rules), list);
@@ -132,14 +132,15 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
 		/* audit the cap request in complain mode but note that it
 		 * should be optional.
 		 */
-		aad(sa)->info = "optional: no audit";
+		ad->info = "optional: no audit";
 	}

-	return audit_caps(sa, profile, cap, error);
+	return audit_caps(ad, profile, cap, error);
 }

 /**
 * aa_capable - test permission to use capability
+ * @subj_cred: cred we are testing capability against
 * @label: label being tested for capability (NOT NULL)
 * @cap: capability to be tested
 * @opts: CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated
@@ -148,15 +149,17 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
 *
 * Returns: 0 on success, or else an error code.
 */
-int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts)
+int aa_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+	       int cap, unsigned int opts)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
 	int error = 0;
-	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP, AA_CLASS_CAP, OP_CAPABLE);
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP, AA_CLASS_CAP, OP_CAPABLE);

-	sa.u.cap = cap;
+	ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
+	ad.common.u.cap = cap;
 	error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
-			profile_capable(profile, cap, opts, &sa));
+			profile_capable(profile, cap, opts, &ad));

 	return error;
 }
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -44,38 +44,40 @@ static u32 map_mask_to_chr_mask(u32 mask)
 static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
-	kuid_t fsuid = current_fsuid();
+	struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);
+	kuid_t fsuid = ad->subj_cred ? ad->subj_cred->fsuid : current_fsuid();
 	char str[10];

-	if (aad(sa)->request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+	if (ad->request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
 		aa_perm_mask_to_str(str, sizeof(str), aa_file_perm_chrs,
-				    map_mask_to_chr_mask(aad(sa)->request));
+				    map_mask_to_chr_mask(ad->request));
 		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"", str);
 	}
-	if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+	if (ad->denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
 		aa_perm_mask_to_str(str, sizeof(str), aa_file_perm_chrs,
-				    map_mask_to_chr_mask(aad(sa)->denied));
+				    map_mask_to_chr_mask(ad->denied));
 		audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"", str);
 	}
-	if (aad(sa)->request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+	if (ad->request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d",
 				 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, fsuid));
 		audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d",
-				 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, aad(sa)->fs.ouid));
+				 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, ad->fs.ouid));
 	}

-	if (aad(sa)->peer) {
+	if (ad->peer) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " target=");
-		aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
+		aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer,
 				FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS, GFP_KERNEL);
-	} else if (aad(sa)->fs.target) {
+	} else if (ad->fs.target) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " target=");
-		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->fs.target);
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->fs.target);
 	}
 }

 /**
 * aa_audit_file - handle the auditing of file operations
+ * @subj_cred: cred of the subject
 * @profile: the profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
 * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
 * @op: operation being mediated
@@ -89,59 +91,74 @@ static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 *
 * Returns: %0 or error on failure
 */
-int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
+int aa_audit_file(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		  struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
 		  const char *op, u32 request, const char *name,
 		  const char *target, struct aa_label *tlabel,
 		  kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error)
 {
 	int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
-	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK, AA_CLASS_FILE, op);
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK, AA_CLASS_FILE, op);

-	sa.u.tsk = NULL;
-	aad(&sa)->request = request;
-	aad(&sa)->name = name;
-	aad(&sa)->fs.target = target;
-	aad(&sa)->peer = tlabel;
-	aad(&sa)->fs.ouid = ouid;
-	aad(&sa)->info = info;
-	aad(&sa)->error = error;
-	sa.u.tsk = NULL;
+	ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
+	ad.request = request;
+	ad.name = name;
+	ad.fs.target = target;
+	ad.peer = tlabel;
+	ad.fs.ouid = ouid;
+	ad.info = info;
+	ad.error = error;
+	ad.common.u.tsk = NULL;

-	if (likely(!aad(&sa)->error)) {
+	if (likely(!ad.error)) {
 		u32 mask = perms->audit;

 		if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
 			mask = 0xffff;

 		/* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
-		aad(&sa)->request &= mask;
+		ad.request &= mask;

-		if (likely(!aad(&sa)->request))
+		if (likely(!ad.request))
 			return 0;
 		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
 	} else {
 		/* only report permissions that were denied */
-		aad(&sa)->request = aad(&sa)->request & ~perms->allow;
-		AA_BUG(!aad(&sa)->request);
+		ad.request = ad.request & ~perms->allow;
+		AA_BUG(!ad.request);

-		if (aad(&sa)->request & perms->kill)
+		if (ad.request & perms->kill)
 			type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;

 		/* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
-		if ((aad(&sa)->request & perms->quiet) &&
+		if ((ad.request & perms->quiet) &&
 		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
 		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
-			aad(&sa)->request &= ~perms->quiet;
+			ad.request &= ~perms->quiet;

-		if (!aad(&sa)->request)
-			return aad(&sa)->error;
+		if (!ad.request)
+			return ad.error;
 	}

-	aad(&sa)->denied = aad(&sa)->request & ~perms->allow;
-	return aa_audit(type, profile, &sa, file_audit_cb);
+	ad.denied = ad.request & ~perms->allow;
+	return aa_audit(type, profile, &ad, file_audit_cb);
 }

-static int path_name(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
+/**
+ * is_deleted - test if a file has been completely unlinked
+ * @dentry: dentry of file to test for deletion  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: true if deleted else false
+ */
+static inline bool is_deleted(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	if (d_unlinked(dentry) && d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_nlink == 0)
+		return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int path_name(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		     struct aa_label *label,
 		     const struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer,
 		     const char **name, struct path_cond *cond, u32 request)
 {
@@ -153,7 +170,8 @@ static int path_name(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
 			     labels_profile(label)->disconnected);
 	if (error) {
 		fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
-			aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, op, request, *name,
+			aa_audit_file(subj_cred,
+				      profile, &nullperms, op, request, *name,
 				      NULL, NULL, cond->uid, info, error));
 		return error;
 	}
@@ -164,7 +182,7 @@ static int path_name(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
 struct aa_perms default_perms = {};
 /**
 * aa_lookup_fperms - convert dfa compressed perms to internal perms
- * @dfa: dfa to lookup perms for   (NOT NULL)
+ * @file_rules: the aa_policydb to lookup perms for  (NOT NULL)
 * @state: state in dfa
 * @cond:  conditions to consider  (NOT NULL)
 *
@@ -188,8 +206,8 @@ struct aa_perms *aa_lookup_fperms(struct aa_policydb *file_rules,

 /**
 * aa_str_perms - find permission that match @name
- * @dfa: to match against  (MAYBE NULL)
- * @state: state to start matching in
+ * @file_rules: the aa_policydb to match against  (NOT NULL)
+ * @start: state to start matching in
 * @name: string to match against dfa  (NOT NULL)
 * @cond: conditions to consider for permission set computation  (NOT NULL)
 * @perms: Returns - the permissions found when matching @name
@@ -207,9 +225,9 @@ aa_state_t aa_str_perms(struct aa_policydb *file_rules, aa_state_t start,
 	return state;
 }

-static int __aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile,
-			  const char *name, u32 request,
-			  struct path_cond *cond, int flags,
+static int __aa_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			  struct aa_profile *profile, const char *name,
+			  u32 request, struct path_cond *cond, int flags,
 			  struct aa_perms *perms)
 {
 	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
@@ -218,16 +236,18 @@ static int __aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile,

 	if (profile_unconfined(profile))
 		return 0;
-	aa_str_perms(&(rules->file), rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE],
+	aa_str_perms(rules->file, rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE],
 		     name, cond, perms);
 	if (request & ~perms->allow)
 		e = -EACCES;
-	return aa_audit_file(profile, perms, op, request, name, NULL, NULL,
+	return aa_audit_file(subj_cred,
+			     profile, perms, op, request, name, NULL, NULL,
 			     cond->uid, NULL, e);
 }


-static int profile_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile,
+static int profile_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			     struct aa_profile *profile,
 			     const struct path *path, char *buffer, u32 request,
 			     struct path_cond *cond, int flags,
 			     struct aa_perms *perms)
@@ -238,18 +258,19 @@ static int profile_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile,
 	if (profile_unconfined(profile))
 		return 0;

-	error = path_name(op, &profile->label, path,
+	error = path_name(op, subj_cred, &profile->label, path,
 			  flags | profile->path_flags, buffer, &name, cond,
 			  request);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
-	return __aa_path_perm(op, profile, name, request, cond, flags,
-			      perms);
+	return __aa_path_perm(op, subj_cred, profile, name, request, cond,
+			      flags, perms);
 }

 /**
 * aa_path_perm - do permissions check & audit for @path
 * @op: operation being checked
+ * @subj_cred: subject cred
 * @label: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
 * @path: path to check permissions of  (NOT NULL)
 * @flags: any additional path flags beyond what the profile specifies
@@ -258,7 +279,8 @@ static int profile_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile,
 *
 * Returns: %0 else error if access denied or other error
 */
-int aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
+int aa_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		 struct aa_label *label,
 		 const struct path *path, int flags, u32 request,
 		 struct path_cond *cond)
 {
@@ -273,8 +295,8 @@ int aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
 	if (!buffer)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
-			profile_path_perm(op, profile, path, buffer, request,
-					  cond, flags, &perms));
+			profile_path_perm(op, subj_cred, profile, path, buffer,
+					  request, cond, flags, &perms));

 	aa_put_buffer(buffer);

@@ -301,7 +323,8 @@ static inline bool xindex_is_subset(u32 link, u32 target)
 	return true;
 }

-static int profile_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile,
+static int profile_path_link(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			     struct aa_profile *profile,
 			     const struct path *link, char *buffer,
 			     const struct path *target, char *buffer2,
 			     struct path_cond *cond)
@@ -315,29 +338,31 @@ static int profile_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	aa_state_t state;
 	int error;

-	error = path_name(OP_LINK, &profile->label, link, profile->path_flags,
+	error = path_name(OP_LINK, subj_cred, &profile->label, link,
+			  profile->path_flags,
 			  buffer, &lname, cond, AA_MAY_LINK);
 	if (error)
 		goto audit;

 	/* buffer2 freed below, tname is pointer in buffer2 */
-	error = path_name(OP_LINK, &profile->label, target, profile->path_flags,
+	error = path_name(OP_LINK, subj_cred, &profile->label, target,
+			  profile->path_flags,
 			  buffer2, &tname, cond, AA_MAY_LINK);
 	if (error)
 		goto audit;

 	error = -EACCES;
 	/* aa_str_perms - handles the case of the dfa being NULL */
-	state = aa_str_perms(&(rules->file),
-			     rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE], lname,
+	state = aa_str_perms(rules->file,
+			     rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE], lname,
 			     cond, &lperms);

 	if (!(lperms.allow & AA_MAY_LINK))
 		goto audit;

 	/* test to see if target can be paired with link */
-	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(rules->file.dfa, state);
-	aa_str_perms(&(rules->file), state, tname, cond, &perms);
+	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(rules->file->dfa, state);
+	aa_str_perms(rules->file, state, tname, cond, &perms);

 	/* force audit/quiet masks for link are stored in the second entry
 	 * in the link pair.
@@ -359,7 +384,7 @@ static int profile_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	/* Do link perm subset test requiring allowed permission on link are
 	 * a subset of the allowed permissions on target.
 	 */
-	aa_str_perms(&(rules->file), rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE],
+	aa_str_perms(rules->file, rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE],
 		     tname, cond, &perms);

 	/* AA_MAY_LINK is not considered in the subset test */
@@ -381,12 +406,14 @@ done_tests:
 	error = 0;

 audit:
-	return aa_audit_file(profile, &lperms, OP_LINK, request, lname, tname,
+	return aa_audit_file(subj_cred,
+			     profile, &lperms, OP_LINK, request, lname, tname,
 			     NULL, cond->uid, info, error);
 }

 /**
 * aa_path_link - Handle hard link permission check
+ * @subj_cred: subject cred
 * @label: the label being enforced  (NOT NULL)
 * @old_dentry: the target dentry  (NOT NULL)
 * @new_dir: directory the new link will be created in  (NOT NULL)
@@ -403,7 +430,8 @@ audit:
 *
 * Returns: %0 if allowed else error
 */
-int aa_path_link(struct aa_label *label, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+int aa_path_link(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		 struct aa_label *label, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 		 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
 {
 	struct path link = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt, .dentry = new_dentry };
@@ -424,8 +452,8 @@ int aa_path_link(struct aa_label *label, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 		goto out;

 	error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
-			profile_path_link(profile, &link, buffer, &target,
-					  buffer2, &cond));
+			profile_path_link(subj_cred, profile, &link, buffer,
+					  &target, buffer2, &cond));
 out:
 	aa_put_buffer(buffer);
 	aa_put_buffer(buffer2);
@@ -453,7 +481,8 @@ static void update_file_ctx(struct aa_file_ctx *fctx, struct aa_label *label,
 	spin_unlock(&fctx->lock);
 }

-static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
+static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			    struct aa_label *label,
 			    struct aa_label *flabel, struct file *file,
 			    u32 request, u32 denied, bool in_atomic)
 {
@@ -480,7 +509,8 @@ static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,

 	/* check every profile in task label not in current cache */
 	error = fn_for_each_not_in_set(flabel, label, profile,
-			profile_path_perm(op, profile, &file->f_path, buffer,
+			profile_path_perm(op, subj_cred, profile,
+					  &file->f_path, buffer,
 					  request, &cond, flags, &perms));
 	if (denied && !error) {
 		/*
@@ -493,12 +523,14 @@ static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
 		 */
 		if (label == flabel)
 			error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
-				profile_path_perm(op, profile, &file->f_path,
+				profile_path_perm(op, subj_cred,
+						  profile, &file->f_path,
 						  buffer, request, &cond, flags,
 						  &perms));
 		else
 			error = fn_for_each_not_in_set(label, flabel, profile,
-				profile_path_perm(op, profile, &file->f_path,
+				profile_path_perm(op, subj_cred,
+						  profile, &file->f_path,
 						  buffer, request, &cond, flags,
 						  &perms));
 	}
@@ -510,7 +542,8 @@ static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
 	return error;
 }

-static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
+static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			    struct aa_label *label,
 			    struct aa_label *flabel, struct file *file,
 			    u32 request, u32 denied)
 {
@@ -524,11 +557,12 @@ static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
 		return 0;

 	/* TODO: improve to skip profiles cached in flabel */
-	error = aa_sock_file_perm(label, op, request, sock);
+	error = aa_sock_file_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, sock);
 	if (denied) {
 		/* TODO: improve to skip profiles checked above */
 		/* check every profile in file label to is cached */
-		last_error(error, aa_sock_file_perm(flabel, op, request, sock));
+		last_error(error, aa_sock_file_perm(subj_cred, flabel, op,
+						    request, sock));
 	}
 	if (!error)
 		update_file_ctx(file_ctx(file), label, request);
@@ -539,6 +573,7 @@ static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
 /**
 * aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file
 * @op: operation being checked
+ * @subj_cred: subject cred
 * @label: label being enforced   (NOT NULL)
 * @file: file to revalidate access permissions on  (NOT NULL)
 * @request: requested permissions
@@ -546,7 +581,8 @@ static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
 *
 * Returns: %0 if access allowed else error
 */
-int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
+int aa_file_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		 struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
 		 u32 request, bool in_atomic)
 {
 	struct aa_file_ctx *fctx;
@@ -582,19 +618,19 @@ int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
 	/* TODO: label cross check */

 	if (file->f_path.mnt && path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry))
-		error = __file_path_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request,
-					 denied, in_atomic);
+		error = __file_path_perm(op, subj_cred, label, flabel, file,
+					 request, denied, in_atomic);

 	else if (S_ISSOCK(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
-		error = __file_sock_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request,
-					 denied);
+		error = __file_sock_perm(op, subj_cred, label, flabel, file,
+					 request, denied);
 	aa_put_label(flabel);

 done:
 	return error;
 }

-static void revalidate_tty(struct aa_label *label)
+static void revalidate_tty(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label)
 {
 	struct tty_struct *tty;
 	int drop_tty = 0;
@@ -612,8 +648,8 @@ static void revalidate_tty(struct aa_label *label)
 					     struct tty_file_private, list);
 		file = file_priv->file;

-		if (aa_file_perm(OP_INHERIT, label, file, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE,
-				 IN_ATOMIC))
+		if (aa_file_perm(OP_INHERIT, subj_cred, label, file,
+				 MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, IN_ATOMIC))
 			drop_tty = 1;
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
@@ -623,12 +659,17 @@ static void revalidate_tty(struct aa_label *label)
 		no_tty();
 }

+struct cred_label {
+	const struct cred *cred;
+	struct aa_label *label;
+};
+
 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned int fd)
 {
-	struct aa_label *label = (struct aa_label *)p;
+	struct cred_label *cl = (struct cred_label *)p;

-	if (aa_file_perm(OP_INHERIT, label, file, aa_map_file_to_perms(file),
-			 IN_ATOMIC))
+	if (aa_file_perm(OP_INHERIT, cl->cred, cl->label, file,
+			 aa_map_file_to_perms(file), IN_ATOMIC))
 		return fd + 1;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -638,13 +679,17 @@ static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned int fd)
 void aa_inherit_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files)
 {
 	struct aa_label *label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
+	struct cred_label cl = {
+		.cred = cred,
+		.label = label,
+	};
 	struct file *devnull = NULL;
 	unsigned int n;

-	revalidate_tty(label);
+	revalidate_tty(cred, label);

 	/* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
-	n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, label);
+	n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, &cl);
 	if (!n) /* none found? */
 		goto out;

@@ -654,7 +699,7 @@ void aa_inherit_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files)
 	/* replace all the matching ones with this */
 	do {
 		replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
-	} while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, label)) != 0);
+	} while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, &cl)) != 0);
 	if (devnull)
 		fput(devnull);
 out:
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
@@ -30,9 +30,10 @@
 #define AA_CLASS_NET		14
 #define AA_CLASS_LABEL		16
 #define AA_CLASS_POSIX_MQUEUE	17
-#define AA_CLASS_IO_URING	18
 #define AA_CLASS_MODULE		19
 #define AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM	20
+#define AA_CLASS_NS		21
+#define AA_CLASS_IO_URING	22

 #define AA_CLASS_X		31
 #define AA_CLASS_DBUS		32
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -103,13 +103,18 @@ enum audit_type {
 #define OP_PROF_LOAD "profile_load"
 #define OP_PROF_RM "profile_remove"

+#define OP_USERNS_CREATE "userns_create"
+
+#define OP_URING_OVERRIDE "uring_override"
+#define OP_URING_SQPOLL "uring_sqpoll"

 struct apparmor_audit_data {
 	int error;
 	int type;
 	u16 class;
 	const char *op;
-	struct aa_label *label;
+	const struct cred *subj_cred;
+	struct aa_label *subj_label;
 	const char *name;
 	const char *info;
 	u32 request;
@@ -151,34 +156,39 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
 			const char *data;
 			unsigned long flags;
 		} mnt;
+		struct {
+			struct aa_label *target;
+		} uring;
 	};
+
+	struct common_audit_data common;
 };

 /* macros for dealing with  apparmor_audit_data structure */
-#define aad(SA) ((SA)->apparmor_audit_data)
+#define aad(SA) (container_of(SA, struct apparmor_audit_data, common))
+#define aad_of_va(VA) aad((struct common_audit_data *)(VA))
+
 #define DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(NAME, T, C, X)				\
 	/* TODO: cleanup audit init so we don't need _aad = {0,} */	\
-	struct apparmor_audit_data NAME ## _aad = {                     \
+	struct apparmor_audit_data NAME = {				\
 		.class = (C),						\
 		.op = (X),                                              \
-	};                                                              \
-	struct common_audit_data NAME =					\
-	{								\
-	.type = (T),							\
-	.u.tsk = NULL,							\
-	};								\
-	NAME.apparmor_audit_data = &(NAME ## _aad)
+		.common.type = (T),					\
+		.common.u.tsk = NULL,					\
+		.common.apparmor_audit_data = &NAME,			\
+	};

-void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa,
+void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
 		  void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *));
-int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
+int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile,
+	     struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
 	     void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *));

-#define aa_audit_error(ERROR, SA, CB)				\
+#define aa_audit_error(ERROR, AD, CB)				\
 ({								\
-	aad((SA))->error = (ERROR);				\
-	aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_ERROR, (SA), (CB));		\
-	aad((SA))->error;					\
+	(AD)->error = (ERROR);					\
+	aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_ERROR, (AD), (CB));		\
+	(AD)->error;					\
 })


--- a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
@@ -36,7 +36,8 @@ struct aa_caps {

 extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_caps[];

-int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts);
+int aa_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+	       int cap, unsigned int opts);

 static inline void aa_free_cap_rules(struct aa_caps *caps)
 {
--- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
@@ -45,43 +45,6 @@ struct aa_file_ctx {
 	u32 allow;
 };

-/**
- * aa_alloc_file_ctx - allocate file_ctx
- * @label: initial label of task creating the file
- * @gfp: gfp flags for allocation
- *
- * Returns: file_ctx or NULL on failure
- */
-static inline struct aa_file_ctx *aa_alloc_file_ctx(struct aa_label *label,
-						    gfp_t gfp)
-{
-	struct aa_file_ctx *ctx;
-
-	ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx), gfp);
-	if (ctx) {
-		spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock);
-		rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label));
-	}
-	return ctx;
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_free_file_ctx - free a file_ctx
- * @ctx: file_ctx to free  (MAYBE_NULL)
- */
-static inline void aa_free_file_ctx(struct aa_file_ctx *ctx)
-{
-	if (ctx) {
-		aa_put_label(rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label));
-		kfree_sensitive(ctx);
-	}
-}
-
-static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_file_label(struct aa_file_ctx *ctx)
-{
-	return aa_get_label_rcu(&ctx->label);
-}
-
 /*
 * The xindex is broken into 3 parts
 * - index - an index into either the exec name table or the variable table
@@ -108,7 +71,8 @@ struct path_cond {

 #define COMBINED_PERM_MASK(X) ((X).allow | (X).audit | (X).quiet | (X).kill)

-int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
+int aa_audit_file(const struct cred *cred,
+		  struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
 		  const char *op, u32 request, const char *name,
 		  const char *target, struct aa_label *tlabel, kuid_t ouid,
 		  const char *info, int error);
@@ -119,14 +83,16 @@ aa_state_t aa_str_perms(struct aa_policydb *file_rules, aa_state_t start,
 			const char *name, struct path_cond *cond,
 			struct aa_perms *perms);

-int aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
-		 const struct path *path, int flags, u32 request,
-		 struct path_cond *cond);
+int aa_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		 struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+		 int flags, u32 request, struct path_cond *cond);

-int aa_path_link(struct aa_label *label, struct dentry *old_dentry,
-		 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
+int aa_path_link(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		 struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
+		 struct dentry *new_dentry);

-int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
+int aa_file_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		 struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
 		 u32 request, bool in_atomic);

 void aa_inherit_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files);
--- a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@

 #include <linux/sched.h>

-int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig);
+int aa_may_signal(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *sender,
+		  const struct cred *target_cred, struct aa_label *target,
+		  int sig);

 #endif /* __AA_IPC_H */
--- a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@

 #include "match.h"

+extern struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa;
+
 /*
 * DEBUG remains global (no per profile flag) since it is mostly used in sysctl
 * which is not related to profile accesses.
--- a/security/apparmor/include/match.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
@@ -102,9 +102,6 @@ struct aa_dfa {
 	struct table_header *tables[YYTD_ID_TSIZE];
 };

-extern struct aa_dfa *nulldfa;
-extern struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa;
-
 #define byte_to_byte(X) (X)

 #define UNPACK_ARRAY(TABLE, BLOB, LEN, TTYPE, BTYPE, NTOHX)	\
@@ -122,9 +119,6 @@ static inline size_t table_size(size_t len, size_t el_size)
 	return ALIGN(sizeof(struct table_header) + len * el_size, 8);
 }

-int aa_setup_dfa_engine(void);
-void aa_teardown_dfa_engine(void);
-
 #define aa_state_t unsigned int

 struct aa_dfa *aa_dfa_unpack(void *blob, size_t size, int flags);
--- a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
@@ -25,26 +25,36 @@

 #define AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK (MS_KERNMOUNT | MS_NOSEC | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN)

-int aa_remount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+int aa_remount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+	       struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
 	       unsigned long flags, void *data);

-int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+int aa_bind_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		  struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
 		  const char *old_name, unsigned long flags);


-int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+int aa_mount_change_type(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			 struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
 			 unsigned long flags);

-int aa_move_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
-		  const char *old_name);
+int aa_move_mount_old(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		      struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+		      const char *old_name);
+int aa_move_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		  struct aa_label *label, const struct path *from_path,
+		  const struct path *to_path);

-int aa_new_mount(struct aa_label *label, const char *dev_name,
+int aa_new_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		 struct aa_label *label, const char *dev_name,
 		 const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
 		 void *data);

-int aa_umount(struct aa_label *label, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
+int aa_umount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+	      struct aa_label *label, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);

-int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *old_path,
+int aa_pivotroot(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		 struct aa_label *label, const struct path *old_path,
 		 const struct path *new_path);

 #endif /* __AA_MOUNT_H */
--- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -52,7 +52,11 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {
 };

 #define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
-#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security
+static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+	return sk->sk_security;
+}
+
 #define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P)				  \
 	struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK),		  \
 						  .family = (F)};	  \
@@ -61,9 +65,9 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {
 						     LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, \
 						     AA_CLASS_NET,        \
 			  OP);						  \
-	NAME.u.net = &(NAME ## _net);					  \
-	aad(&NAME)->net.type = (T);					  \
-	aad(&NAME)->net.protocol = (P)
+	NAME.common.u.net = &(NAME ## _net);				  \
+	NAME.net.type = (T);						  \
+	NAME.net.protocol = (P)

 #define DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(NAME, OP, SK)					\
 	DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, (SK)->sk_family, (SK)->sk_type,	\
@@ -90,21 +94,24 @@ struct aa_secmark {
 extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[];

 void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va);
-int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
+int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+		       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
 		       u32 request, u16 family, int type);
-int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
+int aa_af_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+	       const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
 	       int type, int protocol);
 static inline int aa_profile_af_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
-					struct common_audit_data *sa,
+					struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
 					u32 request,
 					struct sock *sk)
 {
-	return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, sa, request, sk->sk_family,
+	return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, ad, request, sk->sk_family,
 				  sk->sk_type);
 }
 int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk);

-int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+int aa_sock_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		      const char *op, u32 request,
 		      struct socket *sock);

 int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request,
--- a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@

 #define AA_LINK_SUBSET		AA_MAY_LOCK	/* overlaid */

+#define AA_MAY_CREATE_SQPOLL   AA_MAY_CREATE
+#define AA_MAY_OVERRIDE_CRED   AA_MAY_APPEND
+#define AA_URING_PERM_MASK     (AA_MAY_OVERRIDE_CRED | AA_MAY_CREATE_SQPOLL)

 #define PERMS_CHRS_MASK (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_CREATE |		\
 			 AA_MAY_DELETE | AA_MAY_LINK | AA_MAY_LOCK |	\
@@ -212,8 +215,8 @@ void aa_profile_match_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
 			    int type, u32 request, struct aa_perms *perms);
 int aa_profile_label_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_profile *target,
 			  u32 request, int type, u32 *deny,
-			  struct common_audit_data *sa);
+			  struct apparmor_audit_data *ad);
 int aa_check_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
-		   u32 request, struct common_audit_data *sa,
+		   u32 request, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
 		   void (*cb)(struct audit_buffer *, void *));
 #endif /* __AA_PERM_H */
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 struct aa_ns;

 extern int unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy;
+extern int aa_unprivileged_unconfined_restricted;

 extern const char *const aa_profile_mode_names[];
 #define APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX 4
@@ -74,12 +75,14 @@ enum profile_mode {


 /* struct aa_policydb - match engine for a policy
+ * count: refcount for the pdb
 * dfa: dfa pattern match
 * perms: table of permissions
 * strs: table of strings, index by x
 * start: set of start states for the different classes of data
 */
 struct aa_policydb {
+	struct kref count;
 	struct aa_dfa *dfa;
 	struct {
 		struct aa_perms *perms;
@@ -89,13 +92,36 @@ struct aa_policydb {
 	aa_state_t start[AA_CLASS_LAST + 1];
 };

-static inline void aa_destroy_policydb(struct aa_policydb *policy)
-{
-	aa_put_dfa(policy->dfa);
-	if (policy->perms)
-		kvfree(policy->perms);
-	aa_free_str_table(&policy->trans);
+extern struct aa_policydb *nullpdb;

+struct aa_policydb *aa_alloc_pdb(gfp_t gfp);
+void aa_pdb_free_kref(struct kref *kref);
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_pdb - increment refcount on @pdb
+ * @pdb: policydb  (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to @pdb if @pdb is NULL will return NULL
+ * Requires: @pdb must be held with valid refcount when called
+ */
+static inline struct aa_policydb *aa_get_pdb(struct aa_policydb *pdb)
+{
+	if (pdb)
+		kref_get(&(pdb->count));
+
+	return pdb;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_put_pdb - put a pdb refcount
+ * @pdb: pdb to put refcount   (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: if @pdb != NULL that a valid refcount be held
+ */
+static inline void aa_put_pdb(struct aa_policydb *pdb)
+{
+	if (pdb)
+		kref_put(&pdb->count, aa_pdb_free_kref);
 }

 static inline struct aa_perms *aa_lookup_perms(struct aa_policydb *policy,
@@ -139,8 +165,8 @@ struct aa_ruleset {
 	int size;

 	/* TODO: merge policy and file */
-	struct aa_policydb policy;
-	struct aa_policydb file;
+	struct aa_policydb *policy;
+	struct aa_policydb *file;
 	struct aa_caps caps;

 	struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
@@ -159,7 +185,7 @@ struct aa_ruleset {
 */
 struct aa_attachment {
 	const char *xmatch_str;
-	struct aa_policydb xmatch;
+	struct aa_policydb *xmatch;
 	unsigned int xmatch_len;
 	int xattr_count;
 	char **xattrs;
@@ -227,10 +253,6 @@ extern enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode;
 #define profiles_ns(P) ((P)->ns)
 #define name_is_shared(A, B) ((A)->hname && (A)->hname == (B)->hname)

-void aa_add_profile(struct aa_policy *common, struct aa_profile *profile);
-
-
-void aa_free_proxy_kref(struct kref *kref);
 struct aa_ruleset *aa_alloc_ruleset(gfp_t gfp);
 struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_profile(const char *name, struct aa_proxy *proxy,
 				    gfp_t gfp);
@@ -239,14 +261,12 @@ struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_null(struct aa_profile *parent, const char *name,
 struct aa_profile *aa_new_learning_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, bool hat,
 					   const char *base, gfp_t gfp);
 void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile);
-void aa_free_profile_kref(struct kref *kref);
 struct aa_profile *aa_find_child(struct aa_profile *parent, const char *name);
 struct aa_profile *aa_lookupn_profile(struct aa_ns *ns, const char *hname,
 				      size_t n);
 struct aa_profile *aa_lookup_profile(struct aa_ns *ns, const char *name);
 struct aa_profile *aa_fqlookupn_profile(struct aa_label *base,
 					const char *fqname, size_t n);
-struct aa_profile *aa_match_profile(struct aa_ns *ns, const char *name);

 ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *view, struct aa_label *label,
 			    u32 mask, struct aa_loaddata *udata);
@@ -254,9 +274,6 @@ ssize_t aa_remove_profiles(struct aa_ns *view, struct aa_label *label,
 			   char *name, size_t size);
 void __aa_profile_list_release(struct list_head *head);

-#define PROF_ADD 1
-#define PROF_REPLACE 0
-
 #define profile_unconfined(X) ((X)->mode == APPARMOR_UNCONFINED)

 /**
@@ -276,10 +293,10 @@ static inline aa_state_t RULE_MEDIATES(struct aa_ruleset *rules,
 				       unsigned char class)
 {
 	if (class <= AA_CLASS_LAST)
-		return rules->policy.start[class];
+		return rules->policy->start[class];
 	else
-		return aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy.dfa,
-					rules->policy.start[0], &class, 1);
+		return aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa,
+					rules->policy->start[0], &class, 1);
 }

 static inline aa_state_t RULE_MEDIATES_AF(struct aa_ruleset *rules, u16 AF)
@@ -289,7 +306,7 @@ static inline aa_state_t RULE_MEDIATES_AF(struct aa_ruleset *rules, u16 AF)

 	if (!state)
 		return DFA_NOMATCH;
-	return aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &be_af, 2);
+	return aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state, (char *) &be_af, 2);
 }

 static inline aa_state_t ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(struct list_head *head,
@@ -370,9 +387,12 @@ static inline int AUDIT_MODE(struct aa_profile *profile)
 	return profile->audit;
 }

-bool aa_policy_view_capable(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns);
-bool aa_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns);
-int aa_may_manage_policy(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns,
+bool aa_policy_view_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			    struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns);
+bool aa_policy_admin_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			     struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns);
+int aa_may_manage_policy(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			 struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns,
 			 u32 mask);
 bool aa_current_policy_view_capable(struct aa_ns *ns);
 bool aa_current_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_ns *ns);
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h
@@ -86,10 +86,7 @@ const char *aa_ns_name(struct aa_ns *parent, struct aa_ns *child, bool subns);
 void aa_free_ns(struct aa_ns *ns);
 int aa_alloc_root_ns(void);
 void aa_free_root_ns(void);
-void aa_free_ns_kref(struct kref *kref);

-struct aa_ns *aa_find_ns(struct aa_ns *root, const char *name);
-struct aa_ns *aa_findn_ns(struct aa_ns *root, const char *name, size_t n);
 struct aa_ns *__aa_lookupn_ns(struct aa_ns *view, const char *hname, size_t n);
 struct aa_ns *aa_lookupn_ns(struct aa_ns *view, const char *name, size_t n);
 struct aa_ns *__aa_find_or_create_ns(struct aa_ns *parent, const char *name,
@@ -151,15 +148,4 @@ static inline struct aa_ns *__aa_find_ns(struct list_head *head,
 	return __aa_findn_ns(head, name, strlen(name));
 }

-static inline struct aa_ns *__aa_lookup_ns(struct aa_ns *base,
-					   const char *hname)
-{
-	return __aa_lookupn_ns(base, hname, strlen(hname));
-}
-
-static inline struct aa_ns *aa_lookup_ns(struct aa_ns *view, const char *name)
-{
-	return aa_lookupn_ns(view, name, strlen(name));
-}
-
 #endif /* AA_NAMESPACE_H */
--- a/security/apparmor/include/resource.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/resource.h
@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ struct aa_rlimit {
 extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_rlimit[];

 int aa_map_resource(int resource);
-int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_label *label, struct task_struct *task,
+int aa_task_setrlimit(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		      struct task_struct *task,
 		      unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim);

 void __aa_transition_rlimits(struct aa_label *old, struct aa_label *new);
--- a/security/apparmor/include/task.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ struct aa_task_ctx {
 };

 int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label);
-int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack);
+void aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack);
 int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token);
 int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 cookie);
 struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task);
@@ -91,8 +91,15 @@ static inline void aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
 	"segv usr2 pipe alrm term stkflt chld cont stop stp ttin ttou urg " \
 	"xcpu xfsz vtalrm prof winch io pwr sys emt lost"

-int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
+int aa_may_ptrace(const struct cred *tracer_cred, struct aa_label *tracer,
+		  const struct cred *tracee_cred, struct aa_label *tracee,
 		  u32 request);


+
+#define AA_USERNS_CREATE	8
+
+int aa_profile_ns_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+		       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, u32 request);
+
 #endif /* __AA_TASK_H */
--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -52,31 +52,33 @@ static const char *audit_signal_mask(u32 mask)
 static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+	struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);

-	if (aad(sa)->request & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
+	if (ad->request & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"",
-				 audit_signal_mask(aad(sa)->request));
-		if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
+				 audit_signal_mask(ad->request));
+		if (ad->denied & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
 			audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"",
-					 audit_signal_mask(aad(sa)->denied));
+					 audit_signal_mask(ad->denied));
 		}
 	}
-	if (aad(sa)->signal == SIGUNKNOWN)
+	if (ad->signal == SIGUNKNOWN)
 		audit_log_format(ab, "signal=unknown(%d)",
-				 aad(sa)->unmappedsig);
-	else if (aad(sa)->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME)
-		audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[aad(sa)->signal]);
+				 ad->unmappedsig);
+	else if (ad->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[ad->signal]);
 	else
 		audit_log_format(ab, " signal=rtmin+%d",
-				 aad(sa)->signal - SIGRT_BASE);
+				 ad->signal - SIGRT_BASE);
 	audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
-	aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
+	aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer,
 			FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
 }

-static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+static int profile_signal_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+			       struct aa_profile *profile,
 			       struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
-			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
+			       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
 						    typeof(*rules), list);
@@ -87,24 +89,29 @@ static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	    !ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(&profile->rules, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL))
 		return 0;

-	aad(sa)->peer = peer;
+	ad->subj_cred = cred;
+	ad->peer = peer;
 	/* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */
-	state = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy.dfa,
-			    rules->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL],
-			    aad(sa)->signal);
+	state = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy->dfa,
+			    rules->policy->start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL],
+			    ad->signal);
 	aa_label_match(profile, rules, peer, state, false, request, &perms);
 	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
-	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_signal_cb);
+	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_signal_cb);
 }

-int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig)
+int aa_may_signal(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *sender,
+		  const struct cred *target_cred, struct aa_label *target,
+		  int sig)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
-	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL, OP_SIGNAL);
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL, OP_SIGNAL);

-	aad(&sa)->signal = map_signal_num(sig);
-	aad(&sa)->unmappedsig = sig;
+	ad.signal = map_signal_num(sig);
+	ad.unmappedsig = sig;
 	return xcheck_labels(sender, target, profile,
-			profile_signal_perm(profile, target, MAY_WRITE, &sa),
-			profile_signal_perm(profile, sender, MAY_READ, &sa));
+			     profile_signal_perm(subj_cred, profile, target,
+						 MAY_WRITE, &ad),
+			     profile_signal_perm(target_cred, profile, sender,
+						 MAY_READ, &ad));
 }
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More