Sync sysutils fixes from ROCKNIX

systemd: re-enable timedated (was -Dtimedated=false). Drop the
post-install safe_remove that nuked /usr/bin/timedatectl so users
can finally run timedatectl set-timezone from the shell. Two
upstream-equivalent patches accompany the build: 0600 redirects
the timedated write target to /var/run/localtime (writable on our
read-only rootfs), 0601 makes the timezone reader follow indirect
symlinks (matches the /etc -> /storage layout).

udevil: pull the cleaned udevil.conf (UFS gate moved from
allowed_devices to forbidden_devices, /dev/sd* whitelisted as
removable). The udev rule now bails on anything that is not
usb-storage. Internal mmc devices were never matched by the prior
KERNEL=="sd*|sr*" filter anyway, but this makes the intent
explicit and stops misclassified eSATA-like devices.

input_sense: grep -line-buffered before the parse loop so only
EV_KEY / EV_SW / error-reading lines reach the case statement.
evtest output is mostly EV_ABS noise we threw away anyway; this
cuts the CPU spent on the dispatch hot path on every controller.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

packages/sysutils/systemd/package.mk

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ PKG_MESON_OPTS_TARGET="--libdir=/usr/lib \
                        -Dnologin-path=/usr/sbin/nologin \
                        -Dhomed=disabled \
                        -Dnetworkd=false \
-                       -Dtimedated=false \
+                       -Dtimedated=true \
                        -Dtimesyncd=true \
                        -Dfirstboot=false \
                        -Drandomseed=false \
@@ -163,9 +163,6 @@ post_makeinstall_target() {
   safe_remove ${INSTALL}/usr/bin/systemd-nspawn
   safe_remove ${INSTALL}/usr/lib/systemd/system/systemd-nspawn@.service
 
-  # remove timedatectl
-  safe_remove ${INSTALL}/usr/bin/timedatectl
-
   # remove unneeded generators
   for gen in ${INSTALL}/usr/lib/systemd/system-generators/*; do
     case "${gen}" in

packages/sysutils/systemd/patches/systemd-0600-timedated-use-run-archr-localtime.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+--- a/src/timedate/timedated.c
++++ b/src/timedate/timedated.c
+@@ -290,34 +290,47 @@
+ static int context_write_data_timezone(Context *c) {
+         _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL;
+         const char *source;
++        int r;
+ 
+         assert(c);
+ 
+-        /* No timezone is very similar to UTC. Hence in either of these cases link the UTC file in. Except if
+-         * it isn't installed, in which case we remove the symlink altogether. Since glibc defaults to an
+-         * internal version of UTC in that case behaviour is mostly equivalent. We still prefer creating the
+-         * symlink though, since things are more self explanatory then. */
+ 
+         if (isempty(c->zone) || streq(c->zone, "UTC")) {
+ 
+                 if (access("/usr/share/zoneinfo/UTC", F_OK) < 0) {
+ 
+-                        if (unlink("/etc/localtime") < 0 && errno != ENOENT)
++                        if (unlink("/var/run/localtime") < 0 && errno != ENOENT)
+                                 return -errno;
+ 
+                         return 0;
+                 }
+ 
+-                source = "../usr/share/zoneinfo/UTC";
++                source = "/usr/share/zoneinfo/UTC";
+         } else {
+-                p = path_join("../usr/share/zoneinfo", c->zone);
++                p = path_join("/usr/share/zoneinfo", c->zone);
+                 if (!p)
+                         return -ENOMEM;
+ 
+                 source = p;
+         }
+ 
+-        return symlink_atomic(source, "/etc/localtime");
++        r = symlink_atomic(source, "/var/run/localtime");
++        if (r < 0)
++                return r;
++
++        /* Persist timezone across reboots via /storage/.cache/timezone */
++        if (!isempty(c->zone)) {
++                _cleanup_free_ char *tz_line = NULL;
++
++                tz_line = strjoin("TIMEZONE=", c->zone, "\n");
++                if (tz_line)
++                        (void) write_string_file("/storage/.cache/timezone", tz_line,
++                                                 WRITE_STRING_FILE_CREATE |
++                                                 WRITE_STRING_FILE_ATOMIC |
++                                                 WRITE_STRING_FILE_TRUNCATE);
++        }
++
++        return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ static int context_write_data_local_rtc(Context *c) {

packages/sysutils/systemd/patches/systemd-0601-get-timezone-follow-indirect-symlinks.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+--- a/src/basic/time-util.c
++++ b/src/basic/time-util.c
+@@ -1626,8 +1626,18 @@ int get_timezone(char **ret) {
+                 return r; /* returns EINVAL if not a symlink */
+ 
+         e = PATH_STARTSWITH_SET(t, "/usr/share/zoneinfo/", "../usr/share/zoneinfo/");
+-        if (!e)
+-                return -EINVAL;
++        if (!e) {
++                char resolved[PATH_MAX + 1];
++                if (realpath("/etc/localtime", resolved)) {
++                        free(t);
++                        t = strdup(resolved);
++                        if (!t)
++                                return -ENOMEM;
++                        e = PATH_STARTSWITH_SET(t, "/usr/share/zoneinfo/", "../usr/share/zoneinfo/");
++                }
++                if (!e)
++                        return -EINVAL;
++        }
+ 
+         if (!timezone_is_valid(e, LOG_DEBUG))
+                 return -EINVAL;

packages/sysutils/udevil/config/udevil.conf

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 #
 # This file controls what devices, networks, and files users may mount and
 # unmount via udevil (set suid).
-# 
+#
 # IMPORTANT:  IT IS POSSIBLE TO CREATE SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEMS IF THIS FILE
 # IS MISCONFIGURED - EDIT WITH CARE
 #
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ log_keep_days = 10
 # Setting allowed_types = * does NOT allow all types, as this is a security
 # risk, but does allow all recognized types.
 # allowed_types = $KNOWN_FILESYSTEMS, file, cifs, smbfs, nfs, curlftpfs, ftpfs, sshfs, davfs, tmpfs, ramfs
-allowed_types = $KNOWN_FILESYSTEMS, hfsplus, hfs
+allowed_types = $KNOWN_FILESYSTEMS, hfsplus, hfs, btrfs
 
 
 # allowed_users is a list of users permitted to mount and unmount with udevil.
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ allowed_media_dirs = /media, /var/media, /run/media/$USER
 # or unmount.  If a device is not listed in allowed_devices, it cannot be
 # un/mounted (unless in fstab).  However, even if a device is listed, other
 # factors may prevent its use.  For example, access to system internal devices
-# will be denied to normal users even if they are included in allowed_devices.  
+# will be denied to normal users even if they are included in allowed_devices.
 # allowed_devices_FSTYPE, if present, is used to override allowed_devices when
 # mounting or unmounting a specific fstype (eg ext3, ntfs).  For example, to
 # prevent all block devices containing an ext4 filesystem from being
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ allowed_devices = /dev/*
 # Some removable esata drives look like internal drives to udevil.  To avoid
 # this problem, they can be treated as removable with this setting.
 # WARNING:  SETTING A SYSTEM DEVICE HERE CAN CAUSE SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEMS.
-# allowed_internal_devices =
+allowed_internal_devices = /dev/sd*
 
 
 # allowed_internal_uuids and allowed_internal_uuids_FSTYPE work similarly to
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ allowed_devices = /dev/*
 # For example, to allow un/mounting of an internal filesystem based on UUID:
 # allowed_internal_uuids = cc0c4489-8def-1e5b-a304-ab87c3cb626c0
 # WARNING:  SETTING A SYSTEM DEVICE HERE CAN CAUSE SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEMS.
-# allowed_internal_uuids = 
+# allowed_internal_uuids =
 
 
 # forbidden_devices is used to prevent block devices from being un/mounted
@@ -153,13 +153,13 @@ allowed_devices = /dev/*
 # forbidden_devices_ntfs = /dev/sdd1
 # NOTE: device node paths are canonicalized before being tested, so forbidding
 # a link to a device will have no effect.
-forbidden_devices =
+forbidden_devices = /dev/disk/by-path/*ufshc*
 
 
 # allowed_networks determines what hosts may be un/mounted by udevil users when
 # using nfs, cifs, smbfs, curlftpfs, ftpfs, or sshfs.  Hosts may be specified
 # using a hostname (eg myserver.com) or IP address (192.168.1.100).
-# Wildcards may be used in hostnames and IP addresses, but CIDR notation 
+# Wildcards may be used in hostnames and IP addresses, but CIDR notation
 # (192.168.1.0/16) is NOT supported.  IP v6 is supported.  For example:
 # allowed_networks = 127.0.0.1, 192.168.1.*, 10.0.0.*, localmachine, *.okay.com
 # Or, to prevent un/mounting of any network shares, set:
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ allowed_networks = *
 # NO REVERSE LOOKUP IS PERFORMED, so including bad.com will only have an effect
 # if the user uses that hostname.  IP lookup is always performed, so forbidding
 # an IP address will also forbid all corresponding hostnames.
-forbidden_networks = 
+forbidden_networks =
 
 
 # allowed_files is used to determine what files in what directories may be
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ allowed_files = *
 # for "forbidden_files = *".
 # NOTE: file paths are canonicalized before being tested, so forbidding
 # a link to a file will have no effect.
-forbidden_files = 
+forbidden_files =
 
 
 # default_options specifies what options are always included when performing
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ default_options_ftpfs     = nosuid, noexec, nodev, noatime, uid=$UID, gid=$GID
 default_options_davfs     = nosuid, noexec, nodev, uid=$UID, gid=$GID
 default_options_tmpfs     = nosuid, noexec, nodev, noatime, uid=$UID, gid=$GID
 default_options_ramfs     = nosuid, noexec, nodev, noatime, uid=$UID, gid=$GID
-
+default_options_btrfs     = compress=zstd:3
 
 # allowed_options determines all options that a user may specify when mounting.
 # All the options used in default_options above must be included here too, or
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ allowed_options_exfat     = nosuid, noexec, nodev, noatime, ro, rw, uid=$UID, gi
 
 # validate_rootexec works similarly to validate_exec, except that the program
 # is run as root.  validate_rootexec will also be run if the root user runs
-# udevil.  If both validate_exec and validate_rootexec are specified, 
+# udevil.  If both validate_exec and validate_rootexec are specified,
 # validate_rootexec will run first, followed by validate_exec.
 # The program must return an exit status of 0 to allow the mount or unmount
 # to proceed.  If it returns non-zero, the user will be denied permission.
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ allowed_options_exfat     = nosuid, noexec, nodev, noatime, ro, rw, uid=$UID, gi
 # validate_rootexec =
 
 
-# success_exec is run after a successful mount, remount, or unmount.  The 
+# success_exec is run after a successful mount, remount, or unmount.  The
 # program is run as a normal user (if root runs udevil, success_exec
 # will NOT be run).
 # The program is passed the username, a printable description of what action
@@ -329,4 +329,3 @@ allowed_options_exfat     = nosuid, noexec, nodev, noatime, ro, rw, uid=$UID, gi
 # rootexec settings NOT be used, as it is easy to inadvertently open exploits.
 # THIS PROGRAM IS ALWAYS RUN AS ROOT, even if the user running udevil is not.
 # success_rootexec =
-

packages/sysutils/udevil/udev.d/95-udevil-mount.rules

@@ -2,15 +2,18 @@
 IMPORT{cmdline}="installer"
 ENV{installer}=="1", GOTO="exit"
 
-# check for blockdevices, /dev/sd*, /dev/sr*, /dev/mmc*, and /dev/nvme*
-SUBSYSTEM!="block", KERNEL!="sd*|sr*|mmc*|nvme*", GOTO="exit"
+# check for blockdevices, /dev/sd*, /dev/sr*
+SUBSYSTEM!="block", KERNEL!="sd*|sr*", GOTO="exit"
+
+# only allow USB-attached devices
+ENV{ID_USB_DRIVER}!="usb-storage", GOTO="exit"
 
 # check for special partitions we dont want mount
 IMPORT{builtin}="blkid"
 ENV{ID_FS_LABEL}=="EFI|BOOT|Recovery|RECOVERY|SETTINGS|boot|root0|share0", GOTO="exit"
 
-# /dev/sd*, /dev/mmc*, and /dev/nvme* with partitions/disk and filesystems only, and /dev/sr* disks only
-KERNEL=="sd*|mmc*|nvme*", ENV{DEVTYPE}=="partition|disk", ENV{ID_FS_USAGE}=="filesystem", GOTO="harddisk"
+# /dev/sd* with partitions/disk and filesystems only and /dev/sr* disks only
+KERNEL=="sd*", ENV{DEVTYPE}=="partition|disk", ENV{ID_FS_USAGE}=="filesystem", GOTO="harddisk"
 KERNEL=="sr*", ENV{DEVTYPE}=="disk", GOTO="optical"
 GOTO="exit"
 
@@ -27,4 +30,3 @@ GOTO="exit"
 
 # Exit
 LABEL="exit"
-

projects/ArchR/packages/sysutils/system-utils/sources/scripts/input_sense

@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ set +e
   done
 
   wait  # Wait for all background loops (they never end unless forcibly stopped)
-) | while read line; do
+) | grep --line-buffered "EV_KEY\|EV_SW\|error reading" | while read line; do
 
     # Parse lines from any evtest instance:
     case ${line} in

projects/ArchR/packages/sysutils/systemd/package.mk

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ PKG_MESON_OPTS_TARGET="--libdir=/usr/lib \
                        -Duserdb=false \
                        -Dhomed=false \
                        -Dnetworkd=false \
-                       -Dtimedated=false \
+                       -Dtimedated=true \
                        -Dtimesyncd=true \
                        -Dfirstboot=false \
                        -Drandomseed=false \
@@ -168,9 +168,6 @@ post_makeinstall_target() {
   safe_remove ${INSTALL}/usr/bin/systemd-nspawn
   safe_remove ${INSTALL}/usr/lib/systemd/system/systemd-nspawn@.service
 
-  # remove timedatectl
-  safe_remove ${INSTALL}/usr/bin/timedatectl
-
   # remove unneeded generators
   for gen in ${INSTALL}/usr/lib/systemd/system-generators/*; do
     case "${gen}" in

projects/ArchR/packages/sysutils/systemd/patches/systemd-0600-timedated-use-run-archr-localtime.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+--- a/src/timedate/timedated.c
++++ b/src/timedate/timedated.c
+@@ -290,34 +290,47 @@
+ static int context_write_data_timezone(Context *c) {
+         _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL;
+         const char *source;
++        int r;
+ 
+         assert(c);
+ 
+-        /* No timezone is very similar to UTC. Hence in either of these cases link the UTC file in. Except if
+-         * it isn't installed, in which case we remove the symlink altogether. Since glibc defaults to an
+-         * internal version of UTC in that case behaviour is mostly equivalent. We still prefer creating the
+-         * symlink though, since things are more self explanatory then. */
+ 
+         if (isempty(c->zone) || streq(c->zone, "UTC")) {
+ 
+                 if (access("/usr/share/zoneinfo/UTC", F_OK) < 0) {
+ 
+-                        if (unlink("/etc/localtime") < 0 && errno != ENOENT)
++                        if (unlink("/var/run/localtime") < 0 && errno != ENOENT)
+                                 return -errno;
+ 
+                         return 0;
+                 }
+ 
+-                source = "../usr/share/zoneinfo/UTC";
++                source = "/usr/share/zoneinfo/UTC";
+         } else {
+-                p = path_join("../usr/share/zoneinfo", c->zone);
++                p = path_join("/usr/share/zoneinfo", c->zone);
+                 if (!p)
+                         return -ENOMEM;
+ 
+                 source = p;
+         }
+ 
+-        return symlink_atomic(source, "/etc/localtime");
++        r = symlink_atomic(source, "/var/run/localtime");
++        if (r < 0)
++                return r;
++
++        /* Persist timezone across reboots via /storage/.cache/timezone */
++        if (!isempty(c->zone)) {
++                _cleanup_free_ char *tz_line = NULL;
++
++                tz_line = strjoin("TIMEZONE=", c->zone, "\n");
++                if (tz_line)
++                        (void) write_string_file("/storage/.cache/timezone", tz_line,
++                                                 WRITE_STRING_FILE_CREATE |
++                                                 WRITE_STRING_FILE_ATOMIC |
++                                                 WRITE_STRING_FILE_TRUNCATE);
++        }
++
++        return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ static int context_write_data_local_rtc(Context *c) {

projects/ArchR/packages/sysutils/systemd/patches/systemd-0601-get-timezone-follow-indirect-symlinks.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+--- a/src/basic/time-util.c
++++ b/src/basic/time-util.c
+@@ -1626,8 +1626,18 @@ int get_timezone(char **ret) {
+                 return r; /* returns EINVAL if not a symlink */
+ 
+         e = PATH_STARTSWITH_SET(t, "/usr/share/zoneinfo/", "../usr/share/zoneinfo/");
+-        if (!e)
+-                return -EINVAL;
++        if (!e) {
++                char resolved[PATH_MAX + 1];
++                if (realpath("/etc/localtime", resolved)) {
++                        free(t);
++                        t = strdup(resolved);
++                        if (!t)
++                                return -ENOMEM;
++                        e = PATH_STARTSWITH_SET(t, "/usr/share/zoneinfo/", "../usr/share/zoneinfo/");
++                }
++                if (!e)
++                        return -EINVAL;
++        }
+ 
+         if (!timezone_is_valid(e, LOG_DEBUG))
+                 return -EINVAL;

projects/ArchR/packages/sysutils/udevil/config/udevil.conf

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 #
 # This file controls what devices, networks, and files users may mount and
 # unmount via udevil (set suid).
-# 
+#
 # IMPORTANT:  IT IS POSSIBLE TO CREATE SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEMS IF THIS FILE
 # IS MISCONFIGURED - EDIT WITH CARE
 #
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ allowed_media_dirs = /media, /var/media, /run/media/$USER
 # or unmount.  If a device is not listed in allowed_devices, it cannot be
 # un/mounted (unless in fstab).  However, even if a device is listed, other
 # factors may prevent its use.  For example, access to system internal devices
-# will be denied to normal users even if they are included in allowed_devices.  
+# will be denied to normal users even if they are included in allowed_devices.
 # allowed_devices_FSTYPE, if present, is used to override allowed_devices when
 # mounting or unmounting a specific fstype (eg ext3, ntfs).  For example, to
 # prevent all block devices containing an ext4 filesystem from being
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ allowed_media_dirs = /media, /var/media, /run/media/$USER
 # allowed_devices = /dev/*
 # WARNING:  ALLOWING USERS TO MOUNT DEVICES OUTSIDE OF /dev CAN CAUSE SERIOUS
 # SECURITY PROBLEMS.  DO NOT ALLOW DEVICES IN /dev/shm
-allowed_devices = /dev/* !*ufshc-scsi*
+allowed_devices = /dev/*
 
 
 # allowed_internal_devices causes udevil to treat any listed block devices as
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ allowed_devices = /dev/* !*ufshc-scsi*
 # Some removable esata drives look like internal drives to udevil.  To avoid
 # this problem, they can be treated as removable with this setting.
 # WARNING:  SETTING A SYSTEM DEVICE HERE CAN CAUSE SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEMS.
-# allowed_internal_devices =
+allowed_internal_devices = /dev/sd*
 
 
 # allowed_internal_uuids and allowed_internal_uuids_FSTYPE work similarly to
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ allowed_devices = /dev/* !*ufshc-scsi*
 # For example, to allow un/mounting of an internal filesystem based on UUID:
 # allowed_internal_uuids = cc0c4489-8def-1e5b-a304-ab87c3cb626c0
 # WARNING:  SETTING A SYSTEM DEVICE HERE CAN CAUSE SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEMS.
-# allowed_internal_uuids = 
+# allowed_internal_uuids =
 
 
 # forbidden_devices is used to prevent block devices from being un/mounted
@@ -153,13 +153,13 @@ allowed_devices = /dev/* !*ufshc-scsi*
 # forbidden_devices_ntfs = /dev/sdd1
 # NOTE: device node paths are canonicalized before being tested, so forbidding
 # a link to a device will have no effect.
-forbidden_devices =
+forbidden_devices = /dev/disk/by-path/*ufshc*
 
 
 # allowed_networks determines what hosts may be un/mounted by udevil users when
 # using nfs, cifs, smbfs, curlftpfs, ftpfs, or sshfs.  Hosts may be specified
 # using a hostname (eg myserver.com) or IP address (192.168.1.100).
-# Wildcards may be used in hostnames and IP addresses, but CIDR notation 
+# Wildcards may be used in hostnames and IP addresses, but CIDR notation
 # (192.168.1.0/16) is NOT supported.  IP v6 is supported.  For example:
 # allowed_networks = 127.0.0.1, 192.168.1.*, 10.0.0.*, localmachine, *.okay.com
 # Or, to prevent un/mounting of any network shares, set:
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ allowed_networks = *
 # NO REVERSE LOOKUP IS PERFORMED, so including bad.com will only have an effect
 # if the user uses that hostname.  IP lookup is always performed, so forbidding
 # an IP address will also forbid all corresponding hostnames.
-forbidden_networks = 
+forbidden_networks =
 
 
 # allowed_files is used to determine what files in what directories may be
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ allowed_files = *
 # for "forbidden_files = *".
 # NOTE: file paths are canonicalized before being tested, so forbidding
 # a link to a file will have no effect.
-forbidden_files = 
+forbidden_files =
 
 
 # default_options specifies what options are always included when performing
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ allowed_options_exfat     = nosuid, noexec, nodev, noatime, ro, rw, uid=$UID, gi
 
 # validate_rootexec works similarly to validate_exec, except that the program
 # is run as root.  validate_rootexec will also be run if the root user runs
-# udevil.  If both validate_exec and validate_rootexec are specified, 
+# udevil.  If both validate_exec and validate_rootexec are specified,
 # validate_rootexec will run first, followed by validate_exec.
 # The program must return an exit status of 0 to allow the mount or unmount
 # to proceed.  If it returns non-zero, the user will be denied permission.
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ allowed_options_exfat     = nosuid, noexec, nodev, noatime, ro, rw, uid=$UID, gi
 # validate_rootexec =
 
 
-# success_exec is run after a successful mount, remount, or unmount.  The 
+# success_exec is run after a successful mount, remount, or unmount.  The
 # program is run as a normal user (if root runs udevil, success_exec
 # will NOT be run).
 # The program is passed the username, a printable description of what action
@@ -329,4 +329,3 @@ allowed_options_exfat     = nosuid, noexec, nodev, noatime, ro, rw, uid=$UID, gi
 # rootexec settings NOT be used, as it is easy to inadvertently open exploits.
 # THIS PROGRAM IS ALWAYS RUN AS ROOT, even if the user running udevil is not.
 # success_rootexec =
-

projects/ArchR/packages/sysutils/udevil/udev.d/95-udevil-mount.rules

@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@ ENV{installer}=="1", GOTO="exit"
 # check for blockdevices, /dev/sd*, /dev/sr*
 SUBSYSTEM!="block", KERNEL!="sd*|sr*", GOTO="exit"
 
+# only allow USB-attached devices
+ENV{ID_USB_DRIVER}!="usb-storage", GOTO="exit"
+
 # check for special partitions we dont want mount
 IMPORT{builtin}="blkid"
 ENV{ID_FS_LABEL}=="EFI|BOOT|Recovery|RECOVERY|SETTINGS|boot|root0|share0", GOTO="exit"