We must make sure we do not misrecognise a modifier as an Identifier
when trying to match types. Prevent us matching this:
void * __ref
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We are triggering the -p0 check for our own diffs generated using --file
command line option. Suppress this check for files.
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We say that in_atomic() is ok in the core kernel, but then always report
it regardless of where in the kernel it is. Keep quiet if it is used in
kernel/*.
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
I just got this new warning from kmemcheck:
WARNING: kmemcheck: Caught 32-bit read from freed memory (c7806a60)
a06a80c7ecde70c1a04080c700000000a06709c1000000000000000000000000
f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f
^
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted (2.6.29-rc4 #230)
EIP: 0060:[<c1096df7>] EFLAGS: 00000286 CPU: 0
EIP is at __purge_vmap_area_lazy+0x117/0x140
EAX: 00070f43 EBX: c7806a40 ECX: c1677080 EDX: 00027b66
ESI: 00002001 EDI: c170df0c EBP: c170df00 ESP: c178830c
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0000 SS: 0068
CR0: 80050033 CR2: c7806b14 CR3: 01775000 CR4: 00000690
DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: 00004000 DR7: 00000000
[<c1096f3e>] free_unmap_vmap_area_noflush+0x6e/0x70
[<c1096f6a>] remove_vm_area+0x2a/0x70
[<c1097025>] __vunmap+0x45/0xe0
[<c10970de>] vunmap+0x1e/0x30
[<c1008ba5>] text_poke+0x95/0x150
[<c1008ca9>] alternatives_smp_unlock+0x49/0x60
[<c171ef47>] alternative_instructions+0x11b/0x124
[<c171f991>] check_bugs+0xbd/0xdc
[<c17148c5>] start_kernel+0x2ed/0x360
[<c171409e>] __init_begin+0x9e/0xa9
[<ffffffff>] 0xffffffff
It happened here:
$ addr2line -e vmlinux -i c1096df7
mm/vmalloc.c:540
Code:
list_for_each_entry(va, &valist, purge_list)
__free_vmap_area(va);
It's this instruction:
mov 0x20(%ebx),%edx
Which corresponds to a dereference of va->purge_list.next:
(gdb) p ((struct vmap_area *) 0)->purge_list.next
Cannot access memory at address 0x20
It seems that we should use "safe" list traversal here, as the element
is freed inside the loop. Please verify that this is the right fix.
Acked-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.28.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The new vmap allocator can wrap the address and get confused in the case
of large allocations or VMALLOC_END near the end of address space.
Problem reported by Christoph Hellwig on a 32-bit XFS workload.
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Reported-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.28.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
free_uid() and free_user_ns() are corecursive when CONFIG_USER_SCHED=n,
but free_user_ns() is called from free_uid() by way of uid_hash_remove(),
which requires uidhash_lock to be held. free_user_ns() then calls
free_uid() to complete the destruction.
Fix this by deferring the destruction of the user_namespace.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The w1_ds2433 driver does not read from the hardware if the CRC was valid
on the last read. The validcrc flag should be cleared after a write so
that the new value can be read.
Signed-off-by: Ben Gardner <gardner.ben@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Evgeniy Polyakov <johnpol@2ka.mipt.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'upstream-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mfasheh/ocfs2:
ocfs2: add IO error check in ocfs2_get_sector()
ocfs2: set gap to seperate entry and value when xattr in bucket
ocfs2: lock the metaecc process for xattr bucket
ocfs2: Use the right access_* method in ctime update of xattr.
ocfs2/dlm: Make dlm_assert_master_handler() kill itself instead of the asserter
ocfs2/dlm: Use ast_lock to protect ast_list
ocfs2: Cleanup the lockname print in dlmglue.c
ocfs2/dlm: Retract fix for race between purge and migrate
ocfs2: Access and dirty the buffer_head in mark_written.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jbarnes/pci-2.6:
PCI: AMD 813x B2 devices do not need boot interrupt quirk
PCI: Enable PCIe AER only after checking firmware support
PCI: pciehp: Handle interrupts that happen during initialization.
PCI: don't enable too many HT MSI mappings
PCI: add some sysfs ABI docs
PCI quirk: enable MSI on 8132
The PCI 2.x cells used on some 44x SoCs only let us configure the decode
for the low 32-bit of the incoming PLB addresses. The top 4 bits (this
is a 36-bit bus) are hard wired to different values depending on the
specific SoC in use. Our code used to work "by accident" until I added
support for the ISA memory holes and while at it added more validity
checking of the addresses.
This patch should bring it back to working condition. It still relies
on the device-tree being correct but that's somewhat a pre-requisite
for anything to work anyway.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <Geert.Uytterhoeven@sonycom.com>
Acked-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
We really don't want the BIOS flash mapping hacks to get automatically
loaded.
No idea why it isn't using pci_register_driver() though -- that should
be fine... and is even _present_ but disabled by #if 0.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
This patch set a gap (4 bytes) between xattr entry and
name/value when xattr in bucket. This gap use to seperate
entry and name/value when a bucket is full. It had already
been set when xattr in inode/block.
Signed-off-by: Tiger Yang <tiger.yang@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
For other metadata in ocfs2, metaecc is checked in ocfs2_read_blocks
with io_mutex held. While for xattr bucket, it is calculated by
the whole buckets. So we have to add a spin_lock to prevent multiple
processes calculating metaecc.
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <tao.ma@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Tristan Ye <tristan.ye@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
David Altobelli
Andy Whitcroft
Vegard Nossum
Nick Piggin
David Howells
Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski
Benny Halevy
Ben Gardner
Linus Torvalds
Benjamin Herrenschmidt
Stefan Assmann
David Woodhouse
wengang wang
Tiger Yang
Tao Ma