Merge branch 'stable-4.11' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into next

fs/proc/base.c

@@ -2488,6 +2488,12 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
 	length = -ESRCH;
 	if (!task)
 		goto out_no_task;
+
+	/* A task may only write its own attributes. */
+	length = -EACCES;
+	if (current != task)
+		goto out;
+
 	if (count > PAGE_SIZE)
 		count = PAGE_SIZE;
 
@@ -2503,14 +2509,13 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
 	}
 
 	/* Guard against adverse ptrace interaction */
-	length = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+	length = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
 	if (length < 0)
 		goto out_free;
 
-	length = security_setprocattr(task,
-				      (char*)file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name,
+	length = security_setprocattr(file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name,
 				      page, count);
-	mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
 out_free:
 	kfree(page);
 out:

include/linux/lsm_hooks.h

@@ -665,11 +665,6 @@
  *	@sig contains the signal value.
  *	@secid contains the sid of the process where the signal originated
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_wait:
- *	Check permission before allowing a process to reap a child process @p
- *	and collect its status information.
- *	@p contains the task_struct for process.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @task_prctl:
  *	Check permission before performing a process control operation on the
  *	current process.
@@ -1506,7 +1501,6 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*task_movememory)(struct task_struct *p);
 	int (*task_kill)(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 				int sig, u32 secid);
-	int (*task_wait)(struct task_struct *p);
 	int (*task_prctl)(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 				unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
 	void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
@@ -1546,8 +1540,7 @@ union security_list_options {
 	void (*d_instantiate)(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
 
 	int (*getprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
-	int (*setprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value,
-				size_t size);
+	int (*setprocattr)(const char *name, void *value, size_t size);
 	int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name);
 	int (*secid_to_secctx)(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
 	int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
@@ -1767,7 +1760,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
 	struct list_head task_getscheduler;
 	struct list_head task_movememory;
 	struct list_head task_kill;
-	struct list_head task_wait;
 	struct list_head task_prctl;
 	struct list_head task_to_inode;
 	struct list_head ipc_permission;

include/linux/security.h

@@ -332,7 +332,6 @@ int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p);
 int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p);
 int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 			int sig, u32 secid);
-int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p);
 int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 			unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
 void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
@@ -361,7 +360,7 @@ int security_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
 			unsigned nsops, int alter);
 void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
 int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
-int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size);
+int security_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size);
 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
 int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
@@ -980,11 +979,6 @@ static inline int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static inline int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2,
 				      unsigned long arg3,
 				      unsigned long arg4,
@@ -1106,7 +1100,7 @@ static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char *
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
-static inline int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+static inline int security_setprocattr(char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }

kernel/exit.c

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
 #include <linux/tty.h>
 #include <linux/iocontext.h>
 #include <linux/key.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/acct.h>
 #include <linux/tsacct_kern.h>
@@ -1360,7 +1359,7 @@ static int wait_task_continued(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *p)
  * Returns nonzero for a final return, when we have unlocked tasklist_lock.
  * Returns zero if the search for a child should continue;
  * then ->notask_error is 0 if @p is an eligible child,
- * or another error from security_task_wait(), or still -ECHILD.
+ * or still -ECHILD.
  */
 static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace,
 				struct task_struct *p)
@@ -1380,20 +1379,6 @@ static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace,
 	if (!ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	ret = security_task_wait(p);
-	if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
-		/*
-		 * If we have not yet seen any eligible child,
-		 * then let this error code replace -ECHILD.
-		 * A permission error will give the user a clue
-		 * to look for security policy problems, rather
-		 * than for mysterious wait bugs.
-		 */
-		if (wo->notask_error)
-			wo->notask_error = ret;
-		return 0;
-	}
-
 	if (unlikely(exit_state == EXIT_TRACE)) {
 		/*
 		 * ptrace == 0 means we are the natural parent. In this case
@@ -1486,7 +1471,7 @@ static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace,
  * Returns nonzero for a final return, when we have unlocked tasklist_lock.
  * Returns zero if the search for a child should continue; then
  * ->notask_error is 0 if there were any eligible children,
- * or another error from security_task_wait(), or still -ECHILD.
+ * or still -ECHILD.
  */
 static int do_wait_thread(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *tsk)
 {

security/apparmor/lsm.c

@@ -505,8 +505,8 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
 	return error;
 }
 
-static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
-				void *value, size_t size)
+static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
+				size_t size)
 {
 	char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value;
 	size_t arg_size;
@@ -515,9 +515,6 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
 
 	if (size == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	/* task can only write its own attributes */
-	if (current != task)
-		return -EACCES;
 
 	/* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */
 	if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {

security/security.c

@@ -1063,11 +1063,6 @@ int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 	return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, secid);
 }
 
-int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
-{
-	return call_int_hook(task_wait, 0, p);
-}
-
 int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 			 unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
 {
@@ -1208,9 +1203,9 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
 	return call_int_hook(getprocattr, -EINVAL, p, name, value);
 }
 
-int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+int security_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(setprocattr, -EINVAL, p, name, value, size);
+	return call_int_hook(setprocattr, -EINVAL, name, value, size);
 }
 
 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -1807,7 +1802,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = {
 	.task_movememory =
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_movememory),
 	.task_kill =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_kill),
-	.task_wait =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_wait),
 	.task_prctl =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_prctl),
 	.task_to_inode =
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_to_inode),

security/selinux/include/classmap.h

@@ -171,5 +171,67 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	  { COMMON_CAP_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "cap2_userns",
 	  { COMMON_CAP2_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "sctp_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+	    "node_bind", NULL } },
+	{ "icmp_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+	    "node_bind", NULL } },
+	{ "ax25_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "ipx_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netrom_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "atmpvc_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "x25_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "rose_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "decnet_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "atmsvc_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "rds_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "irda_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "pppox_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "llc_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "can_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "tipc_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "bluetooth_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "iucv_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "rxrpc_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "isdn_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "phonet_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "ieee802154_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "caif_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "alg_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "nfc_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "vsock_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "kcm_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "qipcrtr_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ NULL }
   };
+
+#if PF_MAX > 43
+#error New address family defined, please update secclass_map.
+#endif

security/selinux/include/objsec.h

@@ -37,6 +37,16 @@ struct task_security_struct {
 	u32 sockcreate_sid;	/* fscreate SID */
 };
 
+/*
+ * get the subjective security ID of the current task
+ */
+static inline u32 current_sid(void)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+
+	return tsec->sid;
+}
+
 enum label_initialized {
 	LABEL_INVALID,		/* invalid or not initialized */
 	LABEL_INITIALIZED,	/* initialized */

security/selinux/include/security.h

@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ extern int selinux_enabled;
 enum {
 	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER,
 	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM,
-	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_REDHAT1,
+	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS,
 	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK,
 	__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX
 };
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ enum {
 
 extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
 extern int selinux_policycap_openperm;
+extern int selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
 extern int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
 
 /*

security/selinux/selinuxfs.c

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
 static char *policycap_names[] = {
 	"network_peer_controls",
 	"open_perms",
-	"redhat1",
+	"extended_socket_class",
 	"always_check_network"
 };
 
@@ -77,25 +77,6 @@ static char policy_opened;
 /* global data for policy capabilities */
 static struct dentry *policycap_dir;
 
-/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a security operation. */
-static int task_has_security(struct task_struct *tsk,
-			     u32 perms)
-{
-	const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
-	u32 sid = 0;
-
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	tsec = __task_cred(tsk)->security;
-	if (tsec)
-		sid = tsec->sid;
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-	if (!tsec)
-		return -EACCES;
-
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_SECURITY,
-			    SECCLASS_SECURITY, perms, NULL);
-}
-
 enum sel_inos {
 	SEL_ROOT_INO = 2,
 	SEL_LOAD,	/* load policy */
@@ -166,7 +147,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	new_value = !!new_value;
 
 	if (new_value != selinux_enforcing) {
-		length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETENFORCE);
+		length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+				      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETENFORCE,
+				      NULL);
 		if (length)
 			goto out;
 		audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
@@ -368,7 +351,8 @@ static int sel_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 
 	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
 
-	rc = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__READ_POLICY);
+	rc = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			  SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL);
 	if (rc)
 		goto err;
 
@@ -429,7 +413,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_policy(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 
 	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
 
-	ret = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__READ_POLICY);
+	ret = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			  SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -499,7 +484,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 
 	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
 
-	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY);
+	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY, NULL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -522,20 +508,28 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		goto out;
 
 	length = security_load_policy(data, count);
-	if (length)
+	if (length) {
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to load policy\n");
 		goto out;
+	}
 
 	length = sel_make_bools();
-	if (length)
+	if (length) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy booleans\n");
 		goto out1;
+	}
 
 	length = sel_make_classes();
-	if (length)
+	if (length) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy classes\n");
 		goto out1;
+	}
 
 	length = sel_make_policycap();
-	if (length)
+	if (length) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy capabilities\n");
 		goto out1;
+	}
 
 	length = count;
 
@@ -561,7 +555,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	u32 sid, len;
 	ssize_t length;
 
-	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__CHECK_CONTEXT);
+	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__CHECK_CONTEXT, NULL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -604,7 +599,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	ssize_t length;
 	unsigned int new_value;
 
-	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETCHECKREQPROT);
+	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETCHECKREQPROT,
+			      NULL);
 	if (length)
 		return length;
 
@@ -645,7 +642,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_validatetrans(struct file *file,
 	u16 tclass;
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__VALIDATE_TRANS);
+	rc = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			  SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__VALIDATE_TRANS, NULL);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -772,7 +770,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	struct av_decision avd;
 	ssize_t length;
 
-	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_AV);
+	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_AV, NULL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -822,7 +821,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	u32 len;
 	int nargs;
 
-	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_CREATE);
+	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_CREATE,
+			      NULL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -919,7 +920,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	char *newcon = NULL;
 	u32 len;
 
-	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_RELABEL);
+	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_RELABEL,
+			      NULL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -975,7 +978,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	int i, rc;
 	u32 len, nsids;
 
-	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_USER);
+	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_USER,
+			      NULL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -1035,7 +1040,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	char *newcon = NULL;
 	u32 len;
 
-	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_MEMBER);
+	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_MEMBER,
+			      NULL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -1142,7 +1149,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
 
 	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
 
-	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETBOOL);
+	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETBOOL,
+			      NULL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -1198,7 +1207,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
 
 	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
 
-	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETBOOL);
+	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETBOOL,
+			      NULL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -1299,8 +1310,11 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
 
 		isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
 		ret = security_genfs_sid("selinuxfs", page, SECCLASS_FILE, &sid);
-		if (ret)
-			goto out;
+		if (ret) {
+			pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: no sid found, defaulting to security isid for %s\n",
+					   page);
+			sid = SECINITSID_SECURITY;
+		}
 
 		isec->sid = sid;
 		isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
@@ -1351,7 +1365,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *file,
 	ssize_t ret;
 	unsigned int new_value;
 
-	ret = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETSECPARAM);
+	ret = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			   SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETSECPARAM,
+			   NULL);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 

security/selinux/ss/services.c

@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@
 
 int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
 int selinux_policycap_openperm;
+int selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
 int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
 
 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
@@ -1988,6 +1989,8 @@ static void security_load_policycaps(void)
 						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
 	selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
 						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM);
+	selinux_policycap_extsockclass = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
+					  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS);
 	selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
 						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK);
 }

security/smack/smack_lsm.c

@@ -2301,25 +2301,6 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 	return rc;
 }
 
-/**
- * smack_task_wait - Smack access check for waiting
- * @p: task to wait for
- *
- * Returns 0
- */
-static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
-{
-	/*
-	 * Allow the operation to succeed.
-	 * Zombies are bad.
-	 * In userless environments (e.g. phones) programs
-	 * get marked with SMACK64EXEC and even if the parent
-	 * and child shouldn't be talking the parent still
-	 * may expect to know when the child exits.
-	 */
-	return 0;
-}
-
 /**
  * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
  * @p: task to copy from
@@ -3680,7 +3661,6 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
 
 /**
  * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
- * @p: the object task
  * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
  * @value: the value to set
  * @size: the size of the value
@@ -3690,8 +3670,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
  *
  * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
  */
-static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
-			     void *value, size_t size)
+static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 {
 	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
 	struct cred *new;
@@ -3699,13 +3678,6 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
 	struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
 	int rc;
 
-	/*
-	 * Changing another process' Smack value is too dangerous
-	 * and supports no sane use case.
-	 */
-	if (p != current)
-		return -EPERM;
-
 	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
 		return -EPERM;
 
@@ -4727,7 +4699,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, smack_task_wait),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode),
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission),