From 9681bb7b4b4d21295b537837ec10f71a73efe64f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Monica Moniot Date: Wed, 25 Oct 2023 18:37:25 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] fixed typo --- whitepaper/zssp.pdf | Bin 422344 -> 422344 bytes whitepaper/zssp.tex | 2 +- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/whitepaper/zssp.pdf b/whitepaper/zssp.pdf index 7aa94e94fc1ead195ee57105417dbafdcaf3ba92..dab8db47657a6c3c9cd9b2dfdc6773f388a4b3a4 100644 GIT binary patch delta 1129 zcmX@{Sn|YU$%YojElfQe^(%FA6%~z*Rf8uM{^@3nKKQdB-{|6$_3cOcE=HDIPTe7O zP$}P^KTBwG$*zFQ*2bPWE}8XR>Z|{qj*z-C%co9^%SJdjEqTeTzwdmH=$Q-pU+oQP zlZ-OBbX;?3AZN7X^g@foBxB8EH+bf?-#9a$>v7@C{<8)}MqLji^8MqQ;M> zads~6M=6{Aw|)ogTl;r%=e;Q#c5bmgw))kzkHrEjB)Mjn?C9V+@#kRN=G#`&EJ&xDngWlZ+JXErxbaZ7C2Hl6zKv7$i?#@|dts$Sizl~MD#!1FjS<6GRM z-`h5N%BPe>-%hQ_xW(sRxKr)(`tqss<(+Td+p3UQ+&t6dSoTrb&E7V%gE#*2o6qud zQvF1`{0AypmlXDS%<+3N;qA9?!m)SO19nkM@p+a~ayu1#m`?n zyV;@c{ITG!`8V#}f9^bwOM98}?94*`DyA<7563=sH~)2HMtymLZm!|7Eu9;ff(@z+ zuVw6MNr-DU&6yticFu*S%o9>GW@KIYt@N4m$DG*EolVjAf9Mn%F6$9n^#`BjGy+cH~RP1*+-Ub<=h_D5`OAa&ArgmwcI|tx=k(w|9x}j;AkV)en#xt3P`x0x#<>TfbO#j?y^rf}_cdc4!7wcB>xpLX!fiy2zQnwooGR6EAD)m$e$dDif{fn9H@#P+y@aVy%{YPN8SBbz~LL8&c-HgCdQ^tCQfE3_v}6I zqWflM@0*w8W$)(U_r3klQSW-nzpv{)eNHyHy<6-_PM*Q!lND=sOfKs@UaS>%|K(wY z_^hKd+a!{9MBVgDPpY`~jOAoWm4i}=uMkh|JB_^O#WBJ9=zrn6zNA{l=Zu2F+)$^@cs(WmTnPXT2mz(}E zsov=VXRGaBo$7iXG$p&8xM-i(gC6*U&q*=Ax5m?d0F<-uxC& ze7E+$*a`D@r!Va*%-&x%`NkQuhu6A3ghkFfzdLJZexqmkbhfHh^XFRLx^>5ldH2B? zw=6ibO)K{4x?lOv_g3&AUsxon8knPur9mYNfo?X1D%Mnf>2eO4}E-b(}pcr6inpf6BTOiUw!5 zTx;WZP+P1y;Z~W&!lgHhbsL3mg+!|?sDF7{bN7V2pga@dosUjb?Z0ca=}2z9@|%5} zZbo1EkLFtDRJ}gBuE6c?Iwt;&!3WKsvAXcB4t?68tCv}zt6ivefV?DQNCf7X2sLpUpY1nQwl1@?brqKYz1fdoB-CdoB-idoB-4doB;__FNt| zg8*g&L-XkiV%QWwjO~YG*xLD=jZB?fT%BAE4V}#$4P0CdOpGnvoQ+%zjhxJkU0n?= Q>=bMWDcRne&1TI80Oc(U+5i9m diff --git a/whitepaper/zssp.tex b/whitepaper/zssp.tex index 6a3e3f4..c722b8a 100644 --- a/whitepaper/zssp.tex +++ b/whitepaper/zssp.tex @@ -1197,7 +1197,7 @@ We are going to prove that the ZSSP header authentication algorithm is existenti \begin{flalign*} \prob[\algn{Auth}_{\mathcal{A},\, \Pi}(n) = 1] &\leq \mathbf{Adv}^\text{ind-prp}_{D,\,F}(n) + \prob[\algn{Vrfy}(N) = 1] \\ &\leq \algn{negl}(n) + \frac{8}{2^8}\cdot\frac{2^{24}}{2^{64}} \\ - &\leq \algn{negl}(n) + 2^{-5}\cdot 2^{-40} \\ + &= \algn{negl}(n) + 2^{-5}\cdot 2^{-40} \\ &= \algn{negl}(n) + 2^{-45}. \end{flalign*} If we assume the adversary does make oracle queries, then their advantage bound is only negligibly larger than the advantage above.