mirror of
https://gitlab.winehq.org/wine/wine-gecko.git
synced 2024-09-13 09:24:08 -07:00
1298 lines
35 KiB
C
1298 lines
35 KiB
C
/* ***** BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK *****
|
|
* Version: MPL 1.1/GPL 2.0/LGPL 2.1
|
|
*
|
|
* The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version
|
|
* 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
|
|
* the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
|
|
* http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
|
|
*
|
|
* Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis,
|
|
* WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License
|
|
* for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the
|
|
* License.
|
|
*
|
|
* The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries.
|
|
*
|
|
* The Initial Developer of the Original Code is
|
|
* Netscape Communications Corporation.
|
|
* Portions created by the Initial Developer are Copyright (C) 1994-2000
|
|
* the Initial Developer. All Rights Reserved.
|
|
*
|
|
* Contributor(s):
|
|
* Dr Vipul Gupta <vipul.gupta@sun.com>, Sun Microsystems Laboratories
|
|
*
|
|
* Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the terms of
|
|
* either the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the "GPL"), or
|
|
* the GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1 or later (the "LGPL"),
|
|
* in which case the provisions of the GPL or the LGPL are applicable instead
|
|
* of those above. If you wish to allow use of your version of this file only
|
|
* under the terms of either the GPL or the LGPL, and not to allow others to
|
|
* use your version of this file under the terms of the MPL, indicate your
|
|
* decision by deleting the provisions above and replace them with the notice
|
|
* and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete
|
|
* the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under
|
|
* the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL.
|
|
*
|
|
* ***** END LICENSE BLOCK ***** */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* PKCS7 encoding.
|
|
*
|
|
* $Id: p7encode.c,v 1.13 2008/03/10 00:01:26 wtc%google.com Exp $
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include "p7local.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "cert.h"
|
|
#include "cryptohi.h"
|
|
#include "keyhi.h"
|
|
#include "secasn1.h"
|
|
#include "secoid.h"
|
|
#include "secitem.h"
|
|
#include "pk11func.h"
|
|
#include "secerr.h"
|
|
#include "sechash.h" /* for HASH_GetHashObject() */
|
|
|
|
struct sec_pkcs7_encoder_output {
|
|
SEC_PKCS7EncoderOutputCallback outputfn;
|
|
void *outputarg;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
struct SEC_PKCS7EncoderContextStr {
|
|
SEC_ASN1EncoderContext *ecx;
|
|
SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo;
|
|
struct sec_pkcs7_encoder_output output;
|
|
sec_PKCS7CipherObject *encryptobj;
|
|
const SECHashObject *digestobj;
|
|
void *digestcx;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The little output function that the ASN.1 encoder calls to hand
|
|
* us bytes which we in turn hand back to our caller (via the callback
|
|
* they gave us).
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
sec_pkcs7_encoder_out(void *arg, const char *buf, unsigned long len,
|
|
int depth, SEC_ASN1EncodingPart data_kind)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sec_pkcs7_encoder_output *output;
|
|
|
|
output = (struct sec_pkcs7_encoder_output*)arg;
|
|
output->outputfn (output->outputarg, buf, len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static sec_PKCS7CipherObject *
|
|
sec_pkcs7_encoder_start_encrypt (SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
|
|
PK11SymKey *orig_bulkkey)
|
|
{
|
|
SECOidTag kind;
|
|
sec_PKCS7CipherObject *encryptobj;
|
|
SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo **recipientinfos, *ri;
|
|
SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo *enccinfo;
|
|
SEC_PKCS7SMIMEKEAParameters keaParams;
|
|
SECKEYPublicKey *publickey = NULL;
|
|
SECKEYPrivateKey *ourPrivKey = NULL;
|
|
PK11SymKey *bulkkey;
|
|
void *mark, *wincx;
|
|
int i;
|
|
PRArenaPool *arena = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Get the context in case we need it below. */
|
|
wincx = cinfo->pwfn_arg;
|
|
|
|
/* Clear keaParams, since cleanup code checks the lengths */
|
|
(void) memset(&keaParams, 0, sizeof(keaParams));
|
|
|
|
kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType (cinfo);
|
|
switch (kind) {
|
|
default:
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
|
|
recipientinfos = NULL;
|
|
enccinfo = NULL;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
|
|
{
|
|
SEC_PKCS7EncryptedData *encdp;
|
|
|
|
/* To do EncryptedData we *must* be given a bulk key. */
|
|
PORT_Assert (orig_bulkkey != NULL);
|
|
if (orig_bulkkey == NULL) {
|
|
/* XXX error? */
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
encdp = cinfo->content.encryptedData;
|
|
recipientinfos = NULL;
|
|
enccinfo = &(encdp->encContentInfo);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
|
|
{
|
|
SEC_PKCS7EnvelopedData *envdp;
|
|
|
|
envdp = cinfo->content.envelopedData;
|
|
recipientinfos = envdp->recipientInfos;
|
|
enccinfo = &(envdp->encContentInfo);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
|
|
{
|
|
SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *saedp;
|
|
|
|
saedp = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData;
|
|
recipientinfos = saedp->recipientInfos;
|
|
enccinfo = &(saedp->encContentInfo);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (enccinfo == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
bulkkey = orig_bulkkey;
|
|
if (bulkkey == NULL) {
|
|
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(enccinfo->encalg);
|
|
PK11SlotInfo *slot;
|
|
|
|
|
|
slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(type,cinfo->pwfn_arg);
|
|
if (slot == NULL) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
bulkkey = PK11_KeyGen(slot,type,NULL, enccinfo->keysize/8,
|
|
cinfo->pwfn_arg);
|
|
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
|
|
if (bulkkey == NULL) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
encryptobj = NULL;
|
|
mark = PORT_ArenaMark (cinfo->poolp);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Encrypt the bulk key with the public key of each recipient.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 0; recipientinfos && (ri = recipientinfos[i]) != NULL; i++) {
|
|
CERTCertificate *cert;
|
|
SECOidTag certalgtag, encalgtag;
|
|
SECStatus rv;
|
|
int data_len;
|
|
SECItem *params = NULL;
|
|
|
|
cert = ri->cert;
|
|
PORT_Assert (cert != NULL);
|
|
if (cert == NULL)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX Want an interface that takes a cert and some data and
|
|
* fills in an algorithmID and encrypts the data with the public
|
|
* key from the cert. Or, give me two interfaces -- one which
|
|
* gets the algorithm tag from a cert (I should not have to go
|
|
* down into the subjectPublicKeyInfo myself) and another which
|
|
* takes a public key and algorithm tag and data and encrypts
|
|
* the data. Or something like that. The point is that all
|
|
* of the following hardwired RSA and KEA stuff should be done
|
|
* elsewhere.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
certalgtag=SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm));
|
|
|
|
switch (certalgtag) {
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
|
|
encalgtag = certalgtag;
|
|
publickey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey (cert);
|
|
if (publickey == NULL) goto loser;
|
|
|
|
data_len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(publickey);
|
|
ri->encKey.data =
|
|
(unsigned char*)PORT_ArenaAlloc(cinfo->poolp ,data_len);
|
|
ri->encKey.len = data_len;
|
|
if (ri->encKey.data == NULL) goto loser;
|
|
|
|
rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(certalgtag),publickey,
|
|
bulkkey,&ri->encKey);
|
|
|
|
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(publickey);
|
|
publickey = NULL;
|
|
if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
|
|
params = NULL; /* paranoia */
|
|
break;
|
|
/* ### mwelch -- KEA */
|
|
case SEC_OID_MISSI_KEA_DSS_OLD:
|
|
case SEC_OID_MISSI_KEA_DSS:
|
|
case SEC_OID_MISSI_KEA:
|
|
{
|
|
#define SMIME_FORTEZZA_RA_LENGTH 128
|
|
#define SMIME_FORTEZZA_IV_LENGTH 24
|
|
#define SMIME_FORTEZZA_MAX_KEY_SIZE 256
|
|
SECStatus err;
|
|
PK11SymKey *tek;
|
|
CERTCertificate *ourCert;
|
|
SECKEYPublicKey *ourPubKey;
|
|
SECKEATemplateSelector whichKEA = SECKEAInvalid;
|
|
|
|
/* We really want to show our KEA tag as the
|
|
key exchange algorithm tag. */
|
|
encalgtag = SEC_OID_NETSCAPE_SMIME_KEA;
|
|
|
|
/* Get the public key of the recipient. */
|
|
publickey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
|
|
if (publickey == NULL) goto loser;
|
|
|
|
/* Find our own cert, and extract its keys. */
|
|
ourCert = PK11_FindBestKEAMatch(cert,wincx);
|
|
if (ourCert == NULL) goto loser;
|
|
|
|
arena = PORT_NewArena(1024);
|
|
if (arena == NULL) goto loser;
|
|
|
|
ourPubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ourCert);
|
|
if (ourPubKey == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_DestroyCertificate(ourCert);
|
|
goto loser;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* While we're here, copy the public key into the outgoing
|
|
* KEA parameters. */
|
|
SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &(keaParams.originatorKEAKey),
|
|
&(ourPubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey));
|
|
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ourPubKey);
|
|
ourPubKey = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Extract our private key in order to derive the
|
|
* KEA key. */
|
|
ourPrivKey = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(ourCert,wincx);
|
|
CERT_DestroyCertificate(ourCert); /* we're done with this */
|
|
if (!ourPrivKey) goto loser;
|
|
|
|
/* Prepare raItem with 128 bytes (filled with zeros). */
|
|
keaParams.originatorRA.data =
|
|
(unsigned char*)PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena,SMIME_FORTEZZA_RA_LENGTH);
|
|
keaParams.originatorRA.len = SMIME_FORTEZZA_RA_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Generate the TEK (token exchange key) which we use
|
|
* to wrap the bulk encryption key. (raItem) will be
|
|
* filled with a random seed which we need to send to
|
|
* the recipient. */
|
|
tek = PK11_PubDerive(ourPrivKey, publickey, PR_TRUE,
|
|
&keaParams.originatorRA, NULL,
|
|
CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP,
|
|
CKA_WRAP, 0, wincx);
|
|
|
|
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(publickey);
|
|
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ourPrivKey);
|
|
publickey = NULL;
|
|
ourPrivKey = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!tek)
|
|
goto loser;
|
|
|
|
ri->encKey.data = (unsigned char*)PORT_ArenaAlloc(cinfo->poolp,
|
|
SMIME_FORTEZZA_MAX_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
ri->encKey.len = SMIME_FORTEZZA_MAX_KEY_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
if (ri->encKey.data == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
PK11_FreeSymKey(tek);
|
|
goto loser;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Wrap the bulk key. What we do with the resulting data
|
|
depends on whether we're using Skipjack to wrap the key. */
|
|
switch(PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(enccinfo->encalg))
|
|
{
|
|
case CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64:
|
|
case CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64:
|
|
case CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64:
|
|
case CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64:
|
|
case CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32:
|
|
case CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16:
|
|
case CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8:
|
|
/* do SKIPJACK, we use the wrap mechanism */
|
|
err = PK11_WrapSymKey(CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP, NULL,
|
|
tek, bulkkey, &ri->encKey);
|
|
whichKEA = SECKEAUsesSkipjack;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
/* Not SKIPJACK, we encrypt the raw key data */
|
|
keaParams.nonSkipjackIV .data =
|
|
(unsigned char*)PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena,
|
|
SMIME_FORTEZZA_IV_LENGTH);
|
|
keaParams.nonSkipjackIV.len = SMIME_FORTEZZA_IV_LENGTH;
|
|
err = PK11_WrapSymKey(CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64,
|
|
&keaParams.nonSkipjackIV,
|
|
tek, bulkkey, &ri->encKey);
|
|
if (err != SECSuccess)
|
|
goto loser;
|
|
|
|
if (ri->encKey.len != PK11_GetKeyLength(bulkkey))
|
|
{
|
|
/* The size of the encrypted key is not the same as
|
|
that of the original bulk key, presumably due to
|
|
padding. Encode and store the real size of the
|
|
bulk key. */
|
|
if (SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(arena,
|
|
&keaParams.bulkKeySize,
|
|
PK11_GetKeyLength(bulkkey))
|
|
== NULL)
|
|
err = (SECStatus)PORT_GetError();
|
|
else
|
|
/* use full template for encoding */
|
|
whichKEA = SECKEAUsesNonSkipjackWithPaddedEncKey;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
/* enc key length == bulk key length */
|
|
whichKEA = SECKEAUsesNonSkipjack;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PK11_FreeSymKey(tek);
|
|
if (err != SECSuccess)
|
|
goto loser;
|
|
|
|
PORT_Assert( whichKEA != SECKEAInvalid);
|
|
|
|
/* Encode the KEA parameters into the recipient info. */
|
|
params = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena,NULL, &keaParams,
|
|
sec_pkcs7_get_kea_template(whichKEA));
|
|
if (params == NULL) goto loser;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
|
|
goto loser;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(cinfo->poolp, &ri->keyEncAlg, encalgtag,
|
|
params);
|
|
if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
|
goto loser;
|
|
if (arena) PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_FALSE);
|
|
arena = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
encryptobj = sec_PKCS7CreateEncryptObject (cinfo->poolp, bulkkey,
|
|
enccinfo->encalg,
|
|
&(enccinfo->contentEncAlg));
|
|
if (encryptobj != NULL) {
|
|
PORT_ArenaUnmark (cinfo->poolp, mark);
|
|
mark = NULL; /* good one; do not want to release */
|
|
}
|
|
/* fallthru */
|
|
|
|
loser:
|
|
if (arena) {
|
|
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
|
|
}
|
|
if (publickey) {
|
|
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(publickey);
|
|
}
|
|
if (ourPrivKey) {
|
|
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ourPrivKey);
|
|
}
|
|
if (mark != NULL) {
|
|
PORT_ArenaRelease (cinfo->poolp, mark);
|
|
}
|
|
if (orig_bulkkey == NULL) {
|
|
if (bulkkey) PK11_FreeSymKey(bulkkey);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return encryptobj;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sec_pkcs7_encoder_notify (void *arg, PRBool before, void *dest, int depth)
|
|
{
|
|
SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *p7ecx;
|
|
SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo;
|
|
SECOidTag kind;
|
|
PRBool before_content;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We want to notice just before the content field. After fields are
|
|
* not interesting to us.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!before)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
p7ecx = (SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext*)arg;
|
|
cinfo = p7ecx->cinfo;
|
|
|
|
before_content = PR_FALSE;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Watch for the content field, at which point we want to instruct
|
|
* the ASN.1 encoder to start taking bytes from the buffer.
|
|
*
|
|
* XXX The following assumes the inner content type is data;
|
|
* if/when we want to handle fully nested types, this will have
|
|
* to recurse until reaching the innermost data content.
|
|
*/
|
|
kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType (cinfo);
|
|
switch (kind) {
|
|
default:
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
|
|
if (dest == &(cinfo->content.data))
|
|
before_content = PR_TRUE;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
|
|
{
|
|
SEC_PKCS7DigestedData *digd;
|
|
|
|
digd = cinfo->content.digestedData;
|
|
if (digd == NULL)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if (dest == &(digd->contentInfo.content))
|
|
before_content = PR_TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
|
|
{
|
|
SEC_PKCS7EncryptedData *encd;
|
|
|
|
encd = cinfo->content.encryptedData;
|
|
if (encd == NULL)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if (dest == &(encd->encContentInfo.encContent))
|
|
before_content = PR_TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
|
|
{
|
|
SEC_PKCS7EnvelopedData *envd;
|
|
|
|
envd = cinfo->content.envelopedData;
|
|
if (envd == NULL)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if (dest == &(envd->encContentInfo.encContent))
|
|
before_content = PR_TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
|
|
{
|
|
SEC_PKCS7SignedData *sigd;
|
|
|
|
sigd = cinfo->content.signedData;
|
|
if (sigd == NULL)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if (dest == &(sigd->contentInfo.content))
|
|
before_content = PR_TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
|
|
{
|
|
SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *saed;
|
|
|
|
saed = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData;
|
|
if (saed == NULL)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if (dest == &(saed->encContentInfo.encContent))
|
|
before_content = PR_TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (before_content) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* This will cause the next SEC_ASN1EncoderUpdate to take the
|
|
* contents bytes from the passed-in buffer.
|
|
*/
|
|
SEC_ASN1EncoderSetTakeFromBuf (p7ecx->ecx);
|
|
/*
|
|
* And that is all we needed this notify function for.
|
|
*/
|
|
SEC_ASN1EncoderClearNotifyProc (p7ecx->ecx);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *
|
|
sec_pkcs7_encoder_start_contexts (SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
|
|
PK11SymKey *bulkkey)
|
|
{
|
|
SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *p7ecx;
|
|
SECOidTag kind;
|
|
PRBool encrypt;
|
|
SECItem **digests;
|
|
SECAlgorithmID *digestalg, **digestalgs;
|
|
|
|
p7ecx =
|
|
(SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext*)PORT_ZAlloc (sizeof(SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext));
|
|
if (p7ecx == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
digests = NULL;
|
|
digestalg = NULL;
|
|
digestalgs = NULL;
|
|
encrypt = PR_FALSE;
|
|
|
|
kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType (cinfo);
|
|
switch (kind) {
|
|
default:
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
|
|
break;
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
|
|
digestalg = &(cinfo->content.digestedData->digestAlg);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
|
|
digests = cinfo->content.signedData->digests;
|
|
digestalgs = cinfo->content.signedData->digestAlgorithms;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
|
|
encrypt = PR_TRUE;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
|
|
digests = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData->digests;
|
|
digestalgs = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData->digestAlgorithms;
|
|
encrypt = PR_TRUE;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (encrypt) {
|
|
p7ecx->encryptobj = sec_pkcs7_encoder_start_encrypt (cinfo, bulkkey);
|
|
if (p7ecx->encryptobj == NULL) {
|
|
PORT_Free (p7ecx);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (digestalgs != NULL) {
|
|
if (digests != NULL) {
|
|
/* digests already created (probably for detached data) */
|
|
digestalg = NULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX Some day we should handle multiple digests; for now,
|
|
* assume only one will be done.
|
|
*/
|
|
PORT_Assert (digestalgs[0] != NULL && digestalgs[1] == NULL);
|
|
digestalg = digestalgs[0];
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (digestalg != NULL) {
|
|
SECOidTag oidTag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&(digestalg->algorithm));
|
|
|
|
p7ecx->digestobj = HASH_GetHashObjectByOidTag(oidTag);
|
|
if (p7ecx->digestobj != NULL) {
|
|
p7ecx->digestcx = (* p7ecx->digestobj->create) ();
|
|
if (p7ecx->digestcx == NULL)
|
|
p7ecx->digestobj = NULL;
|
|
else
|
|
(* p7ecx->digestobj->begin) (p7ecx->digestcx);
|
|
}
|
|
if (p7ecx->digestobj == NULL) {
|
|
if (p7ecx->encryptobj != NULL)
|
|
sec_PKCS7DestroyEncryptObject (p7ecx->encryptobj);
|
|
PORT_Free (p7ecx);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p7ecx->cinfo = cinfo;
|
|
return p7ecx;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *
|
|
SEC_PKCS7EncoderStart (SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
|
|
SEC_PKCS7EncoderOutputCallback outputfn,
|
|
void *outputarg,
|
|
PK11SymKey *bulkkey)
|
|
{
|
|
SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *p7ecx;
|
|
SECStatus rv;
|
|
|
|
p7ecx = sec_pkcs7_encoder_start_contexts (cinfo, bulkkey);
|
|
if (p7ecx == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
p7ecx->output.outputfn = outputfn;
|
|
p7ecx->output.outputarg = outputarg;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialize the BER encoder.
|
|
*/
|
|
p7ecx->ecx = SEC_ASN1EncoderStart (cinfo, sec_PKCS7ContentInfoTemplate,
|
|
sec_pkcs7_encoder_out, &(p7ecx->output));
|
|
if (p7ecx->ecx == NULL) {
|
|
PORT_Free (p7ecx);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Indicate that we are streaming. We will be streaming until we
|
|
* get past the contents bytes.
|
|
*/
|
|
SEC_ASN1EncoderSetStreaming (p7ecx->ecx);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The notify function will watch for the contents field.
|
|
*/
|
|
SEC_ASN1EncoderSetNotifyProc (p7ecx->ecx, sec_pkcs7_encoder_notify, p7ecx);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This will encode everything up to the content bytes. (The notify
|
|
* function will then cause the encoding to stop there.) Then our
|
|
* caller can start passing contents bytes to our Update, which we
|
|
* will pass along.
|
|
*/
|
|
rv = SEC_ASN1EncoderUpdate (p7ecx->ecx, NULL, 0);
|
|
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
PORT_Free (p7ecx);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return p7ecx;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX If/when we support nested contents, this needs to be revised.
|
|
*/
|
|
static SECStatus
|
|
sec_pkcs7_encoder_work_data (SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *p7ecx, SECItem *dest,
|
|
const unsigned char *data, unsigned long len,
|
|
PRBool final)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
|
|
SECStatus rv;
|
|
|
|
|
|
rv = SECSuccess; /* may as well be optimistic */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We should really have data to process, or we should be trying
|
|
* to finish/flush the last block. (This is an overly paranoid
|
|
* check since all callers are in this file and simple inspection
|
|
* proves they do it right. But it could find a bug in future
|
|
* modifications/development, that is why it is here.)
|
|
*/
|
|
PORT_Assert ((data != NULL && len) || final);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Update the running digest.
|
|
* XXX This needs modification if/when we handle multiple digests.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (len && p7ecx->digestobj != NULL) {
|
|
(* p7ecx->digestobj->update) (p7ecx->digestcx, data, len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Encrypt this chunk.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (p7ecx->encryptobj != NULL) {
|
|
/* XXX the following lengths should all be longs? */
|
|
unsigned int inlen; /* length of data being encrypted */
|
|
unsigned int outlen; /* length of encrypted data */
|
|
unsigned int buflen; /* length available for encrypted data */
|
|
|
|
inlen = len;
|
|
buflen = sec_PKCS7EncryptLength (p7ecx->encryptobj, inlen, final);
|
|
if (buflen == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* No output is expected, but the input data may be buffered
|
|
* so we still have to call Encrypt.
|
|
*/
|
|
rv = sec_PKCS7Encrypt (p7ecx->encryptobj, NULL, NULL, 0,
|
|
data, inlen, final);
|
|
if (final) {
|
|
len = 0;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (dest != NULL)
|
|
buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_ArenaAlloc(p7ecx->cinfo->poolp, buflen);
|
|
else
|
|
buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc (buflen);
|
|
|
|
if (buf == NULL) {
|
|
rv = SECFailure;
|
|
} else {
|
|
rv = sec_PKCS7Encrypt (p7ecx->encryptobj, buf, &outlen, buflen,
|
|
data, inlen, final);
|
|
data = buf;
|
|
len = outlen;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
if (final)
|
|
goto done;
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (p7ecx->ecx != NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Encode the contents bytes.
|
|
*/
|
|
if(len) {
|
|
rv = SEC_ASN1EncoderUpdate (p7ecx->ecx, (const char *)data, len);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
if (p7ecx->encryptobj != NULL) {
|
|
if (final)
|
|
sec_PKCS7DestroyEncryptObject (p7ecx->encryptobj);
|
|
if (dest != NULL) {
|
|
dest->data = buf;
|
|
dest->len = len;
|
|
} else if (buf != NULL) {
|
|
PORT_Free (buf);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (final && p7ecx->digestobj != NULL) {
|
|
SECItem *digest, **digests, ***digestsp;
|
|
unsigned char *digdata;
|
|
SECOidTag kind;
|
|
|
|
kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType (p7ecx->cinfo);
|
|
switch (kind) {
|
|
default:
|
|
PORT_Assert (0);
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
|
|
digest = &(p7ecx->cinfo->content.digestedData->digest);
|
|
digestsp = NULL;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
|
|
digest = NULL;
|
|
digestsp = &(p7ecx->cinfo->content.signedData->digests);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
|
|
digest = NULL;
|
|
digestsp = &(p7ecx->cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData->digests);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
digdata = (unsigned char*)PORT_ArenaAlloc (p7ecx->cinfo->poolp,
|
|
p7ecx->digestobj->length);
|
|
if (digdata == NULL)
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
|
|
if (digestsp != NULL) {
|
|
PORT_Assert (digest == NULL);
|
|
|
|
digest = (SECItem*)PORT_ArenaAlloc (p7ecx->cinfo->poolp,
|
|
sizeof(SECItem));
|
|
digests = (SECItem**)PORT_ArenaAlloc (p7ecx->cinfo->poolp,
|
|
2 * sizeof(SECItem *));
|
|
if (digests == NULL || digest == NULL)
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
|
|
digests[0] = digest;
|
|
digests[1] = NULL;
|
|
|
|
*digestsp = digests;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PORT_Assert (digest != NULL);
|
|
|
|
digest->data = digdata;
|
|
digest->len = p7ecx->digestobj->length;
|
|
|
|
(* p7ecx->digestobj->end) (p7ecx->digestcx, digest->data,
|
|
&(digest->len), digest->len);
|
|
(* p7ecx->digestobj->destroy) (p7ecx->digestcx, PR_TRUE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SECStatus
|
|
SEC_PKCS7EncoderUpdate (SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *p7ecx,
|
|
const char *data, unsigned long len)
|
|
{
|
|
/* XXX Error handling needs help. Return what? Do "Finish" on failure? */
|
|
return sec_pkcs7_encoder_work_data (p7ecx, NULL,
|
|
(const unsigned char *)data, len,
|
|
PR_FALSE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static SECStatus
|
|
sec_pkcs7_encoder_sig_and_certs (SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
|
|
SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn, void *pwfnarg)
|
|
{
|
|
SECOidTag kind;
|
|
CERTCertificate **certs;
|
|
CERTCertificateList **certlists;
|
|
SECAlgorithmID **digestalgs;
|
|
SECItem **digests;
|
|
SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo *signerinfo, **signerinfos;
|
|
SECItem **rawcerts, ***rawcertsp;
|
|
PRArenaPool *poolp;
|
|
int certcount;
|
|
int ci, cli, rci, si;
|
|
|
|
kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType (cinfo);
|
|
switch (kind) {
|
|
default:
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
|
|
certs = NULL;
|
|
certlists = NULL;
|
|
digestalgs = NULL;
|
|
digests = NULL;
|
|
signerinfos = NULL;
|
|
rawcertsp = NULL;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
|
|
{
|
|
SEC_PKCS7SignedData *sdp;
|
|
|
|
sdp = cinfo->content.signedData;
|
|
certs = sdp->certs;
|
|
certlists = sdp->certLists;
|
|
digestalgs = sdp->digestAlgorithms;
|
|
digests = sdp->digests;
|
|
signerinfos = sdp->signerInfos;
|
|
rawcertsp = &(sdp->rawCerts);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
|
|
{
|
|
SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *saedp;
|
|
|
|
saedp = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData;
|
|
certs = saedp->certs;
|
|
certlists = saedp->certLists;
|
|
digestalgs = saedp->digestAlgorithms;
|
|
digests = saedp->digests;
|
|
signerinfos = saedp->signerInfos;
|
|
rawcertsp = &(saedp->rawCerts);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (certs == NULL && certlists == NULL && signerinfos == NULL)
|
|
return SECSuccess; /* nothing for us to do! */
|
|
|
|
poolp = cinfo->poolp;
|
|
certcount = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (signerinfos != NULL) {
|
|
SECOidTag digestalgtag;
|
|
int di;
|
|
SECStatus rv;
|
|
CERTCertificate *cert;
|
|
SECKEYPrivateKey *privkey;
|
|
SECItem signature;
|
|
SECOidTag signalgtag;
|
|
|
|
PORT_Assert (digestalgs != NULL && digests != NULL);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If one fails, we bail right then. If we want to continue and
|
|
* try to do subsequent signatures, this loop, and the departures
|
|
* from it, will need to be reworked.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (si = 0; signerinfos[si] != NULL; si++) {
|
|
|
|
signerinfo = signerinfos[si];
|
|
|
|
/* find right digest */
|
|
digestalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag (&(signerinfo->digestAlg));
|
|
for (di = 0; digestalgs[di] != NULL; di++) {
|
|
/* XXX Should I be comparing more than the tag? */
|
|
if (digestalgtag == SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag (digestalgs[di]))
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (digestalgs[di] == NULL) {
|
|
/* XXX oops; do what? set an error? */
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
PORT_Assert (digests[di] != NULL);
|
|
|
|
cert = signerinfo->cert;
|
|
privkey = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert (cert, pwfnarg);
|
|
if (privkey == NULL)
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX I think there should be a cert-level interface for this,
|
|
* so that I do not have to know about subjectPublicKeyInfo...
|
|
*/
|
|
signalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag (&(cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm));
|
|
|
|
/* Fortezza MISSI have weird signature formats. Map them
|
|
* to standard DSA formats */
|
|
signalgtag = PK11_FortezzaMapSig(signalgtag);
|
|
|
|
if (signerinfo->authAttr != NULL) {
|
|
SEC_PKCS7Attribute *attr;
|
|
SECItem encoded_attrs;
|
|
SECItem *dummy;
|
|
SECOidTag algid;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* First, find and fill in the message digest attribute.
|
|
*/
|
|
attr = sec_PKCS7FindAttribute (signerinfo->authAttr,
|
|
SEC_OID_PKCS9_MESSAGE_DIGEST,
|
|
PR_TRUE);
|
|
PORT_Assert (attr != NULL);
|
|
if (attr == NULL) {
|
|
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey (privkey);
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX The second half of the following assertion prevents
|
|
* the encoder from being called twice on the same content.
|
|
* Either just remove the second half the assertion, or
|
|
* change the code to check if the value already there is
|
|
* the same as digests[di], whichever seems more right.
|
|
*/
|
|
PORT_Assert (attr->values != NULL && attr->values[0] == NULL);
|
|
attr->values[0] = digests[di];
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Before encoding, reorder the attributes so that when they
|
|
* are encoded, they will be conforming DER, which is required
|
|
* to have a specific order and that is what must be used for
|
|
* the hash/signature. We do this here, rather than building
|
|
* it into EncodeAttributes, because we do not want to do
|
|
* such reordering on incoming messages (which also uses
|
|
* EncodeAttributes) or our old signatures (and other "broken"
|
|
* implementations) will not verify. So, we want to guarantee
|
|
* that we send out good DER encodings of attributes, but not
|
|
* to expect to receive them.
|
|
*/
|
|
rv = sec_PKCS7ReorderAttributes (signerinfo->authAttr);
|
|
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey (privkey);
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
encoded_attrs.data = NULL;
|
|
encoded_attrs.len = 0;
|
|
dummy = sec_PKCS7EncodeAttributes (NULL, &encoded_attrs,
|
|
&(signerinfo->authAttr));
|
|
if (dummy == NULL) {
|
|
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey (privkey);
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
algid = SEC_GetSignatureAlgorithmOidTag(privkey->keyType,
|
|
digestalgtag);
|
|
if (algid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
|
|
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey (privkey);
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
rv = SEC_SignData (&signature,
|
|
encoded_attrs.data, encoded_attrs.len,
|
|
privkey,
|
|
algid);
|
|
SECITEM_FreeItem (&encoded_attrs, PR_FALSE);
|
|
} else {
|
|
rv = SGN_Digest (privkey, digestalgtag, &signature,
|
|
digests[di]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey (privkey);
|
|
|
|
if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
|
return rv;
|
|
|
|
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem (poolp, &(signerinfo->encDigest), &signature);
|
|
if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
|
return rv;
|
|
|
|
SECITEM_FreeItem (&signature, PR_FALSE);
|
|
|
|
rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID (poolp, &(signerinfo->digestEncAlg),
|
|
signalgtag, NULL);
|
|
if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Count the cert chain for this signer.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (signerinfo->certList != NULL)
|
|
certcount += signerinfo->certList->len;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (certs != NULL) {
|
|
for (ci = 0; certs[ci] != NULL; ci++)
|
|
certcount++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (certlists != NULL) {
|
|
for (cli = 0; certlists[cli] != NULL; cli++)
|
|
certcount += certlists[cli]->len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (certcount == 0)
|
|
return SECSuccess; /* signing done; no certs */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Combine all of the certs and cert chains into rawcerts.
|
|
* Note: certcount is an upper bound; we may not need that many slots
|
|
* but we will allocate anyway to avoid having to do another pass.
|
|
* (The temporary space saving is not worth it.)
|
|
*/
|
|
rawcerts = (SECItem**)PORT_ArenaAlloc (poolp,
|
|
(certcount + 1) * sizeof(SECItem *));
|
|
if (rawcerts == NULL)
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX Want to check for duplicates and not add *any* cert that is
|
|
* already in the set. This will be more important when we start
|
|
* dealing with larger sets of certs, dual-key certs (signing and
|
|
* encryption), etc. For the time being we can slide by...
|
|
*/
|
|
rci = 0;
|
|
if (signerinfos != NULL) {
|
|
for (si = 0; signerinfos[si] != NULL; si++) {
|
|
signerinfo = signerinfos[si];
|
|
for (ci = 0; ci < signerinfo->certList->len; ci++)
|
|
rawcerts[rci++] = &(signerinfo->certList->certs[ci]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (certs != NULL) {
|
|
for (ci = 0; certs[ci] != NULL; ci++)
|
|
rawcerts[rci++] = &(certs[ci]->derCert);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (certlists != NULL) {
|
|
for (cli = 0; certlists[cli] != NULL; cli++) {
|
|
for (ci = 0; ci < certlists[cli]->len; ci++)
|
|
rawcerts[rci++] = &(certlists[cli]->certs[ci]);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rawcerts[rci] = NULL;
|
|
*rawcertsp = rawcerts;
|
|
|
|
return SECSuccess;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SECStatus
|
|
SEC_PKCS7EncoderFinish (SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *p7ecx,
|
|
SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn, void *pwfnarg)
|
|
{
|
|
SECStatus rv;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Flush out any remaining data.
|
|
*/
|
|
rv = sec_pkcs7_encoder_work_data (p7ecx, NULL, NULL, 0, PR_TRUE);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Turn off streaming stuff.
|
|
*/
|
|
SEC_ASN1EncoderClearTakeFromBuf (p7ecx->ecx);
|
|
SEC_ASN1EncoderClearStreaming (p7ecx->ecx);
|
|
|
|
if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
|
goto loser;
|
|
|
|
rv = sec_pkcs7_encoder_sig_and_certs (p7ecx->cinfo, pwfn, pwfnarg);
|
|
if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
|
goto loser;
|
|
|
|
rv = SEC_ASN1EncoderUpdate (p7ecx->ecx, NULL, 0);
|
|
|
|
loser:
|
|
SEC_ASN1EncoderFinish (p7ecx->ecx);
|
|
PORT_Free (p7ecx);
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Abort the ASN.1 stream. Used by pkcs 12
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
SEC_PKCS7EncoderAbort(SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *p7ecx, int error)
|
|
{
|
|
PORT_Assert(p7ecx);
|
|
SEC_ASN1EncoderAbort(p7ecx->ecx, error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* After this routine is called, the entire PKCS7 contentInfo is ready
|
|
* to be encoded. This is used internally, but can also be called from
|
|
* elsewhere for those who want to be able to just have pointers to
|
|
* the ASN1 template for pkcs7 contentInfo built into their own encodings.
|
|
*/
|
|
SECStatus
|
|
SEC_PKCS7PrepareForEncode (SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
|
|
PK11SymKey *bulkkey,
|
|
SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn,
|
|
void *pwfnarg)
|
|
{
|
|
SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *p7ecx;
|
|
SECItem *content, *enc_content;
|
|
SECStatus rv;
|
|
|
|
p7ecx = sec_pkcs7_encoder_start_contexts (cinfo, bulkkey);
|
|
if (p7ecx == NULL)
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
|
|
content = SEC_PKCS7GetContent (cinfo);
|
|
|
|
if (p7ecx->encryptobj != NULL) {
|
|
SECOidTag kind;
|
|
SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo *enccinfo;
|
|
|
|
kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType (p7ecx->cinfo);
|
|
switch (kind) {
|
|
default:
|
|
PORT_Assert (0);
|
|
rv = SECFailure;
|
|
goto loser;
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
|
|
enccinfo = &(p7ecx->cinfo->content.encryptedData->encContentInfo);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
|
|
enccinfo = &(p7ecx->cinfo->content.envelopedData->encContentInfo);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
|
|
enccinfo = &(p7ecx->cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData->encContentInfo);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
enc_content = &(enccinfo->encContent);
|
|
} else {
|
|
enc_content = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (content != NULL && content->data != NULL && content->len) {
|
|
rv = sec_pkcs7_encoder_work_data (p7ecx, enc_content,
|
|
content->data, content->len, PR_TRUE);
|
|
if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
|
goto loser;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rv = sec_pkcs7_encoder_sig_and_certs (cinfo, pwfn, pwfnarg);
|
|
|
|
loser:
|
|
PORT_Free (p7ecx);
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Encode a PKCS7 object, in one shot. All necessary components
|
|
* of the object must already be specified. Either the data has
|
|
* already been included (via SetContent), or the data is detached,
|
|
* or there is no data at all (certs-only).
|
|
*
|
|
* "cinfo" specifies the object to be encoded.
|
|
*
|
|
* "outputfn" is where the encoded bytes will be passed.
|
|
*
|
|
* "outputarg" is an opaque argument to the above callback.
|
|
*
|
|
* "bulkkey" specifies the bulk encryption key to use. This argument
|
|
* can be NULL if no encryption is being done, or if the bulk key should
|
|
* be generated internally (usually the case for EnvelopedData but never
|
|
* for EncryptedData, which *must* provide a bulk encryption key).
|
|
*
|
|
* "pwfn" is a callback for getting the password which protects the
|
|
* private key of the signer. This argument can be NULL if it is known
|
|
* that no signing is going to be done.
|
|
*
|
|
* "pwfnarg" is an opaque argument to the above callback.
|
|
*/
|
|
SECStatus
|
|
SEC_PKCS7Encode (SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
|
|
SEC_PKCS7EncoderOutputCallback outputfn,
|
|
void *outputarg,
|
|
PK11SymKey *bulkkey,
|
|
SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn,
|
|
void *pwfnarg)
|
|
{
|
|
SECStatus rv;
|
|
|
|
rv = SEC_PKCS7PrepareForEncode (cinfo, bulkkey, pwfn, pwfnarg);
|
|
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
|
|
struct sec_pkcs7_encoder_output outputcx;
|
|
|
|
outputcx.outputfn = outputfn;
|
|
outputcx.outputarg = outputarg;
|
|
|
|
rv = SEC_ASN1Encode (cinfo, sec_PKCS7ContentInfoTemplate,
|
|
sec_pkcs7_encoder_out, &outputcx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Encode a PKCS7 object, in one shot. All necessary components
|
|
* of the object must already be specified. Either the data has
|
|
* already been included (via SetContent), or the data is detached,
|
|
* or there is no data at all (certs-only). The output, rather than
|
|
* being passed to an output function as is done above, is all put
|
|
* into a SECItem.
|
|
*
|
|
* "pool" specifies a pool from which to allocate the result.
|
|
* It can be NULL, in which case memory is allocated generically.
|
|
*
|
|
* "dest" specifies a SECItem in which to put the result data.
|
|
* It can be NULL, in which case the entire item is allocated, too.
|
|
*
|
|
* "cinfo" specifies the object to be encoded.
|
|
*
|
|
* "bulkkey" specifies the bulk encryption key to use. This argument
|
|
* can be NULL if no encryption is being done, or if the bulk key should
|
|
* be generated internally (usually the case for EnvelopedData but never
|
|
* for EncryptedData, which *must* provide a bulk encryption key).
|
|
*
|
|
* "pwfn" is a callback for getting the password which protects the
|
|
* private key of the signer. This argument can be NULL if it is known
|
|
* that no signing is going to be done.
|
|
*
|
|
* "pwfnarg" is an opaque argument to the above callback.
|
|
*/
|
|
SECItem *
|
|
SEC_PKCS7EncodeItem (PRArenaPool *pool,
|
|
SECItem *dest,
|
|
SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
|
|
PK11SymKey *bulkkey,
|
|
SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn,
|
|
void *pwfnarg)
|
|
{
|
|
SECStatus rv;
|
|
|
|
rv = SEC_PKCS7PrepareForEncode (cinfo, bulkkey, pwfn, pwfnarg);
|
|
if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
return SEC_ASN1EncodeItem (pool, dest, cinfo, sec_PKCS7ContentInfoTemplate);
|
|
}
|
|
|