gecko/media/mtransport/dtlsidentity.cpp
Ehsan Akhgari f117c7a7b0 Backed out 2 changesets (bug 579517)
Backed out changeset 5298adc70963
Backed out changeset 86ccf7c918ce (bug 579517)
2012-10-25 12:32:24 -04:00

274 lines
7.7 KiB
C++

/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file,
* You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "nspr.h"
#include "cryptohi.h"
#include "ssl.h"
#include "keyhi.h"
#include "pk11pub.h"
#include "sechash.h"
#include "nsError.h"
#include "dtlsidentity.h"
#include "logging.h"
namespace mozilla {
MOZ_MTLOG_MODULE("mtransport");
DtlsIdentity::~DtlsIdentity() {
// XXX: make cert_ a smart pointer to avoid this, after we figure
// out the linking problem.
if (cert_)
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert_);
}
TemporaryRef<DtlsIdentity> DtlsIdentity::Generate() {
ScopedPK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
if (!slot) {
return nullptr;
}
uint8_t random_name[16];
SECStatus rv = PK11_GenerateRandomOnSlot(slot, random_name,
sizeof(random_name));
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return nullptr;
std::string name;
char chunk[3];
for (int i=0; i<sizeof(random_name); ++i) {
PR_snprintf(chunk, sizeof(chunk), "%.2x", random_name[i]);
name += chunk;
}
std::string subject_name_string = "CN=" + name;
ScopedCERTName subject_name(CERT_AsciiToName(subject_name_string.c_str()));
if (!subject_name) {
return nullptr;
}
PK11RSAGenParams rsaparams;
rsaparams.keySizeInBits = 1024; // TODO: make this stronger when we
// pre-generate.
rsaparams.pe = 65537; // We are too paranoid to use 3 as the exponent.
ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey private_key;
ScopedSECKEYPublicKey public_key;
SECKEYPublicKey *pubkey;
private_key =
PK11_GenerateKeyPair(slot,
CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &rsaparams, &pubkey,
PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE, nullptr);
if (private_key == nullptr)
return nullptr;
public_key = pubkey;
ScopedCERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo spki(
SECKEY_CreateSubjectPublicKeyInfo(pubkey));
if (!spki) {
return nullptr;
}
ScopedCERTCertificateRequest certreq(
CERT_CreateCertificateRequest(subject_name, spki, nullptr));
if (!certreq) {
return nullptr;
}
// From 1 day before todayto 30 days after.
// This is a sort of arbitrary range designed to be valid
// now with some slack in case the other side expects
// some before expiry.
//
// Note: explicit casts necessary to avoid
// warning C4307: '*' : integral constant overflow
static const PRTime oneDay = PRTime(PR_USEC_PER_SEC)
* PRTime(60) // sec
* PRTime(60) // min
* PRTime(24); // hours
PRTime now = PR_Now();
PRTime notBefore = now - oneDay;
PRTime notAfter = now + (PRTime(30) * oneDay);
ScopedCERTValidity validity(CERT_CreateValidity(notBefore, notAfter));
if (!validity) {
return nullptr;
}
unsigned long serial;
// Note: This serial in principle could collide, but it's unlikely
rv = PK11_GenerateRandomOnSlot(slot,
reinterpret_cast<unsigned char *>(&serial),
sizeof(serial));
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return nullptr;
}
ScopedCERTCertificate certificate(
CERT_CreateCertificate(serial, subject_name, validity, certreq));
if (!certificate) {
return nullptr;
}
PLArenaPool *arena = certificate->arena;
rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(arena, &certificate->signature,
SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, 0);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return nullptr;
// Set version to X509v3.
*(certificate->version.data) = SEC_CERTIFICATE_VERSION_3;
certificate->version.len = 1;
SECItem innerDER;
innerDER.len = 0;
innerDER.data = nullptr;
if (!SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &innerDER, certificate,
SEC_ASN1_GET(CERT_CertificateTemplate))) {
return nullptr;
}
SECItem *signedCert = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECItem);
if (!signedCert) {
return nullptr;
}
rv = SEC_DerSignData(arena, signedCert, innerDER.data, innerDER.len,
private_key,
SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return nullptr;
}
certificate->derCert = *signedCert;
return new DtlsIdentity(private_key.forget(), certificate.forget());
}
nsresult DtlsIdentity::ComputeFingerprint(const std::string algorithm,
unsigned char *digest,
std::size_t size,
std::size_t *digest_length) {
MOZ_ASSERT(cert_);
return ComputeFingerprint(cert_, algorithm, digest, size, digest_length);
}
nsresult DtlsIdentity::ComputeFingerprint(const CERTCertificate *cert,
const std::string algorithm,
unsigned char *digest,
std::size_t size,
std::size_t *digest_length) {
MOZ_ASSERT(cert);
HASH_HashType ht;
if (algorithm == "sha-1") {
ht = HASH_AlgSHA1;
} else if (algorithm == "sha-224") {
ht = HASH_AlgSHA224;
} else if (algorithm == "sha-256") {
ht = HASH_AlgSHA256;
} else if (algorithm == "sha-384") {
ht = HASH_AlgSHA384;
} else if (algorithm == "sha-512") {
ht = HASH_AlgSHA512;
} else {
return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
}
const SECHashObject *ho = HASH_GetHashObject(ht);
MOZ_ASSERT(ho);
if (!ho)
return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
MOZ_ASSERT(ho->length >= 20); // Double check
if (size < ho->length)
return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
SECStatus rv = HASH_HashBuf(ho->type, digest,
cert->derCert.data,
cert->derCert.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
*digest_length = ho->length;
return NS_OK;
}
// Format the fingerprint in RFC 4572 Section 5 format, colons and
// all.
std::string DtlsIdentity::FormatFingerprint(const unsigned char *digest,
std::size_t size) {
std::string str("");
char group[3];
for (std::size_t i=0; i < size; i++) {
PR_snprintf(group, sizeof(group), "%.2X", digest[i]);
if (i != 0){
str += ":";
}
str += group;
}
MOZ_ASSERT(str.size() == (size * 3 - 1)); // Check result length
return str;
}
// Parse a fingerprint in RFC 4572 format.
// Note that this tolerates some badly formatted data, in particular:
// (a) arbitrary runs of colons
// (b) colons at the beginning or end.
nsresult DtlsIdentity::ParseFingerprint(const std::string fp,
unsigned char *digest,
size_t size,
size_t *length) {
size_t offset = 0;
bool top_half = true;
uint8_t val = 0;
for (size_t i=0; i<fp.length(); i++) {
if (offset >= size) {
// Note: no known way for offset to get > size
MOZ_MTLOG(PR_LOG_ERROR, "Fingerprint too long for buffer");
return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
}
if (top_half && (fp[i] == ':')) {
continue;
} else if ((fp[i] >= '0') && (fp[i] <= '9')) {
val |= fp[i] - '0';
} else if ((fp[i] >= 'A') && (fp[i] <= 'F')) {
val |= fp[i] - 'A' + 10;
} else {
MOZ_MTLOG(PR_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid fingerprint value " << fp[i]);
return NS_ERROR_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
}
if (top_half) {
val <<= 4;
top_half = false;
} else {
digest[offset++] = val;
top_half = true;
val = 0;
}
}
*length = offset;
return NS_OK;
}
} // close namespace