mirror of
https://gitlab.winehq.org/wine/wine-gecko.git
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897 lines
31 KiB
C++
897 lines
31 KiB
C++
/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
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/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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#include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h"
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include "ExtendedValidation.h"
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#include "nsNSSCertificate.h"
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#include "NSSErrorsService.h"
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#include "OCSPRequestor.h"
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#include "certdb.h"
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#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
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#include "nss.h"
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#include "pk11pub.h"
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#include "pkix/pkix.h"
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#include "pkix/pkixnss.h"
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#include "pkix/ScopedPtr.h"
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#include "prerror.h"
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#include "prmem.h"
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#include "prprf.h"
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#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"
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#include "secerr.h"
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#include "secmod.h"
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using namespace mozilla;
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using namespace mozilla::pkix;
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#ifdef PR_LOGGING
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extern PRLogModuleInfo* gCertVerifierLog;
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#endif
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static const uint64_t ServerFailureDelaySeconds = 5 * 60;
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namespace mozilla { namespace psm {
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const char BUILTIN_ROOTS_MODULE_DEFAULT_NAME[] = "Builtin Roots Module";
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void PORT_Free_string(char* str) { PORT_Free(str); }
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namespace {
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typedef ScopedPtr<SECMODModule, SECMOD_DestroyModule> ScopedSECMODModule;
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} // unnamed namespace
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NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NSSCertDBTrustDomain(SECTrustType certDBTrustType,
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OCSPFetching ocspFetching,
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OCSPCache& ocspCache,
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/*optional but shouldn't be*/ void* pinArg,
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CertVerifier::ocsp_get_config ocspGETConfig,
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/*optional*/ CERTChainVerifyCallback* checkChainCallback,
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/*optional*/ ScopedCERTCertList* builtChain)
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: mCertDBTrustType(certDBTrustType)
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, mOCSPFetching(ocspFetching)
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, mOCSPCache(ocspCache)
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, mPinArg(pinArg)
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, mOCSPGetConfig(ocspGETConfig)
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, mCheckChainCallback(checkChainCallback)
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, mBuiltChain(builtChain)
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{
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}
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// E=igca@sgdn.pm.gouv.fr,CN=IGC/A,OU=DCSSI,O=PM/SGDN,L=Paris,ST=France,C=FR
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static const uint8_t ANSSI_SUBJECT_DATA[] =
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"\x30\x81\x85\x31\x0B\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04"
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"\x06\x13\x02\x46\x52\x31\x0F\x30\x0D\x06\x03"
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"\x55\x04\x08\x13\x06\x46\x72\x61\x6E\x63\x65"
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"\x31\x0E\x30\x0C\x06\x03\x55\x04\x07\x13\x05"
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"\x50\x61\x72\x69\x73\x31\x10\x30\x0E\x06\x03"
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"\x55\x04\x0A\x13\x07\x50\x4D\x2F\x53\x47\x44"
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"\x4E\x31\x0E\x30\x0C\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0B\x13"
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"\x05\x44\x43\x53\x53\x49\x31\x0E\x30\x0C\x06"
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"\x03\x55\x04\x03\x13\x05\x49\x47\x43\x2F\x41"
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"\x31\x23\x30\x21\x06\x09\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7"
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"\x0D\x01\x09\x01\x16\x14\x69\x67\x63\x61\x40"
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"\x73\x67\x64\x6E\x2E\x70\x6D\x2E\x67\x6F\x75"
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"\x76\x2E\x66\x72";
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static const uint8_t PERMIT_FRANCE_GOV_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_DATA[] =
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"\x30\x5D" // SEQUENCE (length=93)
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"\xA0\x5B" // permittedSubtrees (length=91)
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"\x30\x05\x82\x03" ".fr"
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"\x30\x05\x82\x03" ".gp"
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"\x30\x05\x82\x03" ".gf"
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"\x30\x05\x82\x03" ".mq"
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"\x30\x05\x82\x03" ".re"
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"\x30\x05\x82\x03" ".yt"
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"\x30\x05\x82\x03" ".pm"
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"\x30\x05\x82\x03" ".bl"
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"\x30\x05\x82\x03" ".mf"
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"\x30\x05\x82\x03" ".wf"
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"\x30\x05\x82\x03" ".pf"
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"\x30\x05\x82\x03" ".nc"
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"\x30\x05\x82\x03" ".tf";
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Result
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NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FindIssuer(Input encodedIssuerName,
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IssuerChecker& checker, Time)
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{
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// TODO: NSS seems to be ambiguous between "no potential issuers found" and
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// "there was an error trying to retrieve the potential issuers."
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SECItem encodedIssuerNameSECItem = UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(encodedIssuerName);
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ScopedCERTCertList
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candidates(CERT_CreateSubjectCertList(nullptr, CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
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&encodedIssuerNameSECItem, 0,
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false));
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if (candidates) {
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for (CERTCertListNode* n = CERT_LIST_HEAD(candidates);
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!CERT_LIST_END(n, candidates); n = CERT_LIST_NEXT(n)) {
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Input certDER;
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Result rv = certDER.Init(n->cert->derCert.data, n->cert->derCert.len);
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if (rv != Success) {
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continue; // probably too big
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}
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bool keepGoing;
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Input anssiSubject;
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rv = anssiSubject.Init(ANSSI_SUBJECT_DATA,
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sizeof(ANSSI_SUBJECT_DATA) - 1);
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if (rv != Success) {
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return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
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}
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// TODO: Use CERT_CompareName or equivalent
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if (InputsAreEqual(encodedIssuerName, anssiSubject)) {
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Input anssiNameConstraints;
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if (anssiNameConstraints.Init(
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PERMIT_FRANCE_GOV_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_DATA,
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sizeof(PERMIT_FRANCE_GOV_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_DATA) - 1)
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!= Success) {
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return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
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}
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rv = checker.Check(certDER, &anssiNameConstraints, keepGoing);
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} else {
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rv = checker.Check(certDER, nullptr, keepGoing);
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}
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if (rv != Success) {
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return rv;
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}
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if (!keepGoing) {
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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return Success;
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}
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Result
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NSSCertDBTrustDomain::GetCertTrust(EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
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const CertPolicyId& policy,
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Input candidateCertDER,
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/*out*/ TrustLevel& trustLevel)
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{
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#ifdef MOZ_NO_EV_CERTS
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if (!policy.IsAnyPolicy()) {
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return Result::ERROR_POLICY_VALIDATION_FAILED;
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}
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#endif
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// XXX: This would be cleaner and more efficient if we could get the trust
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// information without constructing a CERTCertificate here, but NSS doesn't
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// expose it in any other easy-to-use fashion. The use of
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// CERT_NewTempCertificate to get a CERTCertificate shouldn't be a
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// performance problem because NSS will just find the existing
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// CERTCertificate in its in-memory cache and return it.
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SECItem candidateCertDERSECItem = UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(candidateCertDER);
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ScopedCERTCertificate candidateCert(
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CERT_NewTempCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &candidateCertDERSECItem,
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nullptr, false, true));
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if (!candidateCert) {
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return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
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}
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// XXX: CERT_GetCertTrust seems to be abusing SECStatus as a boolean, where
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// SECSuccess means that there is a trust record and SECFailure means there
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// is not a trust record. I looked at NSS's internal uses of
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// CERT_GetCertTrust, and all that code uses the result as a boolean meaning
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// "We have a trust record."
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CERTCertTrust trust;
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if (CERT_GetCertTrust(candidateCert.get(), &trust) == SECSuccess) {
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uint32_t flags = SEC_GET_TRUST_FLAGS(&trust, mCertDBTrustType);
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// For DISTRUST, we use the CERTDB_TRUSTED or CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA bit,
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// because we can have active distrust for either type of cert. Note that
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// CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD means "stop trying to inherit trust" so if the
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// relevant trust bit isn't set then that means the cert must be considered
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// distrusted.
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uint32_t relevantTrustBit =
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endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA ? CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA
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: CERTDB_TRUSTED;
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if (((flags & (relevantTrustBit|CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD)))
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== CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD) {
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trustLevel = TrustLevel::ActivelyDistrusted;
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return Success;
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}
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// For TRUST, we only use the CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA bit, because Gecko hasn't
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// needed to consider end-entity certs to be their own trust anchors since
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// Gecko implemented nsICertOverrideService.
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if (flags & CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA) {
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if (policy.IsAnyPolicy()) {
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trustLevel = TrustLevel::TrustAnchor;
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return Success;
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}
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#ifndef MOZ_NO_EV_CERTS
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if (CertIsAuthoritativeForEVPolicy(candidateCert.get(), policy)) {
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trustLevel = TrustLevel::TrustAnchor;
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return Success;
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}
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#endif
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}
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}
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trustLevel = TrustLevel::InheritsTrust;
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return Success;
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}
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Result
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NSSCertDBTrustDomain::VerifySignedData(const SignedDataWithSignature& signedData,
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Input subjectPublicKeyInfo)
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{
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return ::mozilla::pkix::VerifySignedData(signedData, subjectPublicKeyInfo,
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mPinArg);
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}
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Result
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NSSCertDBTrustDomain::DigestBuf(Input item,
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/*out*/ uint8_t* digestBuf, size_t digestBufLen)
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{
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return ::mozilla::pkix::DigestBuf(item, digestBuf, digestBufLen);
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}
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static PRIntervalTime
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OCSPFetchingTypeToTimeoutTime(NSSCertDBTrustDomain::OCSPFetching ocspFetching)
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{
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switch (ocspFetching) {
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case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail:
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return PR_SecondsToInterval(2);
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case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForEV:
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case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForDVHardFail:
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return PR_SecondsToInterval(10);
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// The rest of these are error cases. Assert in debug builds, but return
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// the default value corresponding to 2 seconds in release builds.
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case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NeverFetchOCSP:
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case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::LocalOnlyOCSPForEV:
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PR_NOT_REACHED("we should never see this OCSPFetching type here");
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default:
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PR_NOT_REACHED("we're not handling every OCSPFetching type");
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}
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return PR_SecondsToInterval(2);
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}
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// Copied and modified from CERT_GetOCSPAuthorityInfoAccessLocation and
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// CERT_GetGeneralNameByType. Returns SECFailure on error, SECSuccess
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// with url == nullptr when an OCSP URI was not found, and SECSuccess with
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// url != nullptr when an OCSP URI was found. The output url will be owned
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// by the arena.
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static Result
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GetOCSPAuthorityInfoAccessLocation(PLArenaPool* arena,
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Input aiaExtension,
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/*out*/ char const*& url)
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{
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url = nullptr;
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SECItem aiaExtensionSECItem = UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(aiaExtension);
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CERTAuthInfoAccess** aia =
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CERT_DecodeAuthInfoAccessExtension(arena, &aiaExtensionSECItem);
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if (!aia) {
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return Result::ERROR_CERT_BAD_ACCESS_LOCATION;
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}
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for (size_t i = 0; aia[i]; ++i) {
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if (SECOID_FindOIDTag(&aia[i]->method) == SEC_OID_PKIX_OCSP) {
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// NSS chooses the **last** OCSP URL; we choose the **first**
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CERTGeneralName* current = aia[i]->location;
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if (!current) {
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continue;
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}
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do {
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if (current->type == certURI) {
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const SECItem& location = current->name.other;
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// (location.len + 1) must be small enough to fit into a uint32_t,
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// but we limit it to a smaller bound to reduce OOM risk.
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if (location.len > 1024 || memchr(location.data, 0, location.len)) {
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// Reject embedded nulls. (NSS doesn't do this)
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return Result::ERROR_CERT_BAD_ACCESS_LOCATION;
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}
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// Copy the non-null-terminated SECItem into a null-terminated string.
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char* nullTerminatedURL(static_cast<char*>(
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PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena, location.len + 1)));
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if (!nullTerminatedURL) {
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return Result::FATAL_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
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}
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memcpy(nullTerminatedURL, location.data, location.len);
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nullTerminatedURL[location.len] = 0;
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url = nullTerminatedURL;
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return Success;
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}
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current = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(current);
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} while (current != aia[i]->location);
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}
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}
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return Success;
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}
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Result
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NSSCertDBTrustDomain::CheckRevocation(EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
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const CertID& certID, Time time,
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/*optional*/ const Input* stapledOCSPResponse,
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/*optional*/ const Input* aiaExtension)
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{
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// Actively distrusted certificates will have already been blocked by
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// GetCertTrust.
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// TODO: need to verify that IsRevoked isn't called for trust anchors AND
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// that that fact is documented in mozillapkix.
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PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
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("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: Top of CheckRevocation\n"));
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// Bug 991815: The BR allow OCSP for intermediates to be up to one year old.
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// Since this affects EV there is no reason why DV should be more strict
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// so all intermediatates are allowed to have OCSP responses up to one year
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// old.
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uint16_t maxOCSPLifetimeInDays = 10;
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if (endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA) {
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maxOCSPLifetimeInDays = 365;
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}
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// If we have a stapled OCSP response then the verification of that response
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// determines the result unless the OCSP response is expired. We make an
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// exception for expired responses because some servers, nginx in particular,
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// are known to serve expired responses due to bugs.
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// We keep track of the result of verifying the stapled response but don't
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// immediately return failure if the response has expired.
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Result stapledOCSPResponseResult = Success;
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if (stapledOCSPResponse) {
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PR_ASSERT(endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity);
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bool expired;
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stapledOCSPResponseResult =
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VerifyAndMaybeCacheEncodedOCSPResponse(certID, time,
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maxOCSPLifetimeInDays,
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*stapledOCSPResponse,
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ResponseWasStapled, expired);
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if (stapledOCSPResponseResult == Success) {
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// stapled OCSP response present and good
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Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_OCSP_STAPLING, 1);
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PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
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("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: stapled OCSP response: good"));
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return Success;
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}
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if (stapledOCSPResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE ||
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expired) {
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// stapled OCSP response present but expired
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Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_OCSP_STAPLING, 3);
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PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
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("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: expired stapled OCSP response"));
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} else {
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// stapled OCSP response present but invalid for some reason
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Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_OCSP_STAPLING, 4);
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PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
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("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: stapled OCSP response: failure"));
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return stapledOCSPResponseResult;
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}
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} else {
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// no stapled OCSP response
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Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_OCSP_STAPLING, 2);
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PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
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("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: no stapled OCSP response"));
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}
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Result cachedResponseResult = Success;
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Time cachedResponseValidThrough(Time::uninitialized);
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bool cachedResponsePresent = mOCSPCache.Get(certID,
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cachedResponseResult,
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cachedResponseValidThrough);
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if (cachedResponsePresent) {
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if (cachedResponseResult == Success && cachedResponseValidThrough >= time) {
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PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
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("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: cached OCSP response: good"));
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return Success;
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}
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// If we have a cached revoked response, use it.
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if (cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE) {
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PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
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("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: cached OCSP response: revoked"));
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return Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE;
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}
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// The cached response may indicate an unknown certificate or it may be
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// expired. Don't return with either of these statuses yet - we may be
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// able to fetch a more recent one.
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PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
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("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: cached OCSP response: error %ld valid "
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"until %lld", cachedResponseResult, cachedResponseValidThrough));
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// When a good cached response has expired, it is more convenient
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// to convert that to an error code and just deal with
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// cachedResponseResult from here on out.
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if (cachedResponseResult == Success && cachedResponseValidThrough < time) {
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cachedResponseResult = Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE;
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}
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// We may have a cached indication of server failure. Ignore it if
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// it has expired.
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if (cachedResponseResult != Success &&
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cachedResponseResult != Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT &&
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cachedResponseResult != Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE &&
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cachedResponseValidThrough < time) {
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cachedResponseResult = Success;
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cachedResponsePresent = false;
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}
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} else {
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PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
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("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: no cached OCSP response"));
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}
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// At this point, if and only if cachedErrorResult is Success, there was no
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// cached response.
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PR_ASSERT((!cachedResponsePresent && cachedResponseResult == Success) ||
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(cachedResponsePresent && cachedResponseResult != Success));
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// TODO: We still need to handle the fallback for expired responses. But,
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// if/when we disable OCSP fetching by default, it would be ambiguous whether
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// security.OCSP.enable==0 means "I want the default" or "I really never want
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// you to ever fetch OCSP."
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if ((mOCSPFetching == NeverFetchOCSP) ||
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(endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA &&
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(mOCSPFetching == FetchOCSPForDVHardFail ||
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mOCSPFetching == FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail))) {
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|
// We're not going to be doing any fetching, so if there was a cached
|
|
// "unknown" response, say so.
|
|
if (cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
|
|
return Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT;
|
|
}
|
|
// If we're doing hard-fail, we want to know if we have a cached response
|
|
// that has expired.
|
|
if (mOCSPFetching == FetchOCSPForDVHardFail &&
|
|
cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE) {
|
|
return Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return Success;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mOCSPFetching == LocalOnlyOCSPForEV) {
|
|
if (cachedResponseResult != Success) {
|
|
return cachedResponseResult;
|
|
}
|
|
return Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ScopedPLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
|
|
if (!arena) {
|
|
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Result rv;
|
|
const char* url = nullptr; // owned by the arena
|
|
|
|
if (aiaExtension) {
|
|
rv = GetOCSPAuthorityInfoAccessLocation(arena.get(), *aiaExtension, url);
|
|
if (rv != Success) {
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!url) {
|
|
if (mOCSPFetching == FetchOCSPForEV ||
|
|
cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
|
|
return Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT;
|
|
}
|
|
if (cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE) {
|
|
return Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE;
|
|
}
|
|
if (stapledOCSPResponseResult != Success) {
|
|
return stapledOCSPResponseResult;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Nothing to do if we don't have an OCSP responder URI for the cert; just
|
|
// assume it is good. Note that this is the confusing, but intended,
|
|
// interpretation of "strict" revocation checking in the face of a
|
|
// certificate that lacks an OCSP responder URI.
|
|
return Success;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Only request a response if we didn't have a cached indication of failure
|
|
// (don't keep requesting responses from a failing server).
|
|
Input response;
|
|
bool attemptedRequest;
|
|
if (cachedResponseResult == Success ||
|
|
cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT ||
|
|
cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE) {
|
|
uint8_t ocspRequest[OCSP_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH];
|
|
size_t ocspRequestLength;
|
|
rv = CreateEncodedOCSPRequest(*this, certID, ocspRequest,
|
|
ocspRequestLength);
|
|
if (rv != Success) {
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
SECItem ocspRequestItem = {
|
|
siBuffer,
|
|
ocspRequest,
|
|
static_cast<unsigned int>(ocspRequestLength)
|
|
};
|
|
// Owned by arena
|
|
const SECItem* responseSECItem =
|
|
DoOCSPRequest(arena.get(), url, &ocspRequestItem,
|
|
OCSPFetchingTypeToTimeoutTime(mOCSPFetching),
|
|
mOCSPGetConfig == CertVerifier::ocsp_get_enabled);
|
|
if (!responseSECItem) {
|
|
rv = MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
|
|
} else if (response.Init(responseSECItem->data, responseSECItem->len)
|
|
!= Success) {
|
|
rv = Result::ERROR_OCSP_MALFORMED_RESPONSE; // too big
|
|
}
|
|
attemptedRequest = true;
|
|
} else {
|
|
rv = cachedResponseResult;
|
|
attemptedRequest = false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (response.GetLength() == 0) {
|
|
Result error = rv;
|
|
if (attemptedRequest) {
|
|
Time timeout(time);
|
|
if ( timeout.AddSeconds(ServerFailureDelaySeconds) != Success) {
|
|
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; // integer overflow
|
|
}
|
|
rv = mOCSPCache.Put(certID, error, time, timeout);
|
|
if (rv != Success) {
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (mOCSPFetching != FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail) {
|
|
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
|
|
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECFailure after "
|
|
"OCSP request failure"));
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
if (cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
|
|
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
|
|
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECFailure from cached "
|
|
"response after OCSP request failure"));
|
|
return cachedResponseResult;
|
|
}
|
|
if (stapledOCSPResponseResult != Success) {
|
|
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
|
|
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECFailure from expired "
|
|
"stapled response after OCSP request failure"));
|
|
return stapledOCSPResponseResult;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
|
|
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECSuccess after "
|
|
"OCSP request failure"));
|
|
return Success; // Soft fail -> success :(
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If the response from the network has expired but indicates a revoked
|
|
// or unknown certificate, PR_GetError() will return the appropriate error.
|
|
// We actually ignore expired here.
|
|
bool expired;
|
|
rv = VerifyAndMaybeCacheEncodedOCSPResponse(certID, time,
|
|
maxOCSPLifetimeInDays,
|
|
response, ResponseIsFromNetwork,
|
|
expired);
|
|
if (rv == Success || mOCSPFetching != FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail) {
|
|
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
|
|
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning after VerifyEncodedOCSPResponse"));
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rv == Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT ||
|
|
rv == Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE) {
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
if (stapledOCSPResponseResult != Success) {
|
|
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
|
|
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECFailure from expired stapled "
|
|
"response after OCSP request verification failure"));
|
|
return stapledOCSPResponseResult;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
|
|
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: end of CheckRevocation"));
|
|
|
|
return Success; // Soft fail -> success :(
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Result
|
|
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::VerifyAndMaybeCacheEncodedOCSPResponse(
|
|
const CertID& certID, Time time, uint16_t maxLifetimeInDays,
|
|
Input encodedResponse, EncodedResponseSource responseSource,
|
|
/*out*/ bool& expired)
|
|
{
|
|
Time thisUpdate(Time::uninitialized);
|
|
Time validThrough(Time::uninitialized);
|
|
Result rv = VerifyEncodedOCSPResponse(*this, certID, time,
|
|
maxLifetimeInDays, encodedResponse,
|
|
expired, &thisUpdate, &validThrough);
|
|
// If a response was stapled and expired, we don't want to cache it. Return
|
|
// early to simplify the logic here.
|
|
if (responseSource == ResponseWasStapled && expired) {
|
|
PR_ASSERT(rv != Success);
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
// validThrough is only trustworthy if the response successfully verifies
|
|
// or it indicates a revoked or unknown certificate.
|
|
// If this isn't the case, store an indication of failure (to prevent
|
|
// repeatedly requesting a response from a failing server).
|
|
if (rv != Success && rv != Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE &&
|
|
rv != Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
|
|
validThrough = time;
|
|
if (validThrough.AddSeconds(ServerFailureDelaySeconds) != Success) {
|
|
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; // integer overflow
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (responseSource == ResponseIsFromNetwork ||
|
|
rv == Success ||
|
|
rv == Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE ||
|
|
rv == Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
|
|
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
|
|
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: caching OCSP response"));
|
|
Result putRV = mOCSPCache.Put(certID, rv, thisUpdate, validThrough);
|
|
if (putRV != Success) {
|
|
return putRV;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Result
|
|
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::IsChainValid(const DERArray& certArray)
|
|
{
|
|
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
|
|
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: Top of IsChainValid mCheckChainCallback=%p",
|
|
mCheckChainCallback));
|
|
|
|
if (!mBuiltChain && !mCheckChainCallback) {
|
|
// No need to create a CERTCertList, and nothing else to do.
|
|
return Success;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ScopedCERTCertList certList;
|
|
SECStatus srv = ConstructCERTCertListFromReversedDERArray(certArray,
|
|
certList);
|
|
if (srv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mCheckChainCallback) {
|
|
if (!mCheckChainCallback->isChainValid) {
|
|
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
|
|
}
|
|
PRBool chainOK;
|
|
srv = (mCheckChainCallback->isChainValid)(
|
|
mCheckChainCallback->isChainValidArg, certList.get(), &chainOK);
|
|
if (srv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
|
|
}
|
|
if (!chainOK) {
|
|
return Result::ERROR_KEY_PINNING_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mBuiltChain) {
|
|
*mBuiltChain = certList.forget();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return Success;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Result
|
|
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::CheckPublicKey(Input subjectPublicKeyInfo)
|
|
{
|
|
return ::mozilla::pkix::CheckPublicKey(subjectPublicKeyInfo);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
namespace {
|
|
|
|
static char*
|
|
nss_addEscape(const char* string, char quote)
|
|
{
|
|
char* newString = 0;
|
|
size_t escapes = 0, size = 0;
|
|
const char* src;
|
|
char* dest;
|
|
|
|
for (src = string; *src; src++) {
|
|
if ((*src == quote) || (*src == '\\')) {
|
|
escapes++;
|
|
}
|
|
size++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
newString = (char*) PORT_ZAlloc(escapes + size + 1u);
|
|
if (!newString) {
|
|
return nullptr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (src = string, dest = newString; *src; src++, dest++) {
|
|
if ((*src == quote) || (*src == '\\')) {
|
|
*dest++ = '\\';
|
|
}
|
|
*dest = *src;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return newString;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} // unnamed namespace
|
|
|
|
SECStatus
|
|
InitializeNSS(const char* dir, bool readOnly)
|
|
{
|
|
// The NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT flag turns off the loading of the root certs
|
|
// module by NSS_Initialize because we will load it in InstallLoadableRoots
|
|
// later. It also allows us to work around a bug in the system NSS in
|
|
// Ubuntu 8.04, which loads any nonexistent "<configdir>/libnssckbi.so" as
|
|
// "/usr/lib/nss/libnssckbi.so".
|
|
uint32_t flags = NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_OPTIMIZESPACE;
|
|
if (readOnly) {
|
|
flags |= NSS_INIT_READONLY;
|
|
}
|
|
return ::NSS_Initialize(dir, "", "", SECMOD_DB, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
DisableMD5()
|
|
{
|
|
NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_MD5,
|
|
0, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CMS_SIGNATURE);
|
|
NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION,
|
|
0, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CMS_SIGNATURE);
|
|
NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC,
|
|
0, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CMS_SIGNATURE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SECStatus
|
|
LoadLoadableRoots(/*optional*/ const char* dir, const char* modNameUTF8)
|
|
{
|
|
PR_ASSERT(modNameUTF8);
|
|
|
|
if (!modNameUTF8) {
|
|
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ScopedPtr<char, PR_FreeLibraryName> fullLibraryPath(
|
|
PR_GetLibraryName(dir, "nssckbi"));
|
|
if (!fullLibraryPath) {
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ScopedPtr<char, PORT_Free_string> escaped_fullLibraryPath(
|
|
nss_addEscape(fullLibraryPath.get(), '\"'));
|
|
if (!escaped_fullLibraryPath) {
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If a module exists with the same name, delete it.
|
|
int modType;
|
|
SECMOD_DeleteModule(modNameUTF8, &modType);
|
|
|
|
ScopedPtr<char, PR_smprintf_free> pkcs11ModuleSpec(
|
|
PR_smprintf("name=\"%s\" library=\"%s\"", modNameUTF8,
|
|
escaped_fullLibraryPath.get()));
|
|
if (!pkcs11ModuleSpec) {
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ScopedSECMODModule rootsModule(SECMOD_LoadUserModule(pkcs11ModuleSpec.get(),
|
|
nullptr, false));
|
|
if (!rootsModule) {
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!rootsModule->loaded) {
|
|
PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0);
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return SECSuccess;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
UnloadLoadableRoots(const char* modNameUTF8)
|
|
{
|
|
PR_ASSERT(modNameUTF8);
|
|
ScopedSECMODModule rootsModule(SECMOD_FindModule(modNameUTF8));
|
|
|
|
if (rootsModule) {
|
|
SECMOD_UnloadUserModule(rootsModule.get());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
char*
|
|
DefaultServerNicknameForCert(CERTCertificate* cert)
|
|
{
|
|
char* nickname = nullptr;
|
|
int count;
|
|
bool conflict;
|
|
char* servername = nullptr;
|
|
|
|
servername = CERT_GetCommonName(&cert->subject);
|
|
if (!servername) {
|
|
// Certs without common names are strange, but they do exist...
|
|
// Let's try to use another string for the nickname
|
|
servername = CERT_GetOrgUnitName(&cert->subject);
|
|
if (!servername) {
|
|
servername = CERT_GetOrgName(&cert->subject);
|
|
if (!servername) {
|
|
servername = CERT_GetLocalityName(&cert->subject);
|
|
if (!servername) {
|
|
servername = CERT_GetStateName(&cert->subject);
|
|
if (!servername) {
|
|
servername = CERT_GetCountryName(&cert->subject);
|
|
if (!servername) {
|
|
// We tried hard, there is nothing more we can do.
|
|
// A cert without any names doesn't really make sense.
|
|
return nullptr;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
count = 1;
|
|
while (1) {
|
|
if (count == 1) {
|
|
nickname = PR_smprintf("%s", servername);
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
nickname = PR_smprintf("%s #%d", servername, count);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!nickname) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
conflict = SEC_CertNicknameConflict(nickname, &cert->derSubject,
|
|
cert->dbhandle);
|
|
if (!conflict) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
PR_Free(nickname);
|
|
count++;
|
|
}
|
|
PR_FREEIF(servername);
|
|
return nickname;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
SaveIntermediateCerts(const ScopedCERTCertList& certList)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!certList) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool isEndEntity = true;
|
|
for (CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList);
|
|
!CERT_LIST_END(node, certList);
|
|
node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) {
|
|
if (isEndEntity) {
|
|
// Skip the end-entity; we only want to store intermediates
|
|
isEndEntity = false;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (node->cert->slot) {
|
|
// This cert was found on a token, no need to remember it in the temp db.
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (node->cert->isperm) {
|
|
// We don't need to remember certs already stored in perm db.
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We have found a signer cert that we want to remember.
|
|
char* nickname = DefaultServerNicknameForCert(node->cert);
|
|
if (nickname && *nickname) {
|
|
ScopedPtr<PK11SlotInfo, PK11_FreeSlot> slot(PK11_GetInternalKeySlot());
|
|
if (slot) {
|
|
PK11_ImportCert(slot.get(), node->cert, CK_INVALID_HANDLE,
|
|
nickname, false);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
PR_FREEIF(nickname);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} } // namespace mozilla::psm
|