mirror of
https://gitlab.winehq.org/wine/wine-gecko.git
synced 2024-09-13 09:24:08 -07:00
719 lines
28 KiB
C++
719 lines
28 KiB
C++
/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
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/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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#include "CertVerifier.h"
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include "ExtendedValidation.h"
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#include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h"
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#include "NSSErrorsService.h"
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#include "cert.h"
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#include "pk11pub.h"
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#include "pkix/pkix.h"
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#include "pkix/pkixnss.h"
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#include "prerror.h"
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#include "secerr.h"
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#include "sslerr.h"
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using namespace mozilla::pkix;
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using namespace mozilla::psm;
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PRLogModuleInfo* gCertVerifierLog = nullptr;
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namespace mozilla { namespace psm {
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const CertVerifier::Flags CertVerifier::FLAG_LOCAL_ONLY = 1;
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const CertVerifier::Flags CertVerifier::FLAG_MUST_BE_EV = 2;
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const CertVerifier::Flags CertVerifier::FLAG_TLS_IGNORE_STATUS_REQUEST = 4;
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CertVerifier::CertVerifier(OcspDownloadConfig odc,
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OcspStrictConfig osc,
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OcspGetConfig ogc,
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uint32_t certShortLifetimeInDays,
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PinningMode pinningMode,
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SHA1Mode sha1Mode)
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: mOCSPDownloadConfig(odc)
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, mOCSPStrict(osc == ocspStrict)
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, mOCSPGETEnabled(ogc == ocspGetEnabled)
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, mCertShortLifetimeInDays(certShortLifetimeInDays)
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, mPinningMode(pinningMode)
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, mSHA1Mode(sha1Mode)
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{
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}
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CertVerifier::~CertVerifier()
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{
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}
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void
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InitCertVerifierLog()
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{
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if (!gCertVerifierLog) {
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gCertVerifierLog = PR_NewLogModule("certverifier");
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}
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}
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Result
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IsCertChainRootBuiltInRoot(CERTCertList* chain, bool& result)
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{
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if (!chain || CERT_LIST_EMPTY(chain)) {
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return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
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}
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CERTCertListNode* rootNode = CERT_LIST_TAIL(chain);
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if (!rootNode) {
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return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
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}
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CERTCertificate* root = rootNode->cert;
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if (!root) {
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return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
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}
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SECStatus srv = IsCertBuiltInRoot(root, result);
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if (srv != SECSuccess) {
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return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
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}
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return Success;
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}
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SECStatus
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IsCertBuiltInRoot(CERTCertificate* cert, bool& result)
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{
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result = false;
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ScopedPK11SlotList slots;
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slots = PK11_GetAllSlotsForCert(cert, nullptr);
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if (!slots) {
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if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_NO_TOKEN) {
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// no list
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return SECSuccess;
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}
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return SECFailure;
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}
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for (PK11SlotListElement* le = slots->head; le; le = le->next) {
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char* token = PK11_GetTokenName(le->slot);
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MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
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("BuiltInRoot? subject=%s token=%s",cert->subjectName, token));
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if (strcmp("Builtin Object Token", token) == 0) {
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result = true;
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return SECSuccess;
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}
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}
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return SECSuccess;
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}
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static Result
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BuildCertChainForOneKeyUsage(NSSCertDBTrustDomain& trustDomain, Input certDER,
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Time time, KeyUsage ku1, KeyUsage ku2,
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KeyUsage ku3, KeyPurposeId eku,
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const CertPolicyId& requiredPolicy,
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const Input* stapledOCSPResponse,
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/*optional out*/ CertVerifier::OCSPStaplingStatus*
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ocspStaplingStatus)
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{
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trustDomain.ResetOCSPStaplingStatus();
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Result rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
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EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, ku1,
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eku, requiredPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
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if (rv == Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE) {
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trustDomain.ResetOCSPStaplingStatus();
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rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
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EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, ku2,
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eku, requiredPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
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if (rv == Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE) {
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trustDomain.ResetOCSPStaplingStatus();
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rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
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EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, ku3,
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eku, requiredPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
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if (rv != Success) {
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rv = Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE;
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}
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}
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}
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if (ocspStaplingStatus) {
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*ocspStaplingStatus = trustDomain.GetOCSPStaplingStatus();
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}
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return rv;
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}
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bool
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CertVerifier::SHA1ModeMoreRestrictiveThanGivenMode(SHA1Mode mode)
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{
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switch (mSHA1Mode) {
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case SHA1Mode::Forbidden:
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return mode != SHA1Mode::Forbidden;
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case SHA1Mode::Before2016:
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return mode != SHA1Mode::Forbidden && mode != SHA1Mode::Before2016;
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case SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot:
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return mode == SHA1Mode::Allowed;
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case SHA1Mode::Allowed:
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return false;
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default:
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MOZ_ASSERT(false, "unexpected SHA1Mode type");
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return true;
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}
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}
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static const unsigned int MIN_RSA_BITS = 2048;
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static const unsigned int MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK = 1024;
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SECStatus
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CertVerifier::VerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert, SECCertificateUsage usage,
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Time time, void* pinArg, const char* hostname,
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/*out*/ ScopedCERTCertList& builtChain,
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/*optional*/ const Flags flags,
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/*optional*/ const SECItem* stapledOCSPResponseSECItem,
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/*optional out*/ SECOidTag* evOidPolicy,
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/*optional out*/ OCSPStaplingStatus* ocspStaplingStatus,
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/*optional out*/ KeySizeStatus* keySizeStatus,
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/*optional out*/ SHA1ModeResult* sha1ModeResult,
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/*optional out*/ PinningTelemetryInfo* pinningTelemetryInfo)
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{
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MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("Top of VerifyCert\n"));
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PR_ASSERT(cert);
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PR_ASSERT(usage == certificateUsageSSLServer || !(flags & FLAG_MUST_BE_EV));
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PR_ASSERT(usage == certificateUsageSSLServer || !keySizeStatus);
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PR_ASSERT(usage == certificateUsageSSLServer || !sha1ModeResult);
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if (evOidPolicy) {
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*evOidPolicy = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
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}
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if (ocspStaplingStatus) {
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if (usage != certificateUsageSSLServer) {
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PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
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return SECFailure;
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}
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*ocspStaplingStatus = OCSP_STAPLING_NEVER_CHECKED;
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}
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if (keySizeStatus) {
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if (usage != certificateUsageSSLServer) {
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PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
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return SECFailure;
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}
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*keySizeStatus = KeySizeStatus::NeverChecked;
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}
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if (sha1ModeResult) {
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if (usage != certificateUsageSSLServer) {
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PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
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return SECFailure;
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}
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*sha1ModeResult = SHA1ModeResult::NeverChecked;
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}
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if (!cert ||
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(usage != certificateUsageSSLServer && (flags & FLAG_MUST_BE_EV))) {
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PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
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return SECFailure;
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}
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Result rv;
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Input certDER;
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rv = certDER.Init(cert->derCert.data, cert->derCert.len);
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if (rv != Success) {
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PR_SetError(MapResultToPRErrorCode(rv), 0);
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return SECFailure;
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}
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// We configure the OCSP fetching modes separately for EV and non-EV
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// verifications.
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NSSCertDBTrustDomain::OCSPFetching defaultOCSPFetching
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= (mOCSPDownloadConfig == ocspOff) ||
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(mOCSPDownloadConfig == ocspEVOnly) ||
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(flags & FLAG_LOCAL_ONLY) ? NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NeverFetchOCSP
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: !mOCSPStrict ? NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail
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: NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForDVHardFail;
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OcspGetConfig ocspGETConfig = mOCSPGETEnabled ? ocspGetEnabled
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: ocspGetDisabled;
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Input stapledOCSPResponseInput;
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const Input* stapledOCSPResponse = nullptr;
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if (stapledOCSPResponseSECItem) {
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rv = stapledOCSPResponseInput.Init(stapledOCSPResponseSECItem->data,
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stapledOCSPResponseSECItem->len);
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if (rv != Success) {
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// The stapled OCSP response was too big.
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PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OCSP_MALFORMED_RESPONSE, 0);
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return SECFailure;
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}
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stapledOCSPResponse = &stapledOCSPResponseInput;
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}
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switch (usage) {
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case certificateUsageSSLClient: {
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// XXX: We don't really have a trust bit for SSL client authentication so
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// just use trustEmail as it is the closest alternative.
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NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustEmail, defaultOCSPFetching,
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mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
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mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
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pinningDisabled, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
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ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
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SHA1Mode::Allowed, builtChain, nullptr,
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nullptr);
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rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
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EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
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KeyUsage::digitalSignature,
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KeyPurposeId::id_kp_clientAuth,
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CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
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break;
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}
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case certificateUsageSSLServer: {
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// TODO: When verifying a certificate in an SSL handshake, we should
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// restrict the acceptable key usage based on the key exchange method
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// chosen by the server.
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// These configurations are in order of most restrictive to least
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// restrictive. This enables us to gather telemetry on the expected
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// results of setting the default policy to a particular configuration.
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SHA1Mode sha1ModeConfigurations[] = {
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SHA1Mode::Forbidden,
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SHA1Mode::Before2016,
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SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot,
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SHA1Mode::Allowed,
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};
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SHA1ModeResult sha1ModeResults[] = {
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SHA1ModeResult::SucceededWithoutSHA1,
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SHA1ModeResult::SucceededWithSHA1Before2016,
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SHA1ModeResult::SucceededWithImportedRoot,
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SHA1ModeResult::SucceededWithSHA1,
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};
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size_t sha1ModeConfigurationsCount = MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(sha1ModeConfigurations);
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static_assert(MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(sha1ModeConfigurations) ==
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MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(sha1ModeResults),
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"digestAlgorithm array lengths differ");
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rv = Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR;
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#ifndef MOZ_NO_EV_CERTS
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// Try to validate for EV first.
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NSSCertDBTrustDomain::OCSPFetching evOCSPFetching
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= (mOCSPDownloadConfig == ocspOff) ||
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(flags & FLAG_LOCAL_ONLY) ? NSSCertDBTrustDomain::LocalOnlyOCSPForEV
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: NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForEV;
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CertPolicyId evPolicy;
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SECOidTag evPolicyOidTag;
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SECStatus srv = GetFirstEVPolicy(cert, evPolicy, evPolicyOidTag);
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for (size_t i = 0;
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i < sha1ModeConfigurationsCount && rv != Success && srv == SECSuccess;
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i++) {
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// Because of the try-strict and fallback approach, we have to clear any
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// previously noted telemetry information
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if (pinningTelemetryInfo) {
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pinningTelemetryInfo->Reset();
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}
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// Don't attempt verification if the SHA1 mode set by preferences
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// (mSHA1Mode) is more restrictive than the SHA1 mode option we're on.
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// (To put it another way, only attempt verification if the SHA1 mode
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// option we're on is as restrictive or more restrictive than
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// mSHA1Mode.) This allows us to gather telemetry information while
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// still enforcing the mode set by preferences.
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if (SHA1ModeMoreRestrictiveThanGivenMode(sha1ModeConfigurations[i])) {
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continue;
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}
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NSSCertDBTrustDomain
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trustDomain(trustSSL, evOCSPFetching,
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mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
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mCertShortLifetimeInDays, mPinningMode, MIN_RSA_BITS,
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ValidityCheckingMode::CheckForEV,
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sha1ModeConfigurations[i], builtChain,
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pinningTelemetryInfo, hostname);
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rv = BuildCertChainForOneKeyUsage(trustDomain, certDER, time,
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KeyUsage::digitalSignature,// (EC)DHE
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KeyUsage::keyEncipherment, // RSA
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KeyUsage::keyAgreement, // (EC)DH
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KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth,
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evPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse,
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ocspStaplingStatus);
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// If we succeeded with the SHA1Mode of only allowing imported roots to
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// issue SHA1 certificates after 2015, if the chain we built doesn't
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// terminate with an imported root, we must reject it. (This only works
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// because we try SHA1 configurations in order of decreasing
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// strictness.)
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// Note that if there existed a certificate chain with a built-in root
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// that had SHA1 certificates issued before 2016, it would have already
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// been accepted. If such a chain had SHA1 certificates issued after
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// 2015, it will only be accepted in the SHA1Mode::Allowed case.
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if (rv == Success &&
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sha1ModeConfigurations[i] == SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot) {
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bool isBuiltInRoot = false;
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rv = IsCertChainRootBuiltInRoot(builtChain, isBuiltInRoot);
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if (rv != Success) {
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break;
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}
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if (isBuiltInRoot) {
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rv = Result::ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED;
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}
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}
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if (rv == Success) {
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MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
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("cert is EV with status %i\n", sha1ModeResults[i]));
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if (evOidPolicy) {
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*evOidPolicy = evPolicyOidTag;
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}
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if (sha1ModeResult) {
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*sha1ModeResult = sha1ModeResults[i];
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}
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}
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}
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if (rv == Success) {
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break;
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}
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#endif
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if (flags & FLAG_MUST_BE_EV) {
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rv = Result::ERROR_POLICY_VALIDATION_FAILED;
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break;
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}
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// Now try non-EV.
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unsigned int keySizeOptions[] = {
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MIN_RSA_BITS,
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MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK
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};
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KeySizeStatus keySizeStatuses[] = {
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KeySizeStatus::LargeMinimumSucceeded,
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KeySizeStatus::CompatibilityRisk
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};
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static_assert(MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(keySizeOptions) ==
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MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(keySizeStatuses),
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"keySize array lengths differ");
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size_t keySizeOptionsCount = MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(keySizeStatuses);
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for (size_t i = 0; i < keySizeOptionsCount && rv != Success; i++) {
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for (size_t j = 0; j < sha1ModeConfigurationsCount && rv != Success;
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j++) {
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// invalidate any telemetry info relating to failed chains
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if (pinningTelemetryInfo) {
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pinningTelemetryInfo->Reset();
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}
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// Don't attempt verification if the SHA1 mode set by preferences
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|
// (mSHA1Mode) is more restrictive than the SHA1 mode option we're on.
|
|
// (To put it another way, only attempt verification if the SHA1 mode
|
|
// option we're on is as restrictive or more restrictive than
|
|
// mSHA1Mode.) This allows us to gather telemetry information while
|
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// still enforcing the mode set by preferences.
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if (SHA1ModeMoreRestrictiveThanGivenMode(sha1ModeConfigurations[j])) {
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continue;
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}
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NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustSSL, defaultOCSPFetching,
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mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
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mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
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mPinningMode, keySizeOptions[i],
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ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
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sha1ModeConfigurations[j],
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builtChain, pinningTelemetryInfo,
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hostname);
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rv = BuildCertChainForOneKeyUsage(trustDomain, certDER, time,
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KeyUsage::digitalSignature,//(EC)DHE
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KeyUsage::keyEncipherment,//RSA
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KeyUsage::keyAgreement,//(EC)DH
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KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth,
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CertPolicyId::anyPolicy,
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stapledOCSPResponse,
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ocspStaplingStatus);
|
|
// If we succeeded with the SHA1Mode of only allowing imported roots
|
|
// to issue SHA1 certificates after 2015, if the chain we built
|
|
// doesn't terminate with an imported root, we must reject it. (This
|
|
// only works because we try SHA1 configurations in order of
|
|
// decreasing strictness.)
|
|
// Note that if there existed a certificate chain with a built-in root
|
|
// that had SHA1 certificates issued before 2016, it would have
|
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// already been accepted. If such a chain had SHA1 certificates issued
|
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// after 2015, it will only be accepted in the SHA1Mode::Allowed case.
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if (rv == Success &&
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sha1ModeConfigurations[j] == SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot) {
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bool isBuiltInRoot = false;
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rv = IsCertChainRootBuiltInRoot(builtChain, isBuiltInRoot);
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if (rv != Success) {
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break;
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}
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if (isBuiltInRoot) {
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rv = Result::ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED;
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}
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}
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if (rv == Success) {
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if (keySizeStatus) {
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*keySizeStatus = keySizeStatuses[i];
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}
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if (sha1ModeResult) {
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*sha1ModeResult = sha1ModeResults[j];
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}
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}
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}
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}
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if (rv == Success) {
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break;
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}
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if (keySizeStatus) {
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*keySizeStatus = KeySizeStatus::AlreadyBad;
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}
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|
// Only collect CERT_CHAIN_SHA1_POLICY_STATUS telemetry indicating a
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// failure when mSHA1Mode is the default.
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|
// NB: When we change the default, we have to change this.
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|
if (sha1ModeResult && mSHA1Mode == SHA1Mode::Allowed) {
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*sha1ModeResult = SHA1ModeResult::Failed;
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}
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break;
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}
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|
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case certificateUsageSSLCA: {
|
|
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustSSL, defaultOCSPFetching,
|
|
mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
|
|
mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
|
|
pinningDisabled, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
|
|
ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
|
|
mSHA1Mode, builtChain, nullptr, nullptr);
|
|
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
|
|
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA, KeyUsage::keyCertSign,
|
|
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth,
|
|
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case certificateUsageEmailSigner: {
|
|
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustEmail, defaultOCSPFetching,
|
|
mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
|
|
mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
|
|
pinningDisabled, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
|
|
ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
|
|
SHA1Mode::Allowed, builtChain, nullptr,
|
|
nullptr);
|
|
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
|
|
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
|
|
KeyUsage::digitalSignature,
|
|
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_emailProtection,
|
|
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
|
|
if (rv == Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE) {
|
|
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
|
|
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
|
|
KeyUsage::nonRepudiation,
|
|
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_emailProtection,
|
|
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case certificateUsageEmailRecipient: {
|
|
// TODO: The higher level S/MIME processing should pass in which key
|
|
// usage it is trying to verify for, and base its algorithm choices
|
|
// based on the result of the verification(s).
|
|
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustEmail, defaultOCSPFetching,
|
|
mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
|
|
mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
|
|
pinningDisabled, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
|
|
ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
|
|
SHA1Mode::Allowed, builtChain, nullptr,
|
|
nullptr);
|
|
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
|
|
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
|
|
KeyUsage::keyEncipherment, // RSA
|
|
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_emailProtection,
|
|
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
|
|
if (rv == Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE) {
|
|
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
|
|
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
|
|
KeyUsage::keyAgreement, // ECDH/DH
|
|
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_emailProtection,
|
|
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case certificateUsageObjectSigner: {
|
|
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustObjectSigning, defaultOCSPFetching,
|
|
mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
|
|
mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
|
|
pinningDisabled, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
|
|
ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
|
|
SHA1Mode::Allowed, builtChain, nullptr,
|
|
nullptr);
|
|
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
|
|
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
|
|
KeyUsage::digitalSignature,
|
|
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_codeSigning,
|
|
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case certificateUsageVerifyCA:
|
|
case certificateUsageStatusResponder: {
|
|
// XXX This is a pretty useless way to verify a certificate. It is used
|
|
// by the certificate viewer UI. Because we don't know what trust bit is
|
|
// interesting, we just try them all.
|
|
mozilla::pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA;
|
|
mozilla::pkix::KeyUsage keyUsage;
|
|
KeyPurposeId eku;
|
|
if (usage == certificateUsageVerifyCA) {
|
|
endEntityOrCA = EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA;
|
|
keyUsage = KeyUsage::keyCertSign;
|
|
eku = KeyPurposeId::anyExtendedKeyUsage;
|
|
} else {
|
|
endEntityOrCA = EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity;
|
|
keyUsage = KeyUsage::digitalSignature;
|
|
eku = KeyPurposeId::id_kp_OCSPSigning;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NSSCertDBTrustDomain sslTrust(trustSSL, defaultOCSPFetching, mOCSPCache,
|
|
pinArg, ocspGETConfig, mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
|
|
pinningDisabled, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
|
|
ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
|
|
SHA1Mode::Allowed, builtChain, nullptr,
|
|
nullptr);
|
|
rv = BuildCertChain(sslTrust, certDER, time, endEntityOrCA,
|
|
keyUsage, eku, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy,
|
|
stapledOCSPResponse);
|
|
if (rv == Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER) {
|
|
NSSCertDBTrustDomain emailTrust(trustEmail, defaultOCSPFetching,
|
|
mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
|
|
mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
|
|
pinningDisabled, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
|
|
ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
|
|
SHA1Mode::Allowed, builtChain, nullptr,
|
|
nullptr);
|
|
rv = BuildCertChain(emailTrust, certDER, time, endEntityOrCA,
|
|
keyUsage, eku, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy,
|
|
stapledOCSPResponse);
|
|
if (rv == Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER) {
|
|
NSSCertDBTrustDomain objectSigningTrust(trustObjectSigning,
|
|
defaultOCSPFetching, mOCSPCache,
|
|
pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
|
|
mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
|
|
pinningDisabled,
|
|
MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
|
|
ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
|
|
SHA1Mode::Allowed, builtChain,
|
|
nullptr, nullptr);
|
|
rv = BuildCertChain(objectSigningTrust, certDER, time,
|
|
endEntityOrCA, keyUsage, eku,
|
|
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
rv = Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rv != Success) {
|
|
PR_SetError(MapResultToPRErrorCode(rv), 0);
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return SECSuccess;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SECStatus
|
|
CertVerifier::VerifySSLServerCert(CERTCertificate* peerCert,
|
|
/*optional*/ const SECItem* stapledOCSPResponse,
|
|
Time time,
|
|
/*optional*/ void* pinarg,
|
|
const char* hostname,
|
|
/*out*/ ScopedCERTCertList& builtChain,
|
|
/*optional*/ bool saveIntermediatesInPermanentDatabase,
|
|
/*optional*/ Flags flags,
|
|
/*optional out*/ SECOidTag* evOidPolicy,
|
|
/*optional out*/ OCSPStaplingStatus* ocspStaplingStatus,
|
|
/*optional out*/ KeySizeStatus* keySizeStatus,
|
|
/*optional out*/ SHA1ModeResult* sha1ModeResult,
|
|
/*optional out*/ PinningTelemetryInfo* pinningTelemetryInfo)
|
|
{
|
|
PR_ASSERT(peerCert);
|
|
// XXX: PR_ASSERT(pinarg)
|
|
PR_ASSERT(hostname);
|
|
PR_ASSERT(hostname[0]);
|
|
|
|
if (evOidPolicy) {
|
|
*evOidPolicy = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!hostname || !hostname[0]) {
|
|
PR_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN, 0);
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CreateCertErrorRunnable assumes that CheckCertHostname is only called
|
|
// if VerifyCert succeeded.
|
|
SECStatus rv = VerifyCert(peerCert, certificateUsageSSLServer, time, pinarg,
|
|
hostname, builtChain, flags, stapledOCSPResponse,
|
|
evOidPolicy, ocspStaplingStatus, keySizeStatus,
|
|
sha1ModeResult, pinningTelemetryInfo);
|
|
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Input peerCertInput;
|
|
Result result = peerCertInput.Init(peerCert->derCert.data,
|
|
peerCert->derCert.len);
|
|
if (result != Success) {
|
|
PR_SetError(MapResultToPRErrorCode(result), 0);
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Input stapledOCSPResponseInput;
|
|
Input* responseInputPtr = nullptr;
|
|
if (stapledOCSPResponse) {
|
|
result = stapledOCSPResponseInput.Init(stapledOCSPResponse->data,
|
|
stapledOCSPResponse->len);
|
|
if (result != Success) {
|
|
// The stapled OCSP response was too big.
|
|
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OCSP_MALFORMED_RESPONSE, 0);
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
responseInputPtr = &stapledOCSPResponseInput;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(flags & FLAG_TLS_IGNORE_STATUS_REQUEST)) {
|
|
result = CheckTLSFeaturesAreSatisfied(peerCertInput, responseInputPtr);
|
|
|
|
if (result != Success) {
|
|
PR_SetError(MapResultToPRErrorCode(result), 0);
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Input hostnameInput;
|
|
result = hostnameInput.Init(uint8_t_ptr_cast(hostname), strlen(hostname));
|
|
if (result != Success) {
|
|
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
result = CheckCertHostname(peerCertInput, hostnameInput);
|
|
if (result != Success) {
|
|
// Treat malformed name information as a domain mismatch.
|
|
if (result == Result::ERROR_BAD_DER) {
|
|
PR_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN, 0);
|
|
} else {
|
|
PR_SetError(MapResultToPRErrorCode(result), 0);
|
|
}
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (saveIntermediatesInPermanentDatabase) {
|
|
SaveIntermediateCerts(builtChain);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return SECSuccess;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} } // namespace mozilla::psm
|