gecko/security/certverifier/CertVerifier.cpp

572 lines
18 KiB
C++

/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "CertVerifier.h"
#include <stdint.h>
#include "insanity/pkixtypes.h"
#include "ExtendedValidation.h"
#include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h"
#include "cert.h"
#include "ocsp.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "prerror.h"
#include "sslerr.h"
// ScopedXXX in this file are insanity::pkix::ScopedXXX, not
// mozilla::ScopedXXX.
using namespace insanity::pkix;
using namespace mozilla::psm;
#ifdef MOZ_LOGGING
static PRLogModuleInfo* gCertVerifierLog = nullptr;
#endif
namespace mozilla { namespace psm {
const CertVerifier::Flags CertVerifier::FLAG_LOCAL_ONLY = 1;
const CertVerifier::Flags CertVerifier::FLAG_MUST_BE_EV = 2;
CertVerifier::CertVerifier(implementation_config ic,
missing_cert_download_config mcdc,
crl_download_config cdc,
ocsp_download_config odc,
ocsp_strict_config osc,
ocsp_get_config ogc)
: mImplementation(ic)
, mMissingCertDownloadEnabled(mcdc == missing_cert_download_on)
, mCRLDownloadEnabled(cdc == crl_download_allowed)
, mOCSPDownloadEnabled(odc == ocsp_on)
, mOCSPStrict(osc == ocsp_strict)
, mOCSPGETEnabled(ogc == ocsp_get_enabled)
{
}
CertVerifier::~CertVerifier()
{
}
void
InitCertVerifierLog()
{
#ifdef MOZ_LOGGING
if (!gCertVerifierLog) {
gCertVerifierLog = PR_NewLogModule("certverifier");
}
#endif
}
// Once we migrate to insanity::pkix or change the overridable error
// logic this will become unnecesary.
static SECStatus
insertErrorIntoVerifyLog(CERTCertificate* cert, const PRErrorCode err,
CERTVerifyLog* verifyLog){
CERTVerifyLogNode* node;
node = (CERTVerifyLogNode *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(verifyLog->arena,
sizeof(CERTVerifyLogNode));
if (!node) {
PR_SetError(PR_UNKNOWN_ERROR, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
node->cert = CERT_DupCertificate(cert);
node->error = err;
node->depth = 0;
node->arg = nullptr;
//and at to head!
node->prev = nullptr;
node->next = verifyLog->head;
if (verifyLog->head) {
verifyLog->head->prev = node;
}
verifyLog->head = node;
if (!verifyLog->tail) {
verifyLog->tail = node;
}
verifyLog->count++;
return SECSuccess;
}
static SECStatus
ClassicVerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert,
const SECCertificateUsage usage,
const PRTime time,
void* pinArg,
/*optional out*/ ScopedCERTCertList* validationChain,
/*optional out*/ CERTVerifyLog* verifyLog)
{
SECStatus rv;
SECCertUsage enumUsage;
if (validationChain) {
switch(usage){
case certificateUsageSSLClient:
enumUsage = certUsageSSLClient;
break;
case certificateUsageSSLServer:
enumUsage = certUsageSSLServer;
break;
case certificateUsageSSLServerWithStepUp:
enumUsage = certUsageSSLServerWithStepUp;
break;
case certificateUsageSSLCA:
enumUsage = certUsageSSLCA;
break;
case certificateUsageEmailSigner:
enumUsage = certUsageEmailSigner;
break;
case certificateUsageEmailRecipient:
enumUsage = certUsageEmailRecipient;
break;
case certificateUsageObjectSigner:
enumUsage = certUsageObjectSigner;
break;
case certificateUsageUserCertImport:
enumUsage = certUsageUserCertImport;
break;
case certificateUsageVerifyCA:
enumUsage = certUsageVerifyCA;
break;
case certificateUsageProtectedObjectSigner:
enumUsage = certUsageProtectedObjectSigner;
break;
case certificateUsageStatusResponder:
enumUsage = certUsageStatusResponder;
break;
case certificateUsageAnyCA:
enumUsage = certUsageAnyCA;
break;
default:
return SECFailure;
}
}
if (usage == certificateUsageSSLServer) {
// SSL server cert verification has always used CERT_VerifyCert, so we
// continue to use it for SSL cert verification to minimize the risk of
// there being any differnce in results between CERT_VerifyCert and
// CERT_VerifyCertificate.
rv = CERT_VerifyCert(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), cert, true,
certUsageSSLServer, time, pinArg, verifyLog);
} else {
rv = CERT_VerifyCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), cert, true,
usage, time, pinArg, verifyLog, nullptr);
}
if (rv == SECSuccess && validationChain) {
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("VerifyCert: getting chain in 'classic' \n"));
*validationChain = CERT_GetCertChainFromCert(cert, time, enumUsage);
if (!*validationChain) {
rv = SECFailure;
}
}
return rv;
}
#ifndef NSS_NO_LIBPKIX
static void
destroyCertListThatShouldNotExist(CERTCertList** certChain)
{
PR_ASSERT(certChain);
PR_ASSERT(!*certChain);
if (certChain && *certChain) {
// There SHOULD not be a validation chain on failure, asserion here for
// the debug builds AND a fallback for production builds
CERT_DestroyCertList(*certChain);
*certChain = nullptr;
}
}
#endif
SECStatus
CertVerifier::VerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert,
/*optional*/ const SECItem* stapledOCSPResponse,
const SECCertificateUsage usage,
const PRTime time,
void* pinArg,
const Flags flags,
/*optional out*/ ScopedCERTCertList* validationChain,
/*optional out*/ SECOidTag* evOidPolicy,
/*optional out*/ CERTVerifyLog* verifyLog)
{
if (!cert)
{
PR_NOT_REACHED("Invalid arguments to CertVerifier::VerifyCert");
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
if (validationChain) {
*validationChain = nullptr;
}
if (evOidPolicy) {
*evOidPolicy = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
}
switch(usage){
case certificateUsageSSLClient:
case certificateUsageSSLServer:
case certificateUsageSSLCA:
case certificateUsageEmailSigner:
case certificateUsageEmailRecipient:
case certificateUsageObjectSigner:
case certificateUsageStatusResponder:
break;
default:
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
if ((flags & FLAG_MUST_BE_EV) && usage != certificateUsageSSLServer) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
#ifndef NSS_NO_LIBPKIX
ScopedCERTCertList trustAnchors;
SECStatus rv;
SECOidTag evPolicy = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
// Do EV checking only for sslserver usage
if (usage == certificateUsageSSLServer) {
SECStatus srv = GetFirstEVPolicy(cert, evPolicy);
if (srv == SECSuccess) {
if (evPolicy != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
trustAnchors = GetRootsForOid(evPolicy);
}
if (!trustAnchors) {
return SECFailure;
}
// pkix ignores an empty trustanchors list and
// decides then to use the whole set of trust in the DB
// so we set the evPolicy to unkown in this case
if (CERT_LIST_EMPTY(trustAnchors)) {
evPolicy = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
}
} else {
// No known EV policy found
if (flags & FLAG_MUST_BE_EV) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND);
return SECFailure;
}
// Do not setup EV verification params
evPolicy = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
}
if ((evPolicy == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) && (flags & FLAG_MUST_BE_EV)) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER);
return SECFailure;
}
}
PR_ASSERT(evPolicy == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN || trustAnchors);
size_t i = 0;
size_t validationChainLocation = 0;
size_t validationTrustAnchorLocation = 0;
CERTValOutParam cvout[4];
if (verifyLog) {
cvout[i].type = cert_po_errorLog;
cvout[i].value.pointer.log = verifyLog;
++i;
}
if (validationChain) {
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("VerifyCert: setting up validation chain outparam.\n"));
validationChainLocation = i;
cvout[i].type = cert_po_certList;
cvout[i].value.pointer.chain = nullptr;
++i;
validationTrustAnchorLocation = i;
cvout[i].type = cert_po_trustAnchor;
cvout[i].value.pointer.cert = nullptr;
++i;
}
cvout[i].type = cert_po_end;
CERTRevocationFlags rev;
CERTRevocationMethodIndex revPreferredMethods[2];
rev.leafTests.preferred_methods =
rev.chainTests.preferred_methods = revPreferredMethods;
uint64_t revFlagsPerMethod[2];
rev.leafTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method =
rev.chainTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method = revFlagsPerMethod;
rev.leafTests.number_of_preferred_methods =
rev.chainTests.number_of_preferred_methods = 1;
rev.leafTests.number_of_defined_methods =
rev.chainTests.number_of_defined_methods = cert_revocation_method_ocsp + 1;
const bool localOnly = flags & FLAG_LOCAL_ONLY;
CERTValInParam cvin[6];
// Parameters for both EV and DV validation
cvin[0].type = cert_pi_useAIACertFetch;
cvin[0].value.scalar.b = mMissingCertDownloadEnabled && !localOnly;
cvin[1].type = cert_pi_revocationFlags;
cvin[1].value.pointer.revocation = &rev;
cvin[2].type = cert_pi_date;
cvin[2].value.scalar.time = time;
i = 3;
const size_t evParamLocation = i;
if (evPolicy != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
// EV setup!
// XXX 859872 The current flags are not quite correct. (use
// of ocsp flags for crl preferences).
uint64_t ocspRevMethodFlags =
CERT_REV_M_TEST_USING_THIS_METHOD
| ((mOCSPDownloadEnabled && !localOnly) ?
CERT_REV_M_ALLOW_NETWORK_FETCHING : CERT_REV_M_FORBID_NETWORK_FETCHING)
| CERT_REV_M_ALLOW_IMPLICIT_DEFAULT_SOURCE
| CERT_REV_M_REQUIRE_INFO_ON_MISSING_SOURCE
| CERT_REV_M_IGNORE_MISSING_FRESH_INFO
| CERT_REV_M_STOP_TESTING_ON_FRESH_INFO
| (mOCSPGETEnabled ? 0 : CERT_REV_M_FORCE_POST_METHOD_FOR_OCSP);
rev.leafTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method[cert_revocation_method_crl] =
rev.chainTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method[cert_revocation_method_crl]
= CERT_REV_M_DO_NOT_TEST_USING_THIS_METHOD;
rev.leafTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method[cert_revocation_method_ocsp] =
rev.chainTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method[cert_revocation_method_ocsp]
= ocspRevMethodFlags;
rev.leafTests.cert_rev_method_independent_flags =
rev.chainTests.cert_rev_method_independent_flags =
// avoiding the network is good, let's try local first
CERT_REV_MI_TEST_ALL_LOCAL_INFORMATION_FIRST
// is overall revocation requirement strict or relaxed?
| CERT_REV_MI_REQUIRE_SOME_FRESH_INFO_AVAILABLE
;
rev.leafTests.preferred_methods[0] =
rev.chainTests.preferred_methods[0] = cert_revocation_method_ocsp;
cvin[i].type = cert_pi_policyOID;
cvin[i].value.arraySize = 1;
cvin[i].value.array.oids = &evPolicy;
++i;
PR_ASSERT(trustAnchors);
cvin[i].type = cert_pi_trustAnchors;
cvin[i].value.pointer.chain = trustAnchors.get();
++i;
cvin[i].type = cert_pi_end;
rv = CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(cert, usage, cvin, cvout, pinArg);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
if (evOidPolicy) {
*evOidPolicy = evPolicy;
}
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("VerifyCert: successful CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(ev) \n"));
goto pkix_done;
}
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("VerifyCert: failed CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(ev)\n"));
if (flags & FLAG_MUST_BE_EV) {
return rv;
}
if (validationChain) {
destroyCertListThatShouldNotExist(
&cvout[validationChainLocation].value.pointer.chain);
}
if (verifyLog) {
// Cleanup the log so that it is ready the the next validation
CERTVerifyLogNode* i_node;
for (i_node = verifyLog->head; i_node; i_node = i_node->next) {
//destroy cert if any.
if (i_node->cert) {
CERT_DestroyCertificate(i_node->cert);
}
// No need to cleanup the actual nodes in the arena.
}
verifyLog->count = 0;
verifyLog->head = nullptr;
verifyLog->tail = nullptr;
}
}
#endif
// If we're here, PKIX EV verification failed.
// If requested, don't do DV fallback.
if (flags & FLAG_MUST_BE_EV) {
PR_ASSERT(*evOidPolicy == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN);
#ifdef NSS_NO_LIBPKIX
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
#else
PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0);
#endif
return SECFailure;
}
if (mImplementation == classic) {
// XXX: we do not care about the localOnly flag (currently) as the
// caller that wants localOnly should disable and reenable the fetching.
return ClassicVerifyCert(cert, usage, time, pinArg, validationChain,
verifyLog);
}
#ifdef NSS_NO_LIBPKIX
PR_NOT_REACHED("libpkix implementation chosen but not even compiled in");
PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0);
return SECFailure;
#else
PR_ASSERT(mImplementation == libpkix);
// The current flags check the chain the same way as the leafs
rev.leafTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method[cert_revocation_method_crl] =
rev.chainTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method[cert_revocation_method_crl] =
// implicit default source - makes no sense for CRLs
CERT_REV_M_IGNORE_IMPLICIT_DEFAULT_SOURCE
// let's not stop on fresh CRL. If OCSP is enabled, too, let's check it
| CERT_REV_M_CONTINUE_TESTING_ON_FRESH_INFO
// no fresh CRL? well, let other flag decide whether to fail or not
| CERT_REV_M_IGNORE_MISSING_FRESH_INFO
// testing using local CRLs is always allowed
| CERT_REV_M_TEST_USING_THIS_METHOD
// no local crl and don't know where to get it from? ignore
| CERT_REV_M_SKIP_TEST_ON_MISSING_SOURCE
// crl download based on parameter
| ((mCRLDownloadEnabled && !localOnly) ?
CERT_REV_M_ALLOW_NETWORK_FETCHING : CERT_REV_M_FORBID_NETWORK_FETCHING)
;
rev.leafTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method[cert_revocation_method_ocsp] =
rev.chainTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method[cert_revocation_method_ocsp] =
// use OCSP
CERT_REV_M_TEST_USING_THIS_METHOD
// if app has a default OCSP responder configured, let's use it
| CERT_REV_M_ALLOW_IMPLICIT_DEFAULT_SOURCE
// of course OCSP doesn't work without a source. let's accept such certs
| CERT_REV_M_SKIP_TEST_ON_MISSING_SOURCE
// if ocsp is required stop on lack of freshness
| (mOCSPStrict ?
CERT_REV_M_FAIL_ON_MISSING_FRESH_INFO : CERT_REV_M_IGNORE_MISSING_FRESH_INFO)
// ocsp success is sufficient
| CERT_REV_M_STOP_TESTING_ON_FRESH_INFO
// ocsp enabled controls network fetching, too
| ((mOCSPDownloadEnabled && !localOnly) ?
CERT_REV_M_ALLOW_NETWORK_FETCHING : CERT_REV_M_FORBID_NETWORK_FETCHING)
| (mOCSPGETEnabled ? 0 : CERT_REV_M_FORCE_POST_METHOD_FOR_OCSP);
;
rev.leafTests.preferred_methods[0] =
rev.chainTests.preferred_methods[0] = cert_revocation_method_ocsp;
rev.leafTests.cert_rev_method_independent_flags =
rev.chainTests.cert_rev_method_independent_flags =
// avoiding the network is good, let's try local first
CERT_REV_MI_TEST_ALL_LOCAL_INFORMATION_FIRST;
// Skip EV parameters
cvin[evParamLocation].type = cert_pi_end;
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("VerifyCert: calling CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(dv) \n"));
rv = CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(cert, usage, cvin, cvout, pinArg);
pkix_done:
if (validationChain) {
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("VerifyCert: validation chain requested\n"));
ScopedCERTCertificate trustAnchor(cvout[validationTrustAnchorLocation].value.pointer.cert);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
if (! cvout[validationChainLocation].value.pointer.chain) {
PR_SetError(PR_UNKNOWN_ERROR, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("VerifyCert: I have a chain\n"));
*validationChain = cvout[validationChainLocation].value.pointer.chain;
if (trustAnchor) {
// we should only add the issuer to the chain if it is not already
// present. On CA cert checking, the issuer is the same cert, so in
// that case we do not add the cert to the chain.
if (!CERT_CompareCerts(trustAnchor.get(), cert)) {
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("VerifyCert: adding issuer to tail for display\n"));
// note: rv is reused to catch errors on cert creation!
ScopedCERTCertificate tempCert(CERT_DupCertificate(trustAnchor.get()));
rv = CERT_AddCertToListTail(validationChain->get(), tempCert.get());
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
tempCert.release(); // ownership traferred to validationChain
} else {
*validationChain = nullptr;
}
}
}
} else {
destroyCertListThatShouldNotExist(
&cvout[validationChainLocation].value.pointer.chain);
}
}
return rv;
#endif
}
SECStatus
CertVerifier::VerifySSLServerCert(CERTCertificate* peerCert,
/*optional*/ const SECItem* stapledOCSPResponse,
PRTime time,
/*optional*/ void* pinarg,
const char* hostname,
bool saveIntermediatesInPermanentDatabase,
/*optional out*/ insanity::pkix::ScopedCERTCertList* certChainOut,
/*optional out*/ SECOidTag* evOidPolicy)
{
PR_ASSERT(peerCert);
// XXX: PR_ASSERT(pinarg)
PR_ASSERT(hostname);
PR_ASSERT(hostname[0]);
if (certChainOut) {
*certChainOut = nullptr;
}
if (evOidPolicy) {
*evOidPolicy = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
}
if (!hostname || !hostname[0]) {
PR_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
ScopedCERTCertList validationChain;
SECStatus rv = VerifyCert(peerCert, stapledOCSPResponse,
certificateUsageSSLServer, time,
pinarg, 0, &validationChain, evOidPolicy);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
rv = CERT_VerifyCertName(peerCert, hostname);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
if (saveIntermediatesInPermanentDatabase) {
SaveIntermediateCerts(validationChain);
}
if (certChainOut) {
*certChainOut = validationChain.release();
}
return SECSuccess;
}
} } // namespace mozilla::psm