mirror of
https://gitlab.winehq.org/wine/wine-gecko.git
synced 2024-09-13 09:24:08 -07:00
3235 lines
97 KiB
C++
3235 lines
97 KiB
C++
/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
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/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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#include "pk11pub.h"
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#include "cryptohi.h"
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#include "secerr.h"
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#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"
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#include "jsapi.h"
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#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
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#include "mozilla/dom/CryptoBuffer.h"
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#include "mozilla/dom/CryptoKey.h"
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#include "mozilla/dom/KeyAlgorithmProxy.h"
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#include "mozilla/dom/TypedArray.h"
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#include "mozilla/dom/WebCryptoCommon.h"
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#include "mozilla/dom/WebCryptoTask.h"
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namespace mozilla {
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namespace dom {
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// Pre-defined identifiers for telemetry histograms
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enum TelemetryMethod {
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TM_ENCRYPT = 0,
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TM_DECRYPT = 1,
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TM_SIGN = 2,
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TM_VERIFY = 3,
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TM_DIGEST = 4,
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TM_GENERATEKEY = 5,
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TM_DERIVEKEY = 6,
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TM_DERIVEBITS = 7,
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TM_IMPORTKEY = 8,
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TM_EXPORTKEY = 9,
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TM_WRAPKEY = 10,
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TM_UNWRAPKEY = 11
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};
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enum TelemetryAlgorithm {
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// Please make additions at the end of the list,
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// to preserve comparability of histograms over time
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TA_UNKNOWN = 0,
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// encrypt / decrypt
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TA_AES_CBC = 1,
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TA_AES_CFB = 2,
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TA_AES_CTR = 3,
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TA_AES_GCM = 4,
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TA_RSAES_PKCS1 = 5, // NB: This algorithm has been removed
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TA_RSA_OAEP = 6,
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// sign/verify
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TA_RSASSA_PKCS1 = 7,
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TA_RSA_PSS = 8,
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TA_HMAC_SHA_1 = 9,
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TA_HMAC_SHA_224 = 10,
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TA_HMAC_SHA_256 = 11,
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TA_HMAC_SHA_384 = 12,
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TA_HMAC_SHA_512 = 13,
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// digest
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TA_SHA_1 = 14,
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TA_SHA_224 = 15,
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TA_SHA_256 = 16,
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TA_SHA_384 = 17,
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TA_SHA_512 = 18,
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// Later additions
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TA_AES_KW = 19,
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TA_ECDH = 20,
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TA_PBKDF2 = 21,
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TA_ECDSA = 22,
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};
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// Convenience functions for extracting / converting information
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// OOM-safe CryptoBuffer initialization, suitable for constructors
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#define ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(dst, src) \
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if (!dst.Assign(src)) { \
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mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR; \
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return; \
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}
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// OOM-safe CryptoBuffer-to-SECItem copy, suitable for DoCrypto
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#define ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena, dst, src) \
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if (!src.ToSECItem(arena, dst)) { \
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR; \
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}
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// OOM-safe CryptoBuffer copy, suitable for DoCrypto
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#define ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(dst, src) \
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if (!dst.Assign(src)) { \
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR; \
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}
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// Safety check for algorithms that use keys, suitable for constructors
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#define CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(keyAlg, algName) \
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{ \
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if (!NORMALIZED_EQUALS(keyAlg.mName, algName)) { \
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mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR; \
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return; \
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} \
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}
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class ClearException
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{
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public:
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explicit ClearException(JSContext* aCx)
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: mCx(aCx)
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{}
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~ClearException()
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{
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JS_ClearPendingException(mCx);
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}
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private:
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JSContext* mCx;
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};
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template<class OOS>
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static nsresult
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GetAlgorithmName(JSContext* aCx, const OOS& aAlgorithm, nsString& aName)
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{
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ClearException ce(aCx);
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if (aAlgorithm.IsString()) {
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// If string, then treat as algorithm name
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aName.Assign(aAlgorithm.GetAsString());
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} else {
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// Coerce to algorithm and extract name
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JS::RootedValue value(aCx, JS::ObjectValue(*aAlgorithm.GetAsObject()));
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Algorithm alg;
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if (!alg.Init(aCx, value)) {
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
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}
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aName = alg.mName;
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}
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if (!NormalizeToken(aName, aName)) {
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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template<class T, class OOS>
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static nsresult
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Coerce(JSContext* aCx, T& aTarget, const OOS& aAlgorithm)
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{
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ClearException ce(aCx);
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if (!aAlgorithm.IsObject()) {
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
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}
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JS::RootedValue value(aCx, JS::ObjectValue(*aAlgorithm.GetAsObject()));
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if (!aTarget.Init(aCx, value)) {
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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inline size_t
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MapHashAlgorithmNameToBlockSize(const nsString& aName)
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{
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if (aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA1) ||
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aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA256)) {
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return 512;
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}
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if (aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA384) ||
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aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA512)) {
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return 1024;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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inline nsresult
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GetKeyLengthForAlgorithm(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
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size_t& aLength)
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{
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aLength = 0;
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// Extract algorithm name
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nsString algName;
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if (NS_FAILED(GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName))) {
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
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}
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// Read AES key length from given algorithm object.
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if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
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algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
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algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM) ||
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algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW)) {
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RootedDictionary<AesDerivedKeyParams> params(aCx);
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if (NS_FAILED(Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm))) {
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
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}
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if (params.mLength != 128 &&
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params.mLength != 192 &&
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params.mLength != 256) {
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
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}
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aLength = params.mLength;
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return NS_OK;
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}
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// Read HMAC key length from given algorithm object or
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// determine key length as the block size of the given hash.
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if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
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RootedDictionary<HmacDerivedKeyParams> params(aCx);
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if (NS_FAILED(Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm))) {
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
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}
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// Return the passed length, if any.
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if (params.mLength.WasPassed()) {
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aLength = params.mLength.Value();
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return NS_OK;
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}
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nsString hashName;
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if (NS_FAILED(GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, hashName))) {
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
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}
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// Return the given hash algorithm's block size as the key length.
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size_t length = MapHashAlgorithmNameToBlockSize(hashName);
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if (length == 0) {
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
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}
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aLength = length;
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return NS_OK;
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}
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
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}
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inline bool
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MapOIDTagToNamedCurve(SECOidTag aOIDTag, nsString& aResult)
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{
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switch (aOIDTag) {
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case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP256R1:
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aResult.AssignLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_NAMED_CURVE_P256);
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break;
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case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP384R1:
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aResult.AssignLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_NAMED_CURVE_P384);
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break;
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case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP521R1:
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aResult.AssignLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_NAMED_CURVE_P521);
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break;
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default:
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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// Helper function to clone data from an ArrayBuffer or ArrayBufferView object
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inline bool
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CloneData(JSContext* aCx, CryptoBuffer& aDst, JS::Handle<JSObject*> aSrc)
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{
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MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
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// Try ArrayBuffer
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RootedTypedArray<ArrayBuffer> ab(aCx);
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if (ab.Init(aSrc)) {
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return !!aDst.Assign(ab);
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}
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// Try ArrayBufferView
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RootedTypedArray<ArrayBufferView> abv(aCx);
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if (abv.Init(aSrc)) {
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return !!aDst.Assign(abv);
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}
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return false;
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}
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// Implementation of WebCryptoTask methods
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void
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WebCryptoTask::FailWithError(nsresult aRv)
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{
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MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
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Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_RESOLVED, false);
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// Blindly convert nsresult to DOMException
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// Individual tasks must ensure they pass the right values
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mResultPromise->MaybeReject(aRv);
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// Manually release mResultPromise while we're on the main thread
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mResultPromise = nullptr;
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Cleanup();
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}
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nsresult
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WebCryptoTask::CalculateResult()
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{
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MOZ_ASSERT(!NS_IsMainThread());
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if (isAlreadyShutDown()) {
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
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}
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return DoCrypto();
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}
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void
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WebCryptoTask::CallCallback(nsresult rv)
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{
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MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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FailWithError(rv);
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return;
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}
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nsresult rv2 = AfterCrypto();
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if (NS_FAILED(rv2)) {
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FailWithError(rv2);
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return;
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}
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Resolve();
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Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_RESOLVED, true);
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// Manually release mResultPromise while we're on the main thread
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mResultPromise = nullptr;
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Cleanup();
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}
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// Some generic utility classes
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class FailureTask : public WebCryptoTask
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{
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public:
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explicit FailureTask(nsresult aRv) {
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mEarlyRv = aRv;
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}
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};
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class ReturnArrayBufferViewTask : public WebCryptoTask
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{
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protected:
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CryptoBuffer mResult;
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private:
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// Returns mResult as an ArrayBufferView, or an error
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virtual void Resolve() override
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{
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TypedArrayCreator<ArrayBuffer> ret(mResult);
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mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(ret);
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}
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};
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class DeferredData
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{
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public:
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template<class T>
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void SetData(const T& aData) {
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mDataIsSet = mData.Assign(aData);
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}
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protected:
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DeferredData()
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: mDataIsSet(false)
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{}
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CryptoBuffer mData;
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bool mDataIsSet;
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};
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class AesTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask,
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public DeferredData
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{
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public:
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AesTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
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CryptoKey& aKey, bool aEncrypt)
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: mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey())
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, mEncrypt(aEncrypt)
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{
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Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aEncrypt);
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}
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AesTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
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CryptoKey& aKey, const CryptoOperationData& aData,
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bool aEncrypt)
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: mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey())
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, mEncrypt(aEncrypt)
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{
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Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aEncrypt);
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SetData(aData);
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}
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void Init(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
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CryptoKey& aKey, bool aEncrypt)
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{
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nsString algName;
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mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
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if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
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return;
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}
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// Check that we got a reasonable key
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if ((mSymKey.Length() != 16) &&
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(mSymKey.Length() != 24) &&
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(mSymKey.Length() != 32))
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{
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mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
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return;
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}
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// Cache parameters depending on the specific algorithm
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TelemetryAlgorithm telemetryAlg;
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if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC)) {
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CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC);
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mMechanism = CKM_AES_CBC_PAD;
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telemetryAlg = TA_AES_CBC;
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AesCbcParams params;
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nsresult rv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
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return;
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}
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ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mIv, params.mIv)
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if (mIv.Length() != 16) {
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mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
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return;
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}
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} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR)) {
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CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR);
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mMechanism = CKM_AES_CTR;
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telemetryAlg = TA_AES_CTR;
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AesCtrParams params;
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nsresult rv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
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return;
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}
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ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mIv, params.mCounter)
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if (mIv.Length() != 16) {
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mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
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return;
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}
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mCounterLength = params.mLength;
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} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM)) {
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CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM);
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mMechanism = CKM_AES_GCM;
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telemetryAlg = TA_AES_GCM;
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AesGcmParams params;
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nsresult rv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
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return;
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}
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ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mIv, params.mIv)
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if (params.mAdditionalData.WasPassed()) {
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ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mAad, params.mAdditionalData.Value())
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}
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// 32, 64, 96, 104, 112, 120 or 128
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mTagLength = 128;
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if (params.mTagLength.WasPassed()) {
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mTagLength = params.mTagLength.Value();
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if ((mTagLength > 128) ||
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!(mTagLength == 32 || mTagLength == 64 ||
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(mTagLength >= 96 && mTagLength % 8 == 0))) {
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mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
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return;
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}
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}
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} else {
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mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
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return;
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}
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Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, telemetryAlg);
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}
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private:
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CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mMechanism;
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CryptoBuffer mSymKey;
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CryptoBuffer mIv; // Initialization vector
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CryptoBuffer mAad; // Additional Authenticated Data
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uint8_t mTagLength;
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uint8_t mCounterLength;
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bool mEncrypt;
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virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
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{
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nsresult rv;
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if (!mDataIsSet) {
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
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}
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ScopedPLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
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if (!arena) {
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
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}
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// Construct the parameters object depending on algorithm
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SECItem param = { siBuffer, nullptr, 0 };
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CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctrParams;
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CK_GCM_PARAMS gcmParams;
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switch (mMechanism) {
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case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
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ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena, ¶m, mIv);
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break;
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case CKM_AES_CTR:
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ctrParams.ulCounterBits = mCounterLength;
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MOZ_ASSERT(mIv.Length() == 16);
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memcpy(&ctrParams.cb, mIv.Elements(), 16);
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param.type = siBuffer;
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param.data = (unsigned char*) &ctrParams;
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param.len = sizeof(ctrParams);
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break;
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case CKM_AES_GCM:
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gcmParams.pIv = mIv.Elements();
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gcmParams.ulIvLen = mIv.Length();
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gcmParams.pAAD = mAad.Elements();
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gcmParams.ulAADLen = mAad.Length();
|
|
gcmParams.ulTagBits = mTagLength;
|
|
param.type = siBuffer;
|
|
param.data = (unsigned char*) &gcmParams;
|
|
param.len = sizeof(gcmParams);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Import the key
|
|
SECItem keyItem = { siBuffer, nullptr, 0 };
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena, &keyItem, mSymKey);
|
|
ScopedPK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(slot.get());
|
|
ScopedPK11SymKey symKey(PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, mMechanism, PK11_OriginUnwrap,
|
|
CKA_ENCRYPT, &keyItem, nullptr));
|
|
if (!symKey) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Initialize the output buffer (enough space for padding / a full tag)
|
|
uint32_t dataLen = mData.Length();
|
|
uint32_t maxLen = dataLen + 16;
|
|
if (!mResult.SetLength(maxLen, fallible)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
uint32_t outLen = 0;
|
|
|
|
// Perform the encryption/decryption
|
|
if (mEncrypt) {
|
|
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_Encrypt(symKey.get(), mMechanism, ¶m,
|
|
mResult.Elements(), &outLen, maxLen,
|
|
mData.Elements(), mData.Length()));
|
|
} else {
|
|
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_Decrypt(symKey.get(), mMechanism, ¶m,
|
|
mResult.Elements(), &outLen, maxLen,
|
|
mData.Elements(), mData.Length()));
|
|
}
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
|
|
|
|
mResult.SetLength(outLen);
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// This class looks like an encrypt/decrypt task, like AesTask,
|
|
// but it is only exposed to wrapKey/unwrapKey, not encrypt/decrypt
|
|
class AesKwTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask,
|
|
public DeferredData
|
|
{
|
|
public:
|
|
AesKwTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
|
|
CryptoKey& aKey, bool aEncrypt)
|
|
: mMechanism(CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP)
|
|
, mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey())
|
|
, mEncrypt(aEncrypt)
|
|
{
|
|
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aEncrypt);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
AesKwTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
|
|
CryptoKey& aKey, const CryptoOperationData& aData,
|
|
bool aEncrypt)
|
|
: mMechanism(CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP)
|
|
, mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey())
|
|
, mEncrypt(aEncrypt)
|
|
{
|
|
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aEncrypt);
|
|
SetData(aData);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void Init(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
|
|
CryptoKey& aKey, bool aEncrypt)
|
|
{
|
|
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW);
|
|
|
|
nsString algName;
|
|
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check that we got a reasonable key
|
|
if ((mSymKey.Length() != 16) &&
|
|
(mSymKey.Length() != 24) &&
|
|
(mSymKey.Length() != 32))
|
|
{
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_AES_KW);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mMechanism;
|
|
CryptoBuffer mSymKey;
|
|
bool mEncrypt;
|
|
|
|
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
|
|
{
|
|
nsresult rv;
|
|
|
|
if (!mDataIsSet) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check that the input is a multiple of 64 bits long
|
|
if (mData.Length() == 0 || mData.Length() % 8 != 0) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ScopedPLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
|
|
if (!arena) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Import the key
|
|
SECItem keyItem = { siBuffer, nullptr, 0 };
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena, &keyItem, mSymKey);
|
|
ScopedPK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(slot.get());
|
|
ScopedPK11SymKey symKey(PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, mMechanism, PK11_OriginUnwrap,
|
|
CKA_WRAP, &keyItem, nullptr));
|
|
if (!symKey) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Import the data to a SECItem
|
|
SECItem dataItem = { siBuffer, nullptr, 0 };
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena, &dataItem, mData);
|
|
|
|
// Parameters for the fake keys
|
|
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE fakeMechanism = CKM_SHA_1_HMAC;
|
|
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE fakeOperation = CKA_SIGN;
|
|
|
|
if (mEncrypt) {
|
|
// Import the data into a fake PK11SymKey structure
|
|
ScopedPK11SymKey keyToWrap(PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, fakeMechanism,
|
|
PK11_OriginUnwrap, fakeOperation,
|
|
&dataItem, nullptr));
|
|
if (!keyToWrap) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Encrypt and return the wrapped key
|
|
// AES-KW encryption results in a wrapped key 64 bits longer
|
|
if (!mResult.SetLength(mData.Length() + 8, fallible)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
SECItem resultItem = {siBuffer, mResult.Elements(),
|
|
(unsigned int) mResult.Length()};
|
|
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_WrapSymKey(mMechanism, nullptr, symKey.get(),
|
|
keyToWrap.get(), &resultItem));
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Decrypt the ciphertext into a temporary PK11SymKey
|
|
// Unwrapped key should be 64 bits shorter
|
|
int keySize = mData.Length() - 8;
|
|
ScopedPK11SymKey unwrappedKey(PK11_UnwrapSymKey(symKey, mMechanism, nullptr,
|
|
&dataItem, fakeMechanism,
|
|
fakeOperation, keySize));
|
|
if (!unwrappedKey) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Export the key to get the cleartext
|
|
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_ExtractKeyValue(unwrappedKey));
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mResult, PK11_GetKeyData(unwrappedKey));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
class RsaOaepTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask,
|
|
public DeferredData
|
|
{
|
|
public:
|
|
RsaOaepTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
|
|
CryptoKey& aKey, bool aEncrypt)
|
|
: mPrivKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey())
|
|
, mPubKey(aKey.GetPublicKey())
|
|
, mEncrypt(aEncrypt)
|
|
{
|
|
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aEncrypt);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
RsaOaepTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
|
|
CryptoKey& aKey, const CryptoOperationData& aData,
|
|
bool aEncrypt)
|
|
: mPrivKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey())
|
|
, mPubKey(aKey.GetPublicKey())
|
|
, mEncrypt(aEncrypt)
|
|
{
|
|
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aEncrypt);
|
|
SetData(aData);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void Init(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
|
|
CryptoKey& aKey, bool aEncrypt)
|
|
{
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_RSA_OAEP);
|
|
|
|
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP);
|
|
|
|
if (mEncrypt) {
|
|
if (!mPubKey) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
mStrength = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(mPubKey);
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!mPrivKey) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
mStrength = PK11_GetPrivateModulusLen(mPrivKey);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The algorithm could just be given as a string
|
|
// in which case there would be no label specified.
|
|
if (!aAlgorithm.IsString()) {
|
|
RootedDictionary<RsaOaepParams> params(aCx);
|
|
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (params.mLabel.WasPassed()) {
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mLabel, params.mLabel.Value());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Otherwise mLabel remains the empty octet string, as intended
|
|
|
|
// Look up the MGF based on the KeyAlgorithm.
|
|
// static_cast is safe because we only get here if the algorithm name
|
|
// is RSA-OAEP, and that only happens if we've constructed
|
|
// an RsaHashedKeyAlgorithm.
|
|
mHashMechanism = KeyAlgorithmProxy::GetMechanism(aKey.Algorithm().mRsa.mHash);
|
|
|
|
switch (mHashMechanism) {
|
|
case CKM_SHA_1:
|
|
mMgfMechanism = CKG_MGF1_SHA1; break;
|
|
case CKM_SHA256:
|
|
mMgfMechanism = CKG_MGF1_SHA256; break;
|
|
case CKM_SHA384:
|
|
mMgfMechanism = CKG_MGF1_SHA384; break;
|
|
case CKM_SHA512:
|
|
mMgfMechanism = CKG_MGF1_SHA512; break;
|
|
default:
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mHashMechanism;
|
|
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mMgfMechanism;
|
|
ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey mPrivKey;
|
|
ScopedSECKEYPublicKey mPubKey;
|
|
CryptoBuffer mLabel;
|
|
uint32_t mStrength;
|
|
bool mEncrypt;
|
|
|
|
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
|
|
{
|
|
nsresult rv;
|
|
|
|
if (!mDataIsSet) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Ciphertext is an integer mod the modulus, so it will be
|
|
// no longer than mStrength octets
|
|
if (!mResult.SetLength(mStrength, fallible)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS oaepParams;
|
|
oaepParams.source = CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED;
|
|
|
|
oaepParams.pSourceData = mLabel.Length() ? mLabel.Elements() : nullptr;
|
|
oaepParams.ulSourceDataLen = mLabel.Length();
|
|
|
|
oaepParams.mgf = mMgfMechanism;
|
|
oaepParams.hashAlg = mHashMechanism;
|
|
|
|
SECItem param;
|
|
param.type = siBuffer;
|
|
param.data = (unsigned char*) &oaepParams;
|
|
param.len = sizeof(oaepParams);
|
|
|
|
uint32_t outLen = 0;
|
|
if (mEncrypt) {
|
|
// PK11_PubEncrypt() checks the plaintext's length and fails if it is too
|
|
// long to encrypt, i.e. if it is longer than (k - 2hLen - 2) with 'k'
|
|
// being the length in octets of the RSA modulus n and 'hLen' being the
|
|
// output length in octets of the chosen hash function.
|
|
// <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447#section-7.1>
|
|
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_PubEncrypt(
|
|
mPubKey.get(), CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP, ¶m,
|
|
mResult.Elements(), &outLen, mResult.Length(),
|
|
mData.Elements(), mData.Length(), nullptr));
|
|
} else {
|
|
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_PrivDecrypt(
|
|
mPrivKey.get(), CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP, ¶m,
|
|
mResult.Elements(), &outLen, mResult.Length(),
|
|
mData.Elements(), mData.Length()));
|
|
}
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
|
|
|
|
mResult.SetLength(outLen);
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
class HmacTask : public WebCryptoTask
|
|
{
|
|
public:
|
|
HmacTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
|
|
CryptoKey& aKey,
|
|
const CryptoOperationData& aSignature,
|
|
const CryptoOperationData& aData,
|
|
bool aSign)
|
|
: mMechanism(aKey.Algorithm().Mechanism())
|
|
, mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey())
|
|
, mSign(aSign)
|
|
{
|
|
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC);
|
|
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mData, aData);
|
|
if (!aSign) {
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mSignature, aSignature);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check that we got a symmetric key
|
|
if (mSymKey.Length() == 0) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
TelemetryAlgorithm telemetryAlg;
|
|
switch (mMechanism) {
|
|
case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC: telemetryAlg = TA_HMAC_SHA_1; break;
|
|
case CKM_SHA224_HMAC: telemetryAlg = TA_HMAC_SHA_224; break;
|
|
case CKM_SHA256_HMAC: telemetryAlg = TA_HMAC_SHA_256; break;
|
|
case CKM_SHA384_HMAC: telemetryAlg = TA_HMAC_SHA_384; break;
|
|
case CKM_SHA512_HMAC: telemetryAlg = TA_HMAC_SHA_512; break;
|
|
default: telemetryAlg = TA_UNKNOWN;
|
|
}
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, telemetryAlg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mMechanism;
|
|
CryptoBuffer mSymKey;
|
|
CryptoBuffer mData;
|
|
CryptoBuffer mSignature;
|
|
CryptoBuffer mResult;
|
|
bool mSign;
|
|
|
|
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
|
|
{
|
|
// Initialize the output buffer
|
|
if (!mResult.SetLength(HASH_LENGTH_MAX, fallible)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ScopedPLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
|
|
if (!arena) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Import the key
|
|
uint32_t outLen;
|
|
SECItem keyItem = { siBuffer, nullptr, 0 };
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena, &keyItem, mSymKey);
|
|
ScopedPK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(slot.get());
|
|
ScopedPK11SymKey symKey(PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, mMechanism, PK11_OriginUnwrap,
|
|
CKA_SIGN, &keyItem, nullptr));
|
|
if (!symKey) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Compute the MAC
|
|
SECItem param = { siBuffer, nullptr, 0 };
|
|
ScopedPK11Context ctx(PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mMechanism, CKA_SIGN,
|
|
symKey.get(), ¶m));
|
|
if (!ctx.get()) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
nsresult rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_DigestBegin(ctx.get()));
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
|
|
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_DigestOp(ctx.get(), mData.Elements(), mData.Length()));
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
|
|
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_DigestFinal(ctx.get(), mResult.Elements(),
|
|
&outLen, HASH_LENGTH_MAX));
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
|
|
|
|
mResult.SetLength(outLen);
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Returns mResult as an ArrayBufferView, or an error
|
|
virtual void Resolve() override
|
|
{
|
|
if (mSign) {
|
|
// Return the computed MAC
|
|
TypedArrayCreator<ArrayBuffer> ret(mResult);
|
|
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(ret);
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Compare the MAC to the provided signature
|
|
// No truncation allowed
|
|
bool equal = (mResult.Length() == mSignature.Length());
|
|
if (equal) {
|
|
int cmp = NSS_SecureMemcmp(mSignature.Elements(),
|
|
mResult.Elements(),
|
|
mSignature.Length());
|
|
equal = (cmp == 0);
|
|
}
|
|
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(equal);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
class AsymmetricSignVerifyTask : public WebCryptoTask
|
|
{
|
|
public:
|
|
AsymmetricSignVerifyTask(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
|
|
CryptoKey& aKey,
|
|
const CryptoOperationData& aSignature,
|
|
const CryptoOperationData& aData,
|
|
bool aSign)
|
|
: mOidTag(SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
|
|
, mPrivKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey())
|
|
, mPubKey(aKey.GetPublicKey())
|
|
, mSign(aSign)
|
|
, mVerified(false)
|
|
, mEcdsa(false)
|
|
{
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mData, aData);
|
|
if (!aSign) {
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mSignature, aSignature);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsString algName;
|
|
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Look up the SECOidTag
|
|
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1)) {
|
|
mEcdsa = false;
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_RSASSA_PKCS1);
|
|
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1);
|
|
|
|
// For RSA, the hash name comes from the key algorithm
|
|
nsString hashName = aKey.Algorithm().mRsa.mHash.mName;
|
|
switch (MapAlgorithmNameToMechanism(hashName)) {
|
|
case CKM_SHA_1:
|
|
mOidTag = SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION; break;
|
|
case CKM_SHA256:
|
|
mOidTag = SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION; break;
|
|
case CKM_SHA384:
|
|
mOidTag = SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA384_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION; break;
|
|
case CKM_SHA512:
|
|
mOidTag = SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA512_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION; break;
|
|
default:
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA)) {
|
|
mEcdsa = true;
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_ECDSA);
|
|
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA);
|
|
|
|
// For ECDSA, the hash name comes from the algorithm parameter
|
|
RootedDictionary<EcdsaParams> params(aCx);
|
|
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsString hashName;
|
|
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, hashName);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashMechanism = MapAlgorithmNameToMechanism(hashName);
|
|
if (hashMechanism == UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (hashMechanism) {
|
|
case CKM_SHA_1:
|
|
mOidTag = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA1_SIGNATURE; break;
|
|
case CKM_SHA256:
|
|
mOidTag = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE; break;
|
|
case CKM_SHA384:
|
|
mOidTag = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA384_SIGNATURE; break;
|
|
case CKM_SHA512:
|
|
mOidTag = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA512_SIGNATURE; break;
|
|
default:
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// This shouldn't happen; CreateSignVerifyTask shouldn't create
|
|
// one of these unless it's for the above algorithms.
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(false);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check that we have the appropriate key
|
|
if ((mSign && !mPrivKey) || (!mSign && !mPubKey)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
SECOidTag mOidTag;
|
|
ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey mPrivKey;
|
|
ScopedSECKEYPublicKey mPubKey;
|
|
CryptoBuffer mSignature;
|
|
CryptoBuffer mData;
|
|
bool mSign;
|
|
bool mVerified;
|
|
bool mEcdsa;
|
|
|
|
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
|
|
{
|
|
nsresult rv;
|
|
if (mSign) {
|
|
ScopedSECItem signature(::SECITEM_AllocItem(nullptr, nullptr, 0));
|
|
ScopedSGNContext ctx(SGN_NewContext(mOidTag, mPrivKey));
|
|
if (!signature.get() || !ctx.get()) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rv = MapSECStatus(SEC_SignData(signature, mData.Elements(),
|
|
mData.Length(), mPrivKey, mOidTag));
|
|
|
|
if (mEcdsa) {
|
|
// DER-decode the signature
|
|
int signatureLength = PK11_SignatureLen(mPrivKey);
|
|
ScopedSECItem rawSignature(DSAU_DecodeDerSigToLen(signature.get(),
|
|
signatureLength));
|
|
if (!rawSignature.get()) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mSignature, rawSignature);
|
|
} else {
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mSignature, signature);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
ScopedSECItem signature(::SECITEM_AllocItem(nullptr, nullptr, 0));
|
|
if (!signature.get()) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mEcdsa) {
|
|
// DER-encode the signature
|
|
ScopedSECItem rawSignature(::SECITEM_AllocItem(nullptr, nullptr, 0));
|
|
if (!rawSignature || !mSignature.ToSECItem(nullptr, rawSignature)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rv = MapSECStatus(DSAU_EncodeDerSigWithLen(signature, rawSignature,
|
|
rawSignature->len));
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
|
|
} else if (!mSignature.ToSECItem(nullptr, signature)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rv = MapSECStatus(VFY_VerifyData(mData.Elements(), mData.Length(),
|
|
mPubKey, signature, mOidTag, nullptr));
|
|
mVerified = NS_SUCCEEDED(rv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
virtual void Resolve() override
|
|
{
|
|
if (mSign) {
|
|
TypedArrayCreator<ArrayBuffer> ret(mSignature);
|
|
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(ret);
|
|
} else {
|
|
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(mVerified);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
class DigestTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask
|
|
{
|
|
public:
|
|
DigestTask(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
|
|
const CryptoOperationData& aData)
|
|
{
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mData, aData);
|
|
|
|
nsString algName;
|
|
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
TelemetryAlgorithm telemetryAlg;
|
|
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA1)) {
|
|
mOidTag = SEC_OID_SHA1;
|
|
telemetryAlg = TA_SHA_1;
|
|
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA256)) {
|
|
mOidTag = SEC_OID_SHA256;
|
|
telemetryAlg = TA_SHA_224;
|
|
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA384)) {
|
|
mOidTag = SEC_OID_SHA384;
|
|
telemetryAlg = TA_SHA_256;
|
|
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA512)) {
|
|
mOidTag = SEC_OID_SHA512;
|
|
telemetryAlg = TA_SHA_384;
|
|
} else {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, telemetryAlg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
SECOidTag mOidTag;
|
|
CryptoBuffer mData;
|
|
|
|
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
|
|
{
|
|
// Resize the result buffer
|
|
uint32_t hashLen = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(mOidTag);
|
|
if (!mResult.SetLength(hashLen, fallible)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Compute the hash
|
|
nsresult rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_HashBuf(mOidTag, mResult.Elements(),
|
|
mData.Elements(), mData.Length()));
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
class ImportKeyTask : public WebCryptoTask
|
|
{
|
|
public:
|
|
void Init(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const nsAString& aFormat,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
|
|
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
|
|
{
|
|
mFormat = aFormat;
|
|
mDataIsSet = false;
|
|
mDataIsJwk = false;
|
|
|
|
// Get the current global object from the context
|
|
nsIGlobalObject *global = xpc::NativeGlobal(JS::CurrentGlobalOrNull(aCx));
|
|
if (!global) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// This stuff pretty much always happens, so we'll do it here
|
|
mKey = new CryptoKey(global);
|
|
mKey->SetExtractable(aExtractable);
|
|
mKey->ClearUsages();
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aKeyUsages.Length(); ++i) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = mKey->AddUsage(aKeyUsages[i]);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, mAlgName);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool JwkCompatible(const JsonWebKey& aJwk, const CryptoKey* aKey)
|
|
{
|
|
// Check 'ext'
|
|
if (aKey->Extractable() &&
|
|
aJwk.mExt.WasPassed() && !aJwk.mExt.Value()) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check 'alg'
|
|
if (aJwk.mAlg.WasPassed() &&
|
|
aJwk.mAlg.Value() != aKey->Algorithm().JwkAlg()) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check 'key_ops'
|
|
if (aJwk.mKey_ops.WasPassed()) {
|
|
nsTArray<nsString> usages;
|
|
aKey->GetUsages(usages);
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < usages.Length(); ++i) {
|
|
if (!aJwk.mKey_ops.Value().Contains(usages[i])) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Individual algorithms may still have to check 'use'
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SetKeyData(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JSObject*> aKeyData) {
|
|
// First try to treat as ArrayBuffer/ABV,
|
|
// and if that fails, try to initialize a JWK
|
|
if (CloneData(aCx, mKeyData, aKeyData)) {
|
|
mDataIsJwk = false;
|
|
|
|
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
|
|
SetJwkFromKeyData();
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
ClearException ce(aCx);
|
|
JS::RootedValue value(aCx, JS::ObjectValue(*aKeyData));
|
|
if (!mJwk.Init(aCx, value)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
mDataIsJwk = true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SetKeyData(const CryptoBuffer& aKeyData)
|
|
{
|
|
mKeyData = aKeyData;
|
|
mDataIsJwk = false;
|
|
|
|
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
|
|
SetJwkFromKeyData();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SetJwkFromKeyData()
|
|
{
|
|
nsDependentCSubstring utf8((const char*) mKeyData.Elements(),
|
|
(const char*) (mKeyData.Elements() +
|
|
mKeyData.Length()));
|
|
if (!IsUTF8(utf8)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsString json = NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(utf8);
|
|
if (!mJwk.Init(json)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
mDataIsJwk = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
protected:
|
|
nsString mFormat;
|
|
nsRefPtr<CryptoKey> mKey;
|
|
CryptoBuffer mKeyData;
|
|
bool mDataIsSet;
|
|
bool mDataIsJwk;
|
|
JsonWebKey mJwk;
|
|
nsString mAlgName;
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
virtual void Resolve() override
|
|
{
|
|
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(mKey);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
virtual void Cleanup() override
|
|
{
|
|
mKey = nullptr;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
class ImportSymmetricKeyTask : public ImportKeyTask
|
|
{
|
|
public:
|
|
ImportSymmetricKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const nsAString& aFormat,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
|
|
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
|
|
{
|
|
Init(aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ImportSymmetricKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const nsAString& aFormat, const JS::Handle<JSObject*> aKeyData,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
|
|
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
|
|
{
|
|
Init(aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SetKeyData(aCx, aKeyData);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS_VOID(mEarlyRv);
|
|
if (mDataIsJwk && !mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void Init(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const nsAString& aFormat,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
|
|
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
|
|
{
|
|
ImportKeyTask::Init(aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If this is an HMAC key, import the hash name
|
|
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
|
|
RootedDictionary<HmacImportParams> params(aCx);
|
|
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, mHashName);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
virtual nsresult BeforeCrypto() override
|
|
{
|
|
nsresult rv;
|
|
|
|
// If we're doing a JWK import, import the key data
|
|
if (mDataIsJwk) {
|
|
if (!mJwk.mK.WasPassed()) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Import the key material
|
|
rv = mKeyData.FromJwkBase64(mJwk.mK.Value());
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check that we have valid key data.
|
|
if (mKeyData.Length() == 0) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Construct an appropriate KeyAlorithm,
|
|
// and verify that usages are appropriate
|
|
uint32_t length = 8 * mKeyData.Length(); // bytes to bits
|
|
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
|
|
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
|
|
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM) ||
|
|
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW)) {
|
|
if (mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::ENCRYPT | CryptoKey::DECRYPT |
|
|
CryptoKey::WRAPKEY | CryptoKey::UNWRAPKEY)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW) &&
|
|
mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::WRAPKEY | CryptoKey::UNWRAPKEY)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ( (length != 128) && (length != 192) && (length != 256) ) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
mKey->Algorithm().MakeAes(mAlgName, length);
|
|
|
|
if (mDataIsJwk && mJwk.mUse.WasPassed() &&
|
|
!mJwk.mUse.Value().EqualsLiteral(JWK_USE_ENC)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_PBKDF2)) {
|
|
if (mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::DERIVEKEY | CryptoKey::DERIVEBITS)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
mKey->Algorithm().MakeAes(mAlgName, length);
|
|
|
|
if (mDataIsJwk && mJwk.mUse.WasPassed()) {
|
|
// There is not a 'use' value consistent with PBKDF
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
};
|
|
} else if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
|
|
if (mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::SIGN | CryptoKey::VERIFY)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mKey->Algorithm().MakeHmac(length, mHashName);
|
|
|
|
if (mKey->Algorithm().Mechanism() == UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mDataIsJwk && mJwk.mUse.WasPassed() &&
|
|
!mJwk.mUse.Value().EqualsLiteral(JWK_USE_SIG)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mKey->SetSymKey(mKeyData);
|
|
mKey->SetType(CryptoKey::SECRET);
|
|
|
|
if (mDataIsJwk && !JwkCompatible(mJwk, mKey)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mEarlyComplete = true;
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
nsString mHashName;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
class ImportRsaKeyTask : public ImportKeyTask
|
|
{
|
|
public:
|
|
ImportRsaKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const nsAString& aFormat,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
|
|
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
|
|
{
|
|
Init(aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ImportRsaKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const nsAString& aFormat, JS::Handle<JSObject*> aKeyData,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
|
|
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
|
|
{
|
|
Init(aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SetKeyData(aCx, aKeyData);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS_VOID(mEarlyRv);
|
|
if (mDataIsJwk && !mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void Init(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const nsAString& aFormat,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
|
|
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
|
|
{
|
|
ImportKeyTask::Init(aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If this is RSA with a hash, cache the hash name
|
|
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
|
|
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP)) {
|
|
RootedDictionary<RsaHashedImportParams> params(aCx);
|
|
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, mHashName);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check support for the algorithm and hash names
|
|
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech1 = MapAlgorithmNameToMechanism(mAlgName);
|
|
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech2 = MapAlgorithmNameToMechanism(mHashName);
|
|
if ((mech1 == UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM) || (mech2 == UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
nsString mHashName;
|
|
uint32_t mModulusLength;
|
|
CryptoBuffer mPublicExponent;
|
|
|
|
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
|
|
{
|
|
nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
|
|
|
|
// Import the key data itself
|
|
ScopedSECKEYPublicKey pubKey;
|
|
ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey privKey;
|
|
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI) ||
|
|
(mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK) &&
|
|
!mJwk.mD.WasPassed())) {
|
|
// Public key import
|
|
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI)) {
|
|
pubKey = CryptoKey::PublicKeyFromSpki(mKeyData, locker);
|
|
} else {
|
|
pubKey = CryptoKey::PublicKeyFromJwk(mJwk, locker);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!pubKey) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mKey->SetPublicKey(pubKey.get());
|
|
mKey->SetType(CryptoKey::PUBLIC);
|
|
} else if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_PKCS8) ||
|
|
(mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK) &&
|
|
mJwk.mD.WasPassed())) {
|
|
// Private key import
|
|
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_PKCS8)) {
|
|
privKey = CryptoKey::PrivateKeyFromPkcs8(mKeyData, locker);
|
|
} else {
|
|
privKey = CryptoKey::PrivateKeyFromJwk(mJwk, locker);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!privKey) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mKey->SetPrivateKey(privKey.get());
|
|
mKey->SetType(CryptoKey::PRIVATE);
|
|
pubKey = SECKEY_ConvertToPublicKey(privKey.get());
|
|
if (!pubKey) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Invalid key format
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Extract relevant information from the public key
|
|
mModulusLength = 8 * pubKey->u.rsa.modulus.len;
|
|
mPublicExponent.Assign(&pubKey->u.rsa.publicExponent);
|
|
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
virtual nsresult AfterCrypto() override
|
|
{
|
|
// Check permissions for the requested operation
|
|
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP)) {
|
|
if ((mKey->GetKeyType() == CryptoKey::PUBLIC &&
|
|
mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::ENCRYPT | CryptoKey::WRAPKEY)) ||
|
|
(mKey->GetKeyType() == CryptoKey::PRIVATE &&
|
|
mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::DECRYPT | CryptoKey::UNWRAPKEY))) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1)) {
|
|
if ((mKey->GetKeyType() == CryptoKey::PUBLIC &&
|
|
mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::VERIFY)) ||
|
|
(mKey->GetKeyType() == CryptoKey::PRIVATE &&
|
|
mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::SIGN))) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Set an appropriate KeyAlgorithm
|
|
mKey->Algorithm().MakeRsa(mAlgName, mModulusLength,
|
|
mPublicExponent, mHashName);
|
|
|
|
if (mDataIsJwk && !JwkCompatible(mJwk, mKey)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
class ImportEcKeyTask : public ImportKeyTask
|
|
{
|
|
public:
|
|
ImportEcKeyTask(JSContext* aCx, const nsAString& aFormat,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
|
|
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
|
|
{
|
|
ImportKeyTask::Init(aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ImportEcKeyTask(JSContext* aCx, const nsAString& aFormat,
|
|
JS::Handle<JSObject*> aKeyData,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
|
|
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
|
|
{
|
|
ImportKeyTask::Init(aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SetKeyData(aCx, aKeyData);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS_VOID(mEarlyRv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
nsString mNamedCurve;
|
|
|
|
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
|
|
{
|
|
// Import the key data itself
|
|
ScopedSECKEYPublicKey pubKey;
|
|
ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey privKey;
|
|
|
|
nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
|
|
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK) && mJwk.mD.WasPassed()) {
|
|
// Private key import
|
|
privKey = CryptoKey::PrivateKeyFromJwk(mJwk, locker);
|
|
if (!privKey) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mKey->SetPrivateKey(privKey.get());
|
|
mKey->SetType(CryptoKey::PRIVATE);
|
|
} else if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI) ||
|
|
(mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK) &&
|
|
!mJwk.mD.WasPassed())) {
|
|
// Public key import
|
|
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI)) {
|
|
pubKey = CryptoKey::PublicKeyFromSpki(mKeyData, locker);
|
|
} else {
|
|
pubKey = CryptoKey::PublicKeyFromJwk(mJwk, locker);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!pubKey) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI)) {
|
|
if (!CheckEncodedECParameters(&pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Construct the OID tag.
|
|
SECItem oid = { siBuffer, nullptr, 0 };
|
|
oid.len = pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data[1];
|
|
oid.data = pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data + 2;
|
|
|
|
// Find a matching and supported named curve.
|
|
if (!MapOIDTagToNamedCurve(SECOID_FindOIDTag(&oid), mNamedCurve)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mKey->SetPublicKey(pubKey.get());
|
|
mKey->SetType(CryptoKey::PUBLIC);
|
|
} else {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Extract 'crv' parameter from JWKs.
|
|
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
|
|
if (!NormalizeToken(mJwk.mCrv.Value(), mNamedCurve)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
virtual nsresult AfterCrypto() override
|
|
{
|
|
uint32_t privateAllowedUsages = 0, publicAllowedUsages = 0;
|
|
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH)) {
|
|
privateAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::DERIVEBITS | CryptoKey::DERIVEKEY;
|
|
publicAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::DERIVEBITS | CryptoKey::DERIVEKEY;
|
|
} else if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA)) {
|
|
privateAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::SIGN;
|
|
publicAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::VERIFY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check permissions for the requested operation
|
|
if ((mKey->GetKeyType() == CryptoKey::PRIVATE &&
|
|
mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(privateAllowedUsages)) ||
|
|
(mKey->GetKeyType() == CryptoKey::PUBLIC &&
|
|
mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(publicAllowedUsages))) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mKey->Algorithm().MakeEc(mAlgName, mNamedCurve);
|
|
|
|
if (mDataIsJwk && !JwkCompatible(mJwk, mKey)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
class ImportDhKeyTask : public ImportKeyTask
|
|
{
|
|
public:
|
|
ImportDhKeyTask(JSContext* aCx, const nsAString& aFormat,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
|
|
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
|
|
{
|
|
Init(aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ImportDhKeyTask(JSContext* aCx, const nsAString& aFormat,
|
|
JS::Handle<JSObject*> aKeyData,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
|
|
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
|
|
{
|
|
Init(aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
|
|
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
SetKeyData(aCx, aKeyData);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS_VOID(mEarlyRv);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void Init(JSContext* aCx, const nsAString& aFormat,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
|
|
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
|
|
{
|
|
ImportKeyTask::Init(aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW)) {
|
|
RootedDictionary<DhImportKeyParams> params(aCx);
|
|
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CryptoBuffer prime;
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mPrime, params.mPrime);
|
|
|
|
CryptoBuffer generator;
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mGenerator, params.mGenerator);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
CryptoBuffer mPrime;
|
|
CryptoBuffer mGenerator;
|
|
|
|
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
|
|
{
|
|
// Import the key data itself
|
|
ScopedSECKEYPublicKey pubKey;
|
|
|
|
nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
|
|
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW) ||
|
|
mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI)) {
|
|
// Public key import
|
|
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW)) {
|
|
pubKey = CryptoKey::PublicDhKeyFromRaw(mKeyData, mPrime, mGenerator, locker);
|
|
} else if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI)) {
|
|
pubKey = CryptoKey::PublicKeyFromSpki(mKeyData, locker);
|
|
} else {
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(false);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!pubKey) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI)) {
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mPrime, &pubKey->u.dh.prime);
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mGenerator, &pubKey->u.dh.base);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mKey->SetPublicKey(pubKey.get());
|
|
mKey->SetType(CryptoKey::PUBLIC);
|
|
} else {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
virtual nsresult AfterCrypto() override
|
|
{
|
|
// Check permissions for the requested operation
|
|
if (mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::DERIVEBITS | CryptoKey::DERIVEKEY)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mKey->Algorithm().MakeDh(mAlgName, mPrime, mGenerator);
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
class ExportKeyTask : public WebCryptoTask
|
|
{
|
|
public:
|
|
ExportKeyTask(const nsAString& aFormat, CryptoKey& aKey)
|
|
: mFormat(aFormat)
|
|
, mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey())
|
|
, mPrivateKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey())
|
|
, mPublicKey(aKey.GetPublicKey())
|
|
, mKeyType(aKey.GetKeyType())
|
|
, mExtractable(aKey.Extractable())
|
|
, mAlg(aKey.Algorithm().JwkAlg())
|
|
{
|
|
aKey.GetUsages(mKeyUsages);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
protected:
|
|
nsString mFormat;
|
|
CryptoBuffer mSymKey;
|
|
ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey mPrivateKey;
|
|
ScopedSECKEYPublicKey mPublicKey;
|
|
CryptoKey::KeyType mKeyType;
|
|
bool mExtractable;
|
|
nsString mAlg;
|
|
nsTArray<nsString> mKeyUsages;
|
|
CryptoBuffer mResult;
|
|
JsonWebKey mJwk;
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
virtual void ReleaseNSSResources() override
|
|
{
|
|
mPrivateKey.dispose();
|
|
mPublicKey.dispose();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
|
|
{
|
|
nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
|
|
|
|
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW)) {
|
|
if (mPublicKey && mPublicKey->keyType == dhKey) {
|
|
nsresult rv = CryptoKey::PublicDhKeyToRaw(mPublicKey, mResult, locker);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mResult = mSymKey;
|
|
if (mResult.Length() == 0) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
} else if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_PKCS8)) {
|
|
if (!mPrivateKey) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (mPrivateKey->keyType) {
|
|
case rsaKey:
|
|
CryptoKey::PrivateKeyToPkcs8(mPrivateKey.get(), mResult, locker);
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
default:
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI)) {
|
|
if (!mPublicKey) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CryptoKey::PublicKeyToSpki(mPublicKey.get(), mResult, locker);
|
|
} else if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
|
|
if (mKeyType == CryptoKey::SECRET) {
|
|
nsString k;
|
|
nsresult rv = mSymKey.ToJwkBase64(k);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
mJwk.mK.Construct(k);
|
|
mJwk.mKty = NS_LITERAL_STRING(JWK_TYPE_SYMMETRIC);
|
|
} else if (mKeyType == CryptoKey::PUBLIC) {
|
|
if (!mPublicKey) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsresult rv = CryptoKey::PublicKeyToJwk(mPublicKey, mJwk, locker);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (mKeyType == CryptoKey::PRIVATE) {
|
|
if (!mPrivateKey) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsresult rv = CryptoKey::PrivateKeyToJwk(mPrivateKey, mJwk, locker);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!mAlg.IsEmpty()) {
|
|
mJwk.mAlg.Construct(mAlg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mJwk.mExt.Construct(mExtractable);
|
|
|
|
if (!mKeyUsages.IsEmpty()) {
|
|
mJwk.mKey_ops.Construct();
|
|
mJwk.mKey_ops.Value().AppendElements(mKeyUsages);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Returns mResult as an ArrayBufferView or JWK, as appropriate
|
|
virtual void Resolve() override
|
|
{
|
|
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
|
|
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(mJwk);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
TypedArrayCreator<ArrayBuffer> ret(mResult);
|
|
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(ret);
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
class GenerateSymmetricKeyTask : public WebCryptoTask
|
|
{
|
|
public:
|
|
GenerateSymmetricKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
|
|
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
|
|
{
|
|
nsIGlobalObject* global = xpc::NativeGlobal(JS::CurrentGlobalOrNull(aCx));
|
|
if (!global) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create an empty key and set easy attributes
|
|
mKey = new CryptoKey(global);
|
|
mKey->SetExtractable(aExtractable);
|
|
mKey->SetType(CryptoKey::SECRET);
|
|
|
|
// Extract algorithm name
|
|
nsString algName;
|
|
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Construct an appropriate KeyAlorithm
|
|
uint32_t allowedUsages = 0;
|
|
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = GetKeyLengthForAlgorithm(aCx, aAlgorithm, mLength);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
mKey->Algorithm().MakeAes(algName, mLength);
|
|
|
|
allowedUsages = CryptoKey::ENCRYPT | CryptoKey::DECRYPT |
|
|
CryptoKey::WRAPKEY | CryptoKey::UNWRAPKEY;
|
|
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
|
|
RootedDictionary<HmacKeyGenParams> params(aCx);
|
|
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsString hashName;
|
|
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, hashName);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (params.mLength.WasPassed()) {
|
|
mLength = params.mLength.Value();
|
|
} else {
|
|
mLength = MapHashAlgorithmNameToBlockSize(hashName);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mLength == 0) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mKey->Algorithm().MakeHmac(mLength, hashName);
|
|
allowedUsages = CryptoKey::SIGN | CryptoKey::VERIFY;
|
|
} else {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Add key usages
|
|
mKey->ClearUsages();
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aKeyUsages.Length(); ++i) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = mKey->AddUsageIntersecting(aKeyUsages[i], allowedUsages);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mLength = mLength >> 3; // bits to bytes
|
|
mMechanism = mKey->Algorithm().Mechanism();
|
|
// SetSymKey done in Resolve, after we've done the keygen
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
nsRefPtr<CryptoKey> mKey;
|
|
size_t mLength;
|
|
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mMechanism;
|
|
CryptoBuffer mKeyData;
|
|
|
|
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
|
|
{
|
|
ScopedPK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(slot.get());
|
|
|
|
ScopedPK11SymKey symKey(PK11_KeyGen(slot.get(), mMechanism, nullptr,
|
|
mLength, nullptr));
|
|
if (!symKey) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsresult rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_ExtractKeyValue(symKey));
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// This doesn't leak, because the SECItem* returned by PK11_GetKeyData
|
|
// just refers to a buffer managed by symKey. The assignment copies the
|
|
// data, so mKeyData manages one copy, while symKey manages another.
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mKeyData, PK11_GetKeyData(symKey));
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
virtual void Resolve() override
|
|
{
|
|
mKey->SetSymKey(mKeyData);
|
|
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(mKey);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
virtual void Cleanup() override
|
|
{
|
|
mKey = nullptr;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
class GenerateAsymmetricKeyTask : public WebCryptoTask
|
|
{
|
|
public:
|
|
GenerateAsymmetricKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
|
|
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
|
|
{
|
|
nsIGlobalObject* global = xpc::NativeGlobal(JS::CurrentGlobalOrNull(aCx));
|
|
if (!global) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mArena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
|
|
if (!mArena) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create an empty key and set easy attributes
|
|
mKeyPair.mPrivateKey = new CryptoKey(global);
|
|
mKeyPair.mPublicKey = new CryptoKey(global);
|
|
|
|
// Extract algorithm name
|
|
nsString algName;
|
|
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Construct an appropriate KeyAlorithm
|
|
uint32_t privateAllowedUsages = 0, publicAllowedUsages = 0;
|
|
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP)) {
|
|
RootedDictionary<RsaHashedKeyGenParams> params(aCx);
|
|
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Pull relevant info
|
|
uint32_t modulusLength = params.mModulusLength;
|
|
CryptoBuffer publicExponent;
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(publicExponent, params.mPublicExponent);
|
|
nsString hashName;
|
|
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, hashName);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create algorithm
|
|
mKeyPair.mPublicKey.get()->Algorithm().MakeRsa(algName,
|
|
modulusLength,
|
|
publicExponent,
|
|
hashName);
|
|
mKeyPair.mPrivateKey.get()->Algorithm().MakeRsa(algName,
|
|
modulusLength,
|
|
publicExponent,
|
|
hashName);
|
|
mMechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN;
|
|
|
|
// Set up params struct
|
|
mRsaParams.keySizeInBits = modulusLength;
|
|
bool converted = publicExponent.GetBigIntValue(mRsaParams.pe);
|
|
if (!converted) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA)) {
|
|
RootedDictionary<EcKeyGenParams> params(aCx);
|
|
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!NormalizeToken(params.mNamedCurve, mNamedCurve)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create algorithm.
|
|
mKeyPair.mPublicKey.get()->Algorithm().MakeEc(algName, mNamedCurve);
|
|
mKeyPair.mPrivateKey.get()->Algorithm().MakeEc(algName, mNamedCurve);
|
|
mMechanism = CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN;
|
|
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_DH)) {
|
|
RootedDictionary<DhKeyGenParams> params(aCx);
|
|
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CryptoBuffer prime;
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(prime, params.mPrime);
|
|
|
|
CryptoBuffer generator;
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(generator, params.mGenerator);
|
|
|
|
// Set up params.
|
|
if (!prime.ToSECItem(mArena, &mDhParams.prime) ||
|
|
!generator.ToSECItem(mArena, &mDhParams.base)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create algorithm.
|
|
mKeyPair.mPublicKey.get()->Algorithm().MakeDh(algName, prime, generator);
|
|
mKeyPair.mPrivateKey.get()->Algorithm().MakeDh(algName, prime, generator);
|
|
mMechanism = CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN;
|
|
} else {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Set key usages.
|
|
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA)) {
|
|
privateAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::SIGN;
|
|
publicAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::VERIFY;
|
|
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP)) {
|
|
privateAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::DECRYPT | CryptoKey::UNWRAPKEY;
|
|
publicAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::ENCRYPT | CryptoKey::WRAPKEY;
|
|
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_DH)) {
|
|
privateAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::DERIVEKEY | CryptoKey::DERIVEBITS;
|
|
publicAllowedUsages = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mKeyPair.mPrivateKey.get()->SetExtractable(aExtractable);
|
|
mKeyPair.mPrivateKey.get()->SetType(CryptoKey::PRIVATE);
|
|
|
|
mKeyPair.mPublicKey.get()->SetExtractable(true);
|
|
mKeyPair.mPublicKey.get()->SetType(CryptoKey::PUBLIC);
|
|
|
|
mKeyPair.mPrivateKey.get()->ClearUsages();
|
|
mKeyPair.mPublicKey.get()->ClearUsages();
|
|
for (uint32_t i=0; i < aKeyUsages.Length(); ++i) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = mKeyPair.mPrivateKey.get()->AddUsageIntersecting(aKeyUsages[i],
|
|
privateAllowedUsages);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mEarlyRv = mKeyPair.mPublicKey.get()->AddUsageIntersecting(aKeyUsages[i],
|
|
publicAllowedUsages);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If no usages ended up being allowed, DataError
|
|
if (!mKeyPair.mPublicKey.get()->HasAnyUsage() &&
|
|
!mKeyPair.mPrivateKey.get()->HasAnyUsage()) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
ScopedPLArenaPool mArena;
|
|
CryptoKeyPair mKeyPair;
|
|
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mMechanism;
|
|
PK11RSAGenParams mRsaParams;
|
|
SECKEYDHParams mDhParams;
|
|
ScopedSECKEYPublicKey mPublicKey;
|
|
ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey mPrivateKey;
|
|
nsString mNamedCurve;
|
|
|
|
virtual void ReleaseNSSResources() override
|
|
{
|
|
mPublicKey.dispose();
|
|
mPrivateKey.dispose();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
|
|
{
|
|
ScopedPK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(slot.get());
|
|
|
|
void* param;
|
|
switch (mMechanism) {
|
|
case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
|
|
param = &mRsaParams;
|
|
break;
|
|
case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
|
|
param = &mDhParams;
|
|
break;
|
|
case CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN: {
|
|
param = CreateECParamsForCurve(mNamedCurve, mArena);
|
|
if (!param) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SECKEYPublicKey* pubKey = nullptr;
|
|
mPrivateKey = PK11_GenerateKeyPair(slot.get(), mMechanism, param, &pubKey,
|
|
PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE, nullptr);
|
|
mPublicKey = pubKey;
|
|
if (!mPrivateKey.get() || !mPublicKey.get()) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mKeyPair.mPrivateKey.get()->SetPrivateKey(mPrivateKey);
|
|
mKeyPair.mPublicKey.get()->SetPublicKey(mPublicKey);
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
virtual void Resolve() override
|
|
{
|
|
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(mKeyPair);
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
class DerivePbkdfBitsTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask
|
|
{
|
|
public:
|
|
DerivePbkdfBitsTask(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey, uint32_t aLength)
|
|
: mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey())
|
|
{
|
|
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aLength);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DerivePbkdfBitsTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
|
|
CryptoKey& aKey, const ObjectOrString& aTargetAlgorithm)
|
|
: mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey())
|
|
{
|
|
size_t length;
|
|
mEarlyRv = GetKeyLengthForAlgorithm(aCx, aTargetAlgorithm, length);
|
|
|
|
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, length);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void Init(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
|
|
uint32_t aLength)
|
|
{
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_PBKDF2);
|
|
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_PBKDF2);
|
|
|
|
// Check that we got a symmetric key
|
|
if (mSymKey.Length() == 0) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
RootedDictionary<Pbkdf2Params> params(aCx);
|
|
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// length must be a multiple of 8 bigger than zero.
|
|
if (aLength == 0 || aLength % 8) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Extract the hash algorithm.
|
|
nsString hashName;
|
|
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, hashName);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check the given hash algorithm.
|
|
switch (MapAlgorithmNameToMechanism(hashName)) {
|
|
case CKM_SHA_1: mHashOidTag = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1; break;
|
|
case CKM_SHA256: mHashOidTag = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256; break;
|
|
case CKM_SHA384: mHashOidTag = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA384; break;
|
|
case CKM_SHA512: mHashOidTag = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA512; break;
|
|
default:
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mSalt, params.mSalt)
|
|
mLength = aLength >> 3; // bits to bytes
|
|
mIterations = params.mIterations;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
size_t mLength;
|
|
size_t mIterations;
|
|
CryptoBuffer mSalt;
|
|
CryptoBuffer mSymKey;
|
|
SECOidTag mHashOidTag;
|
|
|
|
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
|
|
{
|
|
ScopedPLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
|
|
if (!arena) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SECItem salt = { siBuffer, nullptr, 0 };
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena, &salt, mSalt);
|
|
|
|
// Always pass in cipherAlg=SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1 (i.e. PBMAC1) as this
|
|
// parameter is unused for key generation. It is currently only used
|
|
// for PBKDF2 authentication or key (un)wrapping when specifying an
|
|
// encryption algorithm (PBES2).
|
|
ScopedSECAlgorithmID alg_id(PK11_CreatePBEV2AlgorithmID(
|
|
SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1, mHashOidTag,
|
|
mLength, mIterations, &salt));
|
|
|
|
if (!alg_id.get()) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ScopedPK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
|
|
if (!slot.get()) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SECItem keyItem = { siBuffer, nullptr, 0 };
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena, &keyItem, mSymKey);
|
|
|
|
ScopedPK11SymKey symKey(PK11_PBEKeyGen(slot, alg_id, &keyItem, false, nullptr));
|
|
if (!symKey.get()) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsresult rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_ExtractKeyValue(symKey));
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// This doesn't leak, because the SECItem* returned by PK11_GetKeyData
|
|
// just refers to a buffer managed by symKey. The assignment copies the
|
|
// data, so mResult manages one copy, while symKey manages another.
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mResult, PK11_GetKeyData(symKey));
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
template<class DeriveBitsTask>
|
|
class DeriveKeyTask : public DeriveBitsTask
|
|
{
|
|
public:
|
|
DeriveKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aBaseKey,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aDerivedKeyType, bool aExtractable,
|
|
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
|
|
: DeriveBitsTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aBaseKey, aDerivedKeyType)
|
|
, mResolved(false)
|
|
{
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(this->mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NS_NAMED_LITERAL_STRING(format, WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW);
|
|
mTask = new ImportSymmetricKeyTask(aCx, format, aDerivedKeyType,
|
|
aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
protected:
|
|
nsRefPtr<ImportSymmetricKeyTask> mTask;
|
|
bool mResolved;
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
virtual void Resolve() override {
|
|
mTask->SetKeyData(this->mResult);
|
|
mTask->DispatchWithPromise(this->mResultPromise);
|
|
mResolved = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
virtual void Cleanup() override
|
|
{
|
|
if (mTask && !mResolved) {
|
|
mTask->Skip();
|
|
}
|
|
mTask = nullptr;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
class DeriveEcdhBitsTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask
|
|
{
|
|
public:
|
|
DeriveEcdhBitsTask(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey, uint32_t aLength)
|
|
: mLength(aLength),
|
|
mPrivKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey())
|
|
{
|
|
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DeriveEcdhBitsTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
|
|
CryptoKey& aKey, const ObjectOrString& aTargetAlgorithm)
|
|
: mPrivKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey())
|
|
{
|
|
mEarlyRv = GetKeyLengthForAlgorithm(aCx, aTargetAlgorithm, mLength);
|
|
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void Init(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey)
|
|
{
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_ECDH);
|
|
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH);
|
|
|
|
// Check that we have a private key.
|
|
if (!mPrivKey) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Length must be a multiple of 8 bigger than zero.
|
|
if (mLength == 0 || mLength % 8) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mLength = mLength >> 3; // bits to bytes
|
|
|
|
// Retrieve the peer's public key.
|
|
RootedDictionary<EcdhKeyDeriveParams> params(aCx);
|
|
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CryptoKey* publicKey = params.mPublic;
|
|
mPubKey = publicKey->GetPublicKey();
|
|
if (!mPubKey) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(publicKey->Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH);
|
|
|
|
// Both keys must use the same named curve.
|
|
nsString curve1 = aKey.Algorithm().mEc.mNamedCurve;
|
|
nsString curve2 = publicKey->Algorithm().mEc.mNamedCurve;
|
|
|
|
if (!curve1.Equals(curve2)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
size_t mLength;
|
|
ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey mPrivKey;
|
|
ScopedSECKEYPublicKey mPubKey;
|
|
|
|
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
|
|
{
|
|
// CKM_SHA512_HMAC and CKA_SIGN are key type and usage attributes of the
|
|
// derived symmetric key and don't matter because we ignore them anyway.
|
|
ScopedPK11SymKey symKey(PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(
|
|
mPrivKey, mPubKey, PR_FALSE, nullptr, nullptr, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE,
|
|
CKM_SHA512_HMAC, CKA_SIGN, 0, CKD_NULL, nullptr, nullptr));
|
|
|
|
if (!symKey.get()) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsresult rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_ExtractKeyValue(symKey));
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// This doesn't leak, because the SECItem* returned by PK11_GetKeyData
|
|
// just refers to a buffer managed by symKey. The assignment copies the
|
|
// data, so mResult manages one copy, while symKey manages another.
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mResult, PK11_GetKeyData(symKey));
|
|
|
|
if (mLength > mResult.Length()) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!mResult.SetLength(mLength, fallible)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
class DeriveDhBitsTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask
|
|
{
|
|
public:
|
|
DeriveDhBitsTask(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey, uint32_t aLength)
|
|
: mLength(aLength),
|
|
mPrivKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey())
|
|
{
|
|
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DeriveDhBitsTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
|
|
CryptoKey& aKey, const ObjectOrString& aTargetAlgorithm)
|
|
: mPrivKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey())
|
|
{
|
|
mEarlyRv = GetKeyLengthForAlgorithm(aCx, aTargetAlgorithm, mLength);
|
|
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void Init(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey)
|
|
{
|
|
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_DH);
|
|
|
|
// Check that we have a private key.
|
|
if (!mPrivKey) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mLength = mLength >> 3; // bits to bytes
|
|
|
|
// Retrieve the peer's public key.
|
|
RootedDictionary<DhKeyDeriveParams> params(aCx);
|
|
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CryptoKey* publicKey = params.mPublic;
|
|
mPubKey = publicKey->GetPublicKey();
|
|
if (!mPubKey) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
KeyAlgorithmProxy alg1 = publicKey->Algorithm();
|
|
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(alg1, WEBCRYPTO_ALG_DH);
|
|
|
|
// Both keys must use the same prime and generator.
|
|
KeyAlgorithmProxy alg2 = aKey.Algorithm();
|
|
if (alg1.mDh.mPrime != alg2.mDh.mPrime ||
|
|
alg1.mDh.mGenerator != alg2.mDh.mGenerator) {
|
|
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
size_t mLength;
|
|
ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey mPrivKey;
|
|
ScopedSECKEYPublicKey mPubKey;
|
|
|
|
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
|
|
{
|
|
// CKM_SHA512_HMAC and CKA_SIGN are key type and usage attributes of the
|
|
// derived symmetric key and don't matter because we ignore them anyway.
|
|
ScopedPK11SymKey symKey(PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(
|
|
mPrivKey, mPubKey, PR_FALSE, nullptr, nullptr, CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE,
|
|
CKM_SHA512_HMAC, CKA_SIGN, 0, CKD_NULL, nullptr, nullptr));
|
|
|
|
if (!symKey.get()) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsresult rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_ExtractKeyValue(symKey));
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// This doesn't leak, because the SECItem* returned by PK11_GetKeyData
|
|
// just refers to a buffer managed by symKey. The assignment copies the
|
|
// data, so mResult manages one copy, while symKey manages another.
|
|
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mResult, PK11_GetKeyData(symKey));
|
|
|
|
if (mLength > mResult.Length()) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!mResult.SetLength(mLength, fallible)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
template<class KeyEncryptTask>
|
|
class WrapKeyTask : public ExportKeyTask
|
|
{
|
|
public:
|
|
WrapKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const nsAString& aFormat,
|
|
CryptoKey& aKey,
|
|
CryptoKey& aWrappingKey,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aWrapAlgorithm)
|
|
: ExportKeyTask(aFormat, aKey)
|
|
, mResolved(false)
|
|
{
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mTask = new KeyEncryptTask(aCx, aWrapAlgorithm, aWrappingKey, true);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
nsRefPtr<KeyEncryptTask> mTask;
|
|
bool mResolved;
|
|
|
|
virtual nsresult AfterCrypto() override {
|
|
// If wrapping JWK, stringify the JSON
|
|
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
|
|
nsAutoString json;
|
|
if (!mJwk.ToJSON(json)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8 utf8(json);
|
|
mResult.Assign((const uint8_t*) utf8.BeginReading(), utf8.Length());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
virtual void Resolve() override
|
|
{
|
|
mTask->SetData(mResult);
|
|
mTask->DispatchWithPromise(mResultPromise);
|
|
mResolved = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
virtual void Cleanup() override
|
|
{
|
|
if (mTask && !mResolved) {
|
|
mTask->Skip();
|
|
}
|
|
mTask = nullptr;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
template<class KeyEncryptTask>
|
|
class UnwrapKeyTask : public KeyEncryptTask
|
|
{
|
|
public:
|
|
UnwrapKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const ArrayBufferViewOrArrayBuffer& aWrappedKey,
|
|
CryptoKey& aUnwrappingKey,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aUnwrapAlgorithm,
|
|
ImportKeyTask* aTask)
|
|
: KeyEncryptTask(aCx, aUnwrapAlgorithm, aUnwrappingKey, aWrappedKey, false)
|
|
, mTask(aTask)
|
|
, mResolved(false)
|
|
{}
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
nsRefPtr<ImportKeyTask> mTask;
|
|
bool mResolved;
|
|
|
|
virtual void Resolve() override
|
|
{
|
|
mTask->SetKeyData(KeyEncryptTask::mResult);
|
|
mTask->DispatchWithPromise(KeyEncryptTask::mResultPromise);
|
|
mResolved = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
virtual void Cleanup() override
|
|
{
|
|
if (mTask && !mResolved) {
|
|
mTask->Skip();
|
|
}
|
|
mTask = nullptr;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// Task creation methods for WebCryptoTask
|
|
|
|
// Note: We do not perform algorithm normalization as a monolithic process,
|
|
// as described in the spec. Instead:
|
|
// * Each method handles its slice of the supportedAlgorithms structure
|
|
// * Task constructors take care of:
|
|
// * Coercing the algorithm to the proper concrete type
|
|
// * Cloning subordinate data items
|
|
// * Cloning input data as needed
|
|
//
|
|
// Thus, support for different algorithms is determined by the if-statements
|
|
// below, rather than a data structure.
|
|
//
|
|
// This results in algorithm normalization coming after some other checks,
|
|
// and thus slightly more steps being done synchronously than the spec calls
|
|
// for. But none of these steps is especially time-consuming.
|
|
|
|
WebCryptoTask*
|
|
WebCryptoTask::CreateEncryptDecryptTask(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
|
|
CryptoKey& aKey,
|
|
const CryptoOperationData& aData,
|
|
bool aEncrypt)
|
|
{
|
|
TelemetryMethod method = (aEncrypt)? TM_ENCRYPT : TM_DECRYPT;
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, method);
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_EXTRACTABLE_ENC, aKey.Extractable());
|
|
|
|
// Ensure key is usable for this operation
|
|
if ((aEncrypt && !aKey.HasUsage(CryptoKey::ENCRYPT)) ||
|
|
(!aEncrypt && !aKey.HasUsage(CryptoKey::DECRYPT))) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsString algName;
|
|
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(rv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM)) {
|
|
return new AesTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aData, aEncrypt);
|
|
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP)) {
|
|
return new RsaOaepTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aData, aEncrypt);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
WebCryptoTask*
|
|
WebCryptoTask::CreateSignVerifyTask(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
|
|
CryptoKey& aKey,
|
|
const CryptoOperationData& aSignature,
|
|
const CryptoOperationData& aData,
|
|
bool aSign)
|
|
{
|
|
TelemetryMethod method = (aSign)? TM_SIGN : TM_VERIFY;
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, method);
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_EXTRACTABLE_SIG, aKey.Extractable());
|
|
|
|
// Ensure key is usable for this operation
|
|
if ((aSign && !aKey.HasUsage(CryptoKey::SIGN)) ||
|
|
(!aSign && !aKey.HasUsage(CryptoKey::VERIFY))) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsString algName;
|
|
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(rv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
|
|
return new HmacTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aSignature, aData, aSign);
|
|
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA)) {
|
|
return new AsymmetricSignVerifyTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aSignature,
|
|
aData, aSign);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
WebCryptoTask*
|
|
WebCryptoTask::CreateDigestTask(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
|
|
const CryptoOperationData& aData)
|
|
{
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, TM_DIGEST);
|
|
|
|
nsString algName;
|
|
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(rv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA1) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA256) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA384) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA512)) {
|
|
return new DigestTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aData);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
WebCryptoTask*
|
|
WebCryptoTask::CreateImportKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const nsAString& aFormat,
|
|
JS::Handle<JSObject*> aKeyData,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
|
|
bool aExtractable,
|
|
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
|
|
{
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, TM_IMPORTKEY);
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_EXTRACTABLE_IMPORT, aExtractable);
|
|
|
|
// Verify that the format is recognized
|
|
if (!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW) &&
|
|
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI) &&
|
|
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_PKCS8) &&
|
|
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify that aKeyUsages does not contain an unrecognized value
|
|
if (!CryptoKey::AllUsagesRecognized(aKeyUsages)) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsString algName;
|
|
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(rv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SPEC-BUG: PBKDF2 is not supposed to be supported for this operation.
|
|
// However, the spec should be updated to allow it.
|
|
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_PBKDF2) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
|
|
return new ImportSymmetricKeyTask(aCx, aFormat, aKeyData, aAlgorithm,
|
|
aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
|
|
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP)) {
|
|
return new ImportRsaKeyTask(aCx, aFormat, aKeyData, aAlgorithm,
|
|
aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
|
|
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA)) {
|
|
return new ImportEcKeyTask(aCx, aFormat, aKeyData, aAlgorithm,
|
|
aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
|
|
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_DH)) {
|
|
return new ImportDhKeyTask(aCx, aFormat, aKeyData, aAlgorithm,
|
|
aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
|
|
} else {
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
WebCryptoTask*
|
|
WebCryptoTask::CreateExportKeyTask(const nsAString& aFormat,
|
|
CryptoKey& aKey)
|
|
{
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, TM_EXPORTKEY);
|
|
|
|
// Verify that the format is recognized
|
|
if (!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW) &&
|
|
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI) &&
|
|
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_PKCS8) &&
|
|
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify that the key is extractable
|
|
if (!aKey.Extractable()) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify that the algorithm supports export
|
|
// SPEC-BUG: PBKDF2 is not supposed to be supported for this operation.
|
|
// However, the spec should be updated to allow it.
|
|
nsString algName = aKey.Algorithm().mName;
|
|
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_PBKDF2) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_DH)) {
|
|
return new ExportKeyTask(aFormat, aKey);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
WebCryptoTask*
|
|
WebCryptoTask::CreateGenerateKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
|
|
bool aExtractable,
|
|
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
|
|
{
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, TM_GENERATEKEY);
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_EXTRACTABLE_GENERATE, aExtractable);
|
|
|
|
// Verify that aKeyUsages does not contain an unrecognized value
|
|
// SPEC-BUG: Spec says that this should be InvalidAccessError, but that
|
|
// is inconsistent with other analogous points in the spec
|
|
if (!CryptoKey::AllUsagesRecognized(aKeyUsages)) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsString algName;
|
|
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(rv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
|
|
return new GenerateSymmetricKeyTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
|
|
} else if (algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA) ||
|
|
algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_DH)) {
|
|
return new GenerateAsymmetricKeyTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
|
|
} else {
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
WebCryptoTask*
|
|
WebCryptoTask::CreateDeriveKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
|
|
CryptoKey& aBaseKey,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aDerivedKeyType,
|
|
bool aExtractable,
|
|
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
|
|
{
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, TM_DERIVEKEY);
|
|
|
|
// Ensure baseKey is usable for this operation
|
|
if (!aBaseKey.HasUsage(CryptoKey::DERIVEKEY)) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify that aKeyUsages does not contain an unrecognized value
|
|
if (!CryptoKey::AllUsagesRecognized(aKeyUsages)) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsString algName;
|
|
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(rv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_PBKDF2)) {
|
|
return new DeriveKeyTask<DerivePbkdfBitsTask>(aCx, aAlgorithm, aBaseKey,
|
|
aDerivedKeyType, aExtractable,
|
|
aKeyUsages);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH)) {
|
|
return new DeriveKeyTask<DeriveEcdhBitsTask>(aCx, aAlgorithm, aBaseKey,
|
|
aDerivedKeyType, aExtractable,
|
|
aKeyUsages);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
WebCryptoTask*
|
|
WebCryptoTask::CreateDeriveBitsTask(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
|
|
CryptoKey& aKey,
|
|
uint32_t aLength)
|
|
{
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, TM_DERIVEBITS);
|
|
|
|
// Ensure baseKey is usable for this operation
|
|
if (!aKey.HasUsage(CryptoKey::DERIVEBITS)) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsString algName;
|
|
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(rv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_PBKDF2)) {
|
|
return new DerivePbkdfBitsTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aLength);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH)) {
|
|
return new DeriveEcdhBitsTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aLength);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_DH)) {
|
|
return new DeriveDhBitsTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aLength);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
WebCryptoTask*
|
|
WebCryptoTask::CreateWrapKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const nsAString& aFormat,
|
|
CryptoKey& aKey,
|
|
CryptoKey& aWrappingKey,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aWrapAlgorithm)
|
|
{
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, TM_WRAPKEY);
|
|
|
|
// Verify that the format is recognized
|
|
if (!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW) &&
|
|
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI) &&
|
|
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_PKCS8) &&
|
|
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Ensure wrappingKey is usable for this operation
|
|
if (!aWrappingKey.HasUsage(CryptoKey::WRAPKEY)) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Ensure key is extractable
|
|
if (!aKey.Extractable()) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsString wrapAlgName;
|
|
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aWrapAlgorithm, wrapAlgName);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(rv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (wrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
|
|
wrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
|
|
wrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM)) {
|
|
return new WrapKeyTask<AesTask>(aCx, aFormat, aKey,
|
|
aWrappingKey, aWrapAlgorithm);
|
|
} else if (wrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW)) {
|
|
return new WrapKeyTask<AesKwTask>(aCx, aFormat, aKey,
|
|
aWrappingKey, aWrapAlgorithm);
|
|
} else if (wrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP)) {
|
|
return new WrapKeyTask<RsaOaepTask>(aCx, aFormat, aKey,
|
|
aWrappingKey, aWrapAlgorithm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
WebCryptoTask*
|
|
WebCryptoTask::CreateUnwrapKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
|
|
const nsAString& aFormat,
|
|
const ArrayBufferViewOrArrayBuffer& aWrappedKey,
|
|
CryptoKey& aUnwrappingKey,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aUnwrapAlgorithm,
|
|
const ObjectOrString& aUnwrappedKeyAlgorithm,
|
|
bool aExtractable,
|
|
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
|
|
{
|
|
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, TM_UNWRAPKEY);
|
|
|
|
// Ensure key is usable for this operation
|
|
if (!aUnwrappingKey.HasUsage(CryptoKey::UNWRAPKEY)) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify that aKeyUsages does not contain an unrecognized value
|
|
if (!CryptoKey::AllUsagesRecognized(aKeyUsages)) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsString keyAlgName;
|
|
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aUnwrappedKeyAlgorithm, keyAlgName);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(rv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CryptoOperationData dummy;
|
|
nsRefPtr<ImportKeyTask> importTask;
|
|
if (keyAlgName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
|
|
keyAlgName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
|
|
keyAlgName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM) ||
|
|
keyAlgName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
|
|
importTask = new ImportSymmetricKeyTask(aCx, aFormat,
|
|
aUnwrappedKeyAlgorithm,
|
|
aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
|
|
} else if (keyAlgName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
|
|
keyAlgName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP)) {
|
|
importTask = new ImportRsaKeyTask(aCx, aFormat,
|
|
aUnwrappedKeyAlgorithm,
|
|
aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
|
|
} else {
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsString unwrapAlgName;
|
|
rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aUnwrapAlgorithm, unwrapAlgName);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return new FailureTask(rv);
|
|
}
|
|
if (unwrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
|
|
unwrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
|
|
unwrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM)) {
|
|
return new UnwrapKeyTask<AesTask>(aCx, aWrappedKey,
|
|
aUnwrappingKey, aUnwrapAlgorithm,
|
|
importTask);
|
|
} else if (unwrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW)) {
|
|
return new UnwrapKeyTask<AesKwTask>(aCx, aWrappedKey,
|
|
aUnwrappingKey, aUnwrapAlgorithm,
|
|
importTask);
|
|
} else if (unwrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP)) {
|
|
return new UnwrapKeyTask<RsaOaepTask>(aCx, aWrappedKey,
|
|
aUnwrappingKey, aUnwrapAlgorithm,
|
|
importTask);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} // namespace dom
|
|
} // namespace mozilla
|