mirror of
https://gitlab.winehq.org/wine/wine-gecko.git
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d2e338b885
bug-835919.patch and bug-835919.patch. r=wtc. Bug 866525: Add AddressSanitizer annotations to port_ArenaZeroAfterMark. r=choller. Also include fixes for bug 866363, bug 866949, bug 835919, bug 863871.
1133 lines
33 KiB
C
1133 lines
33 KiB
C
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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/*
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* DTLS Protocol
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*/
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#include "ssl.h"
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#include "sslimpl.h"
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#include "sslproto.h"
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#ifndef PR_ARRAY_SIZE
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#define PR_ARRAY_SIZE(a) (sizeof(a)/sizeof((a)[0]))
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#endif
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static SECStatus dtls_TransmitMessageFlight(sslSocket *ss);
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static void dtls_RetransmitTimerExpiredCb(sslSocket *ss);
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static SECStatus dtls_SendSavedWriteData(sslSocket *ss);
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/* -28 adjusts for the IP/UDP header */
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static const PRUint16 COMMON_MTU_VALUES[] = {
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1500 - 28, /* Ethernet MTU */
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1280 - 28, /* IPv6 minimum MTU */
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576 - 28, /* Common assumption */
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256 - 28 /* We're in serious trouble now */
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};
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#define DTLS_COOKIE_BYTES 32
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/* List copied from ssl3con.c:cipherSuites */
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static const ssl3CipherSuite nonDTLSSuites[] = {
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#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
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TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
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TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
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#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
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TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
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#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
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TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
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TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
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#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
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SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
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SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
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TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,
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SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5,
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0 /* End of list marker */
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};
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/* Map back and forth between TLS and DTLS versions in wire format.
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* Mapping table is:
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*
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* TLS DTLS
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* 1.1 (0302) 1.0 (feff)
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*/
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SSL3ProtocolVersion
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dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(SSL3ProtocolVersion tlsv)
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{
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/* Anything other than TLS 1.1 is an error, so return
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* the invalid version ffff. */
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if (tlsv != SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1)
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return 0xffff;
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return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_0_WIRE;
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}
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/* Map known DTLS versions to known TLS versions.
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* - Invalid versions (< 1.0) return a version of 0
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* - Versions > known return a version one higher than we know of
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* to accomodate a theoretically newer version */
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SSL3ProtocolVersion
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dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(SSL3ProtocolVersion dtlsv)
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{
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if (MSB(dtlsv) == 0xff) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (dtlsv == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_0_WIRE)
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return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
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/* Return a fictional higher version than we know of */
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return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 + 1;
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}
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/* On this socket, Disable non-DTLS cipher suites in the argument's list */
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SECStatus
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ssl3_DisableNonDTLSSuites(sslSocket * ss)
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{
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const ssl3CipherSuite * suite;
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for (suite = nonDTLSSuites; *suite; ++suite) {
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SECStatus rv = ssl3_CipherPrefSet(ss, *suite, PR_FALSE);
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PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); /* else is coding error */
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}
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return SECSuccess;
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}
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/* Allocate a DTLSQueuedMessage.
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*
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* Called from dtls_QueueMessage()
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*/
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static DTLSQueuedMessage *
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dtls_AllocQueuedMessage(PRUint16 epoch, SSL3ContentType type,
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const unsigned char *data, PRUint32 len)
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{
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DTLSQueuedMessage *msg = NULL;
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msg = PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(DTLSQueuedMessage));
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if (!msg)
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return NULL;
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msg->data = PORT_Alloc(len);
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if (!msg->data) {
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PORT_Free(msg);
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return NULL;
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}
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PORT_Memcpy(msg->data, data, len);
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msg->len = len;
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msg->epoch = epoch;
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msg->type = type;
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return msg;
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}
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/*
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* Free a handshake message
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*
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* Called from dtls_FreeHandshakeMessages()
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*/
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static void
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dtls_FreeHandshakeMessage(DTLSQueuedMessage *msg)
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{
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if (!msg)
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return;
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PORT_ZFree(msg->data, msg->len);
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PORT_Free(msg);
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}
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/*
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* Free a list of handshake messages
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*
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* Called from:
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* dtls_HandleHandshake()
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* ssl3_DestroySSL3Info()
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*/
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void
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dtls_FreeHandshakeMessages(PRCList *list)
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{
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PRCList *cur_p;
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while (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(list)) {
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cur_p = PR_LIST_TAIL(list);
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PR_REMOVE_LINK(cur_p);
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dtls_FreeHandshakeMessage((DTLSQueuedMessage *)cur_p);
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}
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}
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/* Called only from ssl3_HandleRecord, for each (deciphered) DTLS record.
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* origBuf is the decrypted ssl record content and is expected to contain
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* complete handshake records
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* Caller must hold the handshake and RecvBuf locks.
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*
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* Note that this code uses msg_len for two purposes:
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*
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* (1) To pass the length to ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage()
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* (2) To carry the length of a message currently being reassembled
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*
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* However, unlike ssl3_HandleHandshake(), it is not used to carry
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* the state of reassembly (i.e., whether one is in progress). That
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* is carried in recvdHighWater and recvdFragments.
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*/
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#define OFFSET_BYTE(o) (o/8)
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#define OFFSET_MASK(o) (1 << (o%8))
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SECStatus
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dtls_HandleHandshake(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *origBuf)
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{
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/* XXX OK for now.
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* This doesn't work properly with asynchronous certificate validation.
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* because that returns a WOULDBLOCK error. The current DTLS
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* applications do not need asynchronous validation, but in the
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* future we will need to add this.
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*/
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sslBuffer buf = *origBuf;
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SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
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PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
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PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
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while (buf.len > 0) {
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PRUint8 type;
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PRUint32 message_length;
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PRUint16 message_seq;
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PRUint32 fragment_offset;
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PRUint32 fragment_length;
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PRUint32 offset;
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if (buf.len < 12) {
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PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE);
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rv = SECFailure;
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break;
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}
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/* Parse the header */
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type = buf.buf[0];
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message_length = (buf.buf[1] << 16) | (buf.buf[2] << 8) | buf.buf[3];
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message_seq = (buf.buf[4] << 8) | buf.buf[5];
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fragment_offset = (buf.buf[6] << 16) | (buf.buf[7] << 8) | buf.buf[8];
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fragment_length = (buf.buf[9] << 16) | (buf.buf[10] << 8) | buf.buf[11];
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#define MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN 0x1ffff /* 128k - 1 */
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if (message_length > MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN) {
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(void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
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PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
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return SECFailure;
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}
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#undef MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN
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buf.buf += 12;
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buf.len -= 12;
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/* This fragment must be complete */
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if (buf.len < fragment_length) {
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PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE);
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rv = SECFailure;
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break;
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}
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/* Sanity check the packet contents */
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if ((fragment_length + fragment_offset) > message_length) {
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PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE);
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rv = SECFailure;
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break;
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}
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/* There are three ways we could not be ready for this packet.
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*
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* 1. It's a partial next message.
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* 2. It's a partial or complete message beyond the next
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* 3. It's a message we've already seen
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*
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* If it's the complete next message we accept it right away.
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* This is the common case for short messages
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*/
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if ((message_seq == ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq)
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&& (fragment_offset == 0)
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&& (fragment_length == message_length)) {
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/* Complete next message. Process immediately */
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ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type = (SSL3HandshakeType)type;
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ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = message_length;
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/* At this point we are advancing our state machine, so
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* we can free our last flight of messages */
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dtls_FreeHandshakeMessages(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight);
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ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater = -1;
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dtls_CancelTimer(ss);
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/* Reset the timer to the initial value if the retry counter
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* is 0, per Sec. 4.2.4.1 */
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if (ss->ssl3.hs.rtRetries == 0) {
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ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimeoutMs = INITIAL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_MS;
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}
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rv = ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(ss, buf.buf, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len);
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if (rv == SECFailure) {
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/* Do not attempt to process rest of messages in this record */
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break;
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}
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} else {
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if (message_seq < ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq) {
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/* Case 3: we do an immediate retransmit if we're
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* in a waiting state*/
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if (ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimerCb == NULL) {
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/* Ignore */
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} else if (ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimerCb ==
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dtls_RetransmitTimerExpiredCb) {
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SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Retransmit detected",
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SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
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/* Check to see if we retransmitted recently. If so,
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* suppress the triggered retransmit. This avoids
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* retransmit wars after packet loss.
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* This is not in RFC 5346 but should be
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*/
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if ((PR_IntervalNow() - ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimerStarted) >
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(ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimeoutMs / 4)) {
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SSL_TRC(30,
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("%d: SSL3[%d]: Shortcutting retransmit timer",
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SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
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/* Cancel the timer and call the CB,
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* which re-arms the timer */
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dtls_CancelTimer(ss);
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dtls_RetransmitTimerExpiredCb(ss);
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rv = SECSuccess;
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break;
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} else {
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SSL_TRC(30,
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("%d: SSL3[%d]: We just retransmitted. Ignoring.",
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SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
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rv = SECSuccess;
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break;
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}
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} else if (ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimerCb == dtls_FinishedTimerCb) {
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/* Retransmit the messages and re-arm the timer
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* Note that we are not backing off the timer here.
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* The spec isn't clear and my reasoning is that this
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* may be a re-ordered packet rather than slowness,
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* so let's be aggressive. */
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dtls_CancelTimer(ss);
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rv = dtls_TransmitMessageFlight(ss);
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if (rv == SECSuccess) {
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rv = dtls_StartTimer(ss, dtls_FinishedTimerCb);
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}
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if (rv != SECSuccess)
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return rv;
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break;
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}
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} else if (message_seq > ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq) {
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/* Case 2
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*
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* Ignore this message. This means we don't handle out of
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* order complete messages that well, but we're still
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* compliant and this probably does not happen often
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*
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* XXX OK for now. Maybe do something smarter at some point?
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*/
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} else {
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/* Case 1
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*
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* Buffer the fragment for reassembly
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*/
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/* Make room for the message */
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if (ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater == -1) {
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PRUint32 map_length = OFFSET_BYTE(message_length) + 1;
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rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body, message_length);
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if (rv != SECSuccess)
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break;
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/* Make room for the fragment map */
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rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments,
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map_length);
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if (rv != SECSuccess)
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break;
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/* Reset the reassembly map */
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ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater = 0;
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PORT_Memset(ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.buf, 0,
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ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.space);
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ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type = (SSL3HandshakeType)type;
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ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = message_length;
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}
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/* If we have a message length mismatch, abandon the reassembly
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* in progress and hope that the next retransmit will give us
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* something sane
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*/
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if (message_length != ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len) {
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ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater = -1;
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PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE);
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rv = SECFailure;
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break;
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}
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/* Now copy this fragment into the buffer */
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PORT_Assert((fragment_offset + fragment_length) <=
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ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.space);
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PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf + fragment_offset,
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buf.buf, fragment_length);
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/* This logic is a bit tricky. We have two values for
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* reassembly state:
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*
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* - recvdHighWater contains the highest contiguous number of
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* bytes received
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* - recvdFragments contains a bitmask of packets received
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* above recvdHighWater
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*
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* This avoids having to fill in the bitmask in the common
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* case of adjacent fragments received in sequence
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*/
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if (fragment_offset <= ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater) {
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/* Either this is the adjacent fragment or an overlapping
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* fragment */
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ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater = fragment_offset +
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fragment_length;
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} else {
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for (offset = fragment_offset;
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offset < fragment_offset + fragment_length;
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offset++) {
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ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.buf[OFFSET_BYTE(offset)] |=
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OFFSET_MASK(offset);
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}
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}
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/* Now figure out the new high water mark if appropriate */
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for (offset = ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater;
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offset < ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len; offset++) {
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/* Note that this loop is not efficient, since it counts
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* bit by bit. If we have a lot of out-of-order packets,
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* we should optimize this */
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if (ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.buf[OFFSET_BYTE(offset)] &
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OFFSET_MASK(offset)) {
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ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater++;
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} else {
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break;
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}
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}
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/* If we have all the bytes, then we are good to go */
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if (ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater == ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len) {
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ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater = -1;
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rv = ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(ss,
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ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf,
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ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len);
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if (rv == SECFailure)
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break; /* Skip rest of record */
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/* At this point we are advancing our state machine, so
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* we can free our last flight of messages */
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dtls_FreeHandshakeMessages(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight);
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dtls_CancelTimer(ss);
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/* If there have been no retries this time, reset the
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* timer value to the default per Section 4.2.4.1 */
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if (ss->ssl3.hs.rtRetries == 0) {
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ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimeoutMs = INITIAL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_MS;
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}
|
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}
|
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}
|
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}
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|
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buf.buf += fragment_length;
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buf.len -= fragment_length;
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}
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origBuf->len = 0; /* So ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord will keep looping. */
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|
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/* XXX OK for now. In future handle rv == SECWouldBlock safely in order
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* to deal with asynchronous certificate verification */
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return rv;
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}
|
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|
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/* Enqueue a message (either handshake or CCS)
|
|
*
|
|
* Called from:
|
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* dtls_StageHandshakeMessage()
|
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* ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs()
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*/
|
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SECStatus dtls_QueueMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSL3ContentType type,
|
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const SSL3Opaque *pIn, PRInt32 nIn)
|
|
{
|
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SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
|
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DTLSQueuedMessage *msg = NULL;
|
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|
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PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
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PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
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|
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msg = dtls_AllocQueuedMessage(ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch, type, pIn, nIn);
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|
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if (!msg) {
|
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PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
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rv = SECFailure;
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} else {
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PR_APPEND_LINK(&msg->link, &ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight);
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}
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|
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return rv;
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}
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|
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/* Add DTLS handshake message to the pending queue
|
|
* Empty the sendBuf buffer.
|
|
* This function returns SECSuccess or SECFailure, never SECWouldBlock.
|
|
* Always set sendBuf.len to 0, even when returning SECFailure.
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|
*
|
|
* Called from:
|
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* ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader()
|
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* dtls_FlushHandshake()
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|
*/
|
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SECStatus
|
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dtls_StageHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss)
|
|
{
|
|
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
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|
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PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
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PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
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|
|
/* This function is sometimes called when no data is actually to
|
|
* be staged, so just return SECSuccess. */
|
|
if (!ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf || !ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len)
|
|
return rv;
|
|
|
|
rv = dtls_QueueMessage(ss, content_handshake,
|
|
ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf, ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len);
|
|
|
|
/* Whether we succeeded or failed, toss the old handshake data. */
|
|
ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len = 0;
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Enqueue the handshake message in sendBuf (if any) and then
|
|
* transmit the resulting flight of handshake messages.
|
|
*
|
|
* Called from:
|
|
* ssl3_FlushHandshake()
|
|
*/
|
|
SECStatus
|
|
dtls_FlushHandshakeMessages(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags)
|
|
{
|
|
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
|
|
|
|
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
|
|
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
|
|
|
|
rv = dtls_StageHandshakeMessage(ss);
|
|
if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
|
return rv;
|
|
|
|
if (!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) {
|
|
rv = dtls_TransmitMessageFlight(ss);
|
|
if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
|
return rv;
|
|
|
|
if (!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_RETRANSMIT)) {
|
|
ss->ssl3.hs.rtRetries = 0;
|
|
rv = dtls_StartTimer(ss, dtls_RetransmitTimerExpiredCb);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The callback for when the retransmit timer expires
|
|
*
|
|
* Called from:
|
|
* dtls_CheckTimer()
|
|
* dtls_HandleHandshake()
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
dtls_RetransmitTimerExpiredCb(sslSocket *ss)
|
|
{
|
|
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
|
|
|
|
ss->ssl3.hs.rtRetries++;
|
|
|
|
if (!(ss->ssl3.hs.rtRetries % 3)) {
|
|
/* If one of the messages was potentially greater than > MTU,
|
|
* then downgrade. Do this every time we have retransmitted a
|
|
* message twice, per RFC 6347 Sec. 4.1.1 */
|
|
dtls_SetMTU(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.maxMessageSent - 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rv = dtls_TransmitMessageFlight(ss);
|
|
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
|
|
|
|
/* Re-arm the timer */
|
|
rv = dtls_RestartTimer(ss, PR_TRUE, dtls_RetransmitTimerExpiredCb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rv == SECFailure) {
|
|
/* XXX OK for now. In future maybe signal the stack that we couldn't
|
|
* transmit. For now, let the read handle any real network errors */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Transmit a flight of handshake messages, stuffing them
|
|
* into as few records as seems reasonable
|
|
*
|
|
* Called from:
|
|
* dtls_FlushHandshake()
|
|
* dtls_RetransmitTimerExpiredCb()
|
|
*/
|
|
static SECStatus
|
|
dtls_TransmitMessageFlight(sslSocket *ss)
|
|
{
|
|
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
|
|
PRCList *msg_p;
|
|
PRUint16 room_left = ss->ssl3.mtu;
|
|
PRInt32 sent;
|
|
|
|
ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
|
|
ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
|
|
|
|
/* DTLS does not buffer its handshake messages in
|
|
* ss->pendingBuf, but rather in the lastMessageFlight
|
|
* structure. This is just a sanity check that
|
|
* some programming error hasn't inadvertantly
|
|
* stuffed something in ss->pendingBuf
|
|
*/
|
|
PORT_Assert(!ss->pendingBuf.len);
|
|
for (msg_p = PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight);
|
|
msg_p != &ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight;
|
|
msg_p = PR_NEXT_LINK(msg_p)) {
|
|
DTLSQueuedMessage *msg = (DTLSQueuedMessage *)msg_p;
|
|
|
|
/* The logic here is:
|
|
*
|
|
* 1. If this is a message that will not fit into the remaining
|
|
* space, then flush.
|
|
* 2. If the message will now fit into the remaining space,
|
|
* encrypt, buffer, and loop.
|
|
* 3. If the message will not fit, then fragment.
|
|
*
|
|
* At the end of the function, flush.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((msg->len + SSL3_BUFFER_FUDGE) > room_left) {
|
|
/* The message will not fit into the remaining space, so flush */
|
|
rv = dtls_SendSavedWriteData(ss);
|
|
if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
room_left = ss->ssl3.mtu;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((msg->len + SSL3_BUFFER_FUDGE) <= room_left) {
|
|
/* The message will fit, so encrypt and then continue with the
|
|
* next packet */
|
|
sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, msg->epoch, msg->type,
|
|
msg->data, msg->len,
|
|
ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER |
|
|
ssl_SEND_FLAG_USE_EPOCH);
|
|
if (sent != msg->len) {
|
|
rv = SECFailure;
|
|
if (sent != -1) {
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
room_left = ss->ssl3.mtu - ss->pendingBuf.len;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* The message will not fit, so fragment.
|
|
*
|
|
* XXX OK for now. Arrange to coalesce the last fragment
|
|
* of this message with the next message if possible.
|
|
* That would be more efficient.
|
|
*/
|
|
PRUint32 fragment_offset = 0;
|
|
unsigned char fragment[DTLS_MAX_MTU]; /* >= than largest
|
|
* plausible MTU */
|
|
|
|
/* Assert that we have already flushed */
|
|
PORT_Assert(room_left == ss->ssl3.mtu);
|
|
|
|
/* Case 3: We now need to fragment this message
|
|
* DTLS only supports fragmenting handshaking messages */
|
|
PORT_Assert(msg->type == content_handshake);
|
|
|
|
/* The headers consume 12 bytes so the smalles possible
|
|
* message (i.e., an empty one) is 12 bytes
|
|
*/
|
|
PORT_Assert(msg->len >= 12);
|
|
|
|
while ((fragment_offset + 12) < msg->len) {
|
|
PRUint32 fragment_len;
|
|
const unsigned char *content = msg->data + 12;
|
|
PRUint32 content_len = msg->len - 12;
|
|
|
|
/* The reason we use 8 here is that that's the length of
|
|
* the new DTLS data that we add to the header */
|
|
fragment_len = PR_MIN(room_left - (SSL3_BUFFER_FUDGE + 8),
|
|
content_len - fragment_offset);
|
|
PORT_Assert(fragment_len < DTLS_MAX_MTU - 12);
|
|
/* Make totally sure that we are within the buffer.
|
|
* Note that the only way that fragment len could get
|
|
* adjusted here is if
|
|
*
|
|
* (a) we are in release mode so the PORT_Assert is compiled out
|
|
* (b) either the MTU table is inconsistent with DTLS_MAX_MTU
|
|
* or ss->ssl3.mtu has become corrupt.
|
|
*/
|
|
fragment_len = PR_MIN(fragment_len, DTLS_MAX_MTU - 12);
|
|
|
|
/* Construct an appropriate-sized fragment */
|
|
/* Type, length, sequence */
|
|
PORT_Memcpy(fragment, msg->data, 6);
|
|
|
|
/* Offset */
|
|
fragment[6] = (fragment_offset >> 16) & 0xff;
|
|
fragment[7] = (fragment_offset >> 8) & 0xff;
|
|
fragment[8] = (fragment_offset) & 0xff;
|
|
|
|
/* Fragment length */
|
|
fragment[9] = (fragment_len >> 16) & 0xff;
|
|
fragment[10] = (fragment_len >> 8) & 0xff;
|
|
fragment[11] = (fragment_len) & 0xff;
|
|
|
|
PORT_Memcpy(fragment + 12, content + fragment_offset,
|
|
fragment_len);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Send the record. We do this in two stages
|
|
* 1. Encrypt
|
|
*/
|
|
sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, msg->epoch, msg->type,
|
|
fragment, fragment_len + 12,
|
|
ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER |
|
|
ssl_SEND_FLAG_USE_EPOCH);
|
|
if (sent != (fragment_len + 12)) {
|
|
rv = SECFailure;
|
|
if (sent != -1) {
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* 2. Flush */
|
|
rv = dtls_SendSavedWriteData(ss);
|
|
if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
fragment_offset += fragment_len;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Finally, we need to flush */
|
|
if (rv == SECSuccess)
|
|
rv = dtls_SendSavedWriteData(ss);
|
|
|
|
/* Give up the locks */
|
|
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
|
|
ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Flush the data in the pendingBuf and update the max message sent
|
|
* so we can adjust the MTU estimate if we need to.
|
|
* Wrapper for ssl_SendSavedWriteData.
|
|
*
|
|
* Called from dtls_TransmitMessageFlight()
|
|
*/
|
|
static
|
|
SECStatus dtls_SendSavedWriteData(sslSocket *ss)
|
|
{
|
|
PRInt32 sent;
|
|
|
|
sent = ssl_SendSavedWriteData(ss);
|
|
if (sent < 0)
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
|
|
/* We should always have complete writes b/c datagram sockets
|
|
* don't really block */
|
|
if (ss->pendingBuf.len > 0) {
|
|
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE);
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Update the largest message sent so we can adjust the MTU
|
|
* estimate if necessary */
|
|
if (sent > ss->ssl3.hs.maxMessageSent)
|
|
ss->ssl3.hs.maxMessageSent = sent;
|
|
|
|
return SECSuccess;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Compress, MAC, encrypt a DTLS record. Allows specification of
|
|
* the epoch using epoch value. If use_epoch is PR_TRUE then
|
|
* we use the provided epoch. If use_epoch is PR_FALSE then
|
|
* whatever the current value is in effect is used.
|
|
*
|
|
* Called from ssl3_SendRecord()
|
|
*/
|
|
SECStatus
|
|
dtls_CompressMACEncryptRecord(sslSocket * ss,
|
|
DTLSEpoch epoch,
|
|
PRBool use_epoch,
|
|
SSL3ContentType type,
|
|
const SSL3Opaque * pIn,
|
|
PRUint32 contentLen,
|
|
sslBuffer * wrBuf)
|
|
{
|
|
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
|
|
ssl3CipherSpec * cwSpec;
|
|
|
|
ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /********************************/
|
|
|
|
/* The reason for this switch-hitting code is that we might have
|
|
* a flight of records spanning an epoch boundary, e.g.,
|
|
*
|
|
* ClientKeyExchange (epoch = 0)
|
|
* ChangeCipherSpec (epoch = 0)
|
|
* Finished (epoch = 1)
|
|
*
|
|
* Thus, each record needs a different cipher spec. The information
|
|
* about which epoch to use is carried with the record.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (use_epoch) {
|
|
if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch == epoch)
|
|
cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
|
|
else if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->epoch == epoch)
|
|
cwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
|
|
else
|
|
cwSpec = NULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cwSpec) {
|
|
rv = ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(cwSpec, ss->sec.isServer, PR_TRUE,
|
|
PR_FALSE, type, pIn, contentLen,
|
|
wrBuf);
|
|
} else {
|
|
PR_NOT_REACHED("Couldn't find a cipher spec matching epoch");
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Start a timer
|
|
*
|
|
* Called from:
|
|
* dtls_HandleHandshake()
|
|
* dtls_FlushHAndshake()
|
|
* dtls_RestartTimer()
|
|
*/
|
|
SECStatus
|
|
dtls_StartTimer(sslSocket *ss, DTLSTimerCb cb)
|
|
{
|
|
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimerCb == NULL);
|
|
|
|
ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimerStarted = PR_IntervalNow();
|
|
ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimerCb = cb;
|
|
|
|
return SECSuccess;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Restart a timer with optional backoff
|
|
*
|
|
* Called from dtls_RetransmitTimerExpiredCb()
|
|
*/
|
|
SECStatus
|
|
dtls_RestartTimer(sslSocket *ss, PRBool backoff, DTLSTimerCb cb)
|
|
{
|
|
if (backoff) {
|
|
ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimeoutMs *= 2;
|
|
if (ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimeoutMs > MAX_DTLS_TIMEOUT_MS)
|
|
ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimeoutMs = MAX_DTLS_TIMEOUT_MS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return dtls_StartTimer(ss, cb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Cancel a pending timer
|
|
*
|
|
* Called from:
|
|
* dtls_HandleHandshake()
|
|
* dtls_CheckTimer()
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
dtls_CancelTimer(sslSocket *ss)
|
|
{
|
|
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
|
|
|
|
ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimerCb = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check the pending timer and fire the callback if it expired
|
|
*
|
|
* Called from ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake()
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
dtls_CheckTimer(sslSocket *ss)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimerCb)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if ((PR_IntervalNow() - ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimerStarted) >
|
|
PR_MillisecondsToInterval(ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimeoutMs)) {
|
|
/* Timer has expired */
|
|
DTLSTimerCb cb = ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimerCb;
|
|
|
|
/* Cancel the timer so that we can call the CB safely */
|
|
dtls_CancelTimer(ss);
|
|
|
|
/* Now call the CB */
|
|
cb(ss);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The callback to fire when the holddown timer for the Finished
|
|
* message expires and we can delete it
|
|
*
|
|
* Called from dtls_CheckTimer()
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
dtls_FinishedTimerCb(sslSocket *ss)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.pwSpec, PR_FALSE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Cancel the Finished hold-down timer and destroy the
|
|
* pending cipher spec. Note that this means that
|
|
* successive rehandshakes will fail if the Finished is
|
|
* lost.
|
|
*
|
|
* XXX OK for now. Figure out how to handle the combination
|
|
* of Finished lost and rehandshake
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(sslSocket *ss)
|
|
{
|
|
dtls_CancelTimer(ss);
|
|
ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.pwSpec, PR_FALSE);
|
|
ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq = 0;
|
|
ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set the MTU to the next step less than or equal to the
|
|
* advertised value. Also used to downgrade the MTU by
|
|
* doing dtls_SetMTU(ss, biggest packet set).
|
|
*
|
|
* Passing 0 means set this to the largest MTU known
|
|
* (effectively resetting the PMTU backoff value).
|
|
*
|
|
* Called by:
|
|
* ssl3_InitState()
|
|
* dtls_RetransmitTimerExpiredCb()
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
dtls_SetMTU(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 advertised)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (advertised == 0) {
|
|
ss->ssl3.mtu = COMMON_MTU_VALUES[0];
|
|
SSL_TRC(30, ("Resetting MTU to %d", ss->ssl3.mtu));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(COMMON_MTU_VALUES); i++) {
|
|
if (COMMON_MTU_VALUES[i] <= advertised) {
|
|
ss->ssl3.mtu = COMMON_MTU_VALUES[i];
|
|
SSL_TRC(30, ("Resetting MTU to %d", ss->ssl3.mtu));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Fallback */
|
|
ss->ssl3.mtu = COMMON_MTU_VALUES[PR_ARRAY_SIZE(COMMON_MTU_VALUES)-1];
|
|
SSL_TRC(30, ("Resetting MTU to %d", ss->ssl3.mtu));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a
|
|
* DTLS hello_verify_request
|
|
* Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
|
|
*/
|
|
SECStatus
|
|
dtls_HandleHelloVerifyRequest(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
|
|
{
|
|
int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
|
|
SECStatus rv;
|
|
PRInt32 temp;
|
|
SECItem cookie = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
|
|
SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter;
|
|
|
|
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle hello_verify_request handshake",
|
|
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
|
|
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
|
|
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
|
|
|
|
if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_hello) {
|
|
errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
|
|
desc = unexpected_message;
|
|
goto alert_loser;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The version */
|
|
temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length);
|
|
if (temp < 0) {
|
|
goto loser; /* alert has been sent */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (temp != SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_0_WIRE) {
|
|
/* Note: this will need adjustment for DTLS 1.2 per Section 4.2.1 */
|
|
goto alert_loser;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The cookie */
|
|
rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &cookie, 1, &b, &length);
|
|
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
goto loser; /* alert has been sent */
|
|
}
|
|
if (cookie.len > DTLS_COOKIE_BYTES) {
|
|
desc = decode_error;
|
|
goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.hs.cookie, cookie.data, cookie.len);
|
|
ss->ssl3.hs.cookieLen = cookie.len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/
|
|
|
|
/* Now re-send the client hello */
|
|
rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, PR_TRUE);
|
|
|
|
ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/
|
|
|
|
if (rv == SECSuccess)
|
|
return rv;
|
|
|
|
alert_loser:
|
|
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
|
|
|
|
loser:
|
|
errCode = ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode);
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize the DTLS anti-replay window
|
|
*
|
|
* Called from:
|
|
* ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec()
|
|
* ssl3_InitCipherSpec()
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
dtls_InitRecvdRecords(DTLSRecvdRecords *records)
|
|
{
|
|
PORT_Memset(records->data, 0, sizeof(records->data));
|
|
records->left = 0;
|
|
records->right = DTLS_RECVD_RECORDS_WINDOW - 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Has this DTLS record been received? Return values are:
|
|
* -1 -- out of range to the left
|
|
* 0 -- not received yet
|
|
* 1 -- replay
|
|
*
|
|
* Called from: dtls_HandleRecord()
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
dtls_RecordGetRecvd(DTLSRecvdRecords *records, PRUint64 seq)
|
|
{
|
|
PRUint64 offset;
|
|
|
|
/* Out of range to the left */
|
|
if (seq < records->left) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Out of range to the right; since we advance the window on
|
|
* receipt, that means that this packet has not been received
|
|
* yet */
|
|
if (seq > records->right)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
offset = seq % DTLS_RECVD_RECORDS_WINDOW;
|
|
|
|
return !!(records->data[offset / 8] & (1 << (offset % 8)));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Update the DTLS anti-replay window
|
|
*
|
|
* Called from ssl3_HandleRecord()
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
dtls_RecordSetRecvd(DTLSRecvdRecords *records, PRUint64 seq)
|
|
{
|
|
PRUint64 offset;
|
|
|
|
if (seq < records->left)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (seq > records->right) {
|
|
PRUint64 new_left;
|
|
PRUint64 new_right;
|
|
PRUint64 right;
|
|
|
|
/* Slide to the right; this is the tricky part
|
|
*
|
|
* 1. new_top is set to have room for seq, on the
|
|
* next byte boundary by setting the right 8
|
|
* bits of seq
|
|
* 2. new_left is set to compensate.
|
|
* 3. Zero all bits between top and new_top. Since
|
|
* this is a ring, this zeroes everything as-yet
|
|
* unseen. Because we always operate on byte
|
|
* boundaries, we can zero one byte at a time
|
|
*/
|
|
new_right = seq | 0x07;
|
|
new_left = (new_right - DTLS_RECVD_RECORDS_WINDOW) + 1;
|
|
|
|
for (right = records->right + 8; right <= new_right; right += 8) {
|
|
offset = right % DTLS_RECVD_RECORDS_WINDOW;
|
|
records->data[offset / 8] = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
records->right = new_right;
|
|
records->left = new_left;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
offset = seq % DTLS_RECVD_RECORDS_WINDOW;
|
|
|
|
records->data[offset / 8] |= (1 << (offset % 8));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SECStatus
|
|
DTLS_GetHandshakeTimeout(PRFileDesc *socket, PRIntervalTime *timeout)
|
|
{
|
|
sslSocket * ss = NULL;
|
|
PRIntervalTime elapsed;
|
|
PRIntervalTime desired;
|
|
|
|
ss = ssl_FindSocket(socket);
|
|
|
|
if (!ss)
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_DTLS(ss))
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
|
|
if (!ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimerCb)
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
|
|
elapsed = PR_IntervalNow() - ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimerStarted;
|
|
desired = PR_MillisecondsToInterval(ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimeoutMs);
|
|
if (elapsed > desired) {
|
|
/* Timer expired */
|
|
*timeout = PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT;
|
|
} else {
|
|
*timeout = desired - elapsed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return SECSuccess;
|
|
}
|