gecko/js/xpconnect/wrappers/AccessCheck.h

113 lines
3.8 KiB
C++

/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*-
* vim: set ts=4 sw=4 et tw=99 ft=cpp:
*
* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#ifndef __AccessCheck_h__
#define __AccessCheck_h__
#include "jsapi.h"
#include "jswrapper.h"
class nsIPrincipal;
namespace xpc {
class AccessCheck {
public:
static bool subsumes(JSCompartment *a, JSCompartment *b);
static bool subsumes(JSObject *a, JSObject *b);
static bool wrapperSubsumes(JSObject *wrapper);
static bool subsumesIgnoringDomain(JSCompartment *a, JSCompartment *b);
static bool isChrome(JSCompartment *compartment);
static bool isChrome(JSObject *obj);
static bool callerIsChrome();
static nsIPrincipal *getPrincipal(JSCompartment *compartment);
static bool isCrossOriginAccessPermitted(JSContext *cx, JSObject *obj, jsid id,
js::Wrapper::Action act);
static bool needsSystemOnlyWrapper(JSObject *obj);
};
struct Policy {
};
// This policy only allows calling the underlying callable. All other operations throw.
struct Opaque : public Policy {
static bool check(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, jsid id, js::Wrapper::Action act) {
return act == js::Wrapper::CALL;
}
static bool deny(js::Wrapper::Action act) {
return false;
}
static bool allowNativeCall(JSContext *cx, JS::IsAcceptableThis test, JS::NativeImpl impl)
{
return false;
}
};
// This policy is designed to protect privileged callers from untrusted non-
// Xrayable objects. Nothing is allowed, and nothing throws.
struct GentlyOpaque : public Policy {
static bool check(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, jsid id, js::Wrapper::Action act) {
return false;
}
static bool deny(js::Wrapper::Action act) {
return true;
}
static bool allowNativeCall(JSContext *cx, JS::IsAcceptableThis test, JS::NativeImpl impl)
{
// We allow nativeCall here because the alternative is throwing (which
// happens in SecurityWrapper::nativeCall), which we don't want. There's
// unlikely to be too much harm to letting this through, because this
// wrapper is only used to wrap less-privileged objects in more-privileged
// scopes, so unwrapping here only drops privileges.
return true;
}
};
// This policy only permits access to properties that are safe to be used
// across origins.
struct CrossOriginAccessiblePropertiesOnly : public Policy {
static bool check(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, jsid id, js::Wrapper::Action act) {
return AccessCheck::isCrossOriginAccessPermitted(cx, wrapper, id, act);
}
static bool deny(js::Wrapper::Action act) {
return false;
}
static bool allowNativeCall(JSContext *cx, JS::IsAcceptableThis test, JS::NativeImpl impl)
{
return false;
}
};
// This policy only permits access to properties if they appear in the
// objects exposed properties list.
struct ExposedPropertiesOnly : public Policy {
static bool check(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, jsid id, js::Wrapper::Action act);
static bool deny(js::Wrapper::Action act) {
// Fail silently for GETs.
return act == js::Wrapper::GET;
}
static bool allowNativeCall(JSContext *cx, JS::IsAcceptableThis test, JS::NativeImpl impl);
};
// Components specific policy
struct ComponentsObjectPolicy : public Policy {
static bool check(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, jsid id, js::Wrapper::Action act);
static bool deny(js::Wrapper::Action act) {
return false;
}
static bool allowNativeCall(JSContext *cx, JS::IsAcceptableThis test, JS::NativeImpl impl) {
return false;
}
};
}
#endif /* __AccessCheck_h__ */