gecko/security/nss/lib/freebl/drbg.c
Wan-Teh Chang 8e431a056c Bug 504080: Update NSS from NSS_3_12_4_FIPS1_WITH_CKBI_1_75 to
NSS_3_12_4_FIPS4 in mozilla-central.  r=kaie.
2009-07-28 17:01:39 -07:00

730 lines
24 KiB
C

/* ***** BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK *****
* Version: MPL 1.1/GPL 2.0/LGPL 2.1
*
* The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version
* 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
* the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
* http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
*
* Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis,
* WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License
* for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the
* License.
*
* The Original Code is the Network Security Services libraries.
*
* The Initial Developer of the Original Code is Red Hat, Inc.
* Portions created by the Initial Developer are Copyright (C) 2009
* the Initial Developer. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Portions created by Netscape Communications Corporation
* are Copyright (C) 1994-2000 Netscape Communications Corporation.
* All Rights Reserved.
*
* Contributor(s):
*
* Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the terms of
* either the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the "GPL"), or
* the GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1 or later (the "LGPL"),
* in which case the provisions of the GPL or the LGPL are applicable instead
* of those above. If you wish to allow use of your version of this file only
* under the terms of either the GPL or the LGPL, and not to allow others to
* use your version of this file under the terms of the MPL, indicate your
* decision by deleting the provisions above and replace them with the notice
* and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete
* the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under
* the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL.
*
* ***** END LICENSE BLOCK ***** */
/* $Id: drbg.c,v 1.9 2009/06/10 03:24:01 rrelyea%redhat.com Exp $ */
#ifdef FREEBL_NO_DEPEND
#include "stubs.h"
#endif
#include "prerror.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "prtypes.h"
#include "prinit.h"
#include "blapi.h"
#include "blapii.h"
#include "nssilock.h"
#include "secitem.h"
#include "sha_fast.h"
#include "sha256.h"
#include "secrng.h" /* for RNG_SystemRNG() */
#include "secmpi.h"
/* PRNG_SEEDLEN defined in NIST SP 800-90 section 10.1
* for SHA-1, SHA-224, and SHA-256 it's 440 bits.
* for SHA-384 and SHA-512 it's 888 bits */
#define PRNG_SEEDLEN (440/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE)
static const PRInt64 PRNG_MAX_ADDITIONAL_BYTES = LL_INIT(0x1, 0x0);
/* 2^35 bits or 2^32 bytes */
#define PRNG_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE 0x10000 /* 2^19 bits or 2^16 bytes */
#define PRNG_ADDITONAL_DATA_CACHE_SIZE (8*1024) /* must be less than
* PRNG_MAX_ADDITIONAL_BYTES
*/
/* RESEED_COUNT is how many calls to the prng before we need to reseed
* under normal NIST rules, you must return an error. In the NSS case, we
* self-reseed with RNG_SystemRNG(). Count can be a large number. For code
* simplicity, we specify count with 2 components: RESEED_BYTE (which is
* the same as LOG256(RESEED_COUNT)) and RESEED_VALUE (which is the same as
* RESEED_COUNT / (256 ^ RESEED_BYTE)). Another way to look at this is
* RESEED_COUNT = RESEED_VALUE * (256 ^ RESEED_BYTE). For Hash based DRBG
* we use the maximum count value, 2^48, or RESEED_BYTE=6 and RESEED_VALUE=1
*/
#define RESEED_BYTE 6
#define RESEED_VALUE 1
#define PRNG_RESET_RESEED_COUNT(rng) \
PORT_Memset((rng)->reseed_counter, 0, sizeof (rng)->reseed_counter); \
(rng)->reseed_counter[RESEED_BYTE] = 1;
/*
* The actual values of this enum are specified in SP 800-90, 10.1.1.*
* The spec does not name the types, it only uses bare values
*/
typedef enum {
prngCGenerateType = 0, /* used when creating a new 'C' */
prngReseedType = 1, /* used in reseeding */
prngAdditionalDataType = 2, /* used in mixing additional data */
prngGenerateByteType = 3 /* used when mixing internal state while
* generating bytes */
} prngVTypes;
/*
* Global RNG context
*/
struct RNGContextStr {
PZLock *lock; /* Lock to serialize access to global rng */
/*
* NOTE, a number of steps in the drbg algorithm need to hash
* V_type || V. The code, therefore, depends on the V array following
* immediately after V_type to avoid extra copies. To accomplish this
* in a way that compiliers can't perturb, we declare V_type and V
* as a V_Data array and reference them by macros */
PRUint8 V_Data[PRNG_SEEDLEN+1]; /* internal state variables */
#define V_type V_Data[0]
#define V(rng) (((rng)->V_Data)+1)
#define VSize(rng) ((sizeof (rng)->V_Data) -1)
PRUint8 C[PRNG_SEEDLEN]; /* internal state variables */
PRUint8 oldV[PRNG_SEEDLEN]; /* for continuous rng checking */
/* If we get calls for the PRNG to return less than the length of our
* hash, we extend the request for a full hash (since we'll be doing
* the full hash anyway). Future requests for random numbers are fulfilled
* from the remainder of the bytes we generated. Requests for bytes longer
* than the hash size are fulfilled directly from the HashGen function
* of the random number generator. */
PRUint8 reseed_counter[RESEED_BYTE+1]; /* number of requests since the
* last reseed. Need only be
* big enough to hold the whole
* reseed count */
PRUint8 data[SHA256_LENGTH]; /* when we request less than a block
* save the rest of the rng output for
* another partial block */
PRUint8 dataAvail; /* # bytes of output available in our cache,
* [0...SHA256_LENGTH] */
/* store additional data that has been shovelled off to us by
* RNG_RandomUpdate. */
PRUint8 additionalDataCache[PRNG_ADDITONAL_DATA_CACHE_SIZE];
PRUint32 additionalAvail;
PRBool isValid; /* false if RNG reaches an invalid state */
};
typedef struct RNGContextStr RNGContext;
static RNGContext *globalrng = NULL;
static RNGContext theGlobalRng;
/*
* The next several functions are derived from the NIST SP 800-90
* spec. In these functions, an attempt was made to use names consistent
* with the names in the spec, even if they differ from normal NSS usage.
*/
/*
* Hash Derive function defined in NISP SP 800-90 Section 10.4.1.
* This function is used in the Instantiate and Reseed functions.
*
* NOTE: requested_bytes cannot overlap with input_string_1 or input_string_2.
* input_string_1 and input_string_2 are logically concatentated.
* input_string_1 must be supplied.
* if input_string_2 is not supplied, NULL should be passed for this parameter.
*/
static SECStatus
prng_Hash_df(PRUint8 *requested_bytes, unsigned int no_of_bytes_to_return,
const PRUint8 *input_string_1, unsigned int input_string_1_len,
const PRUint8 *input_string_2, unsigned int input_string_2_len)
{
SHA256Context ctx;
PRUint32 tmp;
PRUint8 counter;
tmp=SHA_HTONL(no_of_bytes_to_return*8);
for (counter = 1 ; no_of_bytes_to_return > 0; counter++) {
unsigned int hash_return_len;
SHA256_Begin(&ctx);
SHA256_Update(&ctx, &counter, 1);
SHA256_Update(&ctx, (unsigned char *)&tmp, sizeof tmp);
SHA256_Update(&ctx, input_string_1, input_string_1_len);
if (input_string_2) {
SHA256_Update(&ctx, input_string_2, input_string_2_len);
}
SHA256_End(&ctx, requested_bytes, &hash_return_len,
no_of_bytes_to_return);
requested_bytes += hash_return_len;
no_of_bytes_to_return -= hash_return_len;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* Hash_DRBG Instantiate NIST SP 800-80 10.1.1.2
*
* NOTE: bytes & len are entropy || nonce || personalization_string. In
* normal operation, NSS calculates them all together in a single call.
*/
static SECStatus
prng_instantiate(RNGContext *rng, PRUint8 *bytes, unsigned int len)
{
prng_Hash_df(V(rng), VSize(rng), bytes, len, NULL, 0);
rng->V_type = prngCGenerateType;
prng_Hash_df(rng->C,sizeof rng->C,rng->V_Data,sizeof rng->V_Data,NULL,0);
PRNG_RESET_RESEED_COUNT(rng)
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* Update the global random number generator with more seeding
* material. Use the Hash_DRBG reseed algorithm from NIST SP-800-90
* section 10.1.1.3
*
* If entropy is NULL, it is fetched from the noise generator.
*/
static
SECStatus
prng_reseed(RNGContext *rng, const PRUint8 *entropy, unsigned int entropy_len,
const PRUint8 *additional_input, unsigned int additional_input_len)
{
PRUint8 noiseData[(sizeof rng->V_Data)+PRNG_SEEDLEN];
PRUint8 *noise = &noiseData[0];
/* if entropy wasn't supplied, fetch it. (normal operation case) */
if (entropy == NULL) {
entropy_len = (unsigned int) RNG_SystemRNG(
&noiseData[sizeof rng->V_Data], PRNG_SEEDLEN);
} else {
/* NOTE: this code is only available for testing, not to applications */
/* if entropy was too big for the stack variable, get it from malloc */
if (entropy_len > PRNG_SEEDLEN) {
noise = PORT_Alloc(entropy_len + (sizeof rng->V_Data));
if (noise == NULL) {
return SECFailure;
}
}
PORT_Memcpy(&noise[sizeof rng->V_Data],entropy, entropy_len);
}
rng->V_type = prngReseedType;
PORT_Memcpy(noise, rng->V_Data, sizeof rng->V_Data);
prng_Hash_df(V(rng), VSize(rng), noise, (sizeof rng->V_Data) + entropy_len,
additional_input, additional_input_len);
/* clear potential CSP */
PORT_Memset(noise, 0, (sizeof rng->V_Data) + entropy_len);
rng->V_type = prngCGenerateType;
prng_Hash_df(rng->C,sizeof rng->C,rng->V_Data,sizeof rng->V_Data,NULL,0);
PRNG_RESET_RESEED_COUNT(rng)
if (noise != &noiseData[0]) {
PORT_Free(noise);
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* build some fast inline functions for adding.
*/
#define PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(dest, start, cy) \
carry = cy; \
for (k1=start; carry && k1 >=0 ; k1--) { \
carry = !(++dest[k1]); \
}
/*
* NOTE: dest must be an array for the following to work.
*/
#define PRNG_ADD_BITS(dest, dest_len, add, len) \
carry = 0; \
for (k1=dest_len -1, k2=len-1; k2 >= 0; --k1, --k2) { \
carry += dest[k1]+ add[k2]; \
dest[k1] = (PRUint8) carry; \
carry >>= 8; \
}
#define PRNG_ADD_BITS_AND_CARRY(dest, dest_len, add, len) \
PRNG_ADD_BITS(dest, dest_len, add, len) \
PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(dest, k1, carry)
/*
* This function expands the internal state of the prng to fulfill any number
* of bytes we need for this request. We only use this call if we need more
* than can be supplied by a single call to SHA256_HashBuf.
*
* This function is specified in NIST SP 800-90 section 10.1.1.4, Hashgen
*/
static void
prng_Hashgen(RNGContext *rng, PRUint8 *returned_bytes,
unsigned int no_of_returned_bytes)
{
PRUint8 data[VSize(rng)];
PORT_Memcpy(data, V(rng), VSize(rng));
while (no_of_returned_bytes) {
SHA256Context ctx;
unsigned int len;
unsigned int carry;
int k1;
SHA256_Begin(&ctx);
SHA256_Update(&ctx, data, sizeof data);
SHA256_End(&ctx, returned_bytes, &len, no_of_returned_bytes);
returned_bytes += len;
no_of_returned_bytes -= len;
/* The carry parameter is a bool (increment or not).
* This increments data if no_of_returned_bytes is not zero */
PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(data, (sizeof data)- 1, no_of_returned_bytes);
}
PORT_Memset(data, 0, sizeof data);
}
/*
* Generates new random bytes and advances the internal prng state.
* additional bytes are only used in algorithm testing.
*
* This function is specified in NIST SP 800-90 section 10.1.1.4
*/
static SECStatus
prng_generateNewBytes(RNGContext *rng,
PRUint8 *returned_bytes, unsigned int no_of_returned_bytes,
const PRUint8 *additional_input,
unsigned int additional_input_len)
{
PRUint8 H[SHA256_LENGTH]; /* both H and w since they
* aren't used concurrently */
unsigned int carry;
int k1, k2;
if (!rng->isValid) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
/* This code only triggers during tests, normal
* prng operation does not use additional_input */
if (additional_input){
SHA256Context ctx;
/* NIST SP 800-90 defines two temporaries in their calculations,
* w and H. These temporaries are the same lengths, and used
* at different times, so we use the following macro to collapse
* them to the same variable, but keeping their unique names for
* easy comparison to the spec */
#define w H
rng->V_type = prngAdditionalDataType;
SHA256_Begin(&ctx);
SHA256_Update(&ctx, rng->V_Data, sizeof rng->V_Data);
SHA256_Update(&ctx, additional_input, additional_input_len);
SHA256_End(&ctx, w, NULL, sizeof w);
PRNG_ADD_BITS_AND_CARRY(V(rng), VSize(rng), w, sizeof w)
PORT_Memset(w, 0, sizeof w);
#undef w
}
if (no_of_returned_bytes == SHA256_LENGTH) {
/* short_cut to hashbuf and save a copy and a clear */
SHA256_HashBuf(returned_bytes, V(rng), VSize(rng) );
} else {
prng_Hashgen(rng, returned_bytes, no_of_returned_bytes);
}
/* advance our internal state... */
rng->V_type = prngGenerateByteType;
SHA256_HashBuf(H, rng->V_Data, sizeof rng->V_Data);
PRNG_ADD_BITS_AND_CARRY(V(rng), VSize(rng), H, sizeof H)
PRNG_ADD_BITS(V(rng), VSize(rng), rng->C, sizeof rng->C);
PRNG_ADD_BITS_AND_CARRY(V(rng), VSize(rng), rng->reseed_counter,
sizeof rng->reseed_counter)
PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(rng->reseed_counter,(sizeof rng->reseed_counter)-1, 1);
/* continuous rng check */
if (memcmp(V(rng), rng->oldV, sizeof rng->oldV) == 0) {
rng->isValid = PR_FALSE;
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
PORT_Memcpy(rng->oldV, V(rng), sizeof rng->oldV);
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Use NSPR to prevent RNG_RNGInit from being called from separate
* threads, creating a race condition.
*/
static const PRCallOnceType pristineCallOnce;
static PRCallOnceType coRNGInit;
static PRStatus rng_init(void)
{
PRUint8 bytes[PRNG_SEEDLEN*2]; /* entropy + nonce */
unsigned int numBytes;
if (globalrng == NULL) {
/* bytes needs to have enough space to hold
* a SHA256 hash value. Blow up at compile time if this isn't true */
PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(bytes) >= SHA256_LENGTH);
/* create a new global RNG context */
globalrng = &theGlobalRng;
PORT_Assert(NULL == globalrng->lock);
/* create a lock for it */
globalrng->lock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockOther);
if (globalrng->lock == NULL) {
globalrng = NULL;
PORT_SetError(PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR);
return PR_FAILURE;
}
/* Try to get some seed data for the RNG */
numBytes = (unsigned int) RNG_SystemRNG(bytes, sizeof bytes);
PORT_Assert(numBytes == 0 || numBytes == sizeof bytes);
if (numBytes != 0) {
/* if this is our first call, instantiate, otherwise reseed
* prng_instantiate gets a new clean state, we want to mix
* any previous entropy we may have collected */
if (V(globalrng)[0] == 0) {
prng_instantiate(globalrng, bytes, numBytes);
} else {
prng_reseed(globalrng, bytes, numBytes, NULL, 0);
}
memset(bytes, 0, numBytes);
} else {
PZ_DestroyLock(globalrng->lock);
globalrng->lock = NULL;
globalrng = NULL;
return PR_FAILURE;
}
/* the RNG is in a valid state */
globalrng->isValid = PR_TRUE;
/* fetch one random value so that we can populate rng->oldV for our
* continous random number test. */
prng_generateNewBytes(globalrng, bytes, SHA256_LENGTH, NULL, 0);
/* Fetch more entropy into the PRNG */
RNG_SystemInfoForRNG();
}
return PR_SUCCESS;
}
/*
* Clean up the global RNG context
*/
static void
prng_freeRNGContext(RNGContext *rng)
{
PRUint8 inputhash[VSize(rng) + (sizeof rng->C)];
/* destroy context lock */
SKIP_AFTER_FORK(PZ_DestroyLock(globalrng->lock));
/* zero global RNG context except for C & V to preserve entropy */
prng_Hash_df(inputhash, sizeof rng->C, rng->C, sizeof rng->C, NULL, 0);
prng_Hash_df(&inputhash[sizeof rng->C], VSize(rng), V(rng), VSize(rng),
NULL, 0);
memset(rng, 0, sizeof *rng);
memcpy(rng->C, inputhash, sizeof rng->C);
memcpy(V(rng), &inputhash[sizeof rng->C], VSize(rng));
memset(inputhash, 0, sizeof inputhash);
}
/*
* Public functions
*/
/*
* Initialize the global RNG context and give it some seed input taken
* from the system. This function is thread-safe and will only allow
* the global context to be initialized once. The seed input is likely
* small, so it is imperative that RNG_RandomUpdate() be called with
* additional seed data before the generator is used. A good way to
* provide the generator with additional entropy is to call
* RNG_SystemInfoForRNG(). Note that C_Initialize() does exactly that.
*/
SECStatus
RNG_RNGInit(void)
{
/* Allow only one call to initialize the context */
PR_CallOnce(&coRNGInit, rng_init);
/* Make sure there is a context */
return (globalrng != NULL) ? PR_SUCCESS : PR_FAILURE;
}
/*
** Update the global random number generator with more seeding
** material.
*/
SECStatus
RNG_RandomUpdate(const void *data, size_t bytes)
{
SECStatus rv;
/* Make sure our assumption that size_t is unsigned is true */
PR_STATIC_ASSERT(((size_t)-1) > (size_t)1);
#if defined(NS_PTR_GT_32) || (defined(NSS_USE_64) && !defined(NS_PTR_LE_32))
/*
* NIST 800-90 requires us to verify our inputs. This value can
* come from the application, so we need to make sure it's within the
* spec. The spec says it must be less than 2^32 bytes (2^35 bits).
* This can only happen if size_t is greater than 32 bits (i.e. on
* most 64 bit platforms). The 90% case (perhaps 100% case), size_t
* is less than or equal to 32 bits if the platform is not 64 bits, and
* greater than 32 bits if it is a 64 bit platform. The corner
* cases are handled with explicit defines NS_PTR_GT_32 and NS_PTR_LE_32.
*
* In general, neither NS_PTR_GT_32 nor NS_PTR_LE_32 will need to be
* defined. If you trip over the next two size ASSERTS at compile time,
* you will need to define them for your platform.
*
* if 'sizeof(size_t) > 4' is triggered it means that we were expecting
* sizeof(size_t) to be greater than 4, but it wasn't. Setting
* NS_PTR_LE_32 will correct that mistake.
*
* if 'sizeof(size_t) <= 4' is triggered, it means that we were expecting
* sizeof(size_t) to be less than or equal to 4, but it wasn't. Setting
* NS_PTR_GT_32 will correct that mistake.
*/
PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(size_t) > 4);
if (bytes > PRNG_MAX_ADDITIONAL_BYTES) {
bytes = PRNG_MAX_ADDITIONAL_BYTES;
}
#else
PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(size_t) <= 4);
#endif
PZ_Lock(globalrng->lock);
/* if we're passed more than our additionalDataCache, simply
* call reseed with that data */
if (bytes > sizeof (globalrng->additionalDataCache)) {
rv = prng_reseed(globalrng, NULL, 0, data, (unsigned int) bytes);
/* if we aren't going to fill or overflow the buffer, just cache it */
} else if (bytes < ((sizeof globalrng->additionalDataCache)
- globalrng->additionalAvail)) {
PORT_Memcpy(globalrng->additionalDataCache+globalrng->additionalAvail,
data, bytes);
globalrng->additionalAvail += (PRUint32) bytes;
rv = SECSuccess;
} else {
/* we are going to fill or overflow the buffer. In this case we will
* fill the entropy buffer, reseed with it, start a new buffer with the
* remainder. We know the remainder will fit in the buffer because
* we already handled the case where bytes > the size of the buffer.
*/
size_t bufRemain = (sizeof globalrng->additionalDataCache)
- globalrng->additionalAvail;
/* fill the rest of the buffer */
if (bufRemain) {
PORT_Memcpy(globalrng->additionalDataCache
+globalrng->additionalAvail,
data, bufRemain);
data = ((unsigned char *)data) + bufRemain;
bytes -= bufRemain;
}
/* reseed from buffer */
rv = prng_reseed(globalrng, NULL, 0, globalrng->additionalDataCache,
sizeof globalrng->additionalDataCache);
/* copy the rest into the cache */
PORT_Memcpy(globalrng->additionalDataCache, data, bytes);
globalrng->additionalAvail = (PRUint32) bytes;
}
PZ_Unlock(globalrng->lock);
return rv;
}
/*
** Generate some random bytes, using the global random number generator
** object.
*/
static SECStatus
prng_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(RNGContext *rng,
void *dest, size_t len)
{
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
PRUint8 *output = dest;
/* check for a valid global RNG context */
PORT_Assert(rng != NULL);
if (rng == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
/* FIPS limits the amount of entropy available in a single request */
if (len > PRNG_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
/* --- LOCKED --- */
PZ_Lock(rng->lock);
/* Check the amount of seed data in the generator. If not enough,
* don't produce any data.
*/
if (rng->reseed_counter[0] >= RESEED_VALUE) {
rv = prng_reseed(rng, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
PZ_Unlock(rng->lock);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
RNG_SystemInfoForRNG();
PZ_Lock(rng->lock);
}
/*
* see if we have enough bytes to fulfill the request.
*/
if (len <= rng->dataAvail) {
memcpy(output, rng->data + ((sizeof rng->data) - rng->dataAvail), len);
memset(rng->data + ((sizeof rng->data) - rng->dataAvail), 0, len);
rng->dataAvail -= len;
rv = SECSuccess;
/* if we are asking for a small number of bytes, cache the rest of
* the bytes */
} else if (len < sizeof rng->data) {
rv = prng_generateNewBytes(rng, rng->data, sizeof rng->data,
rng->additionalAvail ? rng->additionalDataCache : NULL,
rng->additionalAvail);
rng->additionalAvail = 0;
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
memcpy(output, rng->data, len);
memset(rng->data, 0, len);
rng->dataAvail = (sizeof rng->data) - len;
}
/* we are asking for lots of bytes, just ask the generator to pass them */
} else {
rv = prng_generateNewBytes(rng, output, len,
rng->additionalAvail ? rng->additionalDataCache : NULL,
rng->additionalAvail);
rng->additionalAvail = 0;
}
PZ_Unlock(rng->lock);
/* --- UNLOCKED --- */
return rv;
}
/*
** Generate some random bytes, using the global random number generator
** object.
*/
SECStatus
RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(void *dest, size_t len)
{
return prng_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(globalrng, dest, len);
}
void
RNG_RNGShutdown(void)
{
/* check for a valid global RNG context */
PORT_Assert(globalrng != NULL);
if (globalrng == NULL) {
/* Should set a "not initialized" error code. */
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return;
}
/* clear */
prng_freeRNGContext(globalrng);
globalrng = NULL;
/* reset the callonce struct to allow a new call to RNG_RNGInit() */
coRNGInit = pristineCallOnce;
}
/*
* Test case interface. used by fips testing and power on self test
*/
/* make sure the test context is separate from the global context, This
* allows us to test the internal random number generator without losing
* entropy we may have previously collected. */
RNGContext testContext;
/*
* Test vector API. Use NIST SP 800-90 general interface so one of the
* other NIST SP 800-90 algorithms may be used in the future.
*/
SECStatus
PRNGTEST_Instantiate(const PRUint8 *entropy, unsigned int entropy_len,
const PRUint8 *nonce, unsigned int nonce_len,
const PRUint8 *personal_string, unsigned int ps_len)
{
int bytes_len = entropy_len + nonce_len + ps_len;
PRUint8 *bytes = PORT_Alloc(bytes_len);
if (bytes == NULL) {
return SECFailure;
}
/* concatenate the various inputs, internally NSS only instantiates with
* a single long string */
PORT_Memcpy(bytes, entropy, entropy_len);
if (nonce) {
PORT_Memcpy(&bytes[entropy_len], nonce, nonce_len);
} else {
PORT_Assert(nonce_len == 0);
}
if (personal_string) {
PORT_Memcpy(&bytes[entropy_len+nonce_len], personal_string, ps_len);
} else {
PORT_Assert(ps_len == 0);
}
prng_instantiate(&testContext, bytes, bytes_len);
testContext.isValid = PR_TRUE;
PORT_ZFree(bytes, bytes_len);
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
PRNGTEST_Reseed(const PRUint8 *entropy, unsigned int entropy_len,
const PRUint8 *additional, unsigned int additional_len)
{
if (!testContext.isValid) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
return prng_reseed(&testContext, entropy, entropy_len, additional,
additional_len);
}
SECStatus
PRNGTEST_Generate(PRUint8 *bytes, unsigned int bytes_len,
const PRUint8 *additional, unsigned int additional_len)
{
if (!testContext.isValid) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
return prng_generateNewBytes(&testContext, bytes, bytes_len,
additional, additional_len);
}
SECStatus
PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate()
{
PORT_Memset(&testContext, 0, sizeof testContext);
return SECSuccess;
}