gecko/security/apps/AppTrustDomain.cpp
Brian Smith f3ab0b43c6 Bug 1020683, Part 1: Remove internal uses of CERTCertificate from mozilla::pkix::VerifyEncodedOCSPResponse, r=keeler
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 416938498080c4d44874025f1da4562ab1c7c3c8
2014-06-05 15:18:32 -07:00

185 lines
5.8 KiB
C++

/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#ifdef MOZ_LOGGING
#define FORCE_PR_LOG 1
#endif
#include "AppTrustDomain.h"
#include "certdb.h"
#include "pkix/pkix.h"
#include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h"
#include "nsIX509CertDB.h"
#include "prerror.h"
#include "secerr.h"
// Generated in Makefile.in
#include "marketplace-prod-public.inc"
#include "marketplace-prod-reviewers.inc"
#include "marketplace-dev-public.inc"
#include "marketplace-dev-reviewers.inc"
#include "xpcshell.inc"
using namespace mozilla::pkix;
#ifdef PR_LOGGING
extern PRLogModuleInfo* gPIPNSSLog;
#endif
namespace mozilla { namespace psm {
AppTrustDomain::AppTrustDomain(void* pinArg)
: mPinArg(pinArg)
{
}
SECStatus
AppTrustDomain::SetTrustedRoot(AppTrustedRoot trustedRoot)
{
SECItem trustedDER;
// Load the trusted certificate into the in-memory NSS database so that
// CERT_CreateSubjectCertList can find it.
switch (trustedRoot)
{
case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceProdPublicRoot:
trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceProdPublicRoot);
trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceProdPublicRoot);
break;
case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceProdReviewersRoot:
trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceProdReviewersRoot);
trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceProdReviewersRoot);
break;
case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceDevPublicRoot:
trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceDevPublicRoot);
trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceDevPublicRoot);
break;
case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceDevReviewersRoot:
trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceDevReviewersRoot);
trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceDevReviewersRoot);
break;
case nsIX509CertDB::AppXPCShellRoot:
trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(xpcshellRoot);
trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(xpcshellRoot);
break;
default:
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
mTrustedRoot = CERT_NewTempCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
&trustedDER, nullptr, false, true);
if (!mTrustedRoot) {
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
AppTrustDomain::FindPotentialIssuers(const SECItem* encodedIssuerName,
PRTime time,
/*out*/ mozilla::pkix::ScopedCERTCertList& results)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(mTrustedRoot);
if (!mTrustedRoot) {
PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
results = CERT_CreateSubjectCertList(nullptr, CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
encodedIssuerName, time, true);
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
AppTrustDomain::GetCertTrust(EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
const CertPolicyId& policy,
const SECItem& candidateCertDER,
/*out*/ TrustLevel* trustLevel)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(policy.IsAnyPolicy());
MOZ_ASSERT(trustLevel);
MOZ_ASSERT(mTrustedRoot);
if (!trustLevel || !policy.IsAnyPolicy()) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
if (!mTrustedRoot) {
PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
// Handle active distrust of the certificate.
// XXX: This would be cleaner and more efficient if we could get the trust
// information without constructing a CERTCertificate here, but NSS doesn't
// expose it in any other easy-to-use fashion.
ScopedCERTCertificate candidateCert(
CERT_NewTempCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
const_cast<SECItem*>(&candidateCertDER), nullptr,
false, true));
if (!candidateCert) {
return SECFailure;
}
CERTCertTrust trust;
if (CERT_GetCertTrust(candidateCert.get(), &trust) == SECSuccess) {
PRUint32 flags = SEC_GET_TRUST_FLAGS(&trust, trustObjectSigning);
// For DISTRUST, we use the CERTDB_TRUSTED or CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA bit,
// because we can have active distrust for either type of cert. Note that
// CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD means "stop trying to inherit trust" so if the
// relevant trust bit isn't set then that means the cert must be considered
// distrusted.
PRUint32 relevantTrustBit = endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA
? CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA
: CERTDB_TRUSTED;
if (((flags & (relevantTrustBit | CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD)))
== CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD) {
*trustLevel = TrustLevel::ActivelyDistrusted;
return SECSuccess;
}
}
// mTrustedRoot is the only trust anchor for this validation.
if (CERT_CompareCerts(mTrustedRoot.get(), candidateCert.get())) {
*trustLevel = TrustLevel::TrustAnchor;
return SECSuccess;
}
*trustLevel = TrustLevel::InheritsTrust;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
AppTrustDomain::VerifySignedData(const CERTSignedData* signedData,
const SECItem& subjectPublicKeyInfo)
{
return ::mozilla::pkix::VerifySignedData(signedData, subjectPublicKeyInfo,
mPinArg);
}
SECStatus
AppTrustDomain::CheckRevocation(EndEntityOrCA,
const CERTCertificate*,
/*const*/ CERTCertificate*,
PRTime time,
/*optional*/ const SECItem*)
{
// We don't currently do revocation checking. If we need to distrust an Apps
// certificate, we will use the active distrust mechanism.
return SECSuccess;
}
} }