mirror of
https://gitlab.winehq.org/wine/wine-gecko.git
synced 2024-09-13 09:24:08 -07:00
84f52d8461
--HG-- extra : rebase_source : e445c913994dc027e1179543d7b6cab2505e734d
848 lines
26 KiB
C++
848 lines
26 KiB
C++
/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
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/* vim: set ts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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#ifdef MOZ_LOGGING
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#define FORCE_PR_LOG 1
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#endif
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#include "nsNSSCertificateDB.h"
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#include "pkix/pkix.h"
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#include "mozilla/RefPtr.h"
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#include "CryptoTask.h"
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#include "AppTrustDomain.h"
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#include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h"
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#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
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#include "nsHashKeys.h"
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#include "nsIFile.h"
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#include "nsIInputStream.h"
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#include "nsIStringEnumerator.h"
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#include "nsIZipReader.h"
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#include "nsNSSCertificate.h"
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#include "nsProxyRelease.h"
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#include "nsString.h"
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#include "nsTHashtable.h"
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#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"
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#include "base64.h"
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#include "certdb.h"
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#include "secmime.h"
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#include "plstr.h"
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#include "prlog.h"
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using namespace mozilla::pkix;
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using namespace mozilla;
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using namespace mozilla::psm;
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#ifdef PR_LOGGING
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extern PRLogModuleInfo* gPIPNSSLog;
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#endif
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namespace {
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// Finds exactly one (signature metadata) entry that matches the given
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// search pattern, and then load it. Fails if there are no matches or if
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// there is more than one match. If bugDigest is not null then on success
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// bufDigest will contain the SHA-1 digeset of the entry.
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nsresult
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FindAndLoadOneEntry(nsIZipReader * zip,
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const nsACString & searchPattern,
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/*out*/ nsACString & filename,
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/*out*/ SECItem & buf,
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/*optional, out*/ Digest * bufDigest)
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{
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nsCOMPtr<nsIUTF8StringEnumerator> files;
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nsresult rv = zip->FindEntries(searchPattern, getter_AddRefs(files));
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if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !files) {
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return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
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}
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bool more;
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rv = files->HasMore(&more);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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if (!more) {
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return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
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}
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rv = files->GetNext(filename);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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// Check if there is more than one match, if so then error!
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rv = files->HasMore(&more);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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if (more) {
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return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
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}
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nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> stream;
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rv = zip->GetInputStream(filename, getter_AddRefs(stream));
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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// The size returned by Available() might be inaccurate so we need to check
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// that Available() matches up with the actual length of the file.
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uint64_t len64;
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rv = stream->Available(&len64);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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// Cap the maximum accepted size of signature-related files at 1MB (which is
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// still crazily huge) to avoid OOM. The uncompressed length of an entry can be
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// hundreds of times larger than the compressed version, especially if
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// someone has speifically crafted the entry to cause OOM or to consume
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// massive amounts of disk space.
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//
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// Also, keep in mind bug 164695 and that we must leave room for
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// null-terminating the buffer.
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static const uint32_t MAX_LENGTH = 1024 * 1024;
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static_assert(MAX_LENGTH < UINT32_MAX, "MAX_LENGTH < UINT32_MAX");
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NS_ENSURE_TRUE(len64 < MAX_LENGTH, NS_ERROR_FILE_CORRUPTED);
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NS_ENSURE_TRUE(len64 < UINT32_MAX, NS_ERROR_FILE_CORRUPTED); // bug 164695
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SECITEM_AllocItem(buf, static_cast<uint32_t>(len64 + 1));
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// buf.len == len64 + 1. We attempt to read len64 + 1 bytes instead of len64,
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// so that we can check whether the metadata in the ZIP for the entry is
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// incorrect.
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uint32_t bytesRead;
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rv = stream->Read(char_ptr_cast(buf.data), buf.len, &bytesRead);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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if (bytesRead != len64) {
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return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID;
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}
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buf.data[buf.len - 1] = 0; // null-terminate
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if (bufDigest) {
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rv = bufDigest->DigestBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1, buf.data, buf.len - 1);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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// Verify the digest of an entry. We avoid loading the entire entry into memory
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// at once, which would require memory in proportion to the size of the largest
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// entry. Instead, we require only a small, fixed amount of memory.
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//
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// @param digestFromManifest The digest that we're supposed to check the file's
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// contents against, from the manifest
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// @param buf A scratch buffer that we use for doing the I/O, which must have
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// already been allocated. The size of this buffer is the unit
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// size of our I/O.
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nsresult
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VerifyEntryContentDigest(nsIZipReader * zip, const nsACString & aFilename,
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const SECItem & digestFromManifest, SECItem & buf)
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{
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MOZ_ASSERT(buf.len > 0);
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if (digestFromManifest.len != SHA1_LENGTH)
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return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
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nsresult rv;
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nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> stream;
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rv = zip->GetInputStream(aFilename, getter_AddRefs(stream));
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING;
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}
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uint64_t len64;
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rv = stream->Available(&len64);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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if (len64 > UINT32_MAX) {
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return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_TOO_LARGE;
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}
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ScopedPK11Context digestContext(PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1));
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if (!digestContext) {
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return mozilla::psm::GetXPCOMFromNSSError(PR_GetError());
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}
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rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_DigestBegin(digestContext));
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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uint64_t totalBytesRead = 0;
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for (;;) {
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uint32_t bytesRead;
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rv = stream->Read(char_ptr_cast(buf.data), buf.len, &bytesRead);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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if (bytesRead == 0) {
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break; // EOF
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}
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totalBytesRead += bytesRead;
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if (totalBytesRead >= UINT32_MAX) {
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return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_TOO_LARGE;
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}
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rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_DigestOp(digestContext, buf.data, bytesRead));
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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}
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if (totalBytesRead != len64) {
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// The metadata we used for Available() doesn't match the actual size of
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// the entry.
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return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID;
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}
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// Verify that the digests match.
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Digest digest;
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rv = digest.End(SEC_OID_SHA1, digestContext);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&digestFromManifest, &digest.get()) != SECEqual) {
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return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MODIFIED_ENTRY;
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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// On input, nextLineStart is the start of the current line. On output,
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// nextLineStart is the start of the next line.
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nsresult
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ReadLine(/*in/out*/ const char* & nextLineStart, /*out*/ nsCString & line,
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bool allowContinuations = true)
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{
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line.Truncate();
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size_t previousLength = 0;
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size_t currentLength = 0;
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for (;;) {
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const char* eol = PL_strpbrk(nextLineStart, "\r\n");
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if (!eol) { // Reached end of file before newline
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eol = nextLineStart + strlen(nextLineStart);
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}
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previousLength = currentLength;
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line.Append(nextLineStart, eol - nextLineStart);
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currentLength = line.Length();
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// The spec says "No line may be longer than 72 bytes (not characters)"
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// in its UTF8-encoded form.
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static const size_t lineLimit = 72;
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if (currentLength - previousLength > lineLimit) {
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return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
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}
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// The spec says: "Implementations should support 65535-byte
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// (not character) header values..."
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if (currentLength > 65535) {
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return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
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}
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if (*eol == '\r') {
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++eol;
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}
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if (*eol == '\n') {
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++eol;
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}
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nextLineStart = eol;
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if (*eol != ' ') {
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// not a continuation
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return NS_OK;
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}
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// continuation
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if (!allowContinuations) {
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return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
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}
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++nextLineStart; // skip space and keep appending
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}
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}
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// The header strings are defined in the JAR specification.
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#define JAR_MF_SEARCH_STRING "(M|/M)ETA-INF/(M|m)(ANIFEST|anifest).(MF|mf)$"
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#define JAR_SF_SEARCH_STRING "(M|/M)ETA-INF/*.(SF|sf)$"
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#define JAR_RSA_SEARCH_STRING "(M|/M)ETA-INF/*.(RSA|rsa)$"
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#define JAR_MF_HEADER "Manifest-Version: 1.0"
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#define JAR_SF_HEADER "Signature-Version: 1.0"
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nsresult
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ParseAttribute(const nsAutoCString & curLine,
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/*out*/ nsAutoCString & attrName,
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/*out*/ nsAutoCString & attrValue)
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{
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// Find the colon that separates the name from the value.
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int32_t colonPos = curLine.FindChar(':');
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if (colonPos == kNotFound) {
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return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
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}
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// set attrName to the name, skipping spaces between the name and colon
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int32_t nameEnd = colonPos;
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for (;;) {
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if (nameEnd == 0) {
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return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; // colon with no name
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}
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if (curLine[nameEnd - 1] != ' ')
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break;
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--nameEnd;
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}
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curLine.Left(attrName, nameEnd);
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// Set attrValue to the value, skipping spaces between the colon and the
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// value. The value may be empty.
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int32_t valueStart = colonPos + 1;
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int32_t curLineLength = curLine.Length();
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while (valueStart != curLineLength && curLine[valueStart] == ' ') {
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++valueStart;
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}
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curLine.Right(attrValue, curLineLength - valueStart);
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return NS_OK;
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}
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// Parses the version line of the MF or SF header.
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nsresult
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CheckManifestVersion(const char* & nextLineStart,
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const nsACString & expectedHeader)
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{
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// The JAR spec says: "Manifest-Version and Signature-Version must be first,
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// and in exactly that case (so that they can be recognized easily as magic
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// strings)."
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nsAutoCString curLine;
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nsresult rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, curLine, false);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return rv;
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}
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if (!curLine.Equals(expectedHeader)) {
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return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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// Parses a signature file (SF) as defined in the JDK 8 JAR Specification.
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//
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// The SF file *must* contain exactly one SHA1-Digest-Manifest attribute in
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// the main section. All other sections are ignored. This means that this will
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// NOT parse old-style signature files that have separate digests per entry.
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// The JDK8 x-Digest-Manifest variant is better because:
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//
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// (1) It allows us to follow the principle that we should minimize the
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// processing of data that we do before we verify its signature. In
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// particular, with the x-Digest-Manifest style, we can verify the digest
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// of MANIFEST.MF before we parse it, which prevents malicious JARs
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// exploiting our MANIFEST.MF parser.
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// (2) It is more time-efficient and space-efficient to have one
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// x-Digest-Manifest instead of multiple x-Digest values.
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//
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// In order to get benefit (1), we do NOT implement the fallback to the older
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// mechanism as the spec requires/suggests. Also, for simplity's sake, we only
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// support exactly one SHA1-Digest-Manifest attribute, and no other
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// algorithms.
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//
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// filebuf must be null-terminated. On output, mfDigest will contain the
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// decoded value of SHA1-Digest-Manifest.
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nsresult
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ParseSF(const char* filebuf, /*out*/ SECItem & mfDigest)
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{
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nsresult rv;
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const char* nextLineStart = filebuf;
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rv = CheckManifestVersion(nextLineStart, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(JAR_SF_HEADER));
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if (NS_FAILED(rv))
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return rv;
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// Find SHA1-Digest-Manifest
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for (;;) {
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nsAutoCString curLine;
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rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, curLine);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return rv;
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}
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if (curLine.Length() == 0) {
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// End of main section (blank line or end-of-file), and no
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// SHA1-Digest-Manifest found.
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return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
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}
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nsAutoCString attrName;
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nsAutoCString attrValue;
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rv = ParseAttribute(curLine, attrName, attrValue);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return rv;
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}
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if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("sha1-digest-manifest")) {
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rv = MapSECStatus(ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem(&mfDigest, attrValue.get()));
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return rv;
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}
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// There could be multiple SHA1-Digest-Manifest attributes, which
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// would be an error, but it's better to just skip any erroneous
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// duplicate entries rather than trying to detect them, because:
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//
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// (1) It's simpler, and simpler generally means more secure
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// (2) An attacker can't make us accept a JAR we would otherwise
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// reject just by adding additional SHA1-Digest-Manifest
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// attributes.
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break;
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}
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// ignore unrecognized attributes
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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// Parses MANIFEST.MF. The filenames of all entries will be returned in
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// mfItems. buf must be a pre-allocated scratch buffer that is used for doing
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// I/O.
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nsresult
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ParseMF(const char* filebuf, nsIZipReader * zip,
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/*out*/ nsTHashtable<nsCStringHashKey> & mfItems,
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ScopedAutoSECItem & buf)
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{
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nsresult rv;
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const char* nextLineStart = filebuf;
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rv = CheckManifestVersion(nextLineStart, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(JAR_MF_HEADER));
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return rv;
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}
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// Skip the rest of the header section, which ends with a blank line.
|
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{
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|
nsAutoCString line;
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do {
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rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, line);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
} while (line.Length() > 0);
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|
// Manifest containing no file entries is OK, though useless.
|
|
if (*nextLineStart == '\0') {
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
}
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|
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nsAutoCString curItemName;
|
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ScopedAutoSECItem digest;
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|
|
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for (;;) {
|
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nsAutoCString curLine;
|
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rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, curLine);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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|
|
|
if (curLine.Length() == 0) {
|
|
// end of section (blank line or end-of-file)
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|
|
|
if (curItemName.Length() == 0) {
|
|
// '...Each section must start with an attribute with the name as
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|
// "Name",...', so every section must have a Name attribute.
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return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
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}
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|
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if (digest.len == 0) {
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|
// We require every entry to have a digest, since we require every
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// entry to be signed and we don't allow duplicate entries.
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return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
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}
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|
|
|
if (mfItems.Contains(curItemName)) {
|
|
// Duplicate entry
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|
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
|
|
}
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|
|
|
// Verify that the entry's content digest matches the digest from this
|
|
// MF section.
|
|
rv = VerifyEntryContentDigest(zip, curItemName, digest, buf);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
|
|
return rv;
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|
|
mfItems.PutEntry(curItemName);
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|
|
if (*nextLineStart == '\0') // end-of-file
|
|
break;
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|
|
|
// reset so we know we haven't encountered either of these for the next
|
|
// item yet.
|
|
curItemName.Truncate();
|
|
digest.reset();
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|
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continue; // skip the rest of the loop below
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|
}
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nsAutoCString attrName;
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|
nsAutoCString attrValue;
|
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rv = ParseAttribute(curLine, attrName, attrValue);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return rv;
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|
}
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|
|
|
// Lines to look for:
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|
|
|
// (1) Digest:
|
|
if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("sha1-digest"))
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|
{
|
|
if (digest.len > 0) // multiple SHA1 digests in section
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|
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
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|
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rv = MapSECStatus(ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem(&digest, attrValue.get()));
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|
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
|
|
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
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|
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continue;
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}
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|
|
// (2) Name: associates this manifest section with a file in the jar.
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|
if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("name"))
|
|
{
|
|
if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(curItemName.Length() > 0)) // multiple names in section
|
|
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
|
|
|
|
if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(attrValue.Length() == 0))
|
|
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
|
|
|
|
curItemName = attrValue;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// (3) Magic: the only other must-understand attribute
|
|
if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("magic")) {
|
|
// We don't understand any magic, so we can't verify an entry that
|
|
// requires magic. Since we require every entry to have a valid
|
|
// signature, we have no choice but to reject the entry.
|
|
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// unrecognized attributes must be ignored
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsresult
|
|
VerifySignature(AppTrustedRoot trustedRoot,
|
|
const SECItem& buffer, const SECItem& detachedDigest,
|
|
/*out*/ mozilla::pkix::ScopedCERTCertList& builtChain)
|
|
{
|
|
mozilla::pkix::ScopedPtr<NSSCMSMessage, NSS_CMSMessage_Destroy>
|
|
cmsMsg(NSS_CMSMessage_CreateFromDER(const_cast<SECItem*>(&buffer), nullptr,
|
|
nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr,
|
|
nullptr));
|
|
if (!cmsMsg) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_CMS_VERIFY_ERROR_PROCESSING;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!NSS_CMSMessage_IsSigned(cmsMsg.get())) {
|
|
PR_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("CMS message isn't signed"));
|
|
return NS_ERROR_CMS_VERIFY_NOT_SIGNED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NSSCMSContentInfo* cinfo = NSS_CMSMessage_ContentLevel(cmsMsg.get(), 0);
|
|
if (!cinfo) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_CMS_VERIFY_NO_CONTENT_INFO;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// signedData is non-owning
|
|
NSSCMSSignedData* signedData =
|
|
reinterpret_cast<NSSCMSSignedData*>(NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetContent(cinfo));
|
|
if (!signedData) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_CMS_VERIFY_NO_CONTENT_INFO;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Set digest value.
|
|
if (NSS_CMSSignedData_SetDigestValue(signedData, SEC_OID_SHA1,
|
|
const_cast<SECItem*>(&detachedDigest))) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_CMS_VERIFY_BAD_DIGEST;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Parse the certificates into CERTCertificate objects held in memory, so that
|
|
// AppTrustDomain will be able to find them during path building.
|
|
mozilla::pkix::ScopedCERTCertList certs(CERT_NewCertList());
|
|
if (!certs) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
|
|
}
|
|
if (signedData->rawCerts) {
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; signedData->rawCerts[i]; ++i) {
|
|
mozilla::pkix::ScopedCERTCertificate
|
|
cert(CERT_NewTempCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
|
|
signedData->rawCerts[i], nullptr, false,
|
|
true));
|
|
// Skip certificates that fail to parse
|
|
if (cert) {
|
|
if (CERT_AddCertToListTail(certs.get(), cert.get()) == SECSuccess) {
|
|
cert.release(); // ownership transfered
|
|
} else {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get the end-entity certificate.
|
|
int numSigners = NSS_CMSSignedData_SignerInfoCount(signedData);
|
|
if (NS_WARN_IF(numSigners != 1)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_CMS_VERIFY_ERROR_PROCESSING;
|
|
}
|
|
// signer is non-owning.
|
|
NSSCMSSignerInfo* signer = NSS_CMSSignedData_GetSignerInfo(signedData, 0);
|
|
if (NS_WARN_IF(!signer)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_CMS_VERIFY_ERROR_PROCESSING;
|
|
}
|
|
// cert is signerCert
|
|
CERTCertificate* signerCert =
|
|
NSS_CMSSignerInfo_GetSigningCertificate(signer, CERT_GetDefaultCertDB());
|
|
if (!signerCert) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_CMS_VERIFY_ERROR_PROCESSING;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify certificate.
|
|
AppTrustDomain trustDomain(nullptr); // TODO: null pinArg
|
|
if (trustDomain.SetTrustedRoot(trustedRoot) != SECSuccess) {
|
|
return MapSECStatus(SECFailure);
|
|
}
|
|
if (BuildCertChain(trustDomain, signerCert, PR_Now(),
|
|
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
|
|
KeyUsage::digitalSignature,
|
|
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_codeSigning,
|
|
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy,
|
|
nullptr, builtChain)
|
|
!= SECSuccess) {
|
|
return MapSECStatus(SECFailure);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// See NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetContentTypeOID, which isn't exported from NSS.
|
|
SECOidData* contentTypeOidData =
|
|
SECOID_FindOID(&signedData->contentInfo.contentType);
|
|
if (!contentTypeOidData) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_CMS_VERIFY_ERROR_PROCESSING;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return MapSECStatus(NSS_CMSSignerInfo_Verify(signer,
|
|
const_cast<SECItem*>(&detachedDigest),
|
|
&contentTypeOidData->oid));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
OpenSignedAppFile(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIFile* aJarFile,
|
|
/*out, optional */ nsIZipReader** aZipReader,
|
|
/*out, optional */ nsIX509Cert3** aSignerCert)
|
|
{
|
|
NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aJarFile);
|
|
|
|
if (aZipReader) {
|
|
*aZipReader = nullptr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (aSignerCert) {
|
|
*aSignerCert = nullptr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsresult rv;
|
|
|
|
static NS_DEFINE_CID(kZipReaderCID, NS_ZIPREADER_CID);
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIZipReader> zip = do_CreateInstance(kZipReaderCID, &rv);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
|
|
rv = zip->Open(aJarFile);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
|
|
// Signature (RSA) file
|
|
nsAutoCString sigFilename;
|
|
ScopedAutoSECItem sigBuffer;
|
|
rv = FindAndLoadOneEntry(zip, nsLiteralCString(JAR_RSA_SEARCH_STRING),
|
|
sigFilename, sigBuffer, nullptr);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Signature (SF) file
|
|
nsAutoCString sfFilename;
|
|
ScopedAutoSECItem sfBuffer;
|
|
Digest sfCalculatedDigest;
|
|
rv = FindAndLoadOneEntry(zip, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(JAR_SF_SEARCH_STRING),
|
|
sfFilename, sfBuffer, &sfCalculatedDigest);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sigBuffer.type = siBuffer;
|
|
mozilla::pkix::ScopedCERTCertList builtChain;
|
|
rv = VerifySignature(aTrustedRoot, sigBuffer, sfCalculatedDigest.get(),
|
|
builtChain);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ScopedAutoSECItem mfDigest;
|
|
rv = ParseSF(char_ptr_cast(sfBuffer.data), mfDigest);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Manifest (MF) file
|
|
nsAutoCString mfFilename;
|
|
ScopedAutoSECItem manifestBuffer;
|
|
Digest mfCalculatedDigest;
|
|
rv = FindAndLoadOneEntry(zip, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(JAR_MF_SEARCH_STRING),
|
|
mfFilename, manifestBuffer, &mfCalculatedDigest);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&mfDigest, &mfCalculatedDigest.get()) != SECEqual) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Allocate the I/O buffer only once per JAR, instead of once per entry, in
|
|
// order to minimize malloc/free calls and in order to avoid fragmenting
|
|
// memory.
|
|
ScopedAutoSECItem buf(128 * 1024);
|
|
|
|
nsTHashtable<nsCStringHashKey> items;
|
|
|
|
rv = ParseMF(char_ptr_cast(manifestBuffer.data), zip, items, buf);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify every entry in the file.
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIUTF8StringEnumerator> entries;
|
|
rv = zip->FindEntries(EmptyCString(), getter_AddRefs(entries));
|
|
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && !entries) {
|
|
rv = NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
|
|
}
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
bool hasMore;
|
|
rv = entries->HasMore(&hasMore);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
|
|
if (!hasMore) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsAutoCString entryFilename;
|
|
rv = entries->GetNext(entryFilename);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
|
|
PR_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("Verifying digests for %s",
|
|
entryFilename.get()));
|
|
|
|
// The files that comprise the signature mechanism are not covered by the
|
|
// signature.
|
|
//
|
|
// XXX: This is OK for a single signature, but doesn't work for
|
|
// multiple signatures, because the metadata for the other signatures
|
|
// is not signed either.
|
|
if (entryFilename == mfFilename ||
|
|
entryFilename == sfFilename ||
|
|
entryFilename == sigFilename) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (entryFilename.Length() == 0) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Entries with names that end in "/" are directory entries, which are not
|
|
// signed.
|
|
//
|
|
// XXX: As long as we don't unpack the JAR into the filesystem, the "/"
|
|
// entries are harmless. But, it is not clear what the security
|
|
// implications of directory entries are if/when we were to unpackage the
|
|
// JAR into the filesystem.
|
|
if (entryFilename[entryFilename.Length() - 1] == '/') {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsCStringHashKey * item = items.GetEntry(entryFilename);
|
|
if (!item) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_UNSIGNED_ENTRY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Remove the item so we can check for leftover items later
|
|
items.RemoveEntry(entryFilename);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We verified that every entry that we require to be signed is signed. But,
|
|
// were there any missing entries--that is, entries that are mentioned in the
|
|
// manifest but missing from the archive?
|
|
if (items.Count() != 0) {
|
|
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Return the reader to the caller if they want it
|
|
if (aZipReader) {
|
|
zip.forget(aZipReader);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Return the signer's certificate to the reader if they want it.
|
|
// XXX: We should return an nsIX509CertList with the whole validated chain,
|
|
// but we can't do that until we switch to libpkix.
|
|
if (aSignerCert) {
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(CERT_LIST_HEAD(builtChain));
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert3> signerCert =
|
|
nsNSSCertificate::Create(CERT_LIST_HEAD(builtChain)->cert);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(signerCert, NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
|
|
signerCert.forget(aSignerCert);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
class OpenSignedAppFileTask MOZ_FINAL : public CryptoTask
|
|
{
|
|
public:
|
|
OpenSignedAppFileTask(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIFile* aJarFile,
|
|
nsIOpenSignedAppFileCallback* aCallback)
|
|
: mTrustedRoot(aTrustedRoot)
|
|
, mJarFile(aJarFile)
|
|
, mCallback(new nsMainThreadPtrHolder<nsIOpenSignedAppFileCallback>(aCallback))
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
virtual nsresult CalculateResult() MOZ_OVERRIDE
|
|
{
|
|
return OpenSignedAppFile(mTrustedRoot, mJarFile,
|
|
getter_AddRefs(mZipReader),
|
|
getter_AddRefs(mSignerCert));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// nsNSSCertificate implements nsNSSShutdownObject, so there's nothing that
|
|
// needs to be released
|
|
virtual void ReleaseNSSResources() { }
|
|
|
|
virtual void CallCallback(nsresult rv)
|
|
{
|
|
(void) mCallback->OpenSignedAppFileFinished(rv, mZipReader, mSignerCert);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const AppTrustedRoot mTrustedRoot;
|
|
const nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> mJarFile;
|
|
nsMainThreadPtrHandle<nsIOpenSignedAppFileCallback> mCallback;
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIZipReader> mZipReader; // out
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert3> mSignerCert; // out
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
} // unnamed namespace
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
nsNSSCertificateDB::OpenSignedAppFileAsync(
|
|
AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIFile* aJarFile,
|
|
nsIOpenSignedAppFileCallback* aCallback)
|
|
{
|
|
NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aJarFile);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aCallback);
|
|
RefPtr<OpenSignedAppFileTask> task(new OpenSignedAppFileTask(aTrustedRoot,
|
|
aJarFile,
|
|
aCallback));
|
|
return task->Dispatch("SignedJAR");
|
|
}
|