/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */ /* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */ /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ #include "nsCOMPtr.h" #include "nsContentPolicyUtils.h" #include "nsContentUtils.h" #include "nsCSPContext.h" #include "nsCSPParser.h" #include "nsCSPService.h" #include "nsError.h" #include "nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback.h" #include "nsIClassInfoImpl.h" #include "nsIDocShell.h" #include "nsIDocShellTreeItem.h" #include "nsIDOMHTMLDocument.h" #include "nsIDOMHTMLElement.h" #include "nsIDOMNode.h" #include "nsIHttpChannel.h" #include "nsIInterfaceRequestor.h" #include "nsIInterfaceRequestorUtils.h" #include "nsIObjectInputStream.h" #include "nsIObjectOutputStream.h" #include "nsIObserver.h" #include "nsIObserverService.h" #include "nsIStringStream.h" #include "nsIUploadChannel.h" #include "nsIScriptError.h" #include "nsIWebNavigation.h" #include "nsNetUtil.h" #include "nsNullPrincipal.h" #include "nsIContentPolicy.h" #include "nsSupportsPrimitives.h" #include "nsThreadUtils.h" #include "nsString.h" #include "mozilla/Logging.h" #include "mozilla/dom/CSPReportBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/CSPDictionariesBinding.h" #include "mozilla/net/ReferrerPolicy.h" #include "nsINetworkInterceptController.h" using namespace mozilla; static PRLogModuleInfo * GetCspContextLog() { static PRLogModuleInfo *gCspContextPRLog; if (!gCspContextPRLog) gCspContextPRLog = PR_NewLogModule("CSPContext"); return gCspContextPRLog; } #define CSPCONTEXTLOG(args) MOZ_LOG(GetCspContextLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, args) #define CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED() MOZ_LOG_TEST(GetCspContextLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug) static const uint32_t CSP_CACHE_URI_CUTOFF_SIZE = 512; /** * Creates a key for use in the ShouldLoad cache. * Looks like: ! */ nsresult CreateCacheKey_Internal(nsIURI* aContentLocation, nsContentPolicyType aContentType, nsACString& outCacheKey) { if (!aContentLocation) { return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } bool isDataScheme = false; nsresult rv = aContentLocation->SchemeIs("data", &isDataScheme); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); outCacheKey.Truncate(); if (aContentType != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT && isDataScheme) { // For non-script data: URI, use ("data:", aContentType) as the cache key. outCacheKey.Append(NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("data:")); outCacheKey.AppendInt(aContentType); return NS_OK; } nsAutoCString spec; rv = aContentLocation->GetSpec(spec); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // Don't cache for a URI longer than the cutoff size. if (spec.Length() <= CSP_CACHE_URI_CUTOFF_SIZE) { outCacheKey.Append(spec); outCacheKey.Append(NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("!")); outCacheKey.AppendInt(aContentType); } return NS_OK; } /* ===== nsIContentSecurityPolicy impl ====== */ NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::ShouldLoad(nsContentPolicyType aContentType, nsIURI* aContentLocation, nsIURI* aRequestOrigin, nsISupports* aRequestContext, const nsACString& aMimeTypeGuess, nsISupports* aExtra, int16_t* outDecision) { if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) { nsAutoCString spec; aContentLocation->GetSpec(spec); CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::ShouldLoad, aContentLocation: %s", spec.get())); } nsresult rv = NS_OK; // This ShouldLoad function is called from nsCSPService::ShouldLoad, // which already checked a number of things, including: // * aContentLocation is not null; we can consume this without further checks // * scheme is not a whitelisted scheme (about: chrome:, etc). // * CSP is enabled // * Content Type is not whitelisted (CSP Reports, TYPE_DOCUMENT, etc). // * Fast Path for Apps nsAutoCString cacheKey; rv = CreateCacheKey_Internal(aContentLocation, aContentType, cacheKey); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); bool isCached = mShouldLoadCache.Get(cacheKey, outDecision); if (isCached && cacheKey.Length() > 0) { // this is cached, use the cached value. return NS_OK; } // Default decision, CSP can revise it if there's a policy to enforce *outDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; // If the content type doesn't map to a CSP directive, there's nothing for // CSP to do. CSPDirective dir = CSP_ContentTypeToDirective(aContentType); if (dir == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::NO_DIRECTIVE) { return NS_OK; } // This may be a load or a preload. If it is a preload, the document will // not have been fully parsed yet, and aRequestContext will be an // nsIDOMHTMLDocument rather than the nsIDOMHTMLElement associated with the // resource. As a result, we cannot extract the element's corresponding // nonce attribute, and so we cannot correctly check the nonce on a preload. // // Therefore, the decision returned here for a preload may be *incorrect* as // it cannot take the nonce into account. We will still check the load, but // we will not cache the result or report a violation. When the "real load" // happens subsequently, we will re-check with the additional context to // make a final decision. // // We don't just return false because that would block all preloads and // degrade performance. However, we do want to block preloads that are // clearly blocked (their urls are not whitelisted) by CSP. nsCOMPtr doc = do_QueryInterface(aRequestContext); bool isPreload = doc && (aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT || aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET); nsAutoString nonce; if (!isPreload) { nsCOMPtr htmlElement = do_QueryInterface(aRequestContext); if (htmlElement) { rv = htmlElement->GetAttribute(NS_LITERAL_STRING("nonce"), nonce); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); } } // aExtra is only non-null if the channel got redirected. bool wasRedirected = (aExtra != nullptr); nsCOMPtr originalURI = do_QueryInterface(aExtra); bool permitted = permitsInternal(dir, aContentLocation, originalURI, nonce, wasRedirected, isPreload, false, // allow fallback to default-src true, // send violation reports true); // send blocked URI in violation reports *outDecision = permitted ? nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT : nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_SERVER; // Done looping, cache any relevant result if (cacheKey.Length() > 0 && !isPreload) { mShouldLoadCache.Put(cacheKey, *outDecision); } if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) { nsAutoCString spec; aContentLocation->GetSpec(spec); CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::ShouldLoad, decision: %s, aContentLocation: %s", *outDecision ? "load" : "deny", spec.get())); } return NS_OK; } bool nsCSPContext::permitsInternal(CSPDirective aDir, nsIURI* aContentLocation, nsIURI* aOriginalURI, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected, bool aIsPreload, bool aSpecific, bool aSendViolationReports, bool aSendContentLocationInViolationReports) { bool permits = true; nsAutoString violatedDirective; for (uint32_t p = 0; p < mPolicies.Length(); p++) { // According to the W3C CSP spec, frame-ancestors checks are ignored for // report-only policies (when "monitoring"). if (aDir == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_ANCESTORS_DIRECTIVE && mPolicies[p]->getReportOnlyFlag()) { continue; } if (!mPolicies[p]->permits(aDir, aContentLocation, aNonce, aWasRedirected, aSpecific, violatedDirective)) { // If the policy is violated and not report-only, reject the load and // report to the console if (!mPolicies[p]->getReportOnlyFlag()) { CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::permitsInternal, false")); permits = false; } // Do not send a report or notify observers if this is a preload - the // decision may be wrong due to the inability to get the nonce, and will // incorrectly fail the unit tests. if (!aIsPreload && aSendViolationReports) { this->AsyncReportViolation((aSendContentLocationInViolationReports ? aContentLocation : nullptr), aOriginalURI, /* in case of redirect originalURI is not null */ violatedDirective, p, /* policy index */ EmptyString(), /* no observer subject */ EmptyString(), /* no source file */ EmptyString(), /* no script sample */ 0); /* no line number */ } } } return permits; } /* ===== nsISupports implementation ========== */ NS_IMPL_CLASSINFO(nsCSPContext, nullptr, nsIClassInfo::MAIN_THREAD_ONLY, NS_CSPCONTEXT_CID) NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS_CI(nsCSPContext, nsIContentSecurityPolicy, nsISerializable) nsCSPContext::nsCSPContext() : mSelfURI(nullptr) { CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::nsCSPContext")); } nsCSPContext::~nsCSPContext() { CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::~nsCSPContext")); for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) { delete mPolicies[i]; } mShouldLoadCache.Clear(); } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::GetPolicy(uint32_t aIndex, nsAString& outStr) { if (aIndex >= mPolicies.Length()) { return NS_ERROR_ILLEGAL_VALUE; } mPolicies[aIndex]->toString(outStr); return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::GetPolicyCount(uint32_t *outPolicyCount) { *outPolicyCount = mPolicies.Length(); return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::GetUpgradeInsecureRequests(bool *outUpgradeRequest) { *outUpgradeRequest = false; for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) { if (mPolicies[i]->hasDirective(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE)) { *outUpgradeRequest = true; return NS_OK; } } return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::GetReferrerPolicy(uint32_t* outPolicy, bool* outIsSet) { *outIsSet = false; *outPolicy = mozilla::net::RP_Default; nsAutoString refpol; mozilla::net::ReferrerPolicy previousPolicy = mozilla::net::RP_Default; for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) { mPolicies[i]->getReferrerPolicy(refpol); // an empty string in refpol means it wasn't set (that's the default in // nsCSPPolicy). if (!refpol.IsEmpty()) { // if there are two policies that specify a referrer policy, then they // must agree or the employed policy is no-referrer. uint32_t currentPolicy = mozilla::net::ReferrerPolicyFromString(refpol); if (*outIsSet && previousPolicy != currentPolicy) { *outPolicy = mozilla::net::RP_No_Referrer; return NS_OK; } *outPolicy = currentPolicy; *outIsSet = true; } } return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::RemovePolicy(uint32_t aIndex) { if (aIndex >= mPolicies.Length()) { return NS_ERROR_ILLEGAL_VALUE; } mPolicies.RemoveElementAt(aIndex); // reset cache since effective policy changes mShouldLoadCache.Clear(); return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::AppendPolicy(const nsAString& aPolicyString, bool aReportOnly) { CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::AppendPolicy: %s", NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPolicyString).get())); // Use the mSelfURI from setRequestContext, see bug 991474 NS_ASSERTION(mSelfURI, "mSelfURI required for AppendPolicy, but not set"); nsCSPPolicy* policy = nsCSPParser::parseContentSecurityPolicy(aPolicyString, mSelfURI, aReportOnly, mInnerWindowID); if (policy) { mPolicies.AppendElement(policy); // reset cache since effective policy changes mShouldLoadCache.Clear(); } return NS_OK; } // aNonceOrContent either holds the nonce-value or otherwise the content // of the element to be hashed. NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::getAllowsInternal(nsContentPolicyType aContentType, enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aNonceOrContent, bool* outShouldReportViolation, bool* outIsAllowed) const { *outShouldReportViolation = false; *outIsAllowed = true; // Skip things that aren't hash/nonce compatible if (aKeyword == CSP_NONCE || aKeyword == CSP_HASH) { if (!(aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT || aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET)) { *outIsAllowed = false; return NS_OK; } } for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) { if (!mPolicies[i]->allows(aContentType, aKeyword, aNonceOrContent)) { // policy is violated: must report the violation and allow the inline // script if the policy is report-only. *outShouldReportViolation = true; if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag()) { *outIsAllowed = false; } } } CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::getAllowsInternal, aContentType: %d, aKeyword: %s, aNonceOrContent: %s, isAllowed: %s", aContentType, aKeyword == CSP_HASH ? "hash" : CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aNonceOrContent).get(), *outIsAllowed ? "load" : "deny")); return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::GetAllowsInlineScript(bool* outShouldReportViolation, bool* outAllowsInlineScript) { return getAllowsInternal(nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE, EmptyString(), outShouldReportViolation, outAllowsInlineScript); } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::GetAllowsEval(bool* outShouldReportViolation, bool* outAllowsEval) { return getAllowsInternal(nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT, CSP_UNSAFE_EVAL, EmptyString(), outShouldReportViolation, outAllowsEval); } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::GetAllowsInlineStyle(bool* outShouldReportViolation, bool* outAllowsInlineStyle) { return getAllowsInternal(nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE, EmptyString(), outShouldReportViolation, outAllowsInlineStyle); } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::GetAllowsNonce(const nsAString& aNonce, uint32_t aContentType, bool* outShouldReportViolation, bool* outAllowsNonce) { return getAllowsInternal(aContentType, CSP_NONCE, aNonce, outShouldReportViolation, outAllowsNonce); } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::GetAllowsHash(const nsAString& aContent, uint16_t aContentType, bool* outShouldReportViolation, bool* outAllowsHash) { return getAllowsInternal(aContentType, CSP_HASH, aContent, outShouldReportViolation, outAllowsHash); } /** * Reduces some code repetition for the various logging situations in * LogViolationDetails. * * Call-sites for the eval/inline checks recieve two return values: allows * and violates. Based on those, they must choose whether to call * LogViolationDetails or not. Policies that are report-only allow the * loads/compilations but violations should still be reported. Not all * policies in this nsIContentSecurityPolicy instance will be violated, * which is why we must check allows() again here. * * Note: This macro uses some parameters from its caller's context: * p, mPolicies, this, aSourceFile, aScriptSample, aLineNum, selfISupports * * @param violationType: the VIOLATION_TYPE_* constant (partial symbol) * such as INLINE_SCRIPT * @param contentPolicyType: a constant from nsIContentPolicy such as TYPE_STYLESHEET * @param nonceOrHash: for NONCE and HASH violations, it's the nonce or content * string. For other violations, it is an empty string. * @param keyword: the keyword corresponding to violation (UNSAFE_INLINE for most) * @param observerTopic: the observer topic string to send with the CSP * observer notifications. */ #define CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(violationType, contentPolicyType, nonceOrHash, \ keyword, observerTopic) \ case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_ ## violationType : \ PR_BEGIN_MACRO \ if (!mPolicies[p]->allows(nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_ ## contentPolicyType, \ keyword, nonceOrHash)) \ { \ nsAutoString violatedDirective; \ mPolicies[p]->getDirectiveStringForContentType( \ nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_ ## contentPolicyType, \ violatedDirective); \ this->AsyncReportViolation(selfISupports, nullptr, violatedDirective, p, \ NS_LITERAL_STRING(observerTopic), \ aSourceFile, aScriptSample, aLineNum); \ } \ PR_END_MACRO; \ break /** * For each policy, log any violation on the Error Console and send a report * if a report-uri is present in the policy * * @param aViolationType * one of the VIOLATION_TYPE_* constants, e.g. inline-script or eval * @param aSourceFile * name of the source file containing the violation (if available) * @param aContentSample * sample of the violating content (to aid debugging) * @param aLineNum * source line number of the violation (if available) * @param aNonce * (optional) If this is a nonce violation, include the nonce so we can * recheck to determine which policies were violated and send the * appropriate reports. * @param aContent * (optional) If this is a hash violation, include contents of the inline * resource in the question so we can recheck the hash in order to * determine which policies were violated and send the appropriate * reports. */ NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::LogViolationDetails(uint16_t aViolationType, const nsAString& aSourceFile, const nsAString& aScriptSample, int32_t aLineNum, const nsAString& aNonce, const nsAString& aContent) { for (uint32_t p = 0; p < mPolicies.Length(); p++) { NS_ASSERTION(mPolicies[p], "null pointer in nsTArray"); nsCOMPtr selfICString(do_CreateInstance(NS_SUPPORTS_CSTRING_CONTRACTID)); if (selfICString) { selfICString->SetData(nsDependentCString("self")); } nsCOMPtr selfISupports(do_QueryInterface(selfICString)); switch (aViolationType) { CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(EVAL, SCRIPT, NS_LITERAL_STRING(""), CSP_UNSAFE_EVAL, EVAL_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC); CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(INLINE_STYLE, STYLESHEET, NS_LITERAL_STRING(""), CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE, INLINE_STYLE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC); CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(INLINE_SCRIPT, SCRIPT, NS_LITERAL_STRING(""), CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE, INLINE_SCRIPT_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC); CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(NONCE_SCRIPT, SCRIPT, aNonce, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE, SCRIPT_NONCE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC); CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(NONCE_STYLE, STYLESHEET, aNonce, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE, STYLE_NONCE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC); CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(HASH_SCRIPT, SCRIPT, aContent, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE, SCRIPT_HASH_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC); CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(HASH_STYLE, STYLESHEET, aContent, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE, STYLE_HASH_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC); default: NS_ASSERTION(false, "LogViolationDetails with invalid type"); break; } } return NS_OK; } #undef CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::SetRequestContext(nsIURI* aSelfURI, nsIURI* aReferrer, nsIChannel* aChannel) { NS_PRECONDITION(aSelfURI || aChannel, "Need aSelfURI or aChannel to set the context properly"); NS_ENSURE_ARG(aSelfURI || aChannel); // first use aSelfURI. If that's not available get the URI from aChannel. mSelfURI = aSelfURI; if (!mSelfURI) { nsresult rv = aChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(mSelfURI)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); } NS_ASSERTION(mSelfURI, "No aSelfURI and no URI available from channel in SetRequestContext, can not translate 'self' into actual URI"); if (aChannel) { mInnerWindowID = nsContentUtils::GetInnerWindowID(aChannel); aChannel->GetLoadGroup(getter_AddRefs(mCallingChannelLoadGroup)); // Storing the nsINode from the LoadInfo of the original channel, // so we can reuse that information when sending reports. nsCOMPtr loadInfo; aChannel->GetLoadInfo(getter_AddRefs(loadInfo)); if (loadInfo) { nsINode* loadingNode = loadInfo->LoadingNode(); if (loadingNode) { mLoadingContext = do_GetWeakReference(loadingNode); } } } else { NS_WARNING("Channel needed (but null) in SetRequestContext. Cannot query loadgroup, which means report sending may fail."); } mReferrer = aReferrer; if (!mReferrer) { nsCOMPtr httpChannel(do_QueryInterface(aChannel)); if (httpChannel) { httpChannel->GetReferrer(getter_AddRefs(mReferrer)); } else { NS_WARNING("Channel provided to SetRequestContext is not an nsIHttpChannel so referrer is not available for reporting." ); } } return NS_OK; } /** * Sends CSP violation reports to all sources listed under report-uri. * * @param aBlockedContentSource * Either a CSP Source (like 'self', as string) or nsIURI: the source * of the violation. * @param aOriginalUri * The original URI if the blocked content is a redirect, else null * @param aViolatedDirective * the directive that was violated (string). * @param aSourceFile * name of the file containing the inline script violation * @param aScriptSample * a sample of the violating inline script * @param aLineNum * source line number of the violation (if available) */ nsresult nsCSPContext::SendReports(nsISupports* aBlockedContentSource, nsIURI* aOriginalURI, nsAString& aViolatedDirective, uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex, nsAString& aSourceFile, nsAString& aScriptSample, uint32_t aLineNum) { NS_ENSURE_ARG_MAX(aViolatedPolicyIndex, mPolicies.Length() - 1); #ifdef MOZ_B2G // load group information (on process-split necko implementations like b2g). // (fix this in bug 1011086) if (!mCallingChannelLoadGroup) { NS_WARNING("Load group required but not present for report sending; cannot send CSP violation reports"); return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } #endif dom::CSPReport report; nsresult rv; // blocked-uri if (aBlockedContentSource) { nsAutoCString reportBlockedURI; nsCOMPtr uri = do_QueryInterface(aBlockedContentSource); // could be a string or URI if (uri) { // aOriginalURI will only be *not* null in case of a redirect in which // case aOriginalURI is the uri before the redirect. if (aOriginalURI) { // do not report anything else than the origin in case of a redirect, see: // http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP/#violation-reports uri->GetPrePath(reportBlockedURI); } else { uri->GetSpecIgnoringRef(reportBlockedURI); } } else { nsCOMPtr cstr = do_QueryInterface(aBlockedContentSource); if (cstr) { cstr->GetData(reportBlockedURI); } } if (reportBlockedURI.IsEmpty()) { // this can happen for frame-ancestors violation where the violating // ancestor is cross-origin. NS_WARNING("No blocked URI (null aBlockedContentSource) for CSP violation report."); } report.mCsp_report.mBlocked_uri = NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(reportBlockedURI); } // document-uri nsAutoCString reportDocumentURI; mSelfURI->GetSpecIgnoringRef(reportDocumentURI); report.mCsp_report.mDocument_uri = NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(reportDocumentURI); // original-policy nsAutoString originalPolicy; rv = this->GetPolicy(aViolatedPolicyIndex, originalPolicy); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); report.mCsp_report.mOriginal_policy = originalPolicy; // referrer if (mReferrer) { nsAutoCString referrerURI; mReferrer->GetSpec(referrerURI); report.mCsp_report.mReferrer = NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(referrerURI); } // violated-directive report.mCsp_report.mViolated_directive = aViolatedDirective; // source-file if (!aSourceFile.IsEmpty()) { // if aSourceFile is a URI, we have to make sure to strip fragments nsCOMPtr sourceURI; NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(sourceURI), aSourceFile); if (sourceURI) { nsAutoCString spec; sourceURI->GetSpecIgnoringRef(spec); aSourceFile = NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(spec); } report.mCsp_report.mSource_file.Construct(); report.mCsp_report.mSource_file.Value() = aSourceFile; } // script-sample if (!aScriptSample.IsEmpty()) { report.mCsp_report.mScript_sample.Construct(); report.mCsp_report.mScript_sample.Value() = aScriptSample; } // line-number if (aLineNum != 0) { report.mCsp_report.mLine_number.Construct(); report.mCsp_report.mLine_number.Value() = aLineNum; } nsString csp_report; if (!report.ToJSON(csp_report)) { return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } // ---------- Assembled, now send it to all the report URIs ----------- // nsTArray reportURIs; mPolicies[aViolatedPolicyIndex]->getReportURIs(reportURIs); nsCOMPtr reportURI; nsCOMPtr reportChannel; nsCOMPtr loadingContext = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext); nsCOMPtr loadingNode = do_QueryInterface(loadingContext); for (uint32_t r = 0; r < reportURIs.Length(); r++) { nsAutoCString reportURICstring = NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(reportURIs[r]); // try to create a new uri from every report-uri string rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(reportURI), reportURIs[r]); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { const char16_t* params[] = { reportURIs[r].get() }; CSPCONTEXTLOG(("Could not create nsIURI for report URI %s", reportURICstring.get())); CSP_LogLocalizedStr(NS_LITERAL_STRING("triedToSendReport").get(), params, ArrayLength(params), aSourceFile, aScriptSample, aLineNum, 0, nsIScriptError::errorFlag, "CSP", mInnerWindowID); continue; // don't return yet, there may be more URIs } nsIDocShell* docShell = nullptr; // try to create a new channel for every report-uri if (loadingNode) { nsIDocument* doc = loadingNode->OwnerDoc(); if (doc) { docShell = doc->GetDocShell(); } rv = NS_NewChannel(getter_AddRefs(reportChannel), reportURI, loadingNode, nsILoadInfo::SEC_NORMAL, nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT); } else { nsCOMPtr nullPrincipal = nsNullPrincipal::Create(); NS_ENSURE_TRUE(nullPrincipal, NS_ERROR_FAILURE); rv = NS_NewChannel(getter_AddRefs(reportChannel), reportURI, nullPrincipal, nsILoadInfo::SEC_NORMAL, nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT); } if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { CSPCONTEXTLOG(("Could not create new channel for report URI %s", reportURICstring.get())); continue; // don't return yet, there may be more URIs } // log a warning to console if scheme is not http or https bool isHttpScheme = (NS_SUCCEEDED(reportURI->SchemeIs("http", &isHttpScheme)) && isHttpScheme) || (NS_SUCCEEDED(reportURI->SchemeIs("https", &isHttpScheme)) && isHttpScheme); if (!isHttpScheme) { const char16_t* params[] = { reportURIs[r].get() }; CSP_LogLocalizedStr(NS_LITERAL_STRING("reportURInotHttpsOrHttp2").get(), params, ArrayLength(params), aSourceFile, aScriptSample, aLineNum, 0, nsIScriptError::errorFlag, "CSP", mInnerWindowID); } // make sure this is an anonymous request (no cookies) so in case the // policy URI is injected, it can't be abused for CSRF. nsLoadFlags flags; rv = reportChannel->GetLoadFlags(&flags); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); flags |= nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS; rv = reportChannel->SetLoadFlags(flags); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // we need to set an nsIChannelEventSink on the channel object // so we can tell it to not follow redirects when posting the reports nsRefPtr reportSink = new CSPReportRedirectSink(); if (docShell) { nsCOMPtr interceptController = do_QueryInterface(docShell); reportSink->SetInterceptController(interceptController); } reportChannel->SetNotificationCallbacks(reportSink); // apply the loadgroup from the channel taken by setRequestContext. If // there's no loadgroup, AsyncOpen will fail on process-split necko (since // the channel cannot query the iTabChild). rv = reportChannel->SetLoadGroup(mCallingChannelLoadGroup); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // check content policy int16_t shouldLoad = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; nsCOMPtr cp = do_GetService(NS_CONTENTPOLICY_CONTRACTID); if (!cp) { return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } rv = cp->ShouldLoad(nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT, reportURI, mSelfURI, nullptr, // Context EmptyCString(), // mime type nullptr, // Extra parameter nullptr, // optional request principal &shouldLoad); // refuse to load if we can't do a security check NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (NS_CP_REJECTED(shouldLoad)) { // skip unauthorized URIs CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsIContentPolicy blocked sending report to %s", reportURICstring.get())); continue; // don't return yet, there may be more URIs } // wire in the string input stream to send the report nsCOMPtr sis(do_CreateInstance(NS_STRINGINPUTSTREAM_CONTRACTID)); NS_ASSERTION(sis, "nsIStringInputStream is needed but not available to send CSP violation reports"); rv = sis->SetData(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(csp_report).get(), csp_report.Length()); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); nsCOMPtr uploadChannel(do_QueryInterface(reportChannel)); NS_ASSERTION(uploadChannel, "nsIUploadChannel is needed but not available to send CSP violation reports"); rv = uploadChannel->SetUploadStream(sis, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("application/json"), -1); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // if this is an HTTP channel, set the request method to post nsCOMPtr httpChannel(do_QueryInterface(reportChannel)); if (httpChannel) { httpChannel->SetRequestMethod(NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("POST")); } nsRefPtr listener = new CSPViolationReportListener(); rv = reportChannel->AsyncOpen(listener, nullptr); // AsyncOpen should not fail, but could if there's no load group (like if // SetRequestContext is not given a channel). This should fail quietly and // not return an error since it's really ok if reports don't go out, but // it's good to log the error locally. if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { const char16_t* params[] = { reportURIs[r].get() }; CSPCONTEXTLOG(("AsyncOpen failed for report URI %s", params[0])); CSP_LogLocalizedStr(NS_LITERAL_STRING("triedToSendReport").get(), params, ArrayLength(params), aSourceFile, aScriptSample, aLineNum, 0, nsIScriptError::errorFlag, "CSP", mInnerWindowID); } else { CSPCONTEXTLOG(("Sent violation report to URI %s", reportURICstring.get())); } } return NS_OK; } /** * Dispatched from the main thread to send reports for one CSP violation. */ class CSPReportSenderRunnable final : public nsRunnable { public: CSPReportSenderRunnable(nsISupports* aBlockedContentSource, nsIURI* aOriginalURI, uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex, bool aReportOnlyFlag, const nsAString& aViolatedDirective, const nsAString& aObserverSubject, const nsAString& aSourceFile, const nsAString& aScriptSample, uint32_t aLineNum, uint64_t aInnerWindowID, nsCSPContext* aCSPContext) : mBlockedContentSource(aBlockedContentSource) , mOriginalURI(aOriginalURI) , mViolatedPolicyIndex(aViolatedPolicyIndex) , mReportOnlyFlag(aReportOnlyFlag) , mViolatedDirective(aViolatedDirective) , mSourceFile(aSourceFile) , mScriptSample(aScriptSample) , mLineNum(aLineNum) , mInnerWindowID(aInnerWindowID) , mCSPContext(aCSPContext) { NS_ASSERTION(!aViolatedDirective.IsEmpty(), "Can not send reports without a violated directive"); // the observer subject is an nsISupports: either an nsISupportsCString // from the arg passed in directly, or if that's empty, it's the blocked // source. if (aObserverSubject.IsEmpty()) { mObserverSubject = aBlockedContentSource; } else { nsCOMPtr supportscstr = do_CreateInstance(NS_SUPPORTS_CSTRING_CONTRACTID); NS_ASSERTION(supportscstr, "Couldn't allocate nsISupportsCString"); supportscstr->SetData(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aObserverSubject)); mObserverSubject = do_QueryInterface(supportscstr); } } NS_IMETHOD Run() { MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread()); // 1) notify observers nsCOMPtr observerService = mozilla::services::GetObserverService(); NS_ASSERTION(observerService, "needs observer service"); nsresult rv = observerService->NotifyObservers(mObserverSubject, CSP_VIOLATION_TOPIC, mViolatedDirective.get()); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // 2) send reports for the policy that was violated mCSPContext->SendReports(mBlockedContentSource, mOriginalURI, mViolatedDirective, mViolatedPolicyIndex, mSourceFile, mScriptSample, mLineNum); // 3) log to console (one per policy violation) // mBlockedContentSource could be a URI or a string. nsCOMPtr blockedURI = do_QueryInterface(mBlockedContentSource); // if mBlockedContentSource is not a URI, it could be a string nsCOMPtr blockedString = do_QueryInterface(mBlockedContentSource); nsCString blockedDataStr; if (blockedURI) { blockedURI->GetSpec(blockedDataStr); } else if (blockedString) { blockedString->GetData(blockedDataStr); } if (blockedDataStr.Length() > 0) { nsString blockedDataChar16 = NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(blockedDataStr); const char16_t* params[] = { mViolatedDirective.get(), blockedDataChar16.get() }; CSP_LogLocalizedStr(mReportOnlyFlag ? NS_LITERAL_STRING("CSPROViolationWithURI").get() : NS_LITERAL_STRING("CSPViolationWithURI").get(), params, ArrayLength(params), mSourceFile, mScriptSample, mLineNum, 0, nsIScriptError::errorFlag, "CSP", mInnerWindowID); } return NS_OK; } private: nsCOMPtr mBlockedContentSource; nsCOMPtr mOriginalURI; uint32_t mViolatedPolicyIndex; bool mReportOnlyFlag; nsString mViolatedDirective; nsCOMPtr mObserverSubject; nsString mSourceFile; nsString mScriptSample; uint32_t mLineNum; uint64_t mInnerWindowID; nsRefPtr mCSPContext; }; /** * Asynchronously notifies any nsIObservers listening to the CSP violation * topic that a violation occurred. Also triggers report sending and console * logging. All asynchronous on the main thread. * * @param aBlockedContentSource * Either a CSP Source (like 'self', as string) or nsIURI: the source * of the violation. * @param aOriginalUri * The original URI if the blocked content is a redirect, else null * @param aViolatedDirective * the directive that was violated (string). * @param aViolatedPolicyIndex * the index of the policy that was violated (so we know where to send * the reports). * @param aObserverSubject * optional, subject sent to the nsIObservers listening to the CSP * violation topic. * @param aSourceFile * name of the file containing the inline script violation * @param aScriptSample * a sample of the violating inline script * @param aLineNum * source line number of the violation (if available) */ nsresult nsCSPContext::AsyncReportViolation(nsISupports* aBlockedContentSource, nsIURI* aOriginalURI, const nsAString& aViolatedDirective, uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex, const nsAString& aObserverSubject, const nsAString& aSourceFile, const nsAString& aScriptSample, uint32_t aLineNum) { NS_ENSURE_ARG_MAX(aViolatedPolicyIndex, mPolicies.Length() - 1); NS_DispatchToMainThread(new CSPReportSenderRunnable(aBlockedContentSource, aOriginalURI, aViolatedPolicyIndex, mPolicies[aViolatedPolicyIndex]->getReportOnlyFlag(), aViolatedDirective, aObserverSubject, aSourceFile, aScriptSample, aLineNum, mInnerWindowID, this)); return NS_OK; } /** * Based on the given docshell, determines if this CSP context allows the * ancestry. * * In order to determine the URI of the parent document (one causing the load * of this protected document), this function obtains the docShellTreeItem, * then walks up the hierarchy until it finds a privileged (chrome) tree item. * Getting the a tree item's URI looks like this in pseudocode: * * nsIDocShellTreeItem->GetDocument()->GetDocumentURI(); * * aDocShell is the docShell for the protected document. */ NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::PermitsAncestry(nsIDocShell* aDocShell, bool* outPermitsAncestry) { nsresult rv; // Can't check ancestry without a docShell. if (aDocShell == nullptr) { return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } *outPermitsAncestry = true; // extract the ancestry as an array nsCOMArray ancestorsArray; nsCOMPtr ir(do_QueryInterface(aDocShell)); nsCOMPtr treeItem(do_GetInterface(ir)); nsCOMPtr parentTreeItem; nsCOMPtr currentURI; nsCOMPtr uriClone; // iterate through each docShell parent item while (NS_SUCCEEDED(treeItem->GetParent(getter_AddRefs(parentTreeItem))) && parentTreeItem != nullptr) { nsIDocument* doc = parentTreeItem->GetDocument(); NS_ASSERTION(doc, "Could not get nsIDocument from nsIDocShellTreeItem in nsCSPContext::PermitsAncestry"); NS_ENSURE_TRUE(doc, NS_ERROR_FAILURE); currentURI = doc->GetDocumentURI(); if (currentURI) { // stop when reaching chrome bool isChrome = false; rv = currentURI->SchemeIs("chrome", &isChrome); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (isChrome) { break; } // delete the userpass from the URI. rv = currentURI->CloneIgnoringRef(getter_AddRefs(uriClone)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // We don't care if this succeeds, just want to delete a userpass if // there was one. uriClone->SetUserPass(EmptyCString()); if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) { nsAutoCString spec; uriClone->GetSpec(spec); CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::PermitsAncestry, found ancestor: %s", spec.get())); } ancestorsArray.AppendElement(uriClone); } // next ancestor treeItem = parentTreeItem; } nsAutoString violatedDirective; // Now that we've got the ancestry chain in ancestorsArray, time to check // them against any CSP. // NOTE: the ancestors are not allowed to be sent cross origin; this is a // restriction not placed on subresource loads. for (uint32_t a = 0; a < ancestorsArray.Length(); a++) { if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) { nsAutoCString spec; ancestorsArray[a]->GetSpec(spec); CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::PermitsAncestry, checking ancestor: %s", spec.get())); } // omit the ancestor URI in violation reports if cross-origin as per spec // (it is a violation of the same-origin policy). bool okToSendAncestor = NS_SecurityCompareURIs(ancestorsArray[a], mSelfURI, true); bool permits = permitsInternal(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_ANCESTORS_DIRECTIVE, ancestorsArray[a], nullptr, // no redirect here. EmptyString(), // no nonce false, // no redirect here. false, // not a preload. true, // specific, do not use default-src true, // send violation reports okToSendAncestor); if (!permits) { *outPermitsAncestry = false; } } return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::Permits(nsIURI* aURI, CSPDirective aDir, bool aSpecific, bool* outPermits) { // Can't perform check without aURI if (aURI == nullptr) { return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } *outPermits = permitsInternal(aDir, aURI, nullptr, // no original (pre-redirect) URI EmptyString(), // no nonce false, // not redirected. false, // not a preload. aSpecific, true, // send violation reports true); // send blocked URI in violation reports if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) { nsAutoCString spec; aURI->GetSpec(spec); CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::Permits, aUri: %s, aDir: %d, isAllowed: %s", spec.get(), aDir, *outPermits ? "allow" : "deny")); } return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::ToJSON(nsAString& outCSPinJSON) { outCSPinJSON.Truncate(); dom::CSPPolicies jsonPolicies; jsonPolicies.mCsp_policies.Construct(); for (uint32_t p = 0; p < mPolicies.Length(); p++) { dom::CSP jsonCSP; mPolicies[p]->toDomCSPStruct(jsonCSP); jsonPolicies.mCsp_policies.Value().AppendElement(jsonCSP, fallible); } // convert the gathered information to JSON if (!jsonPolicies.ToJSON(outCSPinJSON)) { return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } return NS_OK; } /* ========== CSPViolationReportListener implementation ========== */ NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(CSPViolationReportListener, nsIStreamListener, nsIRequestObserver, nsISupports); CSPViolationReportListener::CSPViolationReportListener() { } CSPViolationReportListener::~CSPViolationReportListener() { } NS_METHOD AppendSegmentToString(nsIInputStream* aInputStream, void* aClosure, const char* aRawSegment, uint32_t aToOffset, uint32_t aCount, uint32_t* outWrittenCount) { nsCString* decodedData = static_cast(aClosure); decodedData->Append(aRawSegment, aCount); *outWrittenCount = aCount; return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP CSPViolationReportListener::OnDataAvailable(nsIRequest* aRequest, nsISupports* aContext, nsIInputStream* aInputStream, uint64_t aOffset, uint32_t aCount) { uint32_t read; nsCString decodedData; return aInputStream->ReadSegments(AppendSegmentToString, &decodedData, aCount, &read); } NS_IMETHODIMP CSPViolationReportListener::OnStopRequest(nsIRequest* aRequest, nsISupports* aContext, nsresult aStatus) { return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP CSPViolationReportListener::OnStartRequest(nsIRequest* aRequest, nsISupports* aContext) { return NS_OK; } /* ========== CSPReportRedirectSink implementation ========== */ NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(CSPReportRedirectSink, nsIChannelEventSink, nsIInterfaceRequestor); CSPReportRedirectSink::CSPReportRedirectSink() { } CSPReportRedirectSink::~CSPReportRedirectSink() { } NS_IMETHODIMP CSPReportRedirectSink::AsyncOnChannelRedirect(nsIChannel* aOldChannel, nsIChannel* aNewChannel, uint32_t aRedirFlags, nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback* aCallback) { // cancel the old channel so XHR failure callback happens nsresult rv = aOldChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_ABORT); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // notify an observer that we have blocked the report POST due to a redirect, // used in testing, do this async since we're in an async call now to begin with nsCOMPtr uri; rv = aOldChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); nsCOMPtr observerService = mozilla::services::GetObserverService(); NS_ASSERTION(observerService, "Observer service required to log CSP violations"); observerService->NotifyObservers(uri, CSP_VIOLATION_TOPIC, NS_LITERAL_STRING("denied redirect while sending violation report").get()); return NS_BINDING_REDIRECTED; } NS_IMETHODIMP CSPReportRedirectSink::GetInterface(const nsIID& aIID, void** aResult) { if (aIID.Equals(NS_GET_IID(nsINetworkInterceptController)) && mInterceptController) { nsCOMPtr copy(mInterceptController); *aResult = copy.forget().take(); return NS_OK; } return QueryInterface(aIID, aResult); } void CSPReportRedirectSink::SetInterceptController(nsINetworkInterceptController* aInterceptController) { mInterceptController = aInterceptController; } /* ===== nsISerializable implementation ====== */ NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::Read(nsIObjectInputStream* aStream) { nsresult rv; nsCOMPtr supports; rv = NS_ReadOptionalObject(aStream, true, getter_AddRefs(supports)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); mSelfURI = do_QueryInterface(supports); NS_ASSERTION(mSelfURI, "need a self URI to de-serialize"); uint32_t numPolicies; rv = aStream->Read32(&numPolicies); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); nsAutoString policyString; while (numPolicies > 0) { numPolicies--; rv = aStream->ReadString(policyString); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); bool reportOnly = false; rv = aStream->ReadBoolean(&reportOnly); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); nsCSPPolicy* policy = nsCSPParser::parseContentSecurityPolicy(policyString, mSelfURI, reportOnly, mInnerWindowID); if (policy) { mPolicies.AppendElement(policy); } } return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::Write(nsIObjectOutputStream* aStream) { nsresult rv = NS_WriteOptionalCompoundObject(aStream, mSelfURI, NS_GET_IID(nsIURI), true); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // Serialize all the policies. aStream->Write32(mPolicies.Length()); nsAutoString polStr; for (uint32_t p = 0; p < mPolicies.Length(); p++) { polStr.Truncate(); mPolicies[p]->toString(polStr); aStream->WriteWStringZ(polStr.get()); aStream->WriteBoolean(mPolicies[p]->getReportOnlyFlag()); } return NS_OK; }