/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ #include "mozilla/Util.h" #include "xpcprivate.h" #include "XPCWrapper.h" #include "nsScriptSecurityManager.h" #include "nsIServiceManager.h" #include "nsIScriptObjectPrincipal.h" #include "nsIScriptContext.h" #include "nsIURL.h" #include "nsINestedURI.h" #include "nspr.h" #include "nsJSPrincipals.h" #include "nsSystemPrincipal.h" #include "nsPrincipal.h" #include "nsNullPrincipal.h" #include "nsXPIDLString.h" #include "nsCRT.h" #include "nsCRTGlue.h" #include "nsIJSContextStack.h" #include "nsDOMError.h" #include "nsDOMCID.h" #include "jsdbgapi.h" #include "nsIXPConnect.h" #include "nsIXPCSecurityManager.h" #include "nsTextFormatter.h" #include "nsIStringBundle.h" #include "nsNetUtil.h" #include "nsIProperties.h" #include "nsDirectoryServiceDefs.h" #include "nsIFile.h" #include "nsIFileURL.h" #include "nsIZipReader.h" #include "nsIXPConnect.h" #include "nsIScriptGlobalObject.h" #include "nsPIDOMWindow.h" #include "nsIDocShell.h" #include "nsIDocShellTreeItem.h" #include "nsIPrompt.h" #include "nsIWindowWatcher.h" #include "nsIConsoleService.h" #include "nsISecurityCheckedComponent.h" #include "nsIJSRuntimeService.h" #include "nsIObserverService.h" #include "nsIContent.h" #include "nsAutoPtr.h" #include "nsDOMJSUtils.h" #include "nsAboutProtocolUtils.h" #include "nsIClassInfo.h" #include "nsIURIFixup.h" #include "nsCDefaultURIFixup.h" #include "nsIChromeRegistry.h" #include "nsIContentSecurityPolicy.h" #include "nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback.h" #include "mozilla/Preferences.h" #include "mozilla/dom/BindingUtils.h" #include "mozilla/StandardInteger.h" using namespace mozilla; using namespace mozilla::dom; static NS_DEFINE_CID(kZipReaderCID, NS_ZIPREADER_CID); nsIIOService *nsScriptSecurityManager::sIOService = nsnull; nsIXPConnect *nsScriptSecurityManager::sXPConnect = nsnull; nsIThreadJSContextStack *nsScriptSecurityManager::sJSContextStack = nsnull; nsIStringBundle *nsScriptSecurityManager::sStrBundle = nsnull; JSRuntime *nsScriptSecurityManager::sRuntime = 0; bool nsScriptSecurityManager::sStrictFileOriginPolicy = true; /////////////////////////// // Convenience Functions // /////////////////////////// // Result of this function should not be freed. static inline const PRUnichar * IDToString(JSContext *cx, jsid id) { if (JSID_IS_STRING(id)) return JS_GetInternedStringChars(JSID_TO_STRING(id)); JSAutoRequest ar(cx); jsval idval; if (!JS_IdToValue(cx, id, &idval)) return nsnull; JSString *str = JS_ValueToString(cx, idval); if(!str) return nsnull; return JS_GetStringCharsZ(cx, str); } class nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter { public: nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter() { ++sInPrincipalDomainOrigin; } ~nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter() { --sInPrincipalDomainOrigin; } static PRUint32 sInPrincipalDomainOrigin; }; PRUint32 nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter::sInPrincipalDomainOrigin; static nsresult GetOriginFromURI(nsIURI* aURI, nsACString& aOrigin) { if (nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter::sInPrincipalDomainOrigin > 1) { // Allow a single recursive call to GetPrincipalDomainOrigin, since that // might be happening on a different principal from the first call. But // after that, cut off the recursion; it just indicates that something // we're doing in this method causes us to reenter a security check here. return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE; } nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter autoSetter; nsCOMPtr uri = NS_GetInnermostURI(aURI); NS_ENSURE_TRUE(uri, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED); nsCAutoString hostPort; nsresult rv = uri->GetHostPort(hostPort); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { nsCAutoString scheme; rv = uri->GetScheme(scheme); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); aOrigin = scheme + NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("://") + hostPort; } else { // Some URIs (e.g., nsSimpleURI) don't support host. Just // get the full spec. rv = uri->GetSpec(aOrigin); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); } return NS_OK; } static nsresult GetPrincipalDomainOrigin(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, nsACString& aOrigin) { nsCOMPtr uri; aPrincipal->GetDomain(getter_AddRefs(uri)); if (!uri) { aPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)); } NS_ENSURE_TRUE(uri, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED); return GetOriginFromURI(uri, aOrigin); } static nsIScriptContext * GetScriptContext(JSContext *cx) { return GetScriptContextFromJSContext(cx); } // Callbacks for the JS engine to use to push/pop context principals. static JSBool PushPrincipalCallback(JSContext *cx, JSPrincipals *principals) { // We should already be in the compartment of the given principal. MOZ_ASSERT(principals == JS_GetCompartmentPrincipals((js::GetContextCompartment(cx)))); // Get the security manager. nsIScriptSecurityManager *ssm = XPCWrapper::GetSecurityManager(); if (!ssm) { return true; } // Push the principal. JSStackFrame *fp = NULL; nsresult rv = ssm->PushContextPrincipal(cx, JS_FrameIterator(cx, &fp), nsJSPrincipals::get(principals)); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { JS_ReportOutOfMemory(cx); return false; } return true; } static JSBool PopPrincipalCallback(JSContext *cx) { nsIScriptSecurityManager *ssm = XPCWrapper::GetSecurityManager(); if (ssm) { ssm->PopContextPrincipal(cx); } return true; } inline void SetPendingException(JSContext *cx, const char *aMsg) { JSAutoRequest ar(cx); JS_ReportError(cx, "%s", aMsg); } inline void SetPendingException(JSContext *cx, const PRUnichar *aMsg) { JSAutoRequest ar(cx); JS_ReportError(cx, "%hs", aMsg); } // DomainPolicy members #ifdef DEBUG_CAPS_DomainPolicyLifeCycle PRUint32 DomainPolicy::sObjects=0; void DomainPolicy::_printPopulationInfo() { printf("CAPS.DomainPolicy: Gen. %d, %d DomainPolicy objects.\n", sGeneration, sObjects); } #endif PRUint32 DomainPolicy::sGeneration = 0; // Helper class to get stuff from the ClassInfo and not waste extra time with // virtual method calls for things it has already gotten class ClassInfoData { public: ClassInfoData(nsIClassInfo *aClassInfo, const char *aName) : mClassInfo(aClassInfo), mName(const_cast(aName)), mDidGetFlags(false), mMustFreeName(false) { } ~ClassInfoData() { if (mMustFreeName) nsMemory::Free(mName); } PRUint32 GetFlags() { if (!mDidGetFlags) { if (mClassInfo) { nsresult rv = mClassInfo->GetFlags(&mFlags); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { mFlags = 0; } } else { mFlags = 0; } mDidGetFlags = true; } return mFlags; } bool IsDOMClass() { return !!(GetFlags() & nsIClassInfo::DOM_OBJECT); } const char* GetName() { if (!mName) { if (mClassInfo) { mClassInfo->GetClassDescription(&mName); } if (mName) { mMustFreeName = true; } else { mName = const_cast("UnnamedClass"); } } return mName; } private: nsIClassInfo *mClassInfo; // WEAK PRUint32 mFlags; char *mName; bool mDidGetFlags; bool mMustFreeName; }; class AutoCxPusher { public: AutoCxPusher(nsIJSContextStack *aStack, JSContext *cx) : mStack(aStack), mContext(cx) { if (NS_FAILED(mStack->Push(mContext))) { mStack = nsnull; } } ~AutoCxPusher() { if (mStack) { mStack->Pop(nsnull); } } private: nsCOMPtr mStack; JSContext *mContext; }; JSContext * nsScriptSecurityManager::GetCurrentJSContext() { // Get JSContext from stack. JSContext *cx; if (NS_FAILED(sJSContextStack->Peek(&cx))) return nsnull; return cx; } JSContext * nsScriptSecurityManager::GetSafeJSContext() { // Get JSContext from stack. return sJSContextStack->GetSafeJSContext(); } /* static */ bool nsScriptSecurityManager::SecurityCompareURIs(nsIURI* aSourceURI, nsIURI* aTargetURI) { return NS_SecurityCompareURIs(aSourceURI, aTargetURI, sStrictFileOriginPolicy); } // SecurityHashURI is consistent with SecurityCompareURIs because NS_SecurityHashURI // is consistent with NS_SecurityCompareURIs. See nsNetUtil.h. PRUint32 nsScriptSecurityManager::SecurityHashURI(nsIURI* aURI) { return NS_SecurityHashURI(aURI); } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelPrincipal(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) { NS_PRECONDITION(aChannel, "Must have channel!"); nsCOMPtr owner; aChannel->GetOwner(getter_AddRefs(owner)); if (owner) { CallQueryInterface(owner, aPrincipal); if (*aPrincipal) { return NS_OK; } } // OK, get the principal from the URI. Make sure this does the same thing // as nsDocument::Reset and nsXULDocument::StartDocumentLoad. nsCOMPtr uri; nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); return GetCodebasePrincipal(uri, aPrincipal); } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::IsSystemPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, bool* aIsSystem) { *aIsSystem = (aPrincipal == mSystemPrincipal); return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP_(nsIPrincipal *) nsScriptSecurityManager::GetCxSubjectPrincipal(JSContext *cx) { NS_ASSERTION(cx == GetCurrentJSContext(), "Uh, cx is not the current JS context!"); nsresult rv = NS_ERROR_FAILURE; nsIPrincipal *principal = GetSubjectPrincipal(cx, &rv); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return nsnull; return principal; } NS_IMETHODIMP_(nsIPrincipal *) nsScriptSecurityManager::GetCxSubjectPrincipalAndFrame(JSContext *cx, JSStackFrame **fp) { NS_ASSERTION(cx == GetCurrentJSContext(), "Uh, cx is not the current JS context!"); nsresult rv = NS_ERROR_FAILURE; nsIPrincipal *principal = GetPrincipalAndFrame(cx, fp, &rv); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return nsnull; return principal; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::PushContextPrincipal(JSContext *cx, JSStackFrame *fp, nsIPrincipal *principal) { NS_ASSERTION(principal, "Must pass a non-null principal"); ContextPrincipal *cp = new ContextPrincipal(mContextPrincipals, cx, fp, principal); if (!cp) return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; mContextPrincipals = cp; return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::PopContextPrincipal(JSContext *cx) { NS_ASSERTION(mContextPrincipals->mCx == cx, "Mismatched push/pop"); ContextPrincipal *next = mContextPrincipals->mNext; delete mContextPrincipals; mContextPrincipals = next; return NS_OK; } //////////////////// // Policy Storage // //////////////////// // Table of security levels static bool DeleteCapability(nsHashKey *aKey, void *aData, void* closure) { NS_Free(aData); return true; } //-- Per-Domain Policy - applies to one or more protocols or hosts struct DomainEntry { DomainEntry(const char* aOrigin, DomainPolicy* aDomainPolicy) : mOrigin(aOrigin), mDomainPolicy(aDomainPolicy), mNext(nsnull) { mDomainPolicy->Hold(); } ~DomainEntry() { mDomainPolicy->Drop(); } bool Matches(const char *anOrigin) { int len = strlen(anOrigin); int thisLen = mOrigin.Length(); if (len < thisLen) return false; if (mOrigin.RFindChar(':', thisLen-1, 1) != -1) //-- Policy applies to all URLs of this scheme, compare scheme only return mOrigin.EqualsIgnoreCase(anOrigin, thisLen); //-- Policy applies to a particular host; compare domains if (!mOrigin.Equals(anOrigin + (len - thisLen))) return false; if (len == thisLen) return true; char charBefore = anOrigin[len-thisLen-1]; return (charBefore == '.' || charBefore == ':' || charBefore == '/'); } nsCString mOrigin; DomainPolicy* mDomainPolicy; DomainEntry* mNext; #if defined(DEBUG) || defined(DEBUG_CAPS_HACKER) nsCString mPolicyName_DEBUG; #endif }; static bool DeleteDomainEntry(nsHashKey *aKey, void *aData, void* closure) { DomainEntry *entry = (DomainEntry*) aData; do { DomainEntry *next = entry->mNext; delete entry; entry = next; } while (entry); return true; } ///////////////////////////// // nsScriptSecurityManager // ///////////////////////////// //////////////////////////////////// // Methods implementing ISupports // //////////////////////////////////// NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS4(nsScriptSecurityManager, nsIScriptSecurityManager, nsIXPCSecurityManager, nsIChannelEventSink, nsIObserver) /////////////////////////////////////////////////// // Methods implementing nsIScriptSecurityManager // /////////////////////////////////////////////////// ///////////////// Security Checks ///////////////// /* static */ JSPrincipals * nsScriptSecurityManager::ObjectPrincipalFinder(JSObject *aObj) { return nsJSPrincipals::get(doGetObjectPrincipal(aObj)); } JSBool nsScriptSecurityManager::ContentSecurityPolicyPermitsJSAction(JSContext *cx) { // Get the security manager nsScriptSecurityManager *ssm = nsScriptSecurityManager::GetScriptSecurityManager(); NS_ASSERTION(ssm, "Failed to get security manager service"); if (!ssm) return JS_FALSE; nsresult rv; nsIPrincipal* subjectPrincipal = ssm->GetSubjectPrincipal(cx, &rv); NS_ASSERTION(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv), "CSP: Failed to get nsIPrincipal from js context"); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return JS_FALSE; // Not just absence of principal, but failure. if (!subjectPrincipal) { // See bug 553448 for discussion of this case. NS_ASSERTION(!JS_GetSecurityCallbacks(js::GetRuntime(cx))->findObjectPrincipals, "CSP: Should have been able to find subject principal. " "Reluctantly granting access."); return JS_TRUE; } nsCOMPtr csp; rv = subjectPrincipal->GetCsp(getter_AddRefs(csp)); NS_ASSERTION(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv), "CSP: Failed to get CSP from principal."); // don't do anything unless there's a CSP if (!csp) return JS_TRUE; bool evalOK = true; rv = csp->GetAllowsEval(&evalOK); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { NS_WARNING("CSP: failed to get allowsEval"); return JS_TRUE; // fail open to not break sites. } if (!evalOK) { // get the script filename, script sample, and line number // to log with the violation nsAutoString fileName; unsigned lineNum = 0; NS_NAMED_LITERAL_STRING(scriptSample, "call to eval() or related function blocked by CSP"); JSScript *script; if (JS_DescribeScriptedCaller(cx, &script, &lineNum)) { if (const char *file = JS_GetScriptFilename(cx, script)) { CopyUTF8toUTF16(nsDependentCString(file), fileName); } } csp->LogViolationDetails(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_EVAL, fileName, scriptSample, lineNum); } return evalOK; } JSBool nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckObjectAccess(JSContext *cx, JSHandleObject obj, JSHandleId id, JSAccessMode mode, jsval *vp) { // Get the security manager nsScriptSecurityManager *ssm = nsScriptSecurityManager::GetScriptSecurityManager(); NS_ASSERTION(ssm, "Failed to get security manager service"); if (!ssm) return JS_FALSE; // Get the object being accessed. We protect these cases: // 1. The Function.prototype.caller property's value, which might lead // an attacker up a call-stack to a function or another object from // a different trust domain. // 2. A user-defined getter or setter function accessible on another // trust domain's window or document object. // *vp can be a primitive, in that case, we use obj as the target // object. JSObject* target = JSVAL_IS_PRIMITIVE(*vp) ? obj : JSVAL_TO_OBJECT(*vp); // Do the same-origin check -- this sets a JS exception if the check fails. // Pass the parent object's class name, as we have no class-info for it. nsresult rv = ssm->CheckPropertyAccess(cx, target, js::GetObjectClass(obj)->name, id, (mode & JSACC_WRITE) ? (PRInt32)nsIXPCSecurityManager::ACCESS_SET_PROPERTY : (PRInt32)nsIXPCSecurityManager::ACCESS_GET_PROPERTY); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return JS_FALSE; // Security check failed (XXX was an error reported?) return JS_TRUE; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckPropertyAccess(JSContext* cx, JSObject* aJSObject, const char* aClassName, jsid aProperty, PRUint32 aAction) { return CheckPropertyAccessImpl(aAction, nsnull, cx, aJSObject, nsnull, nsnull, nsnull, aClassName, aProperty, nsnull); } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckSameOrigin(JSContext* cx, nsIURI* aTargetURI) { nsresult rv; // Get a context if necessary if (!cx) { cx = GetCurrentJSContext(); if (!cx) return NS_OK; // No JS context, so allow access } // Get a principal from the context nsIPrincipal* sourcePrincipal = GetSubjectPrincipal(cx, &rv); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; if (!sourcePrincipal) { NS_WARNING("CheckSameOrigin called on script w/o principals; should this happen?"); return NS_OK; } if (sourcePrincipal == mSystemPrincipal) { // This is a system (chrome) script, so allow access return NS_OK; } // Get the original URI from the source principal. // This has the effect of ignoring any change to document.domain // which must be done to avoid DNS spoofing (bug 154930) nsCOMPtr sourceURI; sourcePrincipal->GetDomain(getter_AddRefs(sourceURI)); if (!sourceURI) { sourcePrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(sourceURI)); NS_ENSURE_TRUE(sourceURI, NS_ERROR_FAILURE); } // Compare origins if (!SecurityCompareURIs(sourceURI, aTargetURI)) { ReportError(cx, NS_LITERAL_STRING("CheckSameOriginError"), sourceURI, aTargetURI); return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI; } return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckSameOriginURI(nsIURI* aSourceURI, nsIURI* aTargetURI, bool reportError) { if (!SecurityCompareURIs(aSourceURI, aTargetURI)) { if (reportError) { ReportError(nsnull, NS_LITERAL_STRING("CheckSameOriginError"), aSourceURI, aTargetURI); } return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI; } return NS_OK; } nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckPropertyAccessImpl(PRUint32 aAction, nsAXPCNativeCallContext* aCallContext, JSContext* cx, JSObject* aJSObject, nsISupports* aObj, nsIURI* aTargetURI, nsIClassInfo* aClassInfo, const char* aClassName, jsid aProperty, void** aCachedClassPolicy) { nsresult rv; nsIPrincipal* subjectPrincipal = GetSubjectPrincipal(cx, &rv); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; if (!subjectPrincipal || subjectPrincipal == mSystemPrincipal) // We have native code or the system principal: just allow access return NS_OK; nsCOMPtr objectPrincipal; // Hold the class info data here so we don't have to go back to virtual // methods all the time ClassInfoData classInfoData(aClassInfo, aClassName); #ifdef DEBUG_CAPS_CheckPropertyAccessImpl nsCAutoString propertyName; propertyName.AssignWithConversion((PRUnichar*)IDToString(cx, aProperty)); printf("### CanAccess(%s.%s, %i) ", classInfoData.GetName(), propertyName.get(), aAction); #endif //-- Look up the security policy for this class and subject domain SecurityLevel securityLevel; rv = LookupPolicy(subjectPrincipal, classInfoData, aProperty, aAction, (ClassPolicy**)aCachedClassPolicy, &securityLevel); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; if (securityLevel.level == SCRIPT_SECURITY_UNDEFINED_ACCESS) { // No policy found for this property so use the default of last resort. // If we were called from somewhere other than XPConnect // (no XPC call context), assume this is a DOM class. Otherwise, // ask the ClassInfo. if (!aCallContext || classInfoData.IsDOMClass()) securityLevel.level = SCRIPT_SECURITY_SAME_ORIGIN_ACCESS; else securityLevel.level = SCRIPT_SECURITY_NO_ACCESS; } if (SECURITY_ACCESS_LEVEL_FLAG(securityLevel)) // This flag means securityLevel is allAccess, noAccess, or sameOrigin { switch (securityLevel.level) { case SCRIPT_SECURITY_NO_ACCESS: #ifdef DEBUG_CAPS_CheckPropertyAccessImpl printf("noAccess "); #endif rv = NS_ERROR_DOM_PROP_ACCESS_DENIED; break; case SCRIPT_SECURITY_ALL_ACCESS: #ifdef DEBUG_CAPS_CheckPropertyAccessImpl printf("allAccess "); #endif rv = NS_OK; break; case SCRIPT_SECURITY_SAME_ORIGIN_ACCESS: { #ifdef DEBUG_CAPS_CheckPropertyAccessImpl printf("sameOrigin "); #endif nsCOMPtr principalHolder; if(aJSObject) { objectPrincipal = doGetObjectPrincipal(aJSObject); if (!objectPrincipal) rv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR; } else if(aTargetURI) { if (NS_FAILED(GetCodebasePrincipal( aTargetURI, getter_AddRefs(objectPrincipal)))) return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } else { NS_ERROR("CheckPropertyAccessImpl called without a target object or URL"); return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } if(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) rv = CheckSameOriginDOMProp(subjectPrincipal, objectPrincipal, aAction); break; } default: #ifdef DEBUG_CAPS_CheckPropertyAccessImpl printf("ERROR "); #endif NS_ERROR("Bad Security Level Value"); return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } } else // if SECURITY_ACCESS_LEVEL_FLAG is false, securityLevel is a capability { #ifdef DEBUG_CAPS_CheckPropertyAccessImpl printf("Cap:%s ", securityLevel.capability); #endif bool capabilityEnabled = false; rv = IsCapabilityEnabled(securityLevel.capability, &capabilityEnabled); if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !capabilityEnabled) rv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR; else rv = NS_OK; } if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { #ifdef DEBUG_CAPS_CheckPropertyAccessImpl printf(" GRANTED.\n"); #endif return rv; } //--See if the object advertises a non-default level of access // using nsISecurityCheckedComponent nsCOMPtr checkedComponent = do_QueryInterface(aObj); nsXPIDLCString objectSecurityLevel; if (checkedComponent) { nsCOMPtr wrapper; nsCOMPtr interfaceInfo; const nsIID* objIID = nsnull; rv = aCallContext->GetCalleeWrapper(getter_AddRefs(wrapper)); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && wrapper) rv = wrapper->FindInterfaceWithMember(aProperty, getter_AddRefs(interfaceInfo)); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && interfaceInfo) rv = interfaceInfo->GetIIDShared(&objIID); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && objIID) { switch (aAction) { case nsIXPCSecurityManager::ACCESS_GET_PROPERTY: checkedComponent->CanGetProperty(objIID, IDToString(cx, aProperty), getter_Copies(objectSecurityLevel)); break; case nsIXPCSecurityManager::ACCESS_SET_PROPERTY: checkedComponent->CanSetProperty(objIID, IDToString(cx, aProperty), getter_Copies(objectSecurityLevel)); break; case nsIXPCSecurityManager::ACCESS_CALL_METHOD: checkedComponent->CanCallMethod(objIID, IDToString(cx, aProperty), getter_Copies(objectSecurityLevel)); } } } rv = CheckXPCPermissions(cx, aObj, aJSObject, subjectPrincipal, objectSecurityLevel); #ifdef DEBUG_CAPS_CheckPropertyAccessImpl if(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) printf("CheckXPCPerms GRANTED.\n"); else printf("CheckXPCPerms DENIED.\n"); #endif if (NS_FAILED(rv)) //-- Security tests failed, access is denied, report error { nsAutoString stringName; switch(aAction) { case nsIXPCSecurityManager::ACCESS_GET_PROPERTY: stringName.AssignLiteral("GetPropertyDeniedOrigins"); break; case nsIXPCSecurityManager::ACCESS_SET_PROPERTY: stringName.AssignLiteral("SetPropertyDeniedOrigins"); break; case nsIXPCSecurityManager::ACCESS_CALL_METHOD: stringName.AssignLiteral("CallMethodDeniedOrigins"); } // Null out objectPrincipal for now, so we don't leak information about // it. Whenever we can report different error strings to content and // the UI we can take this out again. objectPrincipal = nsnull; NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 className(classInfoData.GetName()); nsCAutoString subjectOrigin; nsCAutoString subjectDomain; if (!nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter::sInPrincipalDomainOrigin) { nsCOMPtr uri, domain; subjectPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)); // Subject can't be system if we failed the security // check, so |uri| is non-null. NS_ASSERTION(uri, "How did that happen?"); GetOriginFromURI(uri, subjectOrigin); subjectPrincipal->GetDomain(getter_AddRefs(domain)); if (domain) { GetOriginFromURI(domain, subjectDomain); } } else { subjectOrigin.AssignLiteral("the security manager"); } NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 subjectOriginUnicode(subjectOrigin); NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 subjectDomainUnicode(subjectDomain); nsCAutoString objectOrigin; nsCAutoString objectDomain; if (!nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter::sInPrincipalDomainOrigin && objectPrincipal) { nsCOMPtr uri, domain; objectPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)); if (uri) { // Object principal might be system GetOriginFromURI(uri, objectOrigin); } objectPrincipal->GetDomain(getter_AddRefs(domain)); if (domain) { GetOriginFromURI(domain, objectDomain); } } NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 objectOriginUnicode(objectOrigin); NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 objectDomainUnicode(objectDomain); nsXPIDLString errorMsg; const PRUnichar *formatStrings[] = { subjectOriginUnicode.get(), className.get(), IDToString(cx, aProperty), objectOriginUnicode.get(), subjectDomainUnicode.get(), objectDomainUnicode.get() }; PRUint32 length = ArrayLength(formatStrings); // XXXbz Our localization system is stupid and can't handle not showing // some strings that get passed in. Which means that we have to get // our length precisely right: it has to be exactly the number of // strings our format string wants. This means we'll have to move // strings in the array as needed, sadly... if (nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter::sInPrincipalDomainOrigin || !objectPrincipal) { stringName.AppendLiteral("OnlySubject"); length -= 3; } else { // default to a length that doesn't include the domains, then // increase it as needed. length -= 2; if (!subjectDomainUnicode.IsEmpty()) { stringName.AppendLiteral("SubjectDomain"); length += 1; } if (!objectDomainUnicode.IsEmpty()) { stringName.AppendLiteral("ObjectDomain"); length += 1; if (length != ArrayLength(formatStrings)) { // We have an object domain but not a subject domain. // Scoot our string over one slot. See the XXX comment // above for why we need to do this. formatStrings[length-1] = formatStrings[length]; } } } // We need to keep our existing failure rv and not override it // with a likely success code from the following string bundle // call in order to throw the correct security exception later. nsresult rv2 = sStrBundle->FormatStringFromName(stringName.get(), formatStrings, length, getter_Copies(errorMsg)); if (NS_FAILED(rv2)) { // Might just be missing the string... Do our best errorMsg = stringName; } SetPendingException(cx, errorMsg.get()); } return rv; } /* static */ nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckSameOriginPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aSubject, nsIPrincipal* aObject) { /* ** Get origin of subject and object and compare. */ if (aSubject == aObject) return NS_OK; // Default to false, and change if that turns out wrong. bool subjectSetDomain = false; bool objectSetDomain = false; nsCOMPtr subjectURI; nsCOMPtr objectURI; aSubject->GetDomain(getter_AddRefs(subjectURI)); if (!subjectURI) { aSubject->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(subjectURI)); } else { subjectSetDomain = true; } aObject->GetDomain(getter_AddRefs(objectURI)); if (!objectURI) { aObject->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(objectURI)); } else { objectSetDomain = true; } if (SecurityCompareURIs(subjectURI, objectURI)) { // If either the subject or the object has changed its principal by // explicitly setting document.domain then the other must also have // done so in order to be considered the same origin. This prevents // DNS spoofing based on document.domain (154930) // If both or neither explicitly set their domain, allow the access if (subjectSetDomain == objectSetDomain) return NS_OK; } /* ** Access tests failed, so now report error. */ return NS_ERROR_DOM_PROP_ACCESS_DENIED; } // It's important that // // CheckSameOriginPrincipal(A, B) == NS_OK // // imply // // HashPrincipalByOrigin(A) == HashPrincipalByOrigin(B) // // if principals A and B could ever be used as keys in a hashtable. // Violation of this invariant leads to spurious failures of hashtable // lookups. See bug 454850. /*static*/ PRUint32 nsScriptSecurityManager::HashPrincipalByOrigin(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal) { nsCOMPtr uri; aPrincipal->GetDomain(getter_AddRefs(uri)); if (!uri) aPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)); return SecurityHashURI(uri); } nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckSameOriginDOMProp(nsIPrincipal* aSubject, nsIPrincipal* aObject, PRUint32 aAction) { nsresult rv; bool subsumes; rv = aSubject->Subsumes(aObject, &subsumes); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && !subsumes) { rv = NS_ERROR_DOM_PROP_ACCESS_DENIED; } if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) return NS_OK; /* * Content can't ever touch chrome (we check for UniversalXPConnect later) */ if (aObject == mSystemPrincipal) return NS_ERROR_DOM_PROP_ACCESS_DENIED; /* ** Access tests failed, so now report error. */ return NS_ERROR_DOM_PROP_ACCESS_DENIED; } nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::LookupPolicy(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, ClassInfoData& aClassData, jsid aProperty, PRUint32 aAction, ClassPolicy** aCachedClassPolicy, SecurityLevel* result) { nsresult rv; result->level = SCRIPT_SECURITY_UNDEFINED_ACCESS; DomainPolicy* dpolicy = nsnull; //-- Initialize policies if necessary if (mPolicyPrefsChanged) { if (!mPrefInitialized) { rv = InitPrefs(); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); } rv = InitPolicies(); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; } else { aPrincipal->GetSecurityPolicy((void**)&dpolicy); } if (!dpolicy && mOriginToPolicyMap) { //-- Look up the relevant domain policy, if any #ifdef DEBUG_CAPS_LookupPolicy printf("DomainLookup "); #endif nsCAutoString origin; rv = GetPrincipalDomainOrigin(aPrincipal, origin); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); char *start = origin.BeginWriting(); const char *nextToLastDot = nsnull; const char *lastDot = nsnull; const char *colon = nsnull; char *p = start; //-- search domain (stop at the end of the string or at the 3rd slash) for (PRUint32 slashes=0; *p; p++) { if (*p == '/' && ++slashes == 3) { *p = '\0'; // truncate at 3rd slash break; } if (*p == '.') { nextToLastDot = lastDot; lastDot = p; } else if (!colon && *p == ':') colon = p; } nsCStringKey key(nextToLastDot ? nextToLastDot+1 : start); DomainEntry *de = (DomainEntry*) mOriginToPolicyMap->Get(&key); if (!de) { nsCAutoString scheme(start, colon-start+1); nsCStringKey schemeKey(scheme); de = (DomainEntry*) mOriginToPolicyMap->Get(&schemeKey); } while (de) { if (de->Matches(start)) { dpolicy = de->mDomainPolicy; break; } de = de->mNext; } if (!dpolicy) dpolicy = mDefaultPolicy; aPrincipal->SetSecurityPolicy((void*)dpolicy); } ClassPolicy* cpolicy = nsnull; if ((dpolicy == mDefaultPolicy) && aCachedClassPolicy) { // No per-domain policy for this principal (the more common case) // so look for a cached class policy from the object wrapper cpolicy = *aCachedClassPolicy; } if (!cpolicy) { //-- No cached policy for this class, need to look it up #ifdef DEBUG_CAPS_LookupPolicy printf("ClassLookup "); #endif cpolicy = static_cast (PL_DHashTableOperate(dpolicy, aClassData.GetName(), PL_DHASH_LOOKUP)); if (PL_DHASH_ENTRY_IS_FREE(cpolicy)) cpolicy = NO_POLICY_FOR_CLASS; if ((dpolicy == mDefaultPolicy) && aCachedClassPolicy) *aCachedClassPolicy = cpolicy; } NS_ASSERTION(JSID_IS_INT(aProperty) || JSID_IS_OBJECT(aProperty) || JSID_IS_STRING(aProperty), "Property must be a valid id"); // Only atomized strings are stored in the policies' hash tables. if (!JSID_IS_STRING(aProperty)) return NS_OK; JSString *propertyKey = JSID_TO_STRING(aProperty); // We look for a PropertyPolicy in the following places: // 1) The ClassPolicy for our class we got from our DomainPolicy // 2) The mWildcardPolicy of our DomainPolicy // 3) The ClassPolicy for our class we got from mDefaultPolicy // 4) The mWildcardPolicy of our mDefaultPolicy PropertyPolicy* ppolicy = nsnull; if (cpolicy != NO_POLICY_FOR_CLASS) { ppolicy = static_cast (PL_DHashTableOperate(cpolicy->mPolicy, propertyKey, PL_DHASH_LOOKUP)); } // If there is no class policy for this property, and we have a wildcard // policy, try that. if (dpolicy->mWildcardPolicy && (!ppolicy || PL_DHASH_ENTRY_IS_FREE(ppolicy))) { ppolicy = static_cast (PL_DHashTableOperate(dpolicy->mWildcardPolicy->mPolicy, propertyKey, PL_DHASH_LOOKUP)); } // If dpolicy is not the defauly policy and there's no class or wildcard // policy for this property, check the default policy for this class and // the default wildcard policy if (dpolicy != mDefaultPolicy && (!ppolicy || PL_DHASH_ENTRY_IS_FREE(ppolicy))) { cpolicy = static_cast (PL_DHashTableOperate(mDefaultPolicy, aClassData.GetName(), PL_DHASH_LOOKUP)); if (PL_DHASH_ENTRY_IS_BUSY(cpolicy)) { ppolicy = static_cast (PL_DHashTableOperate(cpolicy->mPolicy, propertyKey, PL_DHASH_LOOKUP)); } if ((!ppolicy || PL_DHASH_ENTRY_IS_FREE(ppolicy)) && mDefaultPolicy->mWildcardPolicy) { ppolicy = static_cast (PL_DHashTableOperate(mDefaultPolicy->mWildcardPolicy->mPolicy, propertyKey, PL_DHASH_LOOKUP)); } } if (!ppolicy || PL_DHASH_ENTRY_IS_FREE(ppolicy)) return NS_OK; // Get the correct security level from the property policy if (aAction == nsIXPCSecurityManager::ACCESS_SET_PROPERTY) *result = ppolicy->mSet; else *result = ppolicy->mGet; return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIFromScript(JSContext *cx, nsIURI *aURI) { // Get principal of currently executing script. nsresult rv; nsIPrincipal* principal = GetSubjectPrincipal(cx, &rv); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; // Native code can load all URIs. if (!principal) return NS_OK; rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(principal, aURI, nsIScriptSecurityManager::STANDARD); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { // OK to load return NS_OK; } // See if we're attempting to load a file: URI. If so, let a // UniversalXPConnect capability trump the above check. bool isFile = false; bool isRes = false; if (NS_FAILED(aURI->SchemeIs("file", &isFile)) || NS_FAILED(aURI->SchemeIs("resource", &isRes))) return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; if (isFile || isRes) { bool enabled; if (NS_FAILED(IsCapabilityEnabled("UniversalXPConnect", &enabled))) return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; if (enabled) return NS_OK; } // Report error. nsCAutoString spec; if (NS_FAILED(aURI->GetAsciiSpec(spec))) return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; nsCAutoString msg("Access to '"); msg.Append(spec); msg.AppendLiteral("' from script denied"); SetPendingException(cx, msg.get()); return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURI(nsIURI *aSourceURI, nsIURI *aTargetURI, PRUint32 aFlags) { // FIXME: bug 327244 -- this function should really die... Really truly. NS_PRECONDITION(aSourceURI, "CheckLoadURI called with null source URI"); NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aSourceURI); // Note: this is not _quite_ right if aSourceURI has // NS_NULLPRINCIPAL_SCHEME, but we'll just extract the scheme in // CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal anyway, so this is good enough. This method // really needs to go away.... nsCOMPtr sourcePrincipal; nsresult rv = CreateCodebasePrincipal(aSourceURI, getter_AddRefs(sourcePrincipal)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); return CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(sourcePrincipal, aTargetURI, aFlags); } /** * Helper method to handle cases where a flag passed to * CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal means denying loading if the given URI has certain * nsIProtocolHandler flags set. * @return if success, access is allowed. Otherwise, deny access */ static nsresult DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(nsIURI* aURI, PRUint32 aURIFlags) { NS_PRECONDITION(aURI, "Must have URI!"); bool uriHasFlags; nsresult rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aURI, aURIFlags, &uriHasFlags); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (uriHasFlags) { return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI; } return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, nsIURI *aTargetURI, PRUint32 aFlags) { NS_PRECONDITION(aPrincipal, "CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal must have a principal"); // If someone passes a flag that we don't understand, we should // fail, because they may need a security check that we don't // provide. NS_ENSURE_FALSE(aFlags & ~(nsIScriptSecurityManager::LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT | nsIScriptSecurityManager::ALLOW_CHROME | nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT | nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL), NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED); NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aPrincipal); NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aTargetURI); // If DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL is set, we prevent loading of URIs which // would do such inheriting. That would be URIs that do not have their own // security context. We do this even for the system principal. if (aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL) { nsresult rv = DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(aTargetURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); } if (aPrincipal == mSystemPrincipal) { // Allow access return NS_OK; } nsCOMPtr sourceURI; aPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(sourceURI)); if (!sourceURI) { nsCOMPtr expanded = do_QueryInterface(aPrincipal); if (expanded) { nsTArray< nsCOMPtr > *whiteList; expanded->GetWhiteList(&whiteList); for (uint32_t i = 0; i < whiteList->Length(); ++i) { nsresult rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal((*whiteList)[i], aTargetURI, aFlags); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { // Allow access if it succeeded with one of the white listed principals return NS_OK; } } return NS_OK; } NS_ERROR("Non-system principals or expanded principal passed to CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal " "must have a URI!"); return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED; } // Automatic loads are not allowed from certain protocols. if (aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT) { nsresult rv = DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(sourceURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_FORBIDS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); } // If either URI is a nested URI, get the base URI nsCOMPtr sourceBaseURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(sourceURI); nsCOMPtr targetBaseURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(aTargetURI); //-- get the target scheme nsCAutoString targetScheme; nsresult rv = targetBaseURI->GetScheme(targetScheme); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; //-- Some callers do not allow loading javascript: if ((aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT) && targetScheme.EqualsLiteral("javascript")) { return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI; } NS_NAMED_LITERAL_STRING(errorTag, "CheckLoadURIError"); // Check for uris that are only loadable by principals that subsume them bool hasFlags; rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(targetBaseURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_SUBSUMERS, &hasFlags); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (hasFlags) { return aPrincipal->CheckMayLoad(targetBaseURI, true); } //-- get the source scheme nsCAutoString sourceScheme; rv = sourceBaseURI->GetScheme(sourceScheme); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; if (sourceScheme.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral(NS_NULLPRINCIPAL_SCHEME)) { // A null principal can target its own URI. if (sourceURI == aTargetURI) { return NS_OK; } } else if (targetScheme.Equals(sourceScheme, nsCaseInsensitiveCStringComparator())) { // every scheme can access another URI from the same scheme, // as long as they don't represent null principals. return NS_OK; } // If the schemes don't match, the policy is specified by the protocol // flags on the target URI. Note that the order of policy checks here is // very important! We start from most restrictive and work our way down. // Note that since we're working with the innermost URI, we can just use // the methods that work on chains of nested URIs and they will only look // at the flags for our one URI. // Check for system target URI rv = DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(targetBaseURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { // Deny access, since the origin principal is not system ReportError(nsnull, errorTag, sourceURI, aTargetURI); return rv; } // Check for chrome target URI rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(targetBaseURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE, &hasFlags); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (hasFlags) { if (aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::ALLOW_CHROME) { if (!targetScheme.EqualsLiteral("chrome")) { // for now don't change behavior for resource: or moz-icon: return NS_OK; } // allow load only if chrome package is whitelisted nsCOMPtr reg(do_GetService( NS_CHROMEREGISTRY_CONTRACTID)); if (reg) { bool accessAllowed = false; reg->AllowContentToAccess(targetBaseURI, &accessAllowed); if (accessAllowed) { return NS_OK; } } } // resource: and chrome: are equivalent, securitywise // That's bogus!! Fix this. But watch out for // the view-source stylesheet? bool sourceIsChrome; rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(sourceBaseURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE, &sourceIsChrome); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (sourceIsChrome) { return NS_OK; } ReportError(nsnull, errorTag, sourceURI, aTargetURI); return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI; } // Check for target URI pointing to a file rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(targetBaseURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_LOCAL_FILE, &hasFlags); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (hasFlags) { // resource: and chrome: are equivalent, securitywise // That's bogus!! Fix this. But watch out for // the view-source stylesheet? bool sourceIsChrome; rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(sourceURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE, &sourceIsChrome); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (sourceIsChrome) { return NS_OK; } // Now check capability policies static const char loadURIPrefGroup[] = "checkloaduri"; ClassInfoData nameData(nsnull, loadURIPrefGroup); SecurityLevel secLevel; rv = LookupPolicy(aPrincipal, nameData, sEnabledID, nsIXPCSecurityManager::ACCESS_GET_PROPERTY, nsnull, &secLevel); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && secLevel.level == SCRIPT_SECURITY_ALL_ACCESS) { // OK for this site! return NS_OK; } ReportError(nsnull, errorTag, sourceURI, aTargetURI); return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI; } // OK, everyone is allowed to load this, since unflagged handlers are // deprecated but treated as URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE. But check whether we // need to warn. At some point we'll want to make this warning into an // error and treat unflagged handlers as URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD. rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(targetBaseURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE, &hasFlags); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (!hasFlags) { nsXPIDLString message; NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 ucsTargetScheme(targetScheme); const PRUnichar* formatStrings[] = { ucsTargetScheme.get() }; rv = sStrBundle-> FormatStringFromName(NS_LITERAL_STRING("ProtocolFlagError").get(), formatStrings, ArrayLength(formatStrings), getter_Copies(message)); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { nsCOMPtr console( do_GetService("@mozilla.org/consoleservice;1")); NS_ENSURE_TRUE(console, NS_ERROR_FAILURE); console->LogStringMessage(message.get()); #ifdef DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(message).get()); #endif } } return NS_OK; } nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::ReportError(JSContext* cx, const nsAString& messageTag, nsIURI* aSource, nsIURI* aTarget) { nsresult rv; NS_ENSURE_TRUE(aSource && aTarget, NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER); // Get the source URL spec nsCAutoString sourceSpec; rv = aSource->GetAsciiSpec(sourceSpec); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // Get the target URL spec nsCAutoString targetSpec; rv = aTarget->GetAsciiSpec(targetSpec); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // Localize the error message nsXPIDLString message; NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 ucsSourceSpec(sourceSpec); NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 ucsTargetSpec(targetSpec); const PRUnichar *formatStrings[] = { ucsSourceSpec.get(), ucsTargetSpec.get() }; rv = sStrBundle->FormatStringFromName(PromiseFlatString(messageTag).get(), formatStrings, ArrayLength(formatStrings), getter_Copies(message)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // If a JS context was passed in, set a JS exception. // Otherwise, print the error message directly to the JS console // and to standard output if (cx) { SetPendingException(cx, message.get()); } else // Print directly to the console { nsCOMPtr console( do_GetService("@mozilla.org/consoleservice;1")); NS_ENSURE_TRUE(console, NS_ERROR_FAILURE); console->LogStringMessage(message.get()); #ifdef DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", NS_LossyConvertUTF16toASCII(message).get()); #endif } return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIStr(const nsACString& aSourceURIStr, const nsACString& aTargetURIStr, PRUint32 aFlags) { // FIXME: bug 327244 -- this function should really die... Really truly. nsCOMPtr source; nsresult rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(source), aSourceURIStr, nsnull, nsnull, sIOService); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // Note: this is not _quite_ right if aSourceURI has // NS_NULLPRINCIPAL_SCHEME, but we'll just extract the scheme in // CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal anyway, so this is good enough. This method // really needs to go away.... nsCOMPtr sourcePrincipal; rv = CreateCodebasePrincipal(source, getter_AddRefs(sourcePrincipal)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); return CheckLoadURIStrWithPrincipal(sourcePrincipal, aTargetURIStr, aFlags); } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIStrWithPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, const nsACString& aTargetURIStr, PRUint32 aFlags) { nsresult rv; nsCOMPtr target; rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(target), aTargetURIStr, nsnull, nsnull, sIOService); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(aPrincipal, target, aFlags); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // Now start testing fixup -- since aTargetURIStr is a string, not // an nsIURI, we may well end up fixing it up before loading. // Note: This needs to stay in sync with the nsIURIFixup api. nsCOMPtr fixup = do_GetService(NS_URIFIXUP_CONTRACTID); if (!fixup) { return rv; } PRUint32 flags[] = { nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAG_NONE, nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAG_ALLOW_KEYWORD_LOOKUP, nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAGS_MAKE_ALTERNATE_URI, nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAG_ALLOW_KEYWORD_LOOKUP | nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAGS_MAKE_ALTERNATE_URI }; for (PRUint32 i = 0; i < ArrayLength(flags); ++i) { rv = fixup->CreateFixupURI(aTargetURIStr, flags[i], getter_AddRefs(target)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(aPrincipal, target, aFlags); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); } return rv; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckFunctionAccess(JSContext *aCx, void *aFunObj, void *aTargetObj) { // This check is called for event handlers nsresult rv; nsIPrincipal* subject = GetFunctionObjectPrincipal(aCx, (JSObject *)aFunObj, nsnull, &rv); // If subject is null, get a principal from the function object's scope. if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && !subject) { #ifdef DEBUG { JS_ASSERT(JS_ObjectIsFunction(aCx, (JSObject *)aFunObj)); JSFunction *fun = JS_GetObjectFunction((JSObject *)aFunObj); JSScript *script = JS_GetFunctionScript(aCx, fun); NS_ASSERTION(!script, "Null principal for non-native function!"); } #endif subject = doGetObjectPrincipal((JSObject*)aFunObj); } if (!subject) return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; if (subject == mSystemPrincipal) // This is the system principal: just allow access return NS_OK; // Check if the principal the function was compiled under is // allowed to execute scripts. bool result; rv = CanExecuteScripts(aCx, subject, &result); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; if (!result) return NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR; /* ** Get origin of subject and object and compare. */ JSObject* obj = (JSObject*)aTargetObj; nsIPrincipal* object = doGetObjectPrincipal(obj); if (!object) return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; bool subsumes; rv = subject->Subsumes(object, &subsumes); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && !subsumes) { rv = NS_ERROR_DOM_PROP_ACCESS_DENIED; } return rv; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CanExecuteScripts(JSContext* cx, nsIPrincipal *aPrincipal, bool *result) { *result = false; if (aPrincipal == mSystemPrincipal) { // Even if JavaScript is disabled, we must still execute system scripts *result = true; return NS_OK; } //-- See if the current window allows JS execution nsIScriptContext *scriptContext = GetScriptContext(cx); if (!scriptContext) return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; if (!scriptContext->GetScriptsEnabled()) { // No scripting on this context, folks *result = false; return NS_OK; } nsIScriptGlobalObject *sgo = scriptContext->GetGlobalObject(); if (!sgo) { return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } // window can be null here if we're running with a non-DOM window // as the script global (i.e. a XUL prototype document). nsCOMPtr window = do_QueryInterface(sgo); nsCOMPtr docshell; nsresult rv; if (window) { docshell = window->GetDocShell(); } if (docshell) { rv = docshell->GetCanExecuteScripts(result); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; if (!*result) return NS_OK; } // OK, the docshell doesn't have script execution explicitly disabled. // Check whether our URI is an "about:" URI that allows scripts. If it is, // we need to allow JS to run. In this case, don't apply the JS enabled // pref or policies. On failures, just press on and don't do this special // case. nsCOMPtr principalURI; aPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(principalURI)); if (!principalURI) { // Broken principal of some sort. Disallow. *result = false; return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED; } bool isAbout; rv = principalURI->SchemeIs("about", &isAbout); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && isAbout) { nsCOMPtr module; rv = NS_GetAboutModule(principalURI, getter_AddRefs(module)); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { PRUint32 flags; rv = module->GetURIFlags(principalURI, &flags); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && (flags & nsIAboutModule::ALLOW_SCRIPT)) { *result = true; return NS_OK; } } } *result = mIsJavaScriptEnabled; if (!*result) return NS_OK; // Do not run scripts //-- Check for a per-site policy static const char jsPrefGroupName[] = "javascript"; ClassInfoData nameData(nsnull, jsPrefGroupName); SecurityLevel secLevel; rv = LookupPolicy(aPrincipal, nameData, sEnabledID, nsIXPCSecurityManager::ACCESS_GET_PROPERTY, nsnull, &secLevel); if (NS_FAILED(rv) || secLevel.level == SCRIPT_SECURITY_NO_ACCESS) { *result = false; return rv; } //-- Nobody vetoed, so allow the JS to run. *result = true; return NS_OK; } ///////////////// Principals /////////////////////// NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::GetSubjectPrincipal(nsIPrincipal **aSubjectPrincipal) { nsresult rv; *aSubjectPrincipal = doGetSubjectPrincipal(&rv); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) NS_IF_ADDREF(*aSubjectPrincipal); return rv; } nsIPrincipal* nsScriptSecurityManager::doGetSubjectPrincipal(nsresult* rv) { NS_PRECONDITION(rv, "Null out param"); JSContext *cx = GetCurrentJSContext(); if (!cx) { *rv = NS_OK; return nsnull; } return GetSubjectPrincipal(cx, rv); } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::GetSystemPrincipal(nsIPrincipal **result) { NS_ADDREF(*result = mSystemPrincipal); return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::SubjectPrincipalIsSystem(bool* aIsSystem) { NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aIsSystem); *aIsSystem = false; if (!mSystemPrincipal) return NS_OK; nsCOMPtr subject; nsresult rv = GetSubjectPrincipal(getter_AddRefs(subject)); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; if(!subject) { // No subject principal means no JS is running; // this is the equivalent of system principal code *aIsSystem = true; return NS_OK; } return mSystemPrincipal->Equals(subject, aIsSystem); } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::GetCertificatePrincipal(const nsACString& aCertFingerprint, const nsACString& aSubjectName, const nsACString& aPrettyName, nsISupports* aCertificate, nsIURI* aURI, nsIPrincipal **result) { *result = nsnull; NS_ENSURE_ARG(!aCertFingerprint.IsEmpty() && !aSubjectName.IsEmpty() && aCertificate); return DoGetCertificatePrincipal(aCertFingerprint, aSubjectName, aPrettyName, aCertificate, aURI, true, result); } nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::DoGetCertificatePrincipal(const nsACString& aCertFingerprint, const nsACString& aSubjectName, const nsACString& aPrettyName, nsISupports* aCertificate, nsIURI* aURI, bool aModifyTable, nsIPrincipal **result) { NS_ENSURE_ARG(!aCertFingerprint.IsEmpty()); // Create a certificate principal out of the certificate ID // and URI given to us. We will use this principal to test // equality when doing our hashtable lookups below. nsRefPtr certificate = new nsPrincipal(); if (!certificate) return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; nsresult rv = certificate->Init(aCertFingerprint, aSubjectName, aPrettyName, aCertificate, aURI); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // Check to see if we already have this principal. nsCOMPtr fromTable; mPrincipals.Get(certificate, getter_AddRefs(fromTable)); if (fromTable) { // Bingo. We found the certificate in the table, which means // that it has escalated privileges. if (aModifyTable) { // Make sure this principal has names, so if we ever go to save it // we'll save them. If we get a name mismatch here we'll throw, // but that's desirable. rv = static_cast (static_cast(fromTable)) ->EnsureCertData(aSubjectName, aPrettyName, aCertificate); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { // We have a subject name mismatch for the same cert id. // Hand back the |certificate| object we created and don't give // it any rights from the table. NS_ADDREF(*result = certificate); return NS_OK; } } if (!aURI) { // We were asked to just get the base certificate, so output // what we have in the table. certificate = static_cast (static_cast (fromTable)); } else { // We found a certificate and now need to install a codebase // on it. We don't want to modify the principal in the hash // table, so create a new principal and clone the pertinent // things. nsXPIDLCString prefName; nsXPIDLCString id; nsXPIDLCString subjectName; nsXPIDLCString granted; nsXPIDLCString denied; bool isTrusted; rv = fromTable->GetPreferences(getter_Copies(prefName), getter_Copies(id), getter_Copies(subjectName), getter_Copies(granted), getter_Copies(denied), &isTrusted); // XXXbz assert something about subjectName and aSubjectName here? if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { NS_ASSERTION(!isTrusted, "Shouldn't have isTrusted true here"); certificate = new nsPrincipal(); if (!certificate) return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; rv = certificate->InitFromPersistent(prefName, id, subjectName, aPrettyName, granted, denied, aCertificate, true, false); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; certificate->SetURI(aURI); } } } NS_ADDREF(*result = certificate); return rv; } nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::CreateCodebasePrincipal(nsIURI* aURI, nsIPrincipal **result) { // I _think_ it's safe to not create null principals here based on aURI. // At least all the callers would do the right thing in those cases, as far // as I can tell. --bz nsCOMPtr uriPrinc = do_QueryInterface(aURI); if (uriPrinc) { nsCOMPtr principal; uriPrinc->GetPrincipal(getter_AddRefs(principal)); if (!principal || principal == mSystemPrincipal) { return CallCreateInstance(NS_NULLPRINCIPAL_CONTRACTID, result); } principal.forget(result); return NS_OK; } nsRefPtr codebase = new nsPrincipal(); if (!codebase) return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; nsresult rv = codebase->Init(EmptyCString(), EmptyCString(), EmptyCString(), nsnull, aURI); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; NS_ADDREF(*result = codebase); return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::GetCodebasePrincipal(nsIURI *aURI, nsIPrincipal **result) { NS_ENSURE_ARG(aURI); bool inheritsPrincipal; nsresult rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT, &inheritsPrincipal); if (NS_FAILED(rv) || inheritsPrincipal) { return CallCreateInstance(NS_NULLPRINCIPAL_CONTRACTID, result); } nsCOMPtr principal; rv = CreateCodebasePrincipal(aURI, getter_AddRefs(principal)); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; if (mPrincipals.Count() > 0) { //-- Check to see if we already have this principal. nsCOMPtr fromTable; mPrincipals.Get(principal, getter_AddRefs(fromTable)); if (fromTable) { // We found an existing codebase principal. But it might have a // generic codebase for this origin on it. Install our particular // codebase. // XXXbz this is kinda similar to the code in // GetCertificatePrincipal, but just ever so slightly different. // Oh, well. nsXPIDLCString prefName; nsXPIDLCString id; nsXPIDLCString subjectName; nsXPIDLCString granted; nsXPIDLCString denied; bool isTrusted; rv = fromTable->GetPreferences(getter_Copies(prefName), getter_Copies(id), getter_Copies(subjectName), getter_Copies(granted), getter_Copies(denied), &isTrusted); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { nsRefPtr codebase = new nsPrincipal(); if (!codebase) return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; rv = codebase->InitFromPersistent(prefName, id, subjectName, EmptyCString(), granted, denied, nsnull, false, isTrusted); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; codebase->SetURI(aURI); principal = codebase; } } } NS_IF_ADDREF(*result = principal); return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::GetPrincipalFromContext(JSContext *cx, nsIPrincipal **result) { *result = nsnull; nsIScriptContextPrincipal* scp = GetScriptContextPrincipalFromJSContext(cx); if (!scp) { return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } nsIScriptObjectPrincipal* globalData = scp->GetObjectPrincipal(); if (globalData) NS_IF_ADDREF(*result = globalData->GetPrincipal()); return NS_OK; } // static nsIPrincipal* nsScriptSecurityManager::GetScriptPrincipal(JSScript *script, nsresult* rv) { NS_PRECONDITION(rv, "Null out param"); *rv = NS_OK; if (!script) { return nsnull; } JSPrincipals *jsp = JS_GetScriptPrincipals(script); if (!jsp) { *rv = NS_ERROR_FAILURE; NS_ERROR("Script compiled without principals!"); return nsnull; } return nsJSPrincipals::get(jsp); } // static nsIPrincipal* nsScriptSecurityManager::GetFunctionObjectPrincipal(JSContext *cx, JSObject *obj, JSStackFrame *fp, nsresult *rv) { NS_PRECONDITION(rv, "Null out param"); *rv = NS_OK; if (!JS_ObjectIsFunction(cx, obj)) { // Protect against pseudo-functions (like SJOWs). nsIPrincipal *result = doGetObjectPrincipal(obj); if (!result) *rv = NS_ERROR_FAILURE; return result; } JSFunction *fun = JS_GetObjectFunction(obj); JSScript *script = JS_GetFunctionScript(cx, fun); if (!script) { // A native function: skip it in order to find its scripted caller. return nsnull; } JSScript *frameScript = fp ? JS_GetFrameScript(cx, fp) : nsnull; if (frameScript && frameScript != script) { // There is a frame script, and it's different from the // function script. In this case we're dealing with either // an eval or a Script object, and in these cases the // principal we want is in the frame's script, not in the // function's script. The function's script is where the // eval-calling code came from, not where the eval or new // Script object came from, and we want the principal of // the eval function object or new Script object. script = frameScript; } else if (!js::IsOriginalScriptFunction(fun)) { // Here, obj is a cloned function object. In this case, the // clone's prototype may have been precompiled from brutally // shared chrome, or else it is a lambda or nested function. // The general case here is a function compiled against a // different scope than the one it is parented by at runtime, // hence the creation of a clone to carry the correct scope // chain linkage. // // Since principals follow scope, we must get the object // principal from the clone's scope chain. There are no // reliable principals compiled into the function itself. nsIPrincipal *result = doGetObjectPrincipal(obj); if (!result) *rv = NS_ERROR_FAILURE; return result; } return GetScriptPrincipal(script, rv); } nsIPrincipal* nsScriptSecurityManager::GetFramePrincipal(JSContext *cx, JSStackFrame *fp, nsresult *rv) { NS_PRECONDITION(rv, "Null out param"); JSObject *obj = JS_GetFrameFunctionObject(cx, fp); if (!obj) { // Must be in a top-level script. Get principal from the script. JSScript *script = JS_GetFrameScript(cx, fp); return GetScriptPrincipal(script, rv); } nsIPrincipal* result = GetFunctionObjectPrincipal(cx, obj, fp, rv); #ifdef DEBUG if (NS_SUCCEEDED(*rv) && !result) { JSFunction *fun = JS_GetObjectFunction(obj); JSScript *script = JS_GetFunctionScript(cx, fun); NS_ASSERTION(!script, "Null principal for non-native function!"); } #endif return result; } nsIPrincipal* nsScriptSecurityManager::GetPrincipalAndFrame(JSContext *cx, JSStackFrame **frameResult, nsresult* rv) { NS_PRECONDITION(rv, "Null out param"); //-- If there's no principal on the stack, look at the global object // and return the innermost frame for annotations. *rv = NS_OK; if (cx) { JSStackFrame *target = nsnull; nsIPrincipal *targetPrincipal = nsnull; for (ContextPrincipal *cp = mContextPrincipals; cp; cp = cp->mNext) { if (cp->mCx == cx) { target = cp->mFp; targetPrincipal = cp->mPrincipal; break; } } // Get principals from innermost JavaScript frame. JSStackFrame *fp = nsnull; // tell JS_FrameIterator to start at innermost for (fp = JS_FrameIterator(cx, &fp); fp; fp = JS_FrameIterator(cx, &fp)) { if (fp == target) break; nsIPrincipal* result = GetFramePrincipal(cx, fp, rv); if (result) { NS_ASSERTION(NS_SUCCEEDED(*rv), "Weird return"); *frameResult = fp; return result; } } // If targetPrincipal is non-null, then it means that someone wants to // clamp the principals on this context to this principal. Note that // fp might not equal target here (fp might be null) because someone // could have set aside the frame chain in the meantime. if (targetPrincipal) { if (fp && fp == target) { *frameResult = fp; } else { JSStackFrame *inner = nsnull; *frameResult = JS_FrameIterator(cx, &inner); } return targetPrincipal; } nsIScriptContextPrincipal* scp = GetScriptContextPrincipalFromJSContext(cx); if (scp) { nsIScriptObjectPrincipal* globalData = scp->GetObjectPrincipal(); if (!globalData) { *rv = NS_ERROR_FAILURE; return nsnull; } // Note that we're not in a loop or anything, and nothing comes // after this point in the function, so we can just return here. nsIPrincipal* result = globalData->GetPrincipal(); if (result) { JSStackFrame *inner = nsnull; *frameResult = JS_FrameIterator(cx, &inner); return result; } } } return nsnull; } nsIPrincipal* nsScriptSecurityManager::GetSubjectPrincipal(JSContext *cx, nsresult* rv) { NS_PRECONDITION(rv, "Null out param"); JSStackFrame *fp; return GetPrincipalAndFrame(cx, &fp, rv); } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::GetObjectPrincipal(JSContext *aCx, JSObject *aObj, nsIPrincipal **result) { *result = doGetObjectPrincipal(aObj); if (!*result) return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; NS_ADDREF(*result); return NS_OK; } // static nsIPrincipal* nsScriptSecurityManager::doGetObjectPrincipal(JSObject *aObj #ifdef DEBUG , bool aAllowShortCircuit #endif ) { NS_ASSERTION(aObj, "Bad call to doGetObjectPrincipal()!"); nsIPrincipal* result = nsnull; #ifdef DEBUG JSObject* origObj = aObj; #endif js::Class *jsClass = js::GetObjectClass(aObj); // A common case seen in this code is that we enter this function // with aObj being a Function object, whose parent is a Call // object. Neither of those have object principals, so we can skip // those objects here before we enter the below loop. That way we // avoid wasting time checking properties of their classes etc in // the loop. if (jsClass == &js::FunctionClass) { aObj = js::GetObjectParent(aObj); if (!aObj) return nsnull; jsClass = js::GetObjectClass(aObj); if (jsClass == &js::CallClass) { aObj = js::GetObjectParentMaybeScope(aObj); if (!aObj) return nsnull; jsClass = js::GetObjectClass(aObj); } } do { // Note: jsClass is set before this loop, and also at the // *end* of this loop. if (IS_WRAPPER_CLASS(jsClass)) { result = sXPConnect->GetPrincipal(aObj, #ifdef DEBUG aAllowShortCircuit #else true #endif ); if (result) { break; } } else { nsISupports *priv; if (!(~jsClass->flags & (JSCLASS_HAS_PRIVATE | JSCLASS_PRIVATE_IS_NSISUPPORTS))) { priv = (nsISupports *) js::GetObjectPrivate(aObj); } else if (IsDOMClass(jsClass) && DOMJSClass::FromJSClass(jsClass)->mDOMObjectIsISupports) { priv = UnwrapDOMObject(aObj); } else { priv = nsnull; } #ifdef DEBUG if (aAllowShortCircuit) { nsCOMPtr xpcWrapper = do_QueryInterface(priv); NS_ASSERTION(!xpcWrapper || !strcmp(jsClass->name, "XPCNativeWrapper"), "Uh, an nsIXPConnectWrappedNative with the " "wrong JSClass or getObjectOps hooks!"); } #endif nsCOMPtr objPrin = do_QueryInterface(priv); if (objPrin) { result = objPrin->GetPrincipal(); if (result) { break; } } } aObj = js::GetObjectParentMaybeScope(aObj); if (!aObj) break; jsClass = js::GetObjectClass(aObj); } while (1); #ifdef DEBUG if (aAllowShortCircuit) { nsIPrincipal *principal = doGetObjectPrincipal(origObj, false); // Because of inner window reuse, we can have objects with one principal // living in a scope with a different (but same-origin) principal. So // just check same-origin here. NS_ASSERTION(NS_SUCCEEDED(CheckSameOriginPrincipal(result, principal)), "Principal mismatch. Not good"); } #endif return result; } ///////////////// Capabilities API ///////////////////// NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::IsCapabilityEnabled(const char *capability, bool *result) { nsresult rv; JSStackFrame *fp = nsnull; JSContext *cx = GetCurrentJSContext(); fp = cx ? JS_FrameIterator(cx, &fp) : nsnull; JSStackFrame *target = nsnull; nsIPrincipal *targetPrincipal = nsnull; for (ContextPrincipal *cp = mContextPrincipals; cp; cp = cp->mNext) { if (cp->mCx == cx) { target = cp->mFp; targetPrincipal = cp->mPrincipal; break; } } if (!fp) { // No script code on stack. If we had a principal pushed for this // context and fp is null, then we use that principal. Otherwise, we // don't have enough information and have to allow execution. *result = (targetPrincipal && !target) ? (targetPrincipal == mSystemPrincipal) : true; return NS_OK; } *result = false; nsIPrincipal* previousPrincipal = nsnull; do { nsIPrincipal* principal = GetFramePrincipal(cx, fp, &rv); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; if (!principal) continue; // If caller has a different principal, stop looking up the stack. if(previousPrincipal) { bool isEqual = false; if(NS_FAILED(previousPrincipal->Equals(principal, &isEqual)) || !isEqual) break; } else previousPrincipal = principal; // First check if the principal is even able to enable the // given capability. If not, don't look any further. PRInt16 canEnable; rv = principal->CanEnableCapability(capability, &canEnable); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; if (canEnable != nsIPrincipal::ENABLE_GRANTED && canEnable != nsIPrincipal::ENABLE_WITH_USER_PERMISSION) return NS_OK; // Now see if the capability is enabled. void *annotation = JS_GetFrameAnnotation(cx, fp); rv = principal->IsCapabilityEnabled(capability, annotation, result); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; if (*result) return NS_OK; // Capabilities do not extend to calls into C/C++ and then back into // the JS engine via JS_EvaluateScript or similar APIs. if (JS_IsGlobalFrame(cx, fp)) break; } while (fp != target && (fp = JS_FrameIterator(cx, &fp)) != nsnull); if (!previousPrincipal) { // No principals on the stack, all native code. Allow // execution if the subject principal is the system principal. return SubjectPrincipalIsSystem(result); } return NS_OK; } void nsScriptSecurityManager::FormatCapabilityString(nsAString& aCapability) { nsAutoString newcaps; nsAutoString rawcap; NS_NAMED_LITERAL_STRING(capdesc, "capdesc."); PRInt32 pos; PRInt32 index = kNotFound; nsresult rv; NS_ASSERTION(kNotFound == -1, "Basic constant changed, algorithm broken!"); do { pos = index+1; index = aCapability.FindChar(' ', pos); rawcap = Substring(aCapability, pos, (index == kNotFound) ? index : index - pos); nsXPIDLString capstr; rv = sStrBundle->GetStringFromName( nsPromiseFlatString(capdesc+rawcap).get(), getter_Copies(capstr)); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) newcaps += capstr; else { nsXPIDLString extensionCap; const PRUnichar* formatArgs[] = { rawcap.get() }; rv = sStrBundle->FormatStringFromName( NS_LITERAL_STRING("ExtensionCapability").get(), formatArgs, ArrayLength(formatArgs), getter_Copies(extensionCap)); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) newcaps += extensionCap; else newcaps += rawcap; } newcaps += NS_LITERAL_STRING("\n"); } while (index != kNotFound); aCapability = newcaps; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::RequestCapability(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, const char *capability, PRInt16* canEnable) { if (NS_FAILED(aPrincipal->CanEnableCapability(capability, canEnable))) return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; // The confirm dialog is no longer supported. All of this stuff is going away // real soon now anyhow. if (*canEnable == nsIPrincipal::ENABLE_WITH_USER_PERMISSION) *canEnable = nsIPrincipal::ENABLE_DENIED; return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::EnableCapability(const char *capability) { JSContext *cx = GetCurrentJSContext(); JSStackFrame *fp; //-- Error checks for capability string length (200) if(PL_strlen(capability)>200) { static const char msg[] = "Capability name too long"; SetPendingException(cx, msg); return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } //-- Check capability string for valid characters // // Logically we might have wanted this in nsPrincipal, but performance // worries dictate it can't go in IsCapabilityEnabled() and we may have // to show the capability on a dialog before we call the principal's // EnableCapability(). // // We don't need to validate the capability string on the other APIs // available to web content. Without the ability to enable junk then // isPrivilegeEnabled, disablePrivilege, and revertPrivilege all do // the right thing (effectively nothing) when passed unallowed chars. for (const char *ch = capability; *ch; ++ch) { if (!NS_IS_ALPHA(*ch) && *ch != ' ' && !NS_IS_DIGIT(*ch) && *ch != '_' && *ch != '-' && *ch != '.') { static const char msg[] = "Invalid character in capability name"; SetPendingException(cx, msg); return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } } nsresult rv; nsIPrincipal* principal = GetPrincipalAndFrame(cx, &fp, &rv); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; if (!principal) return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE; void *annotation = JS_GetFrameAnnotation(cx, fp); bool enabled; if (NS_FAILED(principal->IsCapabilityEnabled(capability, annotation, &enabled))) return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; if (enabled) return NS_OK; PRInt16 canEnable; if (NS_FAILED(RequestCapability(principal, capability, &canEnable))) return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; if (canEnable != nsIPrincipal::ENABLE_GRANTED) { nsCAutoString val; bool hasCert; nsresult rv; principal->GetHasCertificate(&hasCert); if (hasCert) rv = principal->GetPrettyName(val); else rv = GetPrincipalDomainOrigin(principal, val); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 location(val); NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 cap(capability); const PRUnichar *formatStrings[] = { location.get(), cap.get() }; nsXPIDLString message; rv = sStrBundle->FormatStringFromName(NS_LITERAL_STRING("EnableCapabilityDenied").get(), formatStrings, ArrayLength(formatStrings), getter_Copies(message)); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; SetPendingException(cx, message.get()); return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; // XXX better error code? } if (NS_FAILED(principal->EnableCapability(capability, &annotation))) return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; JS_SetFrameAnnotation(cx, fp, annotation); return NS_OK; } //////////////////////////////////////////////// // Methods implementing nsIXPCSecurityManager // //////////////////////////////////////////////// NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CanCreateWrapper(JSContext *cx, const nsIID &aIID, nsISupports *aObj, nsIClassInfo *aClassInfo, void **aPolicy) { #ifdef DEBUG_CAPS_CanCreateWrapper char* iidStr = aIID.ToString(); printf("### CanCreateWrapper(%s) ", iidStr); NS_Free(iidStr); #endif // XXX Special case for nsIXPCException ? ClassInfoData objClassInfo = ClassInfoData(aClassInfo, nsnull); if (objClassInfo.IsDOMClass()) { #ifdef DEBUG_CAPS_CanCreateWrapper printf("DOM class - GRANTED.\n"); #endif return NS_OK; } //--See if the object advertises a non-default level of access // using nsISecurityCheckedComponent nsCOMPtr checkedComponent = do_QueryInterface(aObj); nsXPIDLCString objectSecurityLevel; if (checkedComponent) checkedComponent->CanCreateWrapper((nsIID *)&aIID, getter_Copies(objectSecurityLevel)); nsresult rv = CheckXPCPermissions(cx, aObj, nsnull, nsnull, objectSecurityLevel); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { //-- Access denied, report an error NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 strName("CreateWrapperDenied"); nsCAutoString origin; nsresult rv2; nsIPrincipal* subjectPrincipal = doGetSubjectPrincipal(&rv2); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv2) && subjectPrincipal) { GetPrincipalDomainOrigin(subjectPrincipal, origin); } NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 originUnicode(origin); NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 className(objClassInfo.GetName()); const PRUnichar* formatStrings[] = { className.get(), originUnicode.get() }; PRUint32 length = ArrayLength(formatStrings); if (originUnicode.IsEmpty()) { --length; } else { strName.AppendLiteral("ForOrigin"); } nsXPIDLString errorMsg; // We need to keep our existing failure rv and not override it // with a likely success code from the following string bundle // call in order to throw the correct security exception later. rv2 = sStrBundle->FormatStringFromName(strName.get(), formatStrings, length, getter_Copies(errorMsg)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv2, rv2); SetPendingException(cx, errorMsg.get()); #ifdef DEBUG_CAPS_CanCreateWrapper printf("DENIED.\n"); } else { printf("GRANTED.\n"); #endif } return rv; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CanCreateInstance(JSContext *cx, const nsCID &aCID) { #ifdef DEBUG_CAPS_CanCreateInstance char* cidStr = aCID.ToString(); printf("### CanCreateInstance(%s) ", cidStr); NS_Free(cidStr); #endif nsresult rv = CheckXPCPermissions(nsnull, nsnull, nsnull, nsnull, nsnull); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { //-- Access denied, report an error nsCAutoString errorMsg("Permission denied to create instance of class. CID="); char cidStr[NSID_LENGTH]; aCID.ToProvidedString(cidStr); errorMsg.Append(cidStr); SetPendingException(cx, errorMsg.get()); #ifdef DEBUG_CAPS_CanCreateInstance printf("DENIED\n"); } else { printf("GRANTED\n"); #endif } return rv; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CanGetService(JSContext *cx, const nsCID &aCID) { #ifdef DEBUG_CAPS_CanGetService char* cidStr = aCID.ToString(); printf("### CanGetService(%s) ", cidStr); NS_Free(cidStr); #endif nsresult rv = CheckXPCPermissions(nsnull, nsnull, nsnull, nsnull, nsnull); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { //-- Access denied, report an error nsCAutoString errorMsg("Permission denied to get service. CID="); char cidStr[NSID_LENGTH]; aCID.ToProvidedString(cidStr); errorMsg.Append(cidStr); SetPendingException(cx, errorMsg.get()); #ifdef DEBUG_CAPS_CanGetService printf("DENIED\n"); } else { printf("GRANTED\n"); #endif } return rv; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::CanAccess(PRUint32 aAction, nsAXPCNativeCallContext* aCallContext, JSContext* cx, JSObject* aJSObject, nsISupports* aObj, nsIClassInfo* aClassInfo, jsid aPropertyName, void** aPolicy) { return CheckPropertyAccessImpl(aAction, aCallContext, cx, aJSObject, aObj, nsnull, aClassInfo, nsnull, aPropertyName, aPolicy); } nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckXPCPermissions(JSContext* cx, nsISupports* aObj, JSObject* aJSObject, nsIPrincipal* aSubjectPrincipal, const char* aObjectSecurityLevel) { //-- Check for the all-powerful UniversalXPConnect privilege bool ok = false; if (NS_SUCCEEDED(IsCapabilityEnabled("UniversalXPConnect", &ok)) && ok) return NS_OK; //-- If the object implements nsISecurityCheckedComponent, it has a non-default policy. if (aObjectSecurityLevel) { if (PL_strcasecmp(aObjectSecurityLevel, "allAccess") == 0) return NS_OK; if (cx && PL_strcasecmp(aObjectSecurityLevel, "sameOrigin") == 0) { nsresult rv; if (!aJSObject) { nsCOMPtr xpcwrappedjs = do_QueryInterface(aObj); if (xpcwrappedjs) { rv = xpcwrappedjs->GetJSObject(&aJSObject); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); } } if (!aSubjectPrincipal) { // No subject principal passed in. Compute it. aSubjectPrincipal = GetSubjectPrincipal(cx, &rv); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); } if (aSubjectPrincipal && aJSObject) { nsIPrincipal* objectPrincipal = doGetObjectPrincipal(aJSObject); // Only do anything if we have both a subject and object // principal. if (objectPrincipal) { bool subsumes; rv = aSubjectPrincipal->Subsumes(objectPrincipal, &subsumes); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (subsumes) return NS_OK; } } } else if (PL_strcasecmp(aObjectSecurityLevel, "noAccess") != 0) { bool canAccess = false; if (NS_SUCCEEDED(IsCapabilityEnabled(aObjectSecurityLevel, &canAccess)) && canAccess) return NS_OK; } } //-- Access tests failed return NS_ERROR_DOM_XPCONNECT_ACCESS_DENIED; } ///////////////////////////////////////////// // Method implementing nsIChannelEventSink // ///////////////////////////////////////////// NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::AsyncOnChannelRedirect(nsIChannel* oldChannel, nsIChannel* newChannel, PRUint32 redirFlags, nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback *cb) { nsCOMPtr oldPrincipal; GetChannelPrincipal(oldChannel, getter_AddRefs(oldPrincipal)); nsCOMPtr newURI; newChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(newURI)); nsCOMPtr newOriginalURI; newChannel->GetOriginalURI(getter_AddRefs(newOriginalURI)); NS_ENSURE_STATE(oldPrincipal && newURI && newOriginalURI); const PRUint32 flags = nsIScriptSecurityManager::LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT | nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT; nsresult rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(oldPrincipal, newURI, flags); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && newOriginalURI != newURI) { rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(oldPrincipal, newOriginalURI, flags); } if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; cb->OnRedirectVerifyCallback(NS_OK); return NS_OK; } ///////////////////////////////////// // Method implementing nsIObserver // ///////////////////////////////////// const char sJSEnabledPrefName[] = "javascript.enabled"; const char sFileOriginPolicyPrefName[] = "security.fileuri.strict_origin_policy"; static const char sPrincipalPrefix[] = "capability.principal"; static const char sPolicyPrefix[] = "capability.policy."; static const char* kObservedPrefs[] = { sJSEnabledPrefName, sFileOriginPolicyPrefName, sPolicyPrefix, sPrincipalPrefix, nsnull }; NS_IMETHODIMP nsScriptSecurityManager::Observe(nsISupports* aObject, const char* aTopic, const PRUnichar* aMessage) { nsresult rv = NS_OK; NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8 messageStr(aMessage); const char *message = messageStr.get(); static const char jsPrefix[] = "javascript."; static const char securityPrefix[] = "security."; if ((PL_strncmp(message, jsPrefix, sizeof(jsPrefix)-1) == 0) || (PL_strncmp(message, securityPrefix, sizeof(securityPrefix)-1) == 0) ) { ScriptSecurityPrefChanged(); } else if (PL_strncmp(message, sPolicyPrefix, sizeof(sPolicyPrefix)-1) == 0) { // This will force re-initialization of the pref table mPolicyPrefsChanged = true; } else if ((PL_strncmp(message, sPrincipalPrefix, sizeof(sPrincipalPrefix)-1) == 0) && !mIsWritingPrefs) { static const char id[] = "id"; char* lastDot = PL_strrchr(message, '.'); //-- This check makes sure the string copy below doesn't overwrite its bounds if(PL_strlen(lastDot) >= sizeof(id)) { PL_strcpy(lastDot + 1, id); const char** idPrefArray = (const char**)&message; rv = InitPrincipals(1, idPrefArray); } } return rv; } ///////////////////////////////////////////// // Constructor, Destructor, Initialization // ///////////////////////////////////////////// nsScriptSecurityManager::nsScriptSecurityManager(void) : mOriginToPolicyMap(nsnull), mDefaultPolicy(nsnull), mCapabilities(nsnull), mContextPrincipals(nsnull), mPrefInitialized(false), mIsJavaScriptEnabled(false), mIsWritingPrefs(false), mPolicyPrefsChanged(true) { MOZ_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(intptr_t) == sizeof(void*), "intptr_t and void* have different lengths on this platform. " "This may cause a security failure with the SecurityLevel union."); mPrincipals.Init(31); } nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::Init() { nsXPConnect* xpconnect = nsXPConnect::GetXPConnect(); if (!xpconnect) return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; NS_ADDREF(sXPConnect = xpconnect); NS_ADDREF(sJSContextStack = xpconnect); JSContext* cx = GetSafeJSContext(); if (!cx) return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; // this can happen of xpt loading fails ::JS_BeginRequest(cx); if (sEnabledID == JSID_VOID) sEnabledID = INTERNED_STRING_TO_JSID(cx, ::JS_InternString(cx, "enabled")); ::JS_EndRequest(cx); InitPrefs(); nsresult rv = CallGetService(NS_IOSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &sIOService); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); nsCOMPtr bundleService = mozilla::services::GetStringBundleService(); if (!bundleService) return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; rv = bundleService->CreateBundle("chrome://global/locale/security/caps.properties", &sStrBundle); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // Create our system principal singleton nsRefPtr system = new nsSystemPrincipal(); NS_ENSURE_TRUE(system, NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY); mSystemPrincipal = system; //-- Register security check callback in the JS engine // Currently this is used to control access to function.caller nsCOMPtr runtimeService = do_QueryInterface(sXPConnect, &rv); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); rv = runtimeService->GetRuntime(&sRuntime); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); static const JSSecurityCallbacks securityCallbacks = { CheckObjectAccess, nsJSPrincipals::Subsume, ObjectPrincipalFinder, ContentSecurityPolicyPermitsJSAction, PushPrincipalCallback, PopPrincipalCallback }; MOZ_ASSERT(!JS_GetSecurityCallbacks(sRuntime)); JS_SetSecurityCallbacks(sRuntime, &securityCallbacks); JS_InitDestroyPrincipalsCallback(sRuntime, nsJSPrincipals::Destroy); JS_SetTrustedPrincipals(sRuntime, system); return NS_OK; } static nsScriptSecurityManager *gScriptSecMan = nsnull; jsid nsScriptSecurityManager::sEnabledID = JSID_VOID; nsScriptSecurityManager::~nsScriptSecurityManager(void) { Preferences::RemoveObservers(this, kObservedPrefs); NS_ASSERTION(!mContextPrincipals, "Leaking mContextPrincipals"); delete mOriginToPolicyMap; if(mDefaultPolicy) mDefaultPolicy->Drop(); delete mCapabilities; gScriptSecMan = nsnull; } void nsScriptSecurityManager::Shutdown() { if (sRuntime) { JS_SetSecurityCallbacks(sRuntime, NULL); JS_SetTrustedPrincipals(sRuntime, NULL); sRuntime = nsnull; } sEnabledID = JSID_VOID; NS_IF_RELEASE(sIOService); NS_IF_RELEASE(sXPConnect); NS_IF_RELEASE(sJSContextStack); NS_IF_RELEASE(sStrBundle); } nsScriptSecurityManager * nsScriptSecurityManager::GetScriptSecurityManager() { if (!gScriptSecMan) { nsScriptSecurityManager* ssManager = new nsScriptSecurityManager(); if (!ssManager) return nsnull; nsresult rv; rv = ssManager->Init(); NS_ASSERTION(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv), "Failed to initialize nsScriptSecurityManager"); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { delete ssManager; return nsnull; } rv = sXPConnect->SetDefaultSecurityManager(ssManager, nsIXPCSecurityManager::HOOK_ALL); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { NS_WARNING("Failed to install xpconnect security manager!"); delete ssManager; return nsnull; } gScriptSecMan = ssManager; } return gScriptSecMan; } // Currently this nsGenericFactory constructor is used only from FastLoad // (XPCOM object deserialization) code, when "creating" the system principal // singleton. nsSystemPrincipal * nsScriptSecurityManager::SystemPrincipalSingletonConstructor() { nsIPrincipal *sysprin = nsnull; if (gScriptSecMan) NS_ADDREF(sysprin = gScriptSecMan->mSystemPrincipal); return static_cast(sysprin); } nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::InitPolicies() { // Clear any policies cached on XPConnect wrappers NS_ENSURE_STATE(sXPConnect); nsresult rv = sXPConnect->ClearAllWrappedNativeSecurityPolicies(); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; //-- Clear mOriginToPolicyMap: delete mapped DomainEntry items, //-- whose dtor decrements refcount of stored DomainPolicy object delete mOriginToPolicyMap; //-- Marks all the survivor DomainPolicy objects (those cached //-- by nsPrincipal objects) as invalid: they will be released //-- on first nsPrincipal::GetSecurityPolicy() attempt. DomainPolicy::InvalidateAll(); //-- Release old default policy if(mDefaultPolicy) { mDefaultPolicy->Drop(); mDefaultPolicy = nsnull; } //-- Initialize a new mOriginToPolicyMap mOriginToPolicyMap = new nsObjectHashtable(nsnull, nsnull, DeleteDomainEntry, nsnull); if (!mOriginToPolicyMap) return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; //-- Create, refcount and initialize a new default policy mDefaultPolicy = new DomainPolicy(); if (!mDefaultPolicy) return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; mDefaultPolicy->Hold(); if (!mDefaultPolicy->Init()) return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED; //-- Initialize the table of security levels if (!mCapabilities) { mCapabilities = new nsObjectHashtable(nsnull, nsnull, DeleteCapability, nsnull); if (!mCapabilities) return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } // Get a JS context - we need it to create internalized strings later. JSContext* cx = GetSafeJSContext(); NS_ASSERTION(cx, "failed to get JS context"); AutoCxPusher autoPusher(sJSContextStack, cx); rv = InitDomainPolicy(cx, "default", mDefaultPolicy); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); nsAdoptingCString policyNames = Preferences::GetCString("capability.policy.policynames"); nsAdoptingCString defaultPolicyNames = Preferences::GetCString("capability.policy.default_policynames"); policyNames += NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(" ") + defaultPolicyNames; //-- Initialize domain policies char* policyCurrent = policyNames.BeginWriting(); bool morePolicies = true; while (morePolicies) { while(*policyCurrent == ' ' || *policyCurrent == ',') policyCurrent++; if (*policyCurrent == '\0') break; char* nameBegin = policyCurrent; while(*policyCurrent != '\0' && *policyCurrent != ' ' && *policyCurrent != ',') policyCurrent++; morePolicies = (*policyCurrent != '\0'); *policyCurrent = '\0'; policyCurrent++; nsCAutoString sitesPrefName( NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(sPolicyPrefix) + nsDependentCString(nameBegin) + NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(".sites")); nsAdoptingCString domainList = Preferences::GetCString(sitesPrefName.get()); if (!domainList) { continue; } DomainPolicy* domainPolicy = new DomainPolicy(); if (!domainPolicy) return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; if (!domainPolicy->Init()) { delete domainPolicy; return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED; } domainPolicy->Hold(); //-- Parse list of sites and create an entry in mOriginToPolicyMap for each char* domainStart = domainList.BeginWriting(); char* domainCurrent = domainStart; char* lastDot = nsnull; char* nextToLastDot = nsnull; bool moreDomains = true; while (moreDomains) { if (*domainCurrent == ' ' || *domainCurrent == '\0') { moreDomains = (*domainCurrent != '\0'); *domainCurrent = '\0'; nsCStringKey key(nextToLastDot ? nextToLastDot+1 : domainStart); DomainEntry *newEntry = new DomainEntry(domainStart, domainPolicy); if (!newEntry) { domainPolicy->Drop(); return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } #ifdef DEBUG newEntry->mPolicyName_DEBUG = nameBegin; #endif DomainEntry *existingEntry = (DomainEntry *) mOriginToPolicyMap->Get(&key); if (!existingEntry) mOriginToPolicyMap->Put(&key, newEntry); else { if (existingEntry->Matches(domainStart)) { newEntry->mNext = existingEntry; mOriginToPolicyMap->Put(&key, newEntry); } else { while (existingEntry->mNext) { if (existingEntry->mNext->Matches(domainStart)) { newEntry->mNext = existingEntry->mNext; existingEntry->mNext = newEntry; break; } existingEntry = existingEntry->mNext; } if (!existingEntry->mNext) existingEntry->mNext = newEntry; } } domainStart = domainCurrent + 1; lastDot = nextToLastDot = nsnull; } else if (*domainCurrent == '.') { nextToLastDot = lastDot; lastDot = domainCurrent; } domainCurrent++; } rv = InitDomainPolicy(cx, nameBegin, domainPolicy); domainPolicy->Drop(); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; } // Reset the "dirty" flag mPolicyPrefsChanged = false; #ifdef DEBUG_CAPS_HACKER PrintPolicyDB(); #endif return NS_OK; } nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::InitDomainPolicy(JSContext* cx, const char* aPolicyName, DomainPolicy* aDomainPolicy) { nsresult rv; nsCAutoString policyPrefix(NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(sPolicyPrefix) + nsDependentCString(aPolicyName) + NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(".")); PRUint32 prefixLength = policyPrefix.Length() - 1; // subtract the '.' PRUint32 prefCount; char** prefNames; nsIPrefBranch* branch = Preferences::GetRootBranch(); NS_ASSERTION(branch, "failed to get the root pref branch"); rv = branch->GetChildList(policyPrefix.get(), &prefCount, &prefNames); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; if (prefCount == 0) return NS_OK; //-- Populate the policy PRUint32 currentPref = 0; for (; currentPref < prefCount; currentPref++) { // Get the class name const char* start = prefNames[currentPref] + prefixLength + 1; char* end = PL_strchr(start, '.'); if (!end) // malformed pref, bail on this one continue; static const char sitesStr[] = "sites"; // We dealt with "sites" in InitPolicies(), so no need to do // that again... if (PL_strncmp(start, sitesStr, sizeof(sitesStr)-1) == 0) continue; // Get the pref value nsAdoptingCString prefValue = Preferences::GetCString(prefNames[currentPref]); if (!prefValue) { continue; } SecurityLevel secLevel; if (PL_strcasecmp(prefValue, "noAccess") == 0) secLevel.level = SCRIPT_SECURITY_NO_ACCESS; else if (PL_strcasecmp(prefValue, "allAccess") == 0) secLevel.level = SCRIPT_SECURITY_ALL_ACCESS; else if (PL_strcasecmp(prefValue, "sameOrigin") == 0) secLevel.level = SCRIPT_SECURITY_SAME_ORIGIN_ACCESS; else { //-- pref value is the name of a capability nsCStringKey secLevelKey(prefValue); secLevel.capability = reinterpret_cast(mCapabilities->Get(&secLevelKey)); if (!secLevel.capability) { secLevel.capability = NS_strdup(prefValue); if (!secLevel.capability) break; mCapabilities->Put(&secLevelKey, secLevel.capability); } } *end = '\0'; // Find or store this class in the classes table ClassPolicy* cpolicy = static_cast (PL_DHashTableOperate(aDomainPolicy, start, PL_DHASH_ADD)); if (!cpolicy) break; // If this is the wildcard class (class '*'), save it in mWildcardPolicy // (we leave it stored in the hashtable too to take care of the cleanup) if ((*start == '*') && (end == start + 1)) { aDomainPolicy->mWildcardPolicy = cpolicy; // Make sure that cpolicy knows about aDomainPolicy so it can reset // the mWildcardPolicy pointer as needed if it gets moved in the // hashtable. cpolicy->mDomainWeAreWildcardFor = aDomainPolicy; } // Get the property name start = end + 1; end = PL_strchr(start, '.'); if (end) *end = '\0'; JSAutoRequest ar(cx); JSString* propertyKey = ::JS_InternString(cx, start); if (!propertyKey) return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; // Store this property in the class policy PropertyPolicy* ppolicy = static_cast (PL_DHashTableOperate(cpolicy->mPolicy, propertyKey, PL_DHASH_ADD)); if (!ppolicy) break; if (end) // The pref specifies an access mode { start = end + 1; if (PL_strcasecmp(start, "set") == 0) ppolicy->mSet = secLevel; else ppolicy->mGet = secLevel; } else { if (ppolicy->mGet.level == SCRIPT_SECURITY_UNDEFINED_ACCESS) ppolicy->mGet = secLevel; if (ppolicy->mSet.level == SCRIPT_SECURITY_UNDEFINED_ACCESS) ppolicy->mSet = secLevel; } } NS_FREE_XPCOM_ALLOCATED_POINTER_ARRAY(prefCount, prefNames); if (currentPref < prefCount) // Loop exited early because of out-of-memory error return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; return NS_OK; } // XXXbz We should really just get a prefbranch to handle this... nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::GetPrincipalPrefNames(const char* prefBase, nsCString& grantedPref, nsCString& deniedPref, nsCString& subjectNamePref) { char* lastDot = PL_strrchr(prefBase, '.'); if (!lastDot) return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; PRInt32 prefLen = lastDot - prefBase + 1; grantedPref.Assign(prefBase, prefLen); deniedPref.Assign(prefBase, prefLen); subjectNamePref.Assign(prefBase, prefLen); #define GRANTED "granted" #define DENIED "denied" #define SUBJECTNAME "subjectName" grantedPref.AppendLiteral(GRANTED); if (grantedPref.Length() != prefLen + sizeof(GRANTED) - 1) { return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } deniedPref.AppendLiteral(DENIED); if (deniedPref.Length() != prefLen + sizeof(DENIED) - 1) { return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } subjectNamePref.AppendLiteral(SUBJECTNAME); if (subjectNamePref.Length() != prefLen + sizeof(SUBJECTNAME) - 1) { return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } #undef SUBJECTNAME #undef DENIED #undef GRANTED return NS_OK; } nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::InitPrincipals(PRUint32 aPrefCount, const char** aPrefNames) { /* This is the principal preference syntax: * capability.principal.[codebase|codebaseTrusted|certificate]..[id|granted|denied] * For example: * user_pref("capability.principal.certificate.p1.id","12:34:AB:CD"); * user_pref("capability.principal.certificate.p1.granted","Capability1 Capability2"); * user_pref("capability.principal.certificate.p1.denied","Capability3"); */ /* codebaseTrusted means a codebase principal that can enable capabilities even if * codebase principals are disabled. Don't use trustedCodebase except with unspoofable * URLs such as HTTPS URLs. */ static const char idSuffix[] = ".id"; for (PRUint32 c = 0; c < aPrefCount; c++) { PRInt32 prefNameLen = PL_strlen(aPrefNames[c]) - (ArrayLength(idSuffix) - 1); if (PL_strcasecmp(aPrefNames[c] + prefNameLen, idSuffix) != 0) continue; nsAdoptingCString id = Preferences::GetCString(aPrefNames[c]); if (!id) { return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } nsCAutoString grantedPrefName; nsCAutoString deniedPrefName; nsCAutoString subjectNamePrefName; nsresult rv = GetPrincipalPrefNames(aPrefNames[c], grantedPrefName, deniedPrefName, subjectNamePrefName); if (rv == NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY) return rv; if (NS_FAILED(rv)) continue; nsAdoptingCString grantedList = Preferences::GetCString(grantedPrefName.get()); nsAdoptingCString deniedList = Preferences::GetCString(deniedPrefName.get()); nsAdoptingCString subjectName = Preferences::GetCString(subjectNamePrefName.get()); //-- Delete prefs if their value is the empty string if (id.IsEmpty() || (grantedList.IsEmpty() && deniedList.IsEmpty())) { Preferences::ClearUser(aPrefNames[c]); Preferences::ClearUser(grantedPrefName.get()); Preferences::ClearUser(deniedPrefName.get()); Preferences::ClearUser(subjectNamePrefName.get()); continue; } //-- Create a principal based on the prefs static const char certificateName[] = "capability.principal.certificate"; static const char codebaseName[] = "capability.principal.codebase"; static const char codebaseTrustedName[] = "capability.principal.codebaseTrusted"; bool isCert = false; bool isTrusted = false; if (PL_strncmp(aPrefNames[c], certificateName, sizeof(certificateName) - 1) == 0) { isCert = true; } else if (PL_strncmp(aPrefNames[c], codebaseName, sizeof(codebaseName) - 1) == 0) { isTrusted = (PL_strncmp(aPrefNames[c], codebaseTrustedName, sizeof(codebaseTrustedName) - 1) == 0); } else { NS_ERROR("Not a codebase or a certificate?!"); } nsRefPtr newPrincipal = new nsPrincipal(); if (!newPrincipal) return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; rv = newPrincipal->InitFromPersistent(aPrefNames[c], id, subjectName, EmptyCString(), grantedList, deniedList, nsnull, isCert, isTrusted); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) mPrincipals.Put(newPrincipal, newPrincipal); } return NS_OK; } inline void nsScriptSecurityManager::ScriptSecurityPrefChanged() { // JavaScript defaults to enabled in failure cases. mIsJavaScriptEnabled = true; sStrictFileOriginPolicy = true; nsresult rv; if (!mPrefInitialized) { rv = InitPrefs(); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return; } mIsJavaScriptEnabled = Preferences::GetBool(sJSEnabledPrefName, mIsJavaScriptEnabled); sStrictFileOriginPolicy = Preferences::GetBool(sFileOriginPolicyPrefName, false); } nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::InitPrefs() { nsresult rv; nsIPrefBranch* branch = Preferences::GetRootBranch(); NS_ENSURE_TRUE(branch, NS_ERROR_FAILURE); mPrefInitialized = true; // Set the initial value of the "javascript.enabled" prefs ScriptSecurityPrefChanged(); // set observer callbacks in case the value of the prefs change Preferences::AddStrongObservers(this, kObservedPrefs); PRUint32 prefCount; char** prefNames; //-- Initialize the principals database from prefs rv = branch->GetChildList(sPrincipalPrefix, &prefCount, &prefNames); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && prefCount > 0) { rv = InitPrincipals(prefCount, (const char**)prefNames); NS_FREE_XPCOM_ALLOCATED_POINTER_ARRAY(prefCount, prefNames); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); } return NS_OK; } /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // The following code prints the contents of the policy DB to the console. #ifdef DEBUG_CAPS_HACKER //typedef PLDHashOperator //(* PLDHashEnumerator)(PLDHashTable *table, PLDHashEntryHdr *hdr, // PRUint32 number, void *arg); static PLDHashOperator PrintPropertyPolicy(PLDHashTable *table, PLDHashEntryHdr *entry, PRUint32 number, void *arg) { PropertyPolicy* pp = (PropertyPolicy*)entry; nsCAutoString prop(" "); JSContext* cx = (JSContext*)arg; prop.AppendInt((PRUint32)pp->key); prop += ' '; prop.AppendWithConversion((PRUnichar*)JS_GetStringChars(pp->key)); prop += ": Get="; if (SECURITY_ACCESS_LEVEL_FLAG(pp->mGet)) prop.AppendInt(pp->mGet.level); else prop += pp->mGet.capability; prop += " Set="; if (SECURITY_ACCESS_LEVEL_FLAG(pp->mSet)) prop.AppendInt(pp->mSet.level); else prop += pp->mSet.capability; printf("%s.\n", prop.get()); return PL_DHASH_NEXT; } static PLDHashOperator PrintClassPolicy(PLDHashTable *table, PLDHashEntryHdr *entry, PRUint32 number, void *arg) { ClassPolicy* cp = (ClassPolicy*)entry; printf(" %s\n", cp->key); PL_DHashTableEnumerate(cp->mPolicy, PrintPropertyPolicy, arg); return PL_DHASH_NEXT; } // typedef bool // (* nsHashtableEnumFunc)(nsHashKey *aKey, void *aData, void* aClosure); static bool PrintDomainPolicy(nsHashKey *aKey, void *aData, void* aClosure) { DomainEntry* de = (DomainEntry*)aData; printf("----------------------------\n"); printf("Domain: %s Policy Name: %s.\n", de->mOrigin.get(), de->mPolicyName_DEBUG.get()); PL_DHashTableEnumerate(de->mDomainPolicy, PrintClassPolicy, aClosure); return true; } static bool PrintCapability(nsHashKey *aKey, void *aData, void* aClosure) { char* cap = (char*)aData; printf(" %s.\n", cap); return true; } void nsScriptSecurityManager::PrintPolicyDB() { printf("############## Security Policies ###############\n"); if(mOriginToPolicyMap) { JSContext* cx = GetCurrentJSContext(); if (!cx) cx = GetSafeJSContext(); printf("----------------------------\n"); printf("Domain: Default.\n"); PL_DHashTableEnumerate(mDefaultPolicy, PrintClassPolicy, (void*)cx); mOriginToPolicyMap->Enumerate(PrintDomainPolicy, (void*)cx); } printf("############ End Security Policies #############\n\n"); printf("############## Capabilities ###############\n"); mCapabilities->Enumerate(PrintCapability); printf("############## End Capabilities ###############\n"); } #endif