# ***** BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK ***** # Version: MPL 1.1/GPL 2.0/LGPL 2.1 # # The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version # 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with # the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at # http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/ # # Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, # WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License # for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the # License. # # The Original Code is Google Safe Browsing. # # The Initial Developer of the Original Code is Google Inc. # Portions created by the Initial Developer are Copyright (C) 2006 # the Initial Developer. All Rights Reserved. # # Contributor(s): # Fritz Schneider (original author) # # Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the terms of # either the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the "GPL"), or # the GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1 or later (the "LGPL"), # in which case the provisions of the GPL or the LGPL are applicable instead # of those above. If you wish to allow use of your version of this file only # under the terms of either the GPL or the LGPL, and not to allow others to # use your version of this file under the terms of the MPL, indicate your # decision by deleting the provisions above and replace them with the notice # and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete # the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under # the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL. # # ***** END LICENSE BLOCK ***** // This file implements the tricky business of managing the keys for our // URL encryption. The protocol is: // // - Server generates secret key K_S // - Client starts up and requests a new key K_C from the server via HTTPS // - Server generates K_C and WrappedKey, which is K_C encrypted with K_S // - Server resonse with K_C and WrappedKey // - When client wants to encrypt a URL, it encrypts it with K_C and sends // the encrypted URL along with WrappedKey // - Server decrypts WrappedKey with K_S to get K_C, and the URL with K_C // // This is, however, trickier than it sounds for two reasons. First, // we want to keep the number of HTTPS requests to an aboslute minimum // (like 1 or 2 per browser session). Second, the HTTPS request at // startup might fail, for example the user might be offline or a URL // fetch might need to be issued before the HTTPS request has // completed. // // We implement the following policy: // // - Firefox will issue at most two HTTPS getkey requests per session // - Firefox will issue one HTTPS getkey request at startup if more than 24 // hours has passed since the last getkey request. // - Firefox will serialize to disk any key it gets // - Firefox will fall back on this serialized key until it has a // fresh key // - The front-end can respond with a flag in a lookup request that tells // the client to re-key. Firefox will issue a new HTTPS getkey request // at this time if it has only issued one before // We store the user key in this file. The key can be used to verify signed // server updates. const kKeyFilename = "urlclassifierkey3.txt"; /** * A key manager for UrlCrypto. There should be exactly one of these * per appplication, and all UrlCrypto's should share it. This is * currently implemented by having the manager attach itself to the * UrlCrypto's prototype at startup. We could've opted for a global * instead, but I like this better, even though it is spooky action * at a distance. * XXX: Should be an XPCOM service * * @param opt_keyFilename String containing the name of the * file we should serialize keys to/from. Used * mostly for testing. * * @param opt_testing Boolean indicating whether we are testing. If we * are, then we skip trying to read the old key from * file and automatically trying to rekey; presumably * the tester will drive these manually. * * @constructor */ function PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager(opt_keyFilename, opt_testing) { this.debugZone = "urlcryptokeymanager"; this.testing_ = !!opt_testing; this.clientKey_ = null; // Base64-encoded, as fetched from server this.clientKeyArray_ = null; // Base64-decoded into an array of numbers this.wrappedKey_ = null; // Opaque websafe base64-encoded server key this.rekeyTries_ = 0; this.updating_ = false; // Don't do anything until keyUrl_ is set. this.keyUrl_ = null; this.keyFilename_ = opt_keyFilename ? opt_keyFilename : kKeyFilename; this.onNewKey_ = null; // Convenience properties this.MAX_REKEY_TRIES = PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.MAX_REKEY_TRIES; this.CLIENT_KEY_NAME = PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.CLIENT_KEY_NAME; this.WRAPPED_KEY_NAME = PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.WRAPPED_KEY_NAME; if (!this.testing_) { this.maybeLoadOldKey(); } } // Do ***** NOT ***** set this higher; HTTPS is expensive PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.MAX_REKEY_TRIES = 2; // Base pref for keeping track of when we updated our key. // We store the time as seconds since the epoch. PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.NEXT_REKEY_PREF = "urlclassifier.keyupdatetime."; // Once every 30 days (interval in seconds) PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.KEY_MIN_UPDATE_TIME = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60; // These are the names the server will respond with in protocol4 format PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.CLIENT_KEY_NAME = "clientkey"; PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.WRAPPED_KEY_NAME = "wrappedkey"; /** * Called to get ClientKey * @returns urlsafe-base64-encoded client key or null if we haven't gotten one. */ PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.prototype.getClientKey = function() { return this.clientKey_; } /** * Called by a UrlCrypto to get the current K_C * * @returns Array of numbers making up the client key or null if we * have no key */ PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.prototype.getClientKeyArray = function() { return this.clientKeyArray_; } /** * Called by a UrlCrypto to get WrappedKey * * @returns Opaque base64-encoded WrappedKey or null if we haven't * gotten one */ PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.prototype.getWrappedKey = function() { return this.wrappedKey_; } /** * Change the key url. When we do this, we go ahead and rekey. * @param keyUrl String */ PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.prototype.setKeyUrl = function(keyUrl) { // If it's the same key url, do nothing. if (keyUrl == this.keyUrl_) return; this.keyUrl_ = keyUrl; this.rekeyTries_ = 0; // Check to see if we should make a new getkey request. var prefs = new G_Preferences(PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.NEXT_REKEY_PREF); var nextRekey = prefs.getPref(this.getPrefName_(this.keyUrl_), 0); if (nextRekey < parseInt(Date.now() / 1000, 10)) { this.reKey(); } } /** * Given a url, return the pref value to use (pref contains last update time). * We basically use the url up until query parameters. This avoids duplicate * pref entries as version number changes over time. * @param url String getkey URL */ PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.prototype.getPrefName_ = function(url) { var queryParam = url.indexOf("?"); if (queryParam != -1) { return url.substring(0, queryParam); } return url; } /** * Tell the manager to re-key. For safety, this method still obeys the * max-tries limit. Clients should generally use maybeReKey() if they * want to try a re-keying: it's an error to call reKey() after we've * hit max-tries, but not an error to call maybeReKey(). */ PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.prototype.reKey = function() { if (this.updating_) { G_Debug(this, "Already re-keying, ignoring this request"); return true; } if (this.rekeyTries_ > this.MAX_REKEY_TRIES) throw new Error("Have already rekeyed " + this.rekeyTries_ + " times"); this.rekeyTries_++; G_Debug(this, "Attempting to re-key"); // If the keyUrl isn't set, we don't do anything. if (!this.testing_ && this.keyUrl_) { this.fetcher_ = new PROT_XMLFetcher(); this.fetcher_.get(this.keyUrl_, BindToObject(this.onGetKeyResponse, this)); this.updating_ = true; // Calculate the next time we're allowed to re-key. var prefs = new G_Preferences(PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.NEXT_REKEY_PREF); var nextRekey = parseInt(Date.now() / 1000, 10) + PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.KEY_MIN_UPDATE_TIME; prefs.setPref(this.getPrefName_(this.keyUrl_), nextRekey); } } /** * Try to re-key if we haven't already hit our limit. It's OK to call * this method multiple times, even if we've already tried to rekey * more than the max. It will simply refuse to do so. * * @returns Boolean indicating if it actually issued a rekey request (that * is, if we haven' already hit the max) */ PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.prototype.maybeReKey = function() { if (this.rekeyTries_ > this.MAX_REKEY_TRIES) { G_Debug(this, "Not re-keying; already at max"); return false; } this.reKey(); return true; } /** * Drop the existing set of keys. Resets the rekeyTries variable to * allow a rekey to succeed. */ PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.prototype.dropKey = function() { this.rekeyTries_ = 0; this.replaceKey_(null, null); } /** * @returns Boolean indicating if we have a key we can use */ PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.prototype.hasKey = function() { return this.clientKey_ != null && this.wrappedKey_ != null; } PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.prototype.unUrlSafe = function(key) { return key ? key.replace("-", "+").replace("_", "/") : ""; } /** * Set a new key and serialize it to disk. * * @param clientKey String containing the base64-encoded client key * we wish to use * * @param wrappedKey String containing the opaque base64-encoded WrappedKey * the server gave us (i.e., K_C encrypted with K_S) */ PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.prototype.replaceKey_ = function(clientKey, wrappedKey) { if (this.clientKey_) G_Debug(this, "Replacing " + this.clientKey_ + " with " + clientKey); this.clientKey_ = clientKey; this.clientKeyArray_ = Array.map(atob(this.unUrlSafe(clientKey)), function(c) { return c.charCodeAt(0); }); this.wrappedKey_ = wrappedKey; this.serializeKey_(this.clientKey_, this.wrappedKey_); if (this.onNewKey_) { this.onNewKey_(); } } /** * Try to write the key to disk so we can fall back on it. Fail * silently if we cannot. The keys are serialized in protocol4 format. * * @returns Boolean indicating whether we succeeded in serializing */ PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.prototype.serializeKey_ = function() { var map = {}; map[this.CLIENT_KEY_NAME] = this.clientKey_; map[this.WRAPPED_KEY_NAME] = this.wrappedKey_; try { var keyfile = Cc["@mozilla.org/file/directory_service;1"] .getService(Ci.nsIProperties) .get("ProfD", Ci.nsILocalFile); /* profile directory */ keyfile.append(this.keyFilename_); if (!this.clientKey_ || !this.wrappedKey_) { keyfile.remove(true); return; } var data = (new G_Protocol4Parser()).serialize(map); try { var stream = Cc["@mozilla.org/network/file-output-stream;1"] .createInstance(Ci.nsIFileOutputStream); stream.init(keyfile, 0x02 | 0x08 | 0x20 /* PR_WRONLY | PR_CREATE_FILE | PR_TRUNCATE */, -1 /* default perms */, 0 /* no special behavior */); stream.write(data, data.length); } finally { stream.close(); } return true; } catch(e) { G_Error(this, "Failed to serialize new key: " + e); return false; } } /** * Invoked when we've received a protocol4 response to our getkey * request. Try to parse it and set this key as the new one if we can. * * @param responseText String containing the protocol4 getkey response */ PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.prototype.onGetKeyResponse = function(responseText) { var response = (new G_Protocol4Parser).parse(responseText); var clientKey = response[this.CLIENT_KEY_NAME]; var wrappedKey = response[this.WRAPPED_KEY_NAME]; this.updating_ = false; this.fetcher_ = null; if (response && clientKey && wrappedKey) { G_Debug(this, "Got new key from: " + responseText); this.replaceKey_(clientKey, wrappedKey); } else { G_Debug(this, "Not a valid response for /newkey"); } } /** * Set the callback to be called whenever we get a new key. * * @param callback The callback. */ PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.prototype.onNewKey = function(callback) { this.onNewKey_ = callback; } /** * Attempt to read a key we've previously serialized from disk, so * that we can fall back on it in case we can't get one from the * server. If we get a key, only use it if we don't already have one * (i.e., if our startup HTTPS request died or hasn't yet completed). * * This method should be invoked early, like when the user's profile * becomes available. */ PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.prototype.maybeLoadOldKey = function() { var oldKey = null; try { var keyfile = Cc["@mozilla.org/file/directory_service;1"] .getService(Ci.nsIProperties) .get("ProfD", Ci.nsILocalFile); /* profile directory */ keyfile.append(this.keyFilename_); if (keyfile.exists()) { try { var fis = Cc["@mozilla.org/network/file-input-stream;1"] .createInstance(Ci.nsIFileInputStream); fis.init(keyfile, 0x01 /* PR_RDONLY */, 0444, 0); var stream = Cc["@mozilla.org/scriptableinputstream;1"] .createInstance(Ci.nsIScriptableInputStream); stream.init(fis); oldKey = stream.read(stream.available()); } finally { if (stream) stream.close(); } } } catch(e) { G_Debug(this, "Caught " + e + " trying to read keyfile"); return; } if (!oldKey) { G_Debug(this, "Couldn't find old key."); return; } oldKey = (new G_Protocol4Parser).parse(oldKey); var clientKey = oldKey[this.CLIENT_KEY_NAME]; var wrappedKey = oldKey[this.WRAPPED_KEY_NAME]; if (oldKey && clientKey && wrappedKey && !this.hasKey()) { G_Debug(this, "Read old key from disk."); this.replaceKey_(clientKey, wrappedKey); } } PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager.prototype.shutdown = function() { if (this.fetcher_) { this.fetcher_.cancel(); this.fetcher_ = null; } } #ifdef DEBUG /** * Cheesey tests */ function TEST_PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager() { if (G_GDEBUG) { var z = "urlcryptokeymanager UNITTEST"; G_debugService.enableZone(z); G_Debug(z, "Starting"); // Let's not clobber any real keyfile out there var kf = "keytest.txt"; // Let's be able to clean up after ourselves function removeTestFile(f) { var file = Cc["@mozilla.org/file/directory_service;1"] .getService(Ci.nsIProperties) .get("ProfD", Ci.nsILocalFile); /* profile directory */ file.append(f); if (file.exists()) file.remove(false /* do not recurse */); }; removeTestFile(kf); var km = new PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager(kf, true /* testing */); // CASE: simulate nothing on disk, then get something from server G_Assert(z, !km.hasKey(), "KM already has key?"); km.maybeLoadOldKey(); G_Assert(z, !km.hasKey(), "KM loaded nonexistent key?"); km.onGetKeyResponse(null); G_Assert(z, !km.hasKey(), "KM got key from null response?"); km.onGetKeyResponse(""); G_Assert(z, !km.hasKey(), "KM got key from empty response?"); km.onGetKeyResponse("aslkaslkdf:34:a230\nskdjfaljsie"); G_Assert(z, !km.hasKey(), "KM got key from garbage response?"); var realResponse = "clientkey:24:zGbaDbx1pxoYe7siZYi8VA==\n" + "wrappedkey:24:MTr1oDt6TSOFQDTvKCWz9PEn"; km.onGetKeyResponse(realResponse); // Will have written it to file as a side effect G_Assert(z, km.hasKey(), "KM couldn't get key from real response?"); G_Assert(z, km.clientKey_ == "zGbaDbx1pxoYe7siZYi8VA==", "Parsed wrong client key from response?"); G_Assert(z, km.wrappedKey_ == "MTr1oDt6TSOFQDTvKCWz9PEn", "Parsed wrong wrapped key from response?"); // CASE: simulate something on disk, then get something from server km = new PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager(kf, true /* testing */); G_Assert(z, !km.hasKey(), "KM already has key?"); km.maybeLoadOldKey(); G_Assert(z, km.hasKey(), "KM couldn't load existing key from disk?"); G_Assert(z, km.clientKey_ == "zGbaDbx1pxoYe7siZYi8VA==", "Parsed wrong client key from disk?"); G_Assert(z, km.wrappedKey_ == "MTr1oDt6TSOFQDTvKCWz9PEn", "Parsed wrong wrapped key from disk?"); var realResponse2 = "clientkey:24:dtmbEN1kgN/LmuEoYifaFw==\n" + "wrappedkey:24:MTpPH3pnLDKihecOci+0W5dk"; km.onGetKeyResponse(realResponse2); // Will have written it to disk G_Assert(z, km.hasKey(), "KM couldn't replace key from server response?"); G_Assert(z, km.clientKey_ == "dtmbEN1kgN/LmuEoYifaFw==", "Replace client key from server failed?"); G_Assert(z, km.wrappedKey == "MTpPH3pnLDKihecOci+0W5dk", "Replace wrapped key from server failed?"); // CASE: check overwriting a key on disk km = new PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager(kf, true /* testing */); G_Assert(z, !km.hasKey(), "KM already has key?"); km.maybeLoadOldKey(); G_Assert(z, km.hasKey(), "KM couldn't load existing key from disk?"); G_Assert(z, km.clientKey_ == "dtmbEN1kgN/LmuEoYifaFw==", "Replace client on from disk failed?"); G_Assert(z, km.wrappedKey_ == "MTpPH3pnLDKihecOci+0W5dk", "Replace wrapped key on disk failed?"); // Test that we only fetch at most two getkey's per lifetime of the manager km = new PROT_UrlCryptoKeyManager(kf, true /* testing */); km.reKey(); for (var i = 0; i < km.MAX_REKEY_TRIES; i++) G_Assert(z, km.maybeReKey(), "Couldn't rekey?"); G_Assert(z, !km.maybeReKey(), "Rekeyed when max hit"); removeTestFile(kf); G_Debug(z, "PASSED"); } } #endif