/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */ /* vim: set ts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */ /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file, * You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ #include "nspr.h" #include "cryptohi.h" #include "ssl.h" #include "keyhi.h" #include "pk11pub.h" #include "sechash.h" #include "nsError.h" #include "dtlsidentity.h" #include "logging.h" namespace mozilla { MOZ_MTLOG_MODULE("mtransport") DtlsIdentity::~DtlsIdentity() { // XXX: make cert_ a smart pointer to avoid this, after we figure // out the linking problem. if (cert_) CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert_); } TemporaryRef DtlsIdentity::Generate() { ScopedPK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot()); if (!slot) { return nullptr; } uint8_t random_name[16]; SECStatus rv = PK11_GenerateRandomOnSlot(slot, random_name, sizeof(random_name)); if (rv != SECSuccess) return nullptr; std::string name; char chunk[3]; for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(random_name); ++i) { PR_snprintf(chunk, sizeof(chunk), "%.2x", random_name[i]); name += chunk; } std::string subject_name_string = "CN=" + name; ScopedCERTName subject_name(CERT_AsciiToName(subject_name_string.c_str())); if (!subject_name) { return nullptr; } PK11RSAGenParams rsaparams; rsaparams.keySizeInBits = 1024; // TODO: make this stronger when we // pre-generate. rsaparams.pe = 65537; // We are too paranoid to use 3 as the exponent. ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey private_key; ScopedSECKEYPublicKey public_key; SECKEYPublicKey *pubkey; private_key = PK11_GenerateKeyPair(slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &rsaparams, &pubkey, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE, nullptr); if (private_key == nullptr) return nullptr; public_key = pubkey; ScopedCERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo spki( SECKEY_CreateSubjectPublicKeyInfo(pubkey)); if (!spki) { return nullptr; } ScopedCERTCertificateRequest certreq( CERT_CreateCertificateRequest(subject_name, spki, nullptr)); if (!certreq) { return nullptr; } // From 1 day before todayto 30 days after. // This is a sort of arbitrary range designed to be valid // now with some slack in case the other side expects // some before expiry. // // Note: explicit casts necessary to avoid // warning C4307: '*' : integral constant overflow static const PRTime oneDay = PRTime(PR_USEC_PER_SEC) * PRTime(60) // sec * PRTime(60) // min * PRTime(24); // hours PRTime now = PR_Now(); PRTime notBefore = now - oneDay; PRTime notAfter = now + (PRTime(30) * oneDay); ScopedCERTValidity validity(CERT_CreateValidity(notBefore, notAfter)); if (!validity) { return nullptr; } unsigned long serial; // Note: This serial in principle could collide, but it's unlikely rv = PK11_GenerateRandomOnSlot(slot, reinterpret_cast(&serial), sizeof(serial)); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return nullptr; } ScopedCERTCertificate certificate( CERT_CreateCertificate(serial, subject_name, validity, certreq)); if (!certificate) { return nullptr; } PLArenaPool *arena = certificate->arena; rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(arena, &certificate->signature, SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, 0); if (rv != SECSuccess) return nullptr; // Set version to X509v3. *(certificate->version.data) = SEC_CERTIFICATE_VERSION_3; certificate->version.len = 1; SECItem innerDER; innerDER.len = 0; innerDER.data = nullptr; if (!SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &innerDER, certificate, SEC_ASN1_GET(CERT_CertificateTemplate))) { return nullptr; } SECItem *signedCert = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECItem); if (!signedCert) { return nullptr; } rv = SEC_DerSignData(arena, signedCert, innerDER.data, innerDER.len, private_key, SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return nullptr; } certificate->derCert = *signedCert; return new DtlsIdentity(private_key.forget(), certificate.forget()); } nsresult DtlsIdentity::ComputeFingerprint(const std::string algorithm, unsigned char *digest, std::size_t size, std::size_t *digest_length) { MOZ_ASSERT(cert_); return ComputeFingerprint(cert_, algorithm, digest, size, digest_length); } nsresult DtlsIdentity::ComputeFingerprint(const CERTCertificate *cert, const std::string algorithm, unsigned char *digest, std::size_t size, std::size_t *digest_length) { MOZ_ASSERT(cert); HASH_HashType ht; if (algorithm == "sha-1") { ht = HASH_AlgSHA1; } else if (algorithm == "sha-224") { ht = HASH_AlgSHA224; } else if (algorithm == "sha-256") { ht = HASH_AlgSHA256; } else if (algorithm == "sha-384") { ht = HASH_AlgSHA384; } else if (algorithm == "sha-512") { ht = HASH_AlgSHA512; } else { return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG; } const SECHashObject *ho = HASH_GetHashObject(ht); MOZ_ASSERT(ho); if (!ho) return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG; MOZ_ASSERT(ho->length >= 20); // Double check if (size < ho->length) return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG; SECStatus rv = HASH_HashBuf(ho->type, digest, cert->derCert.data, cert->derCert.len); if (rv != SECSuccess) return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; *digest_length = ho->length; return NS_OK; } // Format the fingerprint in RFC 4572 Section 5 format, colons and // all. std::string DtlsIdentity::FormatFingerprint(const unsigned char *digest, std::size_t size) { std::string str(""); char group[3]; for (std::size_t i=0; i < size; i++) { PR_snprintf(group, sizeof(group), "%.2X", digest[i]); if (i != 0){ str += ":"; } str += group; } MOZ_ASSERT(str.size() == (size * 3 - 1)); // Check result length return str; } // Parse a fingerprint in RFC 4572 format. // Note that this tolerates some badly formatted data, in particular: // (a) arbitrary runs of colons // (b) colons at the beginning or end. nsresult DtlsIdentity::ParseFingerprint(const std::string fp, unsigned char *digest, size_t size, size_t *length) { size_t offset = 0; bool top_half = true; uint8_t val = 0; for (size_t i=0; i= size) { // Note: no known way for offset to get > size MOZ_MTLOG(PR_LOG_ERROR, "Fingerprint too long for buffer"); return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG; } if (top_half && (fp[i] == ':')) { continue; } else if ((fp[i] >= '0') && (fp[i] <= '9')) { val |= fp[i] - '0'; } else if ((fp[i] >= 'A') && (fp[i] <= 'F')) { val |= fp[i] - 'A' + 10; } else { MOZ_MTLOG(PR_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid fingerprint value " << fp[i]); return NS_ERROR_ILLEGAL_VALUE; } if (top_half) { val <<= 4; top_half = false; } else { digest[offset++] = val; top_half = true; val = 0; } } *length = offset; return NS_OK; } } // close namespace