/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */ /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ #include "nsMixedContentBlocker.h" #include "nsContentPolicyUtils.h" #include "nsThreadUtils.h" #include "nsINode.h" #include "nsCOMPtr.h" #include "nsIDocShell.h" #include "nsISecurityEventSink.h" #include "nsIWebProgressListener.h" #include "nsContentUtils.h" #include "nsNetUtil.h" #include "nsIRequest.h" #include "nsIDocument.h" #include "nsIContentViewer.h" #include "nsIChannel.h" #include "nsIHttpChannel.h" #include "mozilla/Preferences.h" #include "nsIScriptObjectPrincipal.h" #include "nsISecureBrowserUI.h" #include "nsIDocumentLoader.h" #include "nsIWebNavigation.h" #include "nsLoadGroup.h" #include "nsIScriptError.h" #include "nsIURI.h" #include "nsIChannelEventSink.h" #include "nsAsyncRedirectVerifyHelper.h" #include "mozilla/LoadInfo.h" #include "prlog.h" using namespace mozilla; enum nsMixedContentBlockerMessageType { eBlocked = 0x00, eUserOverride = 0x01 }; // Is mixed script blocking (fonts, plugin content, scripts, stylesheets, // iframes, websockets, XHR) enabled? bool nsMixedContentBlocker::sBlockMixedScript = false; // Is mixed display content blocking (images, audio, video, ) enabled? bool nsMixedContentBlocker::sBlockMixedDisplay = false; // Fired at the document that attempted to load mixed content. The UI could // handle this event, for example, by displaying an info bar that offers the // choice to reload the page with mixed content permitted. class nsMixedContentEvent : public nsRunnable { public: nsMixedContentEvent(nsISupports *aContext, MixedContentTypes aType) : mContext(aContext), mType(aType) {} NS_IMETHOD Run() { NS_ASSERTION(mContext, "You can't call this runnable without a requesting context"); // To update the security UI in the tab with the blocked mixed content, call // nsISecurityEventSink::OnSecurityChange. You can get to the event sink by // calling NS_CP_GetDocShellFromContext on the context, and QI'ing to // nsISecurityEventSink. // Mixed content was allowed and is about to load; get the document and // set the approriate flag to true if we are about to load Mixed Active // Content. nsCOMPtr docShell = NS_CP_GetDocShellFromContext(mContext); if (!docShell) { return NS_OK; } nsCOMPtr sameTypeRoot; docShell->GetSameTypeRootTreeItem(getter_AddRefs(sameTypeRoot)); NS_ASSERTION(sameTypeRoot, "No document shell root tree item from document shell tree item!"); // now get the document from sameTypeRoot nsCOMPtr rootDoc = do_GetInterface(sameTypeRoot); NS_ASSERTION(rootDoc, "No root document from document shell root tree item."); if (mType == eMixedScript) { // See if the pref will change here. If it will, only then do we need to call OnSecurityChange() to update the UI. if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedActiveContentLoaded()) { return NS_OK; } rootDoc->SetHasMixedActiveContentLoaded(true); // Update the security UI in the tab with the allowed mixed active content nsCOMPtr eventSink = do_QueryInterface(docShell); if (eventSink) { // If mixed display content is loaded, make sure to include that in the state. if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedDisplayContentLoaded()) { eventSink->OnSecurityChange(mContext, (nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN | nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT | nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT)); } else { eventSink->OnSecurityChange(mContext, (nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN | nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT)); } } } else if (mType == eMixedDisplay) { // See if the pref will change here. If it will, only then do we need to call OnSecurityChange() to update the UI. if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedDisplayContentLoaded()) { return NS_OK; } rootDoc->SetHasMixedDisplayContentLoaded(true); // Update the security UI in the tab with the allowed mixed display content. nsCOMPtr eventSink = do_QueryInterface(docShell); if (eventSink) { // If mixed active content is loaded, make sure to include that in the state. if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedActiveContentLoaded()) { eventSink->OnSecurityChange(mContext, (nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN | nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT | nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT)); } else { eventSink->OnSecurityChange(mContext, (nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN | nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT)); } } } return NS_OK; } private: // The requesting context for the content load. Generally, a DOM node from // the document that caused the load. nsCOMPtr mContext; // The type of mixed content detected, e.g. active or display const MixedContentTypes mType; }; nsMixedContentBlocker::nsMixedContentBlocker() { // Cache the pref for mixed script blocking Preferences::AddBoolVarCache(&sBlockMixedScript, "security.mixed_content.block_active_content"); // Cache the pref for mixed display blocking Preferences::AddBoolVarCache(&sBlockMixedDisplay, "security.mixed_content.block_display_content"); } nsMixedContentBlocker::~nsMixedContentBlocker() { } NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsMixedContentBlocker, nsIContentPolicy, nsIChannelEventSink) static void LogMixedContentMessage(MixedContentTypes aClassification, nsIURI* aContentLocation, nsIDocument* aRootDoc, nsMixedContentBlockerMessageType aMessageType) { nsAutoCString messageCategory; uint32_t severityFlag; nsAutoCString messageLookupKey; if (aMessageType == eBlocked) { severityFlag = nsIScriptError::errorFlag; messageCategory.AssignLiteral("Mixed Content Blocker"); if (aClassification == eMixedDisplay) { messageLookupKey.AssignLiteral("BlockMixedDisplayContent"); } else { messageLookupKey.AssignLiteral("BlockMixedActiveContent"); } } else { severityFlag = nsIScriptError::warningFlag; messageCategory.AssignLiteral("Mixed Content Message"); if (aClassification == eMixedDisplay) { messageLookupKey.AssignLiteral("LoadingMixedDisplayContent"); } else { messageLookupKey.AssignLiteral("LoadingMixedActiveContent"); } } nsAutoCString locationSpec; aContentLocation->GetSpec(locationSpec); NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 locationSpecUTF16(locationSpec); const char16_t* strings[] = { locationSpecUTF16.get() }; nsContentUtils::ReportToConsole(severityFlag, messageCategory, aRootDoc, nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES, messageLookupKey.get(), strings, ArrayLength(strings)); } /* nsIChannelEventSink implementation * This code is called when a request is redirected. * We check the channel associated with the new uri is allowed to load * in the current context */ NS_IMETHODIMP nsMixedContentBlocker::AsyncOnChannelRedirect(nsIChannel* aOldChannel, nsIChannel* aNewChannel, uint32_t aFlags, nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback* aCallback) { nsAsyncRedirectAutoCallback autoCallback(aCallback); if (!aOldChannel) { NS_ERROR("No channel when evaluating mixed content!"); return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } nsresult rv; nsCOMPtr oldUri; rv = aOldChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(oldUri)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); nsCOMPtr newUri; rv = aNewChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(newUri)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // Get the loading Info from the old channel nsCOMPtr loadInfo; rv = aOldChannel->GetLoadInfo(getter_AddRefs(loadInfo)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (!loadInfo) { // XXX: We want to have a loadInfo on all channels, but we don't yet. // If an addon creates a channel, they may not set loadinfo. If that // channel redirects from one page to another page, we would get caught // in this code path. Hence, we have to return NS_OK. Once we have more // confidence that all channels have loadinfo, we can change this to // a failure. See bug 1077201. return NS_OK; } uint32_t contentPolicyType = loadInfo->GetContentPolicyType(); nsCOMPtr requestingPrincipal = loadInfo->LoadingPrincipal(); // Since we are calling shouldLoad() directly on redirects, we don't go through the code // in nsContentPolicyUtils::NS_CheckContentLoadPolicy(). Hence, we have to // duplicate parts of it here. nsCOMPtr requestingLocation; if (requestingPrincipal) { // We check to see if the loadingPrincipal is systemPrincipal and return // early if it is if (nsContentUtils::IsSystemPrincipal(requestingPrincipal)) { return NS_OK; } // We set the requestingLocation from the RequestingPrincipal. rv = requestingPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(requestingLocation)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); } int16_t decision = REJECT_REQUEST; rv = ShouldLoad(contentPolicyType, newUri, requestingLocation, loadInfo->LoadingNode(), EmptyCString(), // aMimeGuess nullptr, // aExtra requestingPrincipal, &decision); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // If the channel is about to load mixed content, abort the channel if (!NS_CP_ACCEPTED(decision)) { autoCallback.DontCallback(); return NS_BINDING_FAILED; } return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsMixedContentBlocker::ShouldLoad(uint32_t aContentType, nsIURI* aContentLocation, nsIURI* aRequestingLocation, nsISupports* aRequestingContext, const nsACString& aMimeGuess, nsISupports* aExtra, nsIPrincipal* aRequestPrincipal, int16_t* aDecision) { // Asserting that we are on the main thread here and hence do not have to lock // and unlock sBlockMixedScript and sBlockMixedDisplay before reading/writing // to them. MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread()); // Assume active (high risk) content and blocked by default MixedContentTypes classification = eMixedScript; // Make decision to block/reject by default *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST; // Notes on non-obvious decisions: // // TYPE_DTD: A DTD can contain entity definitions that expand to scripts. // // TYPE_FONT: The TrueType hinting mechanism is basically a scripting // language that gets interpreted by the operating system's font rasterizer. // Mixed content web fonts are relatively uncommon, and we can can fall back // to built-in fonts with minimal disruption in almost all cases. // // TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST could actually be either active content (e.g. a // script that a plugin will execute) or display content (e.g. Flash video // content). Until we have a way to determine active vs passive content // from plugin requests (bug 836352), we will treat this as passive content. // This is to prevent false positives from causing users to become // desensitized to the mixed content blocker. // // TYPE_CSP_REPORT: High-risk because they directly leak information about // the content of the page, and because blocking them does not have any // negative effect on the page loading. // // TYPE_PING: Ping requests are POSTS, not GETs like images and media. // Also, PING requests have no bearing on the rendering or operation of // the page when used as designed, so even though they are lower risk than // scripts, blocking them is basically risk-free as far as compatibility is // concerned. Ping is turned off by default in Firefox, so unless a user // opts into ping, no request will be made. Categorizing this as Mixed // Display Content for now, but this is subject to change. // // TYPE_STYLESHEET: XSLT stylesheets can insert scripts. CSS positioning // and other advanced CSS features can possibly be exploited to cause // spoofing attacks (e.g. make a "grant permission" button look like a // "refuse permission" button). // // TYPE_BEACON: Beacon requests are similar to TYPE_PING, but are default on. // // TYPE_WEBSOCKET: The Websockets API requires browsers to // reject mixed-content websockets: "If secure is false but the origin of // the entry script has a scheme component that is itself a secure protocol, // e.g. HTTPS, then throw a SecurityError exception." We already block mixed // content websockets within the websockets implementation, so we don't need // to do any blocking here, nor do we need to provide a way to undo or // override the blocking. Websockets without TLS are very flaky anyway in the // face of many HTTP-aware proxies. Compared to psasive content, there is // additional risk that the script using WebSockets will disclose sensitive // information from the HTTPS page and/or eval (directly or indirectly) // received data. // // TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST: XHR requires either same origin or CORS, so most // mixed-content XHR will already be blocked by that check. This will also // block HTTPS-to-HTTP XHR with CORS. The same security concerns mentioned // above for WebSockets apply to XHR, and XHR should have the same security // properties as WebSockets w.r.t. mixed content. XHR's handling of redirects // amplifies these concerns. static_assert(TYPE_DATAREQUEST == TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST, "TYPE_DATAREQUEST is not a synonym for " "TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST"); switch (aContentType) { // The top-level document cannot be mixed content by definition case TYPE_DOCUMENT: *aDecision = ACCEPT; return NS_OK; // Creating insecure websocket connections in a secure page is blocked already // in the websocket constructor. We don't need to check the blocking here // and we don't want to un-block case TYPE_WEBSOCKET: *aDecision = ACCEPT; return NS_OK; // Static display content is considered moderate risk for mixed content so // these will be blocked according to the mixed display preference case TYPE_IMAGE: case TYPE_MEDIA: case TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST: case TYPE_PING: case TYPE_BEACON: classification = eMixedDisplay; break; // Active content (or content with a low value/risk-of-blocking ratio) // that has been explicitly evaluated; listed here for documentation // purposes and to avoid the assertion and warning for the default case. case TYPE_IMAGESET: case TYPE_CSP_REPORT: case TYPE_DTD: case TYPE_FETCH: case TYPE_FONT: case TYPE_OBJECT: case TYPE_SCRIPT: case TYPE_STYLESHEET: case TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT: case TYPE_XBL: case TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST: case TYPE_XSLT: case TYPE_OTHER: break; // This content policy works as a whitelist. default: MOZ_ASSERT(false, "Mixed content of unknown type"); break; } /* Get the scheme of the sub-document resource to be requested. If it is * a safe to load in an https context then mixed content doesn't apply. * * Check Protocol Flags to determine if scheme is safe to load: * URI_DOES_NOT_RETURN_DATA - e.g. * "mailto" * URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE - e.g. * "data", * "resource", * "moz-icon" * URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT - e.g. * "javascript" * URI_SAFE_TO_LOAD_IN_SECURE_CONTEXT - e.g. * "https", * "moz-safe-about" * */ bool schemeLocal = false; bool schemeNoReturnData = false; bool schemeInherits = false; bool schemeSecure = false; if (NS_FAILED(NS_URIChainHasFlags(aContentLocation, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE , &schemeLocal)) || NS_FAILED(NS_URIChainHasFlags(aContentLocation, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_DOES_NOT_RETURN_DATA, &schemeNoReturnData)) || NS_FAILED(NS_URIChainHasFlags(aContentLocation, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT, &schemeInherits)) || NS_FAILED(NS_URIChainHasFlags(aContentLocation, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_SAFE_TO_LOAD_IN_SECURE_CONTEXT, &schemeSecure))) { *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST; return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } if (schemeLocal || schemeNoReturnData || schemeInherits || schemeSecure) { *aDecision = ACCEPT; return NS_OK; } // Since there are cases where aRequestingLocation and aRequestPrincipal are // definitely not the owning document, we try to ignore them by extracting the // requestingLocation in the following order: // 1) from the aRequestingContext, either extracting // a) the node's principal, or the // b) script object's principal. // 2) if aRequestingContext yields a principal but no location, we check // if its the system principal. If it is, allow the load. // 3) Special case handling for: // a) speculative loads, where shouldLoad is called twice (bug 839235) // and the first speculative load does not include a context. // In this case we use aRequestingLocation to set requestingLocation. // b) TYPE_CSP_REPORT which does not provide a context. In this case we // use aRequestingLocation to set requestingLocation. // c) content scripts from addon code that do not provide aRequestingContext // or aRequestingLocation, but do provide aRequestPrincipal. // If aRequestPrincipal is an expanded principal, we allow the load. // 4) If we still end up not having a requestingLocation, we reject the load. nsCOMPtr principal; // 1a) Try to get the principal if aRequestingContext is a node. nsCOMPtr node = do_QueryInterface(aRequestingContext); if (node) { principal = node->NodePrincipal(); } // 1b) Try using the window's script object principal if it's not a node. if (!principal) { nsCOMPtr scriptObjPrin = do_QueryInterface(aRequestingContext); if (scriptObjPrin) { principal = scriptObjPrin->GetPrincipal(); } } nsCOMPtr requestingLocation; if (principal) { principal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(requestingLocation)); } // 2) if aRequestingContext yields a principal but no location, we check if its a system principal. if (principal && !requestingLocation) { if (nsContentUtils::IsSystemPrincipal(principal)) { *aDecision = ACCEPT; return NS_OK; } } // 3a,b) Special case handling for speculative loads and TYPE_CSP_REPORT. In // such cases, aRequestingContext doesn't exist, so we use aRequestingLocation. // Unfortunately we can not distinguish between speculative and normal loads here, // otherwise we could special case this assignment. if (!requestingLocation) { requestingLocation = aRequestingLocation; } // 3c) Special case handling for content scripts from addons code, which only // provide a aRequestPrincipal; aRequestingContext and aRequestingLocation are // both null; if the aRequestPrincipal is an expandedPrincipal, we allow the load. if (!principal && !requestingLocation && aRequestPrincipal) { nsCOMPtr expanded = do_QueryInterface(aRequestPrincipal); if (expanded) { *aDecision = ACCEPT; return NS_OK; } } // 4) Giving up. We still don't have a requesting location, therefore we can't tell // if this is a mixed content load. Deny to be safe. if (!requestingLocation) { *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST; return NS_OK; } // Check the parent scheme. If it is not an HTTPS page then mixed content // restrictions do not apply. bool parentIsHttps; nsresult rv = requestingLocation->SchemeIs("https", &parentIsHttps); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { NS_ERROR("requestingLocation->SchemeIs failed"); *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST; return NS_OK; } if (!parentIsHttps) { *aDecision = ACCEPT; return NS_OK; } // Determine if the rootDoc is https and if the user decided to allow Mixed Content nsCOMPtr docShell = NS_CP_GetDocShellFromContext(aRequestingContext); NS_ENSURE_TRUE(docShell, NS_OK); bool rootHasSecureConnection = false; bool allowMixedContent = false; bool isRootDocShell = false; rv = docShell->GetAllowMixedContentAndConnectionData(&rootHasSecureConnection, &allowMixedContent, &isRootDocShell); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST; return rv; } // Get the sameTypeRoot tree item from the docshell nsCOMPtr sameTypeRoot; docShell->GetSameTypeRootTreeItem(getter_AddRefs(sameTypeRoot)); NS_ASSERTION(sameTypeRoot, "No root tree item from docshell!"); // When navigating an iframe, the iframe may be https // but its parents may not be. Check the parents to see if any of them are https. // If none of the parents are https, allow the load. if (aContentType == TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT && !rootHasSecureConnection) { bool httpsParentExists = false; nsCOMPtr parentTreeItem; parentTreeItem = docShell; while(!httpsParentExists && parentTreeItem) { nsCOMPtr parentAsNav(do_QueryInterface(parentTreeItem)); NS_ASSERTION(parentAsNav, "No web navigation object from parent's docshell tree item"); nsCOMPtr parentURI; parentAsNav->GetCurrentURI(getter_AddRefs(parentURI)); if (!parentURI || NS_FAILED(parentURI->SchemeIs("https", &httpsParentExists))) { // if getting the URI or the scheme fails, assume there is a https parent and break. httpsParentExists = true; break; } // When the parent and the root are the same, we have traversed all the way up // the same type docshell tree. Break out of the while loop. if(sameTypeRoot == parentTreeItem) { break; } // update the parent to the grandparent. nsCOMPtr newParentTreeItem; parentTreeItem->GetSameTypeParent(getter_AddRefs(newParentTreeItem)); parentTreeItem = newParentTreeItem; } // end while loop. if (!httpsParentExists) { *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; return NS_OK; } } // Get the root document from the sameTypeRoot nsCOMPtr rootDoc = do_GetInterface(sameTypeRoot); NS_ASSERTION(rootDoc, "No root document from document shell root tree item."); // Get eventSink and the current security state from the docShell nsCOMPtr eventSink = do_QueryInterface(docShell); NS_ASSERTION(eventSink, "No eventSink from docShell."); nsCOMPtr rootShell = do_GetInterface(sameTypeRoot); NS_ASSERTION(rootShell, "No root docshell from document shell root tree item."); uint32_t State = nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN; nsCOMPtr securityUI; rootShell->GetSecurityUI(getter_AddRefs(securityUI)); // If there is no securityUI, document doesn't have a security state. // Allow load and return early. if (!securityUI) { *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; return NS_OK; } nsresult stateRV = securityUI->GetState(&State); // If the content is display content, and the pref says display content should be blocked, block it. if (sBlockMixedDisplay && classification == eMixedDisplay) { if (allowMixedContent) { LogMixedContentMessage(classification, aContentLocation, rootDoc, eUserOverride); *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; rootDoc->SetHasMixedActiveContentLoaded(true); if (!rootDoc->GetHasMixedDisplayContentLoaded() && NS_SUCCEEDED(stateRV)) { rootDoc->SetHasMixedDisplayContentLoaded(true); eventSink->OnSecurityChange(aRequestingContext, (State | nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT)); } } else { *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST; LogMixedContentMessage(classification, aContentLocation, rootDoc, eBlocked); if (!rootDoc->GetHasMixedDisplayContentBlocked() && NS_SUCCEEDED(stateRV)) { rootDoc->SetHasMixedDisplayContentBlocked(true); eventSink->OnSecurityChange(aRequestingContext, (State | nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_BLOCKED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT)); } } return NS_OK; } else if (sBlockMixedScript && classification == eMixedScript) { // If the content is active content, and the pref says active content should be blocked, block it // unless the user has choosen to override the pref if (allowMixedContent) { LogMixedContentMessage(classification, aContentLocation, rootDoc, eUserOverride); *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; // See if the pref will change here. If it will, only then do we need to call OnSecurityChange() to update the UI. if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedActiveContentLoaded()) { return NS_OK; } rootDoc->SetHasMixedActiveContentLoaded(true); if (rootHasSecureConnection) { // User has decided to override the pref and the root is https, so change the Security State. if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedDisplayContentLoaded()) { // If mixed display content is loaded, make sure to include that in the state. eventSink->OnSecurityChange(aRequestingContext, (nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN | nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT | nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT)); } else { eventSink->OnSecurityChange(aRequestingContext, (nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN | nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT)); } return NS_OK; } else { // User has already overriden the pref and the root is not https; // mixed content was allowed on an https subframe. if (NS_SUCCEEDED(stateRV)) { eventSink->OnSecurityChange(aRequestingContext, (State | nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT)); } return NS_OK; } } else { //User has not overriden the pref by Disabling protection. Reject the request and update the security state. *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST; LogMixedContentMessage(classification, aContentLocation, rootDoc, eBlocked); // See if the pref will change here. If it will, only then do we need to call OnSecurityChange() to update the UI. if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedActiveContentBlocked()) { return NS_OK; } rootDoc->SetHasMixedActiveContentBlocked(true); // The user has not overriden the pref, so make sure they still have an option by calling eventSink // which will invoke the doorhanger if (NS_SUCCEEDED(stateRV)) { eventSink->OnSecurityChange(aRequestingContext, (State | nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_BLOCKED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT)); } return NS_OK; } } else { // The content is not blocked by the mixed content prefs. // Log a message that we are loading mixed content. LogMixedContentMessage(classification, aContentLocation, rootDoc, eUserOverride); // Fire the event from a script runner as it is unsafe to run script // from within ShouldLoad nsContentUtils::AddScriptRunner( new nsMixedContentEvent(aRequestingContext, classification)); *aDecision = ACCEPT; return NS_OK; } *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST; return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsMixedContentBlocker::ShouldProcess(uint32_t aContentType, nsIURI* aContentLocation, nsIURI* aRequestingLocation, nsISupports* aRequestingContext, const nsACString& aMimeGuess, nsISupports* aExtra, nsIPrincipal* aRequestPrincipal, int16_t* aDecision) { if (!aContentLocation) { // aContentLocation may be null when a plugin is loading without an associated URI resource if (aContentType == TYPE_OBJECT) { *aDecision = ACCEPT; return NS_OK; } else { *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST; return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } } return ShouldLoad(aContentType, aContentLocation, aRequestingLocation, aRequestingContext, aMimeGuess, aExtra, aRequestPrincipal, aDecision); }