Bug 1020157 - Replace ManagedPBrowserParent with GetManagedTabContext in NeckoParent, r=jduell

This commit is contained in:
Kershaw Chang 2014-12-09 17:34:00 +01:00
parent e0e9311fed
commit e536e1f4fd

View File

@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include "mozilla/net/RemoteOpenFileParent.h"
#include "mozilla/net/ChannelDiverterParent.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/ContentParent.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/TabContext.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/TabParent.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/network/TCPSocketParent.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/network/TCPServerSocketParent.h"
@ -41,6 +42,7 @@
#include "mozilla/net/OfflineObserver.h"
using mozilla::dom::ContentParent;
using mozilla::dom::TabContext;
using mozilla::dom::TabParent;
using mozilla::net::PTCPSocketParent;
using mozilla::dom::TCPSocketParent;
@ -113,22 +115,23 @@ NeckoParent::GetValidatedAppInfo(const SerializedLoadContext& aSerialized,
}
}
const InfallibleTArray<PBrowserParent*>& browsers = aContent->ManagedPBrowserParent();
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < browsers.Length(); i++) {
nsRefPtr<TabParent> tabParent = static_cast<TabParent*>(browsers[i]);
uint32_t appId = tabParent->OwnOrContainingAppId();
nsTArray<TabContext> contextArray =
static_cast<ContentParent*>(aContent)->GetManagedTabContext();
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < contextArray.Length(); i++) {
TabContext tabContext = contextArray[i];
uint32_t appId = tabContext.OwnOrContainingAppId();
bool inBrowserElement = aSerialized.IsNotNull() ? aSerialized.mIsInBrowserElement
: tabParent->IsBrowserElement();
: tabContext.IsBrowserElement();
if (appId == NECKO_UNKNOWN_APP_ID) {
continue;
}
// We may get appID=NO_APP if child frame is neither a browser nor an app
if (appId == NECKO_NO_APP_ID) {
if (tabParent->HasOwnApp()) {
if (tabContext.HasOwnApp()) {
continue;
}
if (UsingNeckoIPCSecurity() && tabParent->IsBrowserElement()) {
if (UsingNeckoIPCSecurity() && tabContext.IsBrowserElement()) {
// <iframe mozbrowser> which doesn't have an <iframe mozapp> above it.
// This is not supported now, and we'll need to do a code audit to make
// sure we can handle it (i.e don't short-circuit using separate
@ -141,7 +144,7 @@ NeckoParent::GetValidatedAppInfo(const SerializedLoadContext& aSerialized,
return nullptr;
}
if (browsers.Length() != 0) {
if (contextArray.Length() != 0) {
return "App does not have permission";
}
@ -521,10 +524,11 @@ NeckoParent::AllocPRemoteOpenFileParent(const SerializedLoadContext& aSerialized
bool haveValidBrowser = false;
bool hasManage = false;
nsCOMPtr<mozIApplication> mozApp;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < Manager()->ManagedPBrowserParent().Length(); i++) {
nsRefPtr<TabParent> tabParent =
static_cast<TabParent*>(Manager()->ManagedPBrowserParent()[i]);
uint32_t appId = tabParent->OwnOrContainingAppId();
nsTArray<TabContext> contextArray =
static_cast<ContentParent*>(Manager())->GetManagedTabContext();
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < contextArray.Length(); i++) {
TabContext tabContext = contextArray[i];
uint32_t appId = tabContext.OwnOrContainingAppId();
// Note: this enforces that SerializedLoadContext.appID is one of the apps
// in the child process, but there's currently no way to verify the
// request is not from a different app in that process.
@ -814,10 +818,11 @@ NeckoParent::OfflineNotification(nsISupports *aSubject)
uint32_t targetAppId = NECKO_UNKNOWN_APP_ID;
info->GetAppId(&targetAppId);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < Manager()->ManagedPBrowserParent().Length(); ++i) {
nsRefPtr<TabParent> tabParent =
static_cast<TabParent*>(Manager()->ManagedPBrowserParent()[i]);
uint32_t appId = tabParent->OwnOrContainingAppId();
nsTArray<TabContext> contextArray =
static_cast<ContentParent*>(Manager())->GetManagedTabContext();
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < contextArray.Length(); ++i) {
TabContext tabContext = contextArray[i];
uint32_t appId = tabContext.OwnOrContainingAppId();
if (appId == targetAppId) {
if (gIOService) {