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Bug 1063281, Part 5: Implement DNS ID matching, r=keeler
--HG-- extra : rebase_source : 5221245ce8da065d64a7ff17bdfde0e617562447
This commit is contained in:
Brian Smith
parent
01eb47bf7f
commit
d9be7c3bb6
@ -22,10 +22,14 @@
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* limitations under the License.
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*/
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// This code attempts to implement RFC6125 name matching. It also attempts to
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// give the same results as the Chromium implementation
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// (X509Certificate::VerifyHostname) when both are given clean input (no
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// leading whitespace, etc.)
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// This code attempts to implement RFC6125 name matching.
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//
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// In this code, identifiers are classified as either "presented" or
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// "reference" identifiers are defined in
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// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-1.8. A "presented identifier" is
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// one in the subjectAltName of the certificate, or sometimes within a CN of
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// the certificate's subject. The "reference identifier" is the one we are
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// being asked to match the certificate against.
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//
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// On Windows and maybe other platforms, OS-provided IP address parsing
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// functions might fail if the protocol (IPv4 or IPv6) has been disabled, so we
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@ -38,6 +42,189 @@ namespace mozilla { namespace pkix {
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namespace {
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uint8_t LocaleInsensitveToLower(uint8_t a);
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bool StartsWithIDNALabel(Input id);
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} // unnamed namespace
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// We do not distinguish between a syntactically-invalid presentedDNSID and one
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// that is syntactically valid but does not match referenceDNSID; in both
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// cases, the result is false.
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//
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// We assume that both presentedDNSID and referenceDNSID are encoded in such a
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// way that US-ASCII (7-bit) characters are encoded in one byte and no encoding
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// of a non-US-ASCII character contains a code point in the range 0-127. For
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// example, UTF-8 is OK but UTF-16 is not.
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//
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// The referenceDNSIDWasVerifiedAsValid parameter must be the result of calling
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// IsValidDNSName.
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//
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// RFC6125 says that a wildcard label may be of the form <x>*<y>.<DNSID>, where
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// <x> and/or <y> may be empty. However, NSS requires <y> to be empty, and we
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// follow NSS's stricter policy by accepting wildcards only of the form
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// <x>*.<DNSID>, where <x> may be empty.
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bool
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PresentedDNSIDMatchesReferenceDNSID(Input presentedDNSID,
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Input referenceDNSID,
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bool referenceDNSIDWasVerifiedAsValid)
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{
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assert(referenceDNSIDWasVerifiedAsValid);
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if (!referenceDNSIDWasVerifiedAsValid) {
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return false;
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}
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Reader presented(presentedDNSID);
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Reader reference(referenceDNSID);
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size_t currentLabel = 0;
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bool hasWildcardLabel = false;
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bool lastPresentedByteWasDot = false;
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bool firstPresentedByteIsWildcard = presented.Peek('*');
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do {
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uint8_t presentedByte;
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if (presented.Read(presentedByte) != Success) {
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return false; // Reject completely empty input.
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}
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if (presentedByte == '*' && currentLabel == 0) {
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hasWildcardLabel = true;
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// Like NSS, be stricter than RFC6125 requires by insisting that the
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// "*" must be the last character in the label. This also prevents
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// multiple "*" in the label.
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if (!presented.Peek('.')) {
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return false;
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}
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// RFC6125 says that we shouldn't accept wildcards within an IDN A-Label.
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//
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// We also don't allow a non-IDN presented ID label to match an IDN
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// reference ID label, except when the entire presented ID label is "*".
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// This avoids confusion when matching a presented ID like
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// "xn-*.example.org" against "xn--www.example.org" (which attempts to
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// abuse the punycode syntax) or "www-*.example.org" against
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// "xn--www--ep4c4a2kpf" (which makes sense to match, semantically, but
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// no implementations actually do).
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//
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// XXX: The consequence of this is that we effectively discriminate
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// against users of languages that cannot be encoded with ASCII.
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if (!firstPresentedByteIsWildcard) {
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if (StartsWithIDNALabel(presentedDNSID)) {
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return false;
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}
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if (StartsWithIDNALabel(referenceDNSID)) {
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return false;
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}
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}
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// RFC 6125 is unclear about whether "www*.example.org" matches
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// "www.example.org". The Chromium test suite has this test:
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//
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// { false, "w.bar.foo.com", "w*.bar.foo.com" },
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//
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// We agree with Chromium by forbidding "*" from expanding to the empty
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// string.
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uint8_t referenceByte;
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if (reference.Read(referenceByte) != Success) {
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return false;
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}
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if (referenceByte == '.') {
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return false;
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}
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while (!reference.Peek('.')) {
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if (reference.Read(referenceByte) != Success) {
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return false;
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}
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}
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} else {
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if (presentedByte == '.') {
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// This check is needed to prevent ".." at the end of the presented ID
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// from being accepted.
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if (lastPresentedByteWasDot) {
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return false;
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}
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lastPresentedByteWasDot = true;
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if (!presented.AtEnd()) {
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++currentLabel;
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}
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} else {
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lastPresentedByteWasDot = false;
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}
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// The presented ID may have a terminating dot '.' to mark it as
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// absolute, and it still matches a reference ID without that
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// terminating dot.
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if (presentedByte != '.' || !presented.AtEnd() || !reference.AtEnd()) {
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uint8_t referenceByte;
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if (reference.Read(referenceByte) != Success) {
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return false;
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}
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if (LocaleInsensitveToLower(presentedByte) !=
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LocaleInsensitveToLower(referenceByte)) {
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return false;
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}
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}
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}
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} while (!presented.AtEnd());
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// The reference ID may have a terminating dot '.' to mark it as absolute,
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// and a presented ID without that terminating dot still matches it.
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static const uint8_t DOT[1] = { '.' };
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if (!reference.AtEnd() && !reference.MatchRest(DOT)) {
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return false;
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}
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if (hasWildcardLabel) {
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// Like NSS, we require at least two labels after the wildcard.
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if (currentLabel < 2) {
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return false;
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}
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// TODO(bug XXXXXXX): Allow the TrustDomain to control this on a
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// per-eTLD+1 basis, similar to Chromium. Even then, it might be better to
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// still enforce that there are at least two labels after the wildcard.
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// TODO(bug XXXXXXX): Wildcards are not allowed for EV certificates.
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// Provide an option to indicate whether wildcards should be matched, for
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// the purpose of helping the application enforce this.
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}
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return true;
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}
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namespace {
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// We avoid isdigit because it is locale-sensitive. See
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// http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/009695399/functions/tolower.html.
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inline uint8_t
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LocaleInsensitveToLower(uint8_t a)
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{
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if (a >= 'A' && a <= 'Z') { // unlikely
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return static_cast<uint8_t>(
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static_cast<uint8_t>(a - static_cast<uint8_t>('A')) +
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static_cast<uint8_t>('a'));
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}
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return a;
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}
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bool
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StartsWithIDNALabel(Input id)
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{
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static const uint8_t IDN_ALABEL_PREFIX[4] = { 'x', 'n', '-', '-' };
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Reader input(id);
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for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(IDN_ALABEL_PREFIX); ++i) {
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uint8_t b;
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if (input.Read(b) != Success) {
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return false;
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}
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if (b != IDN_ALABEL_PREFIX[i]) {
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return false;
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}
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}
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return true;
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}
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bool
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ReadIPv4AddressComponent(Reader& input, bool lastComponent,
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/*out*/ uint8_t& valueOut)
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@ -30,6 +30,10 @@
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namespace mozilla { namespace pkix {
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bool PresentedDNSIDMatchesReferenceDNSID(Input presentedDNSID,
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Input referenceDNSID,
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bool referenceDNSIDWasVerifiedAsValid);
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bool IsValidDNSName(Input hostname);
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bool ParseIPv4Address(Input hostname, /*out*/ uint8_t (&out)[4]);
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bool ParseIPv6Address(Input hostname, /*out*/ uint8_t (&out)[16]);
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@ -39,6 +43,236 @@ bool ParseIPv6Address(Input hostname, /*out*/ uint8_t (&out)[16]);
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using namespace mozilla::pkix;
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using namespace mozilla::pkix::test;
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struct PresentedMatchesReference
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{
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ByteString presentedDNSID;
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ByteString referenceDNSID;
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bool matches;
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};
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#define DNS_ID_MATCH(a, b) \
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{ \
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ByteString(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(a), sizeof(a) - 1), \
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ByteString(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(b), sizeof(b) - 1), \
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true \
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}
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#define DNS_ID_MISMATCH(a, b) \
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{ \
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ByteString(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(a), sizeof(a) - 1), \
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ByteString(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(b), sizeof(b) - 1), \
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false \
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}
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static const PresentedMatchesReference DNSID_MATCH_PARAMS[] =
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{
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("", "a"),
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DNS_ID_MATCH("a", "a"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("b", "a"),
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DNS_ID_MATCH("*.b.a", "c.b.a"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*.b.a", "b.a"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*.b.a", "b.a."),
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// Wildcard not in leftmost label
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DNS_ID_MATCH("d.c.b.a", "d.c.b.a"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("d.*.b.a", "d.c.b.a"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("d.c*.b.a", "d.c.b.a"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("d.c*.b.a", "d.cc.b.a"),
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// case sensitivity
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DNS_ID_MATCH("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz", "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"),
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DNS_ID_MATCH("ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ", "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"),
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DNS_ID_MATCH("aBc", "Abc"),
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// digits
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DNS_ID_MATCH("a1", "a1"),
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// A trailing dot indicates an absolute name, and absolute names can match
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// relative names, and vice-versa.
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DNS_ID_MATCH("example", "example"),
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DNS_ID_MATCH("example.", "example."),
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DNS_ID_MATCH("example", "example."),
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DNS_ID_MATCH("example.", "example"),
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DNS_ID_MATCH("example.com", "example.com"),
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DNS_ID_MATCH("example.com.", "example.com."),
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DNS_ID_MATCH("example.com", "example.com."),
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DNS_ID_MATCH("example.com.", "example.com"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("example.com..", "example.com."),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("example.com..", "example.com"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("example.com...", "example.com."),
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// xn-- IDN prefix
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DNS_ID_MATCH("x*.b.a", "xa.b.a"),
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DNS_ID_MATCH("x*.b.a", "xna.b.a"),
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DNS_ID_MATCH("x*.b.a", "xn-a.b.a"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("x*.b.a", "xn--a.b.a"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("xn*.b.a", "xn--a.b.a"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("xn-*.b.a", "xn--a.b.a"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("xn--*.b.a", "xn--a.b.a"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("xn*.b.a", "xn--a.b.a"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("xn-*.b.a", "xn--a.b.a"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("xn--*.b.a", "xn--a.b.a"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("xn---*.b.a", "xn--a.b.a"),
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// "*" cannot expand to nothing.
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("c*.b.a", "c.b.a"),
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// --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// The rest of these are test cases adapted from Chromium's
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// x509_certificate_unittest.cc. The parameter order is the opposite in
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// Chromium's tests. Also, they some tests were modified to fit into this
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// framework or due to intentional differences between mozilla::pkix and
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// Chromium.
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DNS_ID_MATCH("foo.com", "foo.com"),
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DNS_ID_MATCH("f", "f"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("i", "h"),
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DNS_ID_MATCH("*.foo.com", "bar.foo.com"),
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DNS_ID_MATCH("*.test.fr", "www.test.fr"),
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DNS_ID_MATCH("*.test.FR", "wwW.tESt.fr"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH(".uk", "f.uk"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("?.bar.foo.com", "w.bar.foo.com"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("(www|ftp).foo.com", "www.foo.com"), // regex!
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("www.foo.com\0", "www.foo.com"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("www.foo.com\0*.foo.com", "www.foo.com"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("ww.house.example", "www.house.example"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("www.test.org", "test.org"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*.test.org", "test.org"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*.org", "test.org"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("w*.bar.foo.com", "w.bar.foo.com"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("ww*ww.bar.foo.com", "www.bar.foo.com"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("ww*ww.bar.foo.com", "wwww.bar.foo.com"),
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// Different than Chromium, matches NSS.
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("w*w.bar.foo.com", "wwww.bar.foo.com"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("w*w.bar.foo.c0m", "wwww.bar.foo.com"),
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DNS_ID_MATCH("wa*.bar.foo.com", "WALLY.bar.foo.com"),
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// We require "*" to be the last character in a wildcard label, but
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// Chromium does not.
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*Ly.bar.foo.com", "wally.bar.foo.com"),
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// Chromium does URL decoding of the reference ID, but we don't, and we also
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// require that the reference ID is valid, so we can't test these two.
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// DNS_ID_MATCH("www.foo.com", "ww%57.foo.com"),
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// DNS_ID_MATCH("www&.foo.com", "www%26.foo.com"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*.test.de", "www.test.co.jp"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*.jp", "www.test.co.jp"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("www.test.co.uk", "www.test.co.jp"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("www.*.co.jp", "www.test.co.jp"),
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DNS_ID_MATCH("www.bar.foo.com", "www.bar.foo.com"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*.foo.com", "www.bar.foo.com"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*.*.foo.com", "www.bar.foo.com"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*.*.foo.com", "www.bar.foo.com"),
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// Our matcher requires the reference ID to be a valid DNS name, so we cannot
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// test this case.
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// DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*.*.bar.foo.com", "*..bar.foo.com"),
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DNS_ID_MATCH("www.bath.org", "www.bath.org"),
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// Our matcher requires the reference ID to be a valid DNS name, so we cannot
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// test these cases.
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// DNS_ID_MISMATCH("www.bath.org", ""),
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// DNS_ID_MISMATCH("www.bath.org", "20.30.40.50"),
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// DNS_ID_MISMATCH("www.bath.org", "66.77.88.99"),
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// IDN tests
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DNS_ID_MATCH("xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br", "xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br"),
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DNS_ID_MATCH("*.xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br", "www.xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*.xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br", "xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("xn--poema-*.com.br", "xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("xn--*-9qae5a.com.br", "xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*--poema-9qae5a.com.br", "xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br"),
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// The following are adapted from the examples quoted from
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// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
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// (e.g., *.example.com would match foo.example.com but
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// not bar.foo.example.com or example.com).
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DNS_ID_MATCH("*.example.com", "foo.example.com"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*.example.com", "bar.foo.example.com"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*.example.com", "example.com"),
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// (e.g., baz*.example.net and *baz.example.net and b*z.example.net would
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// be taken to match baz1.example.net and foobaz.example.net and
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// buzz.example.net, respectively
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DNS_ID_MATCH("baz*.example.net", "baz1.example.net"),
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// Both of these are different from Chromium, but match NSS, becaues the
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// wildcard character "*" is not the last character of the label.
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*baz.example.net", "foobaz.example.net"),
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DNS_ID_MISMATCH("b*z.example.net", "buzz.example.net"),
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// Wildcards should not be valid for public registry controlled domains,
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// and unknown/unrecognized domains, at least three domain components must
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// be present. For mozilla::pkix and NSS, there must always be at least two
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// labels after the wildcard label.
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DNS_ID_MATCH("*.test.example", "www.test.example"),
|
||||
DNS_ID_MATCH("*.example.co.uk", "test.example.co.uk"),
|
||||
DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*.exmaple", "test.example"),
|
||||
|
||||
// The result is different than Chromium, because Chromium takes into account
|
||||
// the additional knowledge it has that "co.uk" is a TLD. mozilla::pkix does
|
||||
// not know that.
|
||||
DNS_ID_MATCH("*.co.uk", "example.co.uk"),
|
||||
|
||||
DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*.com", "foo.com"),
|
||||
DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*.us", "foo.us"),
|
||||
DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*", "foo"),
|
||||
|
||||
// IDN variants of wildcards and registry controlled domains.
|
||||
DNS_ID_MATCH("*.xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br", "www.xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br"),
|
||||
DNS_ID_MATCH("*.example.xn--mgbaam7a8h", "test.example.xn--mgbaam7a8h"),
|
||||
|
||||
// RFC6126 allows this, and NSS accepts it, but Chromium disallows it.
|
||||
// TODO: File bug against Chromium.
|
||||
DNS_ID_MATCH("*.com.br", "xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br"),
|
||||
|
||||
DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*.xn--mgbaam7a8h", "example.xn--mgbaam7a8h"),
|
||||
// Wildcards should be permissible for 'private' registry-controlled
|
||||
// domains. (In mozilla::pkix, we do not know if it is a private registry-
|
||||
// controlled domain or not.)
|
||||
DNS_ID_MATCH("*.appspot.com", "www.appspot.com"),
|
||||
DNS_ID_MATCH("*.s3.amazonaws.com", "foo.s3.amazonaws.com"),
|
||||
|
||||
// Multiple wildcards are not valid.
|
||||
DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*.*.com", "foo.example.com"),
|
||||
DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*.bar.*.com", "foo.bar.example.com"),
|
||||
|
||||
// Absolute vs relative DNS name tests. Although not explicitly specified
|
||||
// in RFC 6125, absolute reference names (those ending in a .) should
|
||||
// match either absolute or relative presented names.
|
||||
// TODO: File errata against RFC 6125 about this.
|
||||
DNS_ID_MATCH("foo.com.", "foo.com"),
|
||||
DNS_ID_MATCH("foo.com", "foo.com."),
|
||||
DNS_ID_MATCH("foo.com.", "foo.com."),
|
||||
DNS_ID_MATCH("f.", "f"),
|
||||
DNS_ID_MATCH("f", "f."),
|
||||
DNS_ID_MATCH("f.", "f."),
|
||||
DNS_ID_MATCH("*.bar.foo.com.", "www-3.bar.foo.com"),
|
||||
DNS_ID_MATCH("*.bar.foo.com", "www-3.bar.foo.com."),
|
||||
DNS_ID_MATCH("*.bar.foo.com.", "www-3.bar.foo.com."),
|
||||
|
||||
// We require the reference ID to be a valid DNS name, so we cannot test this
|
||||
// case.
|
||||
// DNS_ID_MISMATCH(".", "."),
|
||||
|
||||
DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*.com.", "example.com"),
|
||||
DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*.com", "example.com."),
|
||||
DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*.com.", "example.com."),
|
||||
DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*.", "foo."),
|
||||
DNS_ID_MISMATCH("*.", "foo"),
|
||||
|
||||
// The result is different than Chromium because we don't know that co.uk is
|
||||
// a TLD.
|
||||
DNS_ID_MATCH("*.co.uk.", "foo.co.uk"),
|
||||
DNS_ID_MATCH("*.co.uk.", "foo.co.uk."),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
struct InputValidity
|
||||
{
|
||||
ByteString input;
|
||||
@ -63,8 +297,8 @@ static const InputValidity DNSNAMES_VALIDITY[] =
|
||||
I("", false),
|
||||
I(".", false),
|
||||
I("a", true),
|
||||
I(".a", false),
|
||||
I(".a.b", false),
|
||||
I(".a", false), // PresentedDNSIDMatchesReferenceDNSID depends on this
|
||||
I(".a.b", false), // PresentedDNSIDMatchesReferenceDNSID depends on this
|
||||
I("..a", false),
|
||||
I("a..b", false),
|
||||
I("a...b", false),
|
||||
@ -239,6 +473,11 @@ static const InputValidity DNSNAMES_VALIDITY_TURKISH_I[] =
|
||||
I("xn--\0xC4\0xB1", false), // latin small letter dotless i, mashup
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static const uint8_t LOWERCASE_I_VALUE[1] = { 'i' };
|
||||
static const uint8_t UPPERCASE_I_VALUE[1] = { 'I' };
|
||||
static const Input LOWERCASE_I(LOWERCASE_I_VALUE);
|
||||
static const Input UPPERCASE_I(UPPERCASE_I_VALUE);
|
||||
|
||||
template <unsigned int L>
|
||||
struct IPAddressParams
|
||||
{
|
||||
@ -573,6 +812,63 @@ static const IPAddressParams<16> IPV6_ADDRESSES[] =
|
||||
IPV6_INVALID("::1.2\02.3.4"),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
class pkixnames_PresentedDNSIDMatchesReferenceDNSID
|
||||
: public ::testing::Test
|
||||
, public ::testing::WithParamInterface<PresentedMatchesReference>
|
||||
{
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_P(pkixnames_PresentedDNSIDMatchesReferenceDNSID,
|
||||
PresentedDNSIDMatchesReferenceDNSID)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const PresentedMatchesReference& param(GetParam());
|
||||
SCOPED_TRACE(param.presentedDNSID.c_str());
|
||||
SCOPED_TRACE(param.referenceDNSID.c_str());
|
||||
Input presented;
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(Success, presented.Init(param.presentedDNSID.data(),
|
||||
param.presentedDNSID.length()));
|
||||
Input reference;
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(Success, reference.Init(param.referenceDNSID.data(),
|
||||
param.referenceDNSID.length()));
|
||||
bool referenceIsValidDNSName = IsValidDNSName(reference);
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(referenceIsValidDNSName); // sanity check that test makes sense
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(param.matches,
|
||||
PresentedDNSIDMatchesReferenceDNSID(presented, reference,
|
||||
referenceIsValidDNSName));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(pkixnames_PresentedDNSIDMatchesReferenceDNSID,
|
||||
pkixnames_PresentedDNSIDMatchesReferenceDNSID,
|
||||
testing::ValuesIn(DNSID_MATCH_PARAMS));
|
||||
|
||||
class pkixnames_Turkish_I_Comparison
|
||||
: public ::testing::Test
|
||||
, public ::testing::WithParamInterface<InputValidity>
|
||||
{
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_P(pkixnames_Turkish_I_Comparison, PresentedDNSIDMatchesReferenceDNSID)
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Make sure we don't have the similar problems that strcasecmp and others
|
||||
// have with the other kinds of "i" and "I" commonly used in Turkish locales.
|
||||
|
||||
const InputValidity& inputValidity(GetParam());
|
||||
SCOPED_TRACE(inputValidity.input.c_str());
|
||||
Input input;
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(Success, input.Init(inputValidity.input.data(),
|
||||
inputValidity.input.length()));
|
||||
bool isASCII = InputsAreEqual(LOWERCASE_I, input) ||
|
||||
InputsAreEqual(UPPERCASE_I, input);
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(isASCII, PresentedDNSIDMatchesReferenceDNSID(input, LOWERCASE_I,
|
||||
true));
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(isASCII, PresentedDNSIDMatchesReferenceDNSID(input, UPPERCASE_I,
|
||||
true));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(pkixnames_Turkish_I_Comparison,
|
||||
pkixnames_Turkish_I_Comparison,
|
||||
testing::ValuesIn(DNSNAMES_VALIDITY_TURKISH_I));
|
||||
|
||||
class pkixnames_IsValidDNSName
|
||||
: public ::testing::Test
|
||||
, public ::testing::WithParamInterface<InputValidity>
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user