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Bug 823348 - Hoist special cases to the top of WrapperFactory::Rewrap. r=mrbkap

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This paves the way for more rule-based selection of wrappers in the common case.
This commit is contained in:
Bobby Holley 2013-01-23 06:04:39 +01:00
parent 6284ce3329
commit 4b3c0f19a3
1 changed files with 37 additions and 17 deletions
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54
js/xpconnect/wrappers/WrapperFactory.cpp
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@ -334,7 +334,41 @@ WrapperFactory::Rewrap(JSContext *cx, JSObject *existing, JSObject *obj,
Wrapper *wrapper;
CompartmentPrivate *targetdata = EnsureCompartmentPrivate(target);
if (targetIsChrome) {
//
// First, handle the special cases.
//
// If UniversalXPConnect is enabled, this is just some dumb mochitest. Use
// a vanilla CCW.
if (xpc::IsUniversalXPConnectEnabled(target)) {
wrapper = &CrossCompartmentWrapper::singleton;
// If this is a chrome object being exposed to content without Xrays, use
// a COW.
} else if (originIsChrome && !targetIsChrome && xrayType == NotXray) {
wrapper = &ChromeObjectWrapper::singleton;
// If content is accessing a Components object or NAC, we need a special filter,
// even if the object is same origin.
} else if (IsComponentsObject(obj) && !AccessCheck::isChrome(target)) {
wrapper = &FilteringWrapper<CrossCompartmentSecurityWrapper,
ComponentsObjectPolicy>::singleton;
} else if (AccessCheck::needsSystemOnlyWrapper(obj) && !AccessCheck::isChrome(target)) {
// This should never happen unless an addon does something really dumb.
if (!AccessCheck::subsumes(target, origin)) {
JS_ReportError(cx, "Don't expose cross-origin NAC");
return nullptr;
}
wrapper = &FilteringWrapper<CrossCompartmentSecurityWrapper,
OnlyIfSubjectIsSystem>::singleton;
}
//
// Now, handle the regular cases.
//
else if (targetIsChrome) {
if (originIsChrome) {
wrapper = &CrossCompartmentWrapper::singleton;
} else {
@ -353,19 +387,14 @@ WrapperFactory::Rewrap(JSContext *cx, JSObject *existing, JSObject *obj,
}
}
}
} else if (xpc::IsUniversalXPConnectEnabled(target)) {
wrapper = &CrossCompartmentWrapper::singleton;
} else if (originIsChrome) {
if (xrayType == XrayForWrappedNative) {
wrapper = &FilteringWrapper<SecurityXrayXPCWN, CrossOriginAccessiblePropertiesOnly>::singleton;
} else if (xrayType == XrayForDOMObject) {
wrapper = &FilteringWrapper<SecurityXrayDOM, CrossOriginAccessiblePropertiesOnly>::singleton;
} else if (IsComponentsObject(obj)) {
wrapper = &FilteringWrapper<CrossCompartmentSecurityWrapper,
ComponentsObjectPolicy>::singleton;
} else {
wrapper = &ChromeObjectWrapper::singleton;
MOZ_NOT_REACHED();
}
} else if (targetSubsumesOrigin) {
// For the same-origin case we use a transparent wrapper, unless one
@ -377,13 +406,7 @@ WrapperFactory::Rewrap(JSContext *cx, JSObject *existing, JSObject *obj,
//
// The first two cases always require a security wrapper for non-chrome
// access, regardless of the origin of the object.
if (AccessCheck::needsSystemOnlyWrapper(obj)) {
wrapper = &FilteringWrapper<CrossCompartmentSecurityWrapper,
OnlyIfSubjectIsSystem>::singleton;
} else if (IsComponentsObject(obj)) {
wrapper = &FilteringWrapper<CrossCompartmentSecurityWrapper,
ComponentsObjectPolicy>::singleton;
} else if (!targetdata->wantXrays || xrayType == NotXray) {
if (!targetdata->wantXrays || xrayType == NotXray) {
wrapper = &CrossCompartmentWrapper::singleton;
} else if (xrayType == XrayForDOMObject) {
wrapper = &PermissiveXrayDOM::singleton;
@ -391,9 +414,6 @@ WrapperFactory::Rewrap(JSContext *cx, JSObject *existing, JSObject *obj,
wrapper = &PermissiveXrayXPCWN::singleton;
}
} else {
NS_ASSERTION(!AccessCheck::needsSystemOnlyWrapper(obj),
"bad object exposed across origins");
// Cross origin we want to disallow scripting and limit access to
// a predefined set of properties.
if (xrayType == NotXray) {