gecko/security/apps/AppTrustDomain.cpp

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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "AppTrustDomain.h"
#include "certdb.h"
#include "pkix/pkixnss.h"
#include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h"
#include "nsIX509CertDB.h"
#include "nsNSSCertificate.h"
#include "prerror.h"
#include "secerr.h"
// Generated in Makefile.in
#include "marketplace-prod-public.inc"
#include "marketplace-prod-reviewers.inc"
#include "marketplace-dev-public.inc"
#include "marketplace-dev-reviewers.inc"
#include "marketplace-stage.inc"
#include "xpcshell.inc"
// Trusted Hosted Apps Certificates
#include "manifest-signing-root.inc"
#include "manifest-signing-test-root.inc"
bug 985201 - rename insanity::pkix to mozilla::pkix r=cviecco r=briansmith --HG-- rename : security/insanity/include/insanity/ScopedPtr.h => security/pkix/include/pkix/ScopedPtr.h rename : security/insanity/include/insanity/bind.h => security/pkix/include/pkix/bind.h rename : security/insanity/include/insanity/nullptr.h => security/pkix/include/pkix/nullptr.h rename : security/insanity/include/insanity/pkix.h => security/pkix/include/pkix/pkix.h rename : security/insanity/include/insanity/pkixtypes.h => security/pkix/include/pkix/pkixtypes.h rename : security/insanity/lib/pkixbind.cpp => security/pkix/lib/pkixbind.cpp rename : security/insanity/lib/pkixbuild.cpp => security/pkix/lib/pkixbuild.cpp rename : security/insanity/lib/pkixcheck.cpp => security/pkix/lib/pkixcheck.cpp rename : security/insanity/lib/pkixcheck.h => security/pkix/lib/pkixcheck.h rename : security/insanity/lib/pkixder.cpp => security/pkix/lib/pkixder.cpp rename : security/insanity/lib/pkixder.h => security/pkix/lib/pkixder.h rename : security/insanity/lib/pkixkey.cpp => security/pkix/lib/pkixkey.cpp rename : security/insanity/lib/pkixocsp.cpp => security/pkix/lib/pkixocsp.cpp rename : security/insanity/lib/pkixutil.h => security/pkix/lib/pkixutil.h rename : security/insanity/moz.build => security/pkix/moz.build rename : security/insanity/test/lib/moz.build => security/pkix/test/lib/moz.build rename : security/insanity/test/lib/pkixtestutil.cpp => security/pkix/test/lib/pkixtestutil.cpp rename : security/insanity/test/lib/pkixtestutil.h => security/pkix/test/lib/pkixtestutil.h
2014-03-20 14:29:21 -07:00
using namespace mozilla::pkix;
#ifdef PR_LOGGING
extern PRLogModuleInfo* gPIPNSSLog;
#endif
static const unsigned int DEFAULT_MINIMUM_NON_ECC_BITS = 2048;
namespace mozilla { namespace psm {
AppTrustDomain::AppTrustDomain(ScopedCERTCertList& certChain, void* pinArg)
: mCertChain(certChain)
, mPinArg(pinArg)
, mMinimumNonECCBits(DEFAULT_MINIMUM_NON_ECC_BITS)
{
}
SECStatus
AppTrustDomain::SetTrustedRoot(AppTrustedRoot trustedRoot)
{
SECItem trustedDER;
// Load the trusted certificate into the in-memory NSS database so that
// CERT_CreateSubjectCertList can find it.
switch (trustedRoot)
{
case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceProdPublicRoot:
trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceProdPublicRoot);
trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceProdPublicRoot);
break;
case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceProdReviewersRoot:
trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceProdReviewersRoot);
trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceProdReviewersRoot);
break;
case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceDevPublicRoot:
trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceDevPublicRoot);
trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceDevPublicRoot);
break;
case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceDevReviewersRoot:
trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceDevReviewersRoot);
trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceDevReviewersRoot);
break;
case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceStageRoot:
trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceStageRoot);
trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceStageRoot);
// The staging root was generated with a 1024-bit key.
mMinimumNonECCBits = 1024u;
break;
case nsIX509CertDB::AppXPCShellRoot:
trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(xpcshellRoot);
trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(xpcshellRoot);
break;
case nsIX509CertDB::TrustedHostedAppPublicRoot:
trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(trustedAppPublicRoot);
trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(trustedAppPublicRoot);
break;
case nsIX509CertDB::TrustedHostedAppTestRoot:
trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(trustedAppTestRoot);
trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(trustedAppTestRoot);
break;
default:
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
mTrustedRoot = CERT_NewTempCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
&trustedDER, nullptr, false, true);
if (!mTrustedRoot) {
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
Result
AppTrustDomain::FindIssuer(Input encodedIssuerName, IssuerChecker& checker,
Time)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(mTrustedRoot);
if (!mTrustedRoot) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
}
// TODO(bug 1035418): If/when mozilla::pkix relaxes the restriction that
// FindIssuer must only pass certificates with a matching subject name to
// checker.Check, we can stop using CERT_CreateSubjectCertList and instead
// use logic like this:
//
// 1. First, try the trusted trust anchor.
// 2. Secondly, iterate through the certificates that were stored in the CMS
// message, passing each one to checker.Check.
SECItem encodedIssuerNameSECItem =
UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(encodedIssuerName);
ScopedCERTCertList
candidates(CERT_CreateSubjectCertList(nullptr, CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
&encodedIssuerNameSECItem, 0,
false));
if (candidates) {
for (CERTCertListNode* n = CERT_LIST_HEAD(candidates);
!CERT_LIST_END(n, candidates); n = CERT_LIST_NEXT(n)) {
Input certDER;
Result rv = certDER.Init(n->cert->derCert.data, n->cert->derCert.len);
if (rv != Success) {
continue; // probably too big
}
bool keepGoing;
rv = checker.Check(certDER, nullptr/*additionalNameConstraints*/,
keepGoing);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
if (!keepGoing) {
break;
}
}
}
return Success;
}
Result
AppTrustDomain::GetCertTrust(EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
const CertPolicyId& policy,
Input candidateCertDER,
/*out*/ TrustLevel& trustLevel)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(policy.IsAnyPolicy());
MOZ_ASSERT(mTrustedRoot);
if (!policy.IsAnyPolicy()) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
}
if (!mTrustedRoot) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
}
// Handle active distrust of the certificate.
// XXX: This would be cleaner and more efficient if we could get the trust
// information without constructing a CERTCertificate here, but NSS doesn't
// expose it in any other easy-to-use fashion.
SECItem candidateCertDERSECItem =
UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(candidateCertDER);
ScopedCERTCertificate candidateCert(
CERT_NewTempCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &candidateCertDERSECItem,
nullptr, false, true));
if (!candidateCert) {
return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
}
CERTCertTrust trust;
if (CERT_GetCertTrust(candidateCert.get(), &trust) == SECSuccess) {
uint32_t flags = SEC_GET_TRUST_FLAGS(&trust, trustObjectSigning);
// For DISTRUST, we use the CERTDB_TRUSTED or CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA bit,
// because we can have active distrust for either type of cert. Note that
// CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD means "stop trying to inherit trust" so if the
// relevant trust bit isn't set then that means the cert must be considered
// distrusted.
uint32_t relevantTrustBit = endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA
? CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA
: CERTDB_TRUSTED;
if (((flags & (relevantTrustBit | CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD)))
== CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD) {
trustLevel = TrustLevel::ActivelyDistrusted;
return Success;
}
}
// mTrustedRoot is the only trust anchor for this validation.
if (CERT_CompareCerts(mTrustedRoot.get(), candidateCert.get())) {
trustLevel = TrustLevel::TrustAnchor;
return Success;
}
trustLevel = TrustLevel::InheritsTrust;
return Success;
}
Result
AppTrustDomain::VerifySignedData(const SignedDataWithSignature& signedData,
Input subjectPublicKeyInfo)
{
return ::mozilla::pkix::VerifySignedData(signedData, subjectPublicKeyInfo,
mMinimumNonECCBits, mPinArg);
}
Result
AppTrustDomain::DigestBuf(Input item, /*out*/ uint8_t* digestBuf,
size_t digestBufLen)
{
return ::mozilla::pkix::DigestBuf(item, digestBuf, digestBufLen);
}
Result
AppTrustDomain::CheckRevocation(EndEntityOrCA, const CertID&, Time,
/*optional*/ const Input*,
/*optional*/ const Input*)
{
// We don't currently do revocation checking. If we need to distrust an Apps
// certificate, we will use the active distrust mechanism.
return Success;
}
Result
AppTrustDomain::IsChainValid(const DERArray& certChain, Time time)
{
SECStatus srv = ConstructCERTCertListFromReversedDERArray(certChain,
mCertChain);
if (srv != SECSuccess) {
return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
}
return Success;
}
Result
AppTrustDomain::CheckPublicKey(Input subjectPublicKeyInfo)
{
return ::mozilla::pkix::CheckPublicKey(subjectPublicKeyInfo,
mMinimumNonECCBits);
}
} } // namespace mozilla::psm