gecko/caps/src/nsScriptSecurityManager.cpp

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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=4 et sw=4 tw=80: */
2012-05-21 04:12:37 -07:00
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "nsScriptSecurityManager.h"
#include "mozilla/Util.h"
#include "js/OldDebugAPI.h"
#include "xpcprivate.h"
#include "XPCWrapper.h"
#include "nsIServiceManager.h"
#include "nsIScriptObjectPrincipal.h"
#include "nsIScriptContext.h"
#include "nsIURL.h"
#include "nsINestedURI.h"
#include "nspr.h"
#include "nsJSPrincipals.h"
#include "nsSystemPrincipal.h"
#include "nsPrincipal.h"
#include "nsNullPrincipal.h"
#include "nsXPIDLString.h"
#include "nsCRT.h"
#include "nsCRTGlue.h"
#include "nsError.h"
#include "nsDOMCID.h"
#include "nsIXPConnect.h"
#include "nsIXPCSecurityManager.h"
#include "nsTextFormatter.h"
#include "nsIStringBundle.h"
#include "nsNetUtil.h"
#include "nsIProperties.h"
#include "nsDirectoryServiceDefs.h"
#include "nsIFile.h"
#include "nsIFileURL.h"
#include "nsIZipReader.h"
#include "nsIXPConnect.h"
#include "nsIScriptGlobalObject.h"
#include "nsPIDOMWindow.h"
#include "nsIDocShell.h"
#include "nsIPrompt.h"
#include "nsIWindowWatcher.h"
#include "nsIConsoleService.h"
#include "nsISecurityCheckedComponent.h"
#include "nsIJSRuntimeService.h"
#include "nsIObserverService.h"
#include "nsIContent.h"
#include "nsAutoPtr.h"
#include "nsDOMJSUtils.h"
#include "nsAboutProtocolUtils.h"
#include "nsIClassInfo.h"
#include "nsIURIFixup.h"
#include "nsCDefaultURIFixup.h"
#include "nsIChromeRegistry.h"
#include "nsIContentSecurityPolicy.h"
#include "nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback.h"
#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
Bug 742217. Reduce the use of nested namespaces in our binding code. r=peterv,bent In the new setup, all per-interface DOM binding files are exported into mozilla/dom. General files not specific to an interface are also exported into mozilla/dom. In terms of namespaces, most things now live in mozilla::dom. Each interface Foo that has generated code has a mozilla::dom::FooBinding namespace for said generated code (and possibly a mozilla::bindings::FooBinding_workers if there's separate codegen for workers). IDL enums are a bit weird: since the name of the enum and the names of its entries all end up in the same namespace, we still generate a C++ namespace with the name of the IDL enum type with "Values" appended to it, with a ::valuelist inside for the actual C++ enum. We then typedef EnumFooValues::valuelist to EnumFoo. That makes it a bit more difficult to refer to the values, but means that values from different enums don't collide with each other. The enums with the proto and constructor IDs in them now live under the mozilla::dom::prototypes and mozilla::dom::constructors namespaces respectively. Again, this lets us deal sanely with the whole "enum value names are flattened into the namespace the enum is in" deal. The main benefit of this setup (and the reason "Binding" got appended to the per-interface namespaces) is that this way "using mozilla::dom" should Just Work for consumers and still allow C++ code to sanely use the IDL interface names for concrete classes, which is fairly desirable. --HG-- rename : dom/bindings/Utils.cpp => dom/bindings/BindingUtils.cpp rename : dom/bindings/Utils.h => dom/bindings/BindingUtils.h
2012-05-02 21:35:38 -07:00
#include "mozilla/dom/BindingUtils.h"
#include <stdint.h>
#include "mozilla/ClearOnShutdown.h"
#include "mozilla/StaticPtr.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsCxPusher.h"
// This should be probably defined on some other place... but I couldn't find it
#define WEBAPPS_PERM_NAME "webapps-manage"
using namespace mozilla;
using namespace mozilla::dom;
static NS_DEFINE_CID(kZipReaderCID, NS_ZIPREADER_CID);
nsIIOService *nsScriptSecurityManager::sIOService = nullptr;
nsIStringBundle *nsScriptSecurityManager::sStrBundle = nullptr;
JSRuntime *nsScriptSecurityManager::sRuntime = 0;
bool nsScriptSecurityManager::sStrictFileOriginPolicy = true;
// Lazily initialized. Use the getter below.
static jsid sEnabledID = JSID_VOID;
static JS::HandleId
EnabledID()
{
if (sEnabledID != JSID_VOID)
return JS::HandleId::fromMarkedLocation(&sEnabledID);
AutoSafeJSContext cx;
sEnabledID = INTERNED_STRING_TO_JSID(cx, JS_InternString(cx, "enabled"));
return JS::HandleId::fromMarkedLocation(&sEnabledID);
}
bool
nsScriptSecurityManager::SubjectIsPrivileged()
{
JSContext *cx = GetCurrentJSContext();
if (cx && xpc::IsUniversalXPConnectEnabled(cx))
return true;
bool isSystem = false;
return NS_SUCCEEDED(SubjectPrincipalIsSystem(&isSystem)) && isSystem;
}
///////////////////////////
// Convenience Functions //
///////////////////////////
// Result of this function should not be freed.
static inline const PRUnichar *
IDToString(JSContext *cx, jsid id_)
{
JS::RootedId id(cx, id_);
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if (JSID_IS_STRING(id))
return JS_GetInternedStringChars(JSID_TO_STRING(id));
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JS::Value idval;
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if (!JS_IdToValue(cx, id, &idval))
return nullptr;
JSString *str = JS_ValueToString(cx, idval);
if(!str)
return nullptr;
return JS_GetStringCharsZ(cx, str);
}
class nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter {
public:
nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter() {
++sInPrincipalDomainOrigin;
}
~nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter() {
--sInPrincipalDomainOrigin;
}
static uint32_t sInPrincipalDomainOrigin;
};
uint32_t nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter::sInPrincipalDomainOrigin;
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static
nsresult
GetOriginFromURI(nsIURI* aURI, nsACString& aOrigin)
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{
if (nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter::sInPrincipalDomainOrigin > 1) {
// Allow a single recursive call to GetPrincipalDomainOrigin, since that
// might be happening on a different principal from the first call. But
// after that, cut off the recursion; it just indicates that something
// we're doing in this method causes us to reenter a security check here.
return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
}
nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter autoSetter;
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nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri = NS_GetInnermostURI(aURI);
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NS_ENSURE_TRUE(uri, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
nsAutoCString hostPort;
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nsresult rv = uri->GetHostPort(hostPort);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
nsAutoCString scheme;
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rv = uri->GetScheme(scheme);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
aOrigin = scheme + NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("://") + hostPort;
}
else {
// Some URIs (e.g., nsSimpleURI) don't support host. Just
// get the full spec.
rv = uri->GetSpec(aOrigin);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
return NS_OK;
}
static
nsresult
GetPrincipalDomainOrigin(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
nsACString& aOrigin)
{
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
aPrincipal->GetDomain(getter_AddRefs(uri));
if (!uri) {
aPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
}
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(uri, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
return GetOriginFromURI(uri, aOrigin);
}
static nsIScriptContext *
GetScriptContext(JSContext *cx)
{
return GetScriptContextFromJSContext(cx);
}
inline void SetPendingException(JSContext *cx, const char *aMsg)
{
JS_ReportError(cx, "%s", aMsg);
}
inline void SetPendingException(JSContext *cx, const PRUnichar *aMsg)
{
JS_ReportError(cx, "%hs", aMsg);
}
// DomainPolicy members
uint32_t DomainPolicy::sGeneration = 0;
// Helper class to get stuff from the ClassInfo and not waste extra time with
// virtual method calls for things it has already gotten
class ClassInfoData
{
public:
ClassInfoData(nsIClassInfo *aClassInfo, const char *aName)
: mClassInfo(aClassInfo),
mName(const_cast<char *>(aName)),
mDidGetFlags(false),
mMustFreeName(false)
{
}
~ClassInfoData()
{
if (mMustFreeName)
nsMemory::Free(mName);
}
uint32_t GetFlags()
{
if (!mDidGetFlags) {
if (mClassInfo) {
nsresult rv = mClassInfo->GetFlags(&mFlags);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
mFlags = 0;
}
} else {
mFlags = 0;
}
mDidGetFlags = true;
}
return mFlags;
}
bool IsDOMClass()
{
return !!(GetFlags() & nsIClassInfo::DOM_OBJECT);
}
const char* GetName()
{
if (!mName) {
if (mClassInfo) {
mClassInfo->GetClassDescription(&mName);
}
if (mName) {
mMustFreeName = true;
} else {
mName = const_cast<char *>("UnnamedClass");
}
}
return mName;
}
private:
nsIClassInfo *mClassInfo; // WEAK
uint32_t mFlags;
char *mName;
bool mDidGetFlags;
bool mMustFreeName;
};
JSContext *
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetCurrentJSContext()
{
// Get JSContext from stack.
return nsXPConnect::XPConnect()->GetCurrentJSContext();
}
JSContext *
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetSafeJSContext()
{
// Get JSContext from stack.
return nsXPConnect::XPConnect()->GetSafeJSContext();
}
/* static */
bool
nsScriptSecurityManager::SecurityCompareURIs(nsIURI* aSourceURI,
nsIURI* aTargetURI)
{
return NS_SecurityCompareURIs(aSourceURI, aTargetURI, sStrictFileOriginPolicy);
}
// SecurityHashURI is consistent with SecurityCompareURIs because NS_SecurityHashURI
// is consistent with NS_SecurityCompareURIs. See nsNetUtil.h.
uint32_t
nsScriptSecurityManager::SecurityHashURI(nsIURI* aURI)
{
return NS_SecurityHashURI(aURI);
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelPrincipal(nsIChannel* aChannel,
nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
{
NS_PRECONDITION(aChannel, "Must have channel!");
nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> owner;
aChannel->GetOwner(getter_AddRefs(owner));
if (owner) {
CallQueryInterface(owner, aPrincipal);
if (*aPrincipal) {
return NS_OK;
}
}
// OK, get the principal from the URI. Make sure this does the same thing
// as nsDocument::Reset and XULDocument::StartDocumentLoad.
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> docShell;
NS_QueryNotificationCallbacks(aChannel, docShell);
if (docShell) {
return GetDocShellCodebasePrincipal(uri, docShell, aPrincipal);
}
return GetCodebasePrincipalInternal(uri, UNKNOWN_APP_ID,
/* isInBrowserElement */ false, aPrincipal);
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::IsSystemPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
bool* aIsSystem)
{
*aIsSystem = (aPrincipal == mSystemPrincipal);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP_(nsIPrincipal *)
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetCxSubjectPrincipal(JSContext *cx)
{
NS_ASSERTION(cx == GetCurrentJSContext(),
"Uh, cx is not the current JS context!");
nsresult rv = NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
nsIPrincipal *principal = GetSubjectPrincipal(cx, &rv);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return nullptr;
return principal;
}
////////////////////
// Policy Storage //
////////////////////
// Table of security levels
static bool
DeleteCapability(nsHashKey *aKey, void *aData, void* closure)
{
NS_Free(aData);
return true;
}
//-- Per-Domain Policy - applies to one or more protocols or hosts
struct DomainEntry
{
DomainEntry(const char* aOrigin,
DomainPolicy* aDomainPolicy) : mOrigin(aOrigin),
mDomainPolicy(aDomainPolicy),
mNext(nullptr)
{
mDomainPolicy->Hold();
}
~DomainEntry()
{
mDomainPolicy->Drop();
}
bool Matches(const char *anOrigin)
{
int len = strlen(anOrigin);
int thisLen = mOrigin.Length();
if (len < thisLen)
return false;
if (mOrigin.RFindChar(':', thisLen-1, 1) != -1)
//-- Policy applies to all URLs of this scheme, compare scheme only
return mOrigin.EqualsIgnoreCase(anOrigin, thisLen);
//-- Policy applies to a particular host; compare domains
if (!mOrigin.Equals(anOrigin + (len - thisLen)))
return false;
if (len == thisLen)
return true;
char charBefore = anOrigin[len-thisLen-1];
return (charBefore == '.' || charBefore == ':' || charBefore == '/');
}
nsCString mOrigin;
DomainPolicy* mDomainPolicy;
DomainEntry* mNext;
};
static bool
DeleteDomainEntry(nsHashKey *aKey, void *aData, void* closure)
{
DomainEntry *entry = (DomainEntry*) aData;
do
{
DomainEntry *next = entry->mNext;
delete entry;
entry = next;
} while (entry);
return true;
}
/////////////////////////////
// nsScriptSecurityManager //
/////////////////////////////
////////////////////////////////////
// Methods implementing ISupports //
////////////////////////////////////
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS4(nsScriptSecurityManager,
nsIScriptSecurityManager,
nsIXPCSecurityManager,
nsIChannelEventSink,
nsIObserver)
///////////////////////////////////////////////////
// Methods implementing nsIScriptSecurityManager //
///////////////////////////////////////////////////
///////////////// Security Checks /////////////////
bool
nsScriptSecurityManager::ContentSecurityPolicyPermitsJSAction(JSContext *cx)
{
// Get the security manager
nsScriptSecurityManager *ssm =
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetScriptSecurityManager();
NS_ASSERTION(ssm, "Failed to get security manager service");
if (!ssm)
return false;
nsresult rv;
nsIPrincipal* subjectPrincipal = ssm->GetSubjectPrincipal(cx, &rv);
NS_ASSERTION(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv), "CSP: Failed to get nsIPrincipal from js context");
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return false; // Not just absence of principal, but failure.
if (!subjectPrincipal)
return true;
nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> csp;
rv = subjectPrincipal->GetCsp(getter_AddRefs(csp));
NS_ASSERTION(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv), "CSP: Failed to get CSP from principal.");
// don't do anything unless there's a CSP
if (!csp)
return true;
bool evalOK = true;
bool reportViolation = false;
rv = csp->GetAllowsEval(&reportViolation, &evalOK);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
{
NS_WARNING("CSP: failed to get allowsEval");
return true; // fail open to not break sites.
}
if (reportViolation) {
nsAutoString fileName;
unsigned lineNum = 0;
NS_NAMED_LITERAL_STRING(scriptSample, "call to eval() or related function blocked by CSP");
JSScript *script;
if (JS_DescribeScriptedCaller(cx, &script, &lineNum)) {
if (const char *file = JS_GetScriptFilename(cx, script)) {
CopyUTF8toUTF16(nsDependentCString(file), fileName);
}
}
csp->LogViolationDetails(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_EVAL,
fileName,
scriptSample,
lineNum);
}
return evalOK;
}
bool
nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckObjectAccess(JSContext *cx, JS::Handle<JSObject*> obj,
JS::Handle<jsid> id, JSAccessMode mode,
JS::MutableHandle<JS::Value> vp)
{
// Get the security manager
nsScriptSecurityManager *ssm =
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetScriptSecurityManager();
NS_WARN_IF_FALSE(ssm, "Failed to get security manager service");
if (!ssm)
return false;
// Get the object being accessed. We protect these cases:
// 1. The Function.prototype.caller property's value, which might lead
// an attacker up a call-stack to a function or another object from
// a different trust domain.
// 2. A user-defined getter or setter function accessible on another
// trust domain's window or document object.
// vp can be a primitive, in that case, we use obj as the target
// object.
JSObject* target = JSVAL_IS_PRIMITIVE(vp) ? obj : JSVAL_TO_OBJECT(vp);
// Do the same-origin check -- this sets a JS exception if the check fails.
// Pass the parent object's class name, as we have no class-info for it.
nsresult rv =
ssm->CheckPropertyAccess(cx, target, js::GetObjectClass(obj)->name, id,
(mode & JSACC_WRITE) ?
(int32_t)nsIXPCSecurityManager::ACCESS_SET_PROPERTY :
(int32_t)nsIXPCSecurityManager::ACCESS_GET_PROPERTY);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return false; // Security check failed (XXX was an error reported?)
return true;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckPropertyAccess(JSContext* cx,
JSObject* aJSObject,
const char* aClassName,
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jsid aProperty,
uint32_t aAction)
{
return CheckPropertyAccessImpl(aAction, nullptr, cx, aJSObject,
nullptr, nullptr,
aClassName, aProperty, nullptr);
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckSameOrigin(JSContext* cx,
nsIURI* aTargetURI)
{
nsresult rv;
// Get a context if necessary
if (!cx)
{
cx = GetCurrentJSContext();
if (!cx)
return NS_OK; // No JS context, so allow access
}
// Get a principal from the context
nsIPrincipal* sourcePrincipal = GetSubjectPrincipal(cx, &rv);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return rv;
if (!sourcePrincipal)
{
NS_WARNING("CheckSameOrigin called on script w/o principals; should this happen?");
return NS_OK;
}
if (sourcePrincipal == mSystemPrincipal)
{
// This is a system (chrome) script, so allow access
return NS_OK;
}
// Get the original URI from the source principal.
// This has the effect of ignoring any change to document.domain
// which must be done to avoid DNS spoofing (bug 154930)
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> sourceURI;
sourcePrincipal->GetDomain(getter_AddRefs(sourceURI));
if (!sourceURI) {
sourcePrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(sourceURI));
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(sourceURI, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
}
// Compare origins
if (!SecurityCompareURIs(sourceURI, aTargetURI))
{
ReportError(cx, NS_LITERAL_STRING("CheckSameOriginError"), sourceURI, aTargetURI);
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckSameOriginURI(nsIURI* aSourceURI,
nsIURI* aTargetURI,
bool reportError)
{
if (!SecurityCompareURIs(aSourceURI, aTargetURI))
{
if (reportError) {
ReportError(nullptr, NS_LITERAL_STRING("CheckSameOriginError"),
aSourceURI, aTargetURI);
}
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult
nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckPropertyAccessImpl(uint32_t aAction,
nsAXPCNativeCallContext* aCallContext,
JSContext* cx, JSObject* aJSObject,
nsISupports* aObj,
nsIClassInfo* aClassInfo,
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const char* aClassName, jsid aProperty,
void** aCachedClassPolicy)
{
nsresult rv;
JS::RootedObject jsObject(cx, aJSObject);
JS::RootedId property(cx, aProperty);
nsIPrincipal* subjectPrincipal = GetSubjectPrincipal(cx, &rv);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return rv;
if (!subjectPrincipal || subjectPrincipal == mSystemPrincipal)
// We have native code or the system principal: just allow access
return NS_OK;
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> objectPrincipal;
// Hold the class info data here so we don't have to go back to virtual
// methods all the time
ClassInfoData classInfoData(aClassInfo, aClassName);
//-- Look up the security policy for this class and subject domain
SecurityLevel securityLevel;
rv = LookupPolicy(subjectPrincipal, classInfoData, property, aAction,
(ClassPolicy**)aCachedClassPolicy, &securityLevel);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return rv;
if (securityLevel.level == SCRIPT_SECURITY_UNDEFINED_ACCESS)
{
// No policy found for this property so use the default of last resort.
// If we were called from somewhere other than XPConnect
// (no XPC call context), assume this is a DOM class. Otherwise,
// ask the ClassInfo.
if (!aCallContext || classInfoData.IsDOMClass())
securityLevel.level = SCRIPT_SECURITY_SAME_ORIGIN_ACCESS;
else
securityLevel.level = SCRIPT_SECURITY_NO_ACCESS;
}
if (SECURITY_ACCESS_LEVEL_FLAG(securityLevel))
// This flag means securityLevel is allAccess, noAccess, or sameOrigin
{
switch (securityLevel.level)
{
case SCRIPT_SECURITY_NO_ACCESS:
rv = NS_ERROR_DOM_PROP_ACCESS_DENIED;
break;
case SCRIPT_SECURITY_ALL_ACCESS:
rv = NS_OK;
break;
case SCRIPT_SECURITY_SAME_ORIGIN_ACCESS:
{
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principalHolder;
if (jsObject)
{
objectPrincipal = doGetObjectPrincipal(jsObject);
if (!objectPrincipal)
rv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR;
}
else
{
NS_ERROR("CheckPropertyAccessImpl called without a target object or URL");
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
if(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv))
rv = CheckSameOriginDOMProp(subjectPrincipal, objectPrincipal,
aAction);
break;
}
default:
NS_ERROR("Bad Security Level Value");
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
}
else // if SECURITY_ACCESS_LEVEL_FLAG is false, securityLevel is a capability
{
rv = SubjectIsPrivileged() ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR;
}
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv))
{
return rv;
}
//--See if the object advertises a non-default level of access
// using nsISecurityCheckedComponent
nsCOMPtr<nsISecurityCheckedComponent> checkedComponent =
do_QueryInterface(aObj);
nsXPIDLCString objectSecurityLevel;
if (checkedComponent)
{
nsCOMPtr<nsIXPConnectWrappedNative> wrapper;
nsCOMPtr<nsIInterfaceInfo> interfaceInfo;
const nsIID* objIID = nullptr;
rv = aCallContext->GetCalleeWrapper(getter_AddRefs(wrapper));
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && wrapper)
rv = wrapper->FindInterfaceWithMember(property, getter_AddRefs(interfaceInfo));
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && interfaceInfo)
rv = interfaceInfo->GetIIDShared(&objIID);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && objIID)
{
switch (aAction)
{
case nsIXPCSecurityManager::ACCESS_GET_PROPERTY:
checkedComponent->CanGetProperty(objIID,
IDToString(cx, property),
getter_Copies(objectSecurityLevel));
break;
case nsIXPCSecurityManager::ACCESS_SET_PROPERTY:
checkedComponent->CanSetProperty(objIID,
IDToString(cx, property),
getter_Copies(objectSecurityLevel));
break;
case nsIXPCSecurityManager::ACCESS_CALL_METHOD:
checkedComponent->CanCallMethod(objIID,
IDToString(cx, property),
getter_Copies(objectSecurityLevel));
}
}
}
rv = CheckXPCPermissions(cx, aObj, jsObject, subjectPrincipal,
objectSecurityLevel);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) //-- Security tests failed, access is denied, report error
{
nsAutoString stringName;
switch(aAction)
{
case nsIXPCSecurityManager::ACCESS_GET_PROPERTY:
stringName.AssignLiteral("GetPropertyDeniedOrigins");
break;
case nsIXPCSecurityManager::ACCESS_SET_PROPERTY:
stringName.AssignLiteral("SetPropertyDeniedOrigins");
break;
case nsIXPCSecurityManager::ACCESS_CALL_METHOD:
stringName.AssignLiteral("CallMethodDeniedOrigins");
}
// Null out objectPrincipal for now, so we don't leak information about
// it. Whenever we can report different error strings to content and
// the UI we can take this out again.
objectPrincipal = nullptr;
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 className(classInfoData.GetName());
nsAutoCString subjectOrigin;
nsAutoCString subjectDomain;
if (!nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter::sInPrincipalDomainOrigin) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri, domain;
subjectPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
if (uri) { // Object principal might be expanded
GetOriginFromURI(uri, subjectOrigin);
}
subjectPrincipal->GetDomain(getter_AddRefs(domain));
if (domain) {
GetOriginFromURI(domain, subjectDomain);
}
} else {
subjectOrigin.AssignLiteral("the security manager");
}
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 subjectOriginUnicode(subjectOrigin);
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 subjectDomainUnicode(subjectDomain);
nsAutoCString objectOrigin;
nsAutoCString objectDomain;
if (!nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter::sInPrincipalDomainOrigin &&
objectPrincipal) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri, domain;
objectPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
if (uri) { // Object principal might be system
GetOriginFromURI(uri, objectOrigin);
}
objectPrincipal->GetDomain(getter_AddRefs(domain));
if (domain) {
GetOriginFromURI(domain, objectDomain);
}
}
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 objectOriginUnicode(objectOrigin);
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 objectDomainUnicode(objectDomain);
nsXPIDLString errorMsg;
const PRUnichar *formatStrings[] =
{
subjectOriginUnicode.get(),
className.get(),
IDToString(cx, property),
objectOriginUnicode.get(),
subjectDomainUnicode.get(),
objectDomainUnicode.get()
};
uint32_t length = ArrayLength(formatStrings);
// XXXbz Our localization system is stupid and can't handle not showing
// some strings that get passed in. Which means that we have to get
// our length precisely right: it has to be exactly the number of
// strings our format string wants. This means we'll have to move
// strings in the array as needed, sadly...
if (nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter::sInPrincipalDomainOrigin ||
!objectPrincipal) {
stringName.AppendLiteral("OnlySubject");
length -= 3;
} else {
// default to a length that doesn't include the domains, then
// increase it as needed.
length -= 2;
if (!subjectDomainUnicode.IsEmpty()) {
stringName.AppendLiteral("SubjectDomain");
length += 1;
}
if (!objectDomainUnicode.IsEmpty()) {
stringName.AppendLiteral("ObjectDomain");
length += 1;
if (length != ArrayLength(formatStrings)) {
// We have an object domain but not a subject domain.
// Scoot our string over one slot. See the XXX comment
// above for why we need to do this.
formatStrings[length-1] = formatStrings[length];
}
}
}
// We need to keep our existing failure rv and not override it
// with a likely success code from the following string bundle
// call in order to throw the correct security exception later.
nsresult rv2 = sStrBundle->FormatStringFromName(stringName.get(),
formatStrings,
length,
getter_Copies(errorMsg));
if (NS_FAILED(rv2)) {
// Might just be missing the string... Do our best
errorMsg = stringName;
}
SetPendingException(cx, errorMsg.get());
}
return rv;
}
/* static */
nsresult
nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckSameOriginPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aSubject,
nsIPrincipal* aObject)
{
/*
** Get origin of subject and object and compare.
*/
if (aSubject == aObject)
return NS_OK;
if (!AppAttributesEqual(aSubject, aObject)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_PROP_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
// Default to false, and change if that turns out wrong.
bool subjectSetDomain = false;
bool objectSetDomain = false;
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> subjectURI;
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> objectURI;
aSubject->GetDomain(getter_AddRefs(subjectURI));
if (!subjectURI) {
aSubject->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(subjectURI));
} else {
subjectSetDomain = true;
}
aObject->GetDomain(getter_AddRefs(objectURI));
if (!objectURI) {
aObject->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(objectURI));
} else {
objectSetDomain = true;
}
if (SecurityCompareURIs(subjectURI, objectURI))
{ // If either the subject or the object has changed its principal by
// explicitly setting document.domain then the other must also have
// done so in order to be considered the same origin. This prevents
// DNS spoofing based on document.domain (154930)
// If both or neither explicitly set their domain, allow the access
if (subjectSetDomain == objectSetDomain)
return NS_OK;
}
/*
** Access tests failed, so now report error.
*/
return NS_ERROR_DOM_PROP_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
// It's important that
//
// CheckSameOriginPrincipal(A, B) == NS_OK
//
// imply
//
// HashPrincipalByOrigin(A) == HashPrincipalByOrigin(B)
//
// if principals A and B could ever be used as keys in a hashtable.
// Violation of this invariant leads to spurious failures of hashtable
// lookups. See bug 454850.
/*static*/ uint32_t
nsScriptSecurityManager::HashPrincipalByOrigin(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal)
{
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
aPrincipal->GetDomain(getter_AddRefs(uri));
if (!uri)
aPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
return SecurityHashURI(uri);
}
/* static */ bool
nsScriptSecurityManager::AppAttributesEqual(nsIPrincipal* aFirst,
nsIPrincipal* aSecond)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(aFirst && aSecond, "Don't pass null pointers!");
uint32_t firstAppId = nsIScriptSecurityManager::UNKNOWN_APP_ID;
if (!aFirst->GetUnknownAppId()) {
firstAppId = aFirst->GetAppId();
}
uint32_t secondAppId = nsIScriptSecurityManager::UNKNOWN_APP_ID;
if (!aSecond->GetUnknownAppId()) {
secondAppId = aSecond->GetAppId();
}
return ((firstAppId == secondAppId) &&
(aFirst->GetIsInBrowserElement() == aSecond->GetIsInBrowserElement()));
}
nsresult
nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckSameOriginDOMProp(nsIPrincipal* aSubject,
nsIPrincipal* aObject,
uint32_t aAction)
{
nsresult rv;
bool subsumes;
rv = aSubject->Subsumes(aObject, &subsumes);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && !subsumes) {
rv = NS_ERROR_DOM_PROP_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv))
return NS_OK;
/*
* Content can't ever touch chrome (we check for UniversalXPConnect later)
*/
if (aObject == mSystemPrincipal)
return NS_ERROR_DOM_PROP_ACCESS_DENIED;
/*
** Access tests failed, so now report error.
*/
return NS_ERROR_DOM_PROP_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
nsresult
nsScriptSecurityManager::LookupPolicy(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
ClassInfoData& aClassData,
JS::Handle<jsid> aProperty,
uint32_t aAction,
ClassPolicy** aCachedClassPolicy,
SecurityLevel* result)
{
AutoJSContext cx;
nsresult rv;
JS::RootedId property(cx, aProperty);
result->level = SCRIPT_SECURITY_UNDEFINED_ACCESS;
DomainPolicy* dpolicy = nullptr;
//-- Initialize policies if necessary
if (mPolicyPrefsChanged)
{
if (!mPrefInitialized) {
rv = InitPrefs();
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
rv = InitPolicies();
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return rv;
}
else
{
aPrincipal->GetSecurityPolicy((void**)&dpolicy);
}
if (!dpolicy && mOriginToPolicyMap)
{
//-- Look up the relevant domain policy, if any
if (nsCOMPtr<nsIExpandedPrincipal> exp = do_QueryInterface(aPrincipal))
{
// For expanded principals domain origin is not defined so let's just
// use the default policy
dpolicy = mDefaultPolicy;
}
else
{
nsAutoCString origin;
rv = GetPrincipalDomainOrigin(aPrincipal, origin);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
char *start = origin.BeginWriting();
const char *nextToLastDot = nullptr;
const char *lastDot = nullptr;
const char *colon = nullptr;
char *p = start;
//-- search domain (stop at the end of the string or at the 3rd slash)
for (uint32_t slashes=0; *p; p++)
{
if (*p == '/' && ++slashes == 3)
{
*p = '\0'; // truncate at 3rd slash
break;
}
if (*p == '.')
{
nextToLastDot = lastDot;
lastDot = p;
}
else if (!colon && *p == ':')
colon = p;
}
nsCStringKey key(nextToLastDot ? nextToLastDot+1 : start);
DomainEntry *de = (DomainEntry*) mOriginToPolicyMap->Get(&key);
if (!de)
{
nsAutoCString scheme(start, colon-start+1);
nsCStringKey schemeKey(scheme);
de = (DomainEntry*) mOriginToPolicyMap->Get(&schemeKey);
}
while (de)
{
if (de->Matches(start))
{
dpolicy = de->mDomainPolicy;
break;
}
de = de->mNext;
}
if (!dpolicy)
dpolicy = mDefaultPolicy;
}
aPrincipal->SetSecurityPolicy((void*)dpolicy);
}
ClassPolicy* cpolicy = nullptr;
if ((dpolicy == mDefaultPolicy) && aCachedClassPolicy)
{
// No per-domain policy for this principal (the more common case)
// so look for a cached class policy from the object wrapper
cpolicy = *aCachedClassPolicy;
}
if (!cpolicy)
{ //-- No cached policy for this class, need to look it up
cpolicy = static_cast<ClassPolicy*>
(PL_DHashTableOperate(dpolicy,
aClassData.GetName(),
PL_DHASH_LOOKUP));
if (PL_DHASH_ENTRY_IS_FREE(cpolicy))
cpolicy = NO_POLICY_FOR_CLASS;
if ((dpolicy == mDefaultPolicy) && aCachedClassPolicy)
*aCachedClassPolicy = cpolicy;
}
NS_ASSERTION(JSID_IS_INT(property) || JSID_IS_OBJECT(property) ||
JSID_IS_STRING(property), "Property must be a valid id");
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// Only atomized strings are stored in the policies' hash tables.
if (!JSID_IS_STRING(property))
2010-07-14 23:19:36 -07:00
return NS_OK;
JS::RootedString propertyKey(cx, JSID_TO_STRING(property));
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// We look for a PropertyPolicy in the following places:
// 1) The ClassPolicy for our class we got from our DomainPolicy
// 2) The mWildcardPolicy of our DomainPolicy
// 3) The ClassPolicy for our class we got from mDefaultPolicy
// 4) The mWildcardPolicy of our mDefaultPolicy
PropertyPolicy* ppolicy = nullptr;
if (cpolicy != NO_POLICY_FOR_CLASS)
{
ppolicy = static_cast<PropertyPolicy*>
(PL_DHashTableOperate(cpolicy->mPolicy,
2010-07-14 23:19:36 -07:00
propertyKey,
PL_DHASH_LOOKUP));
}
// If there is no class policy for this property, and we have a wildcard
// policy, try that.
if (dpolicy->mWildcardPolicy &&
(!ppolicy || PL_DHASH_ENTRY_IS_FREE(ppolicy)))
{
ppolicy =
static_cast<PropertyPolicy*>
(PL_DHashTableOperate(dpolicy->mWildcardPolicy->mPolicy,
2010-07-14 23:19:36 -07:00
propertyKey,
PL_DHASH_LOOKUP));
}
// If dpolicy is not the defauly policy and there's no class or wildcard
// policy for this property, check the default policy for this class and
// the default wildcard policy
if (dpolicy != mDefaultPolicy &&
(!ppolicy || PL_DHASH_ENTRY_IS_FREE(ppolicy)))
{
cpolicy = static_cast<ClassPolicy*>
(PL_DHashTableOperate(mDefaultPolicy,
aClassData.GetName(),
PL_DHASH_LOOKUP));
if (PL_DHASH_ENTRY_IS_BUSY(cpolicy))
{
ppolicy =
static_cast<PropertyPolicy*>
(PL_DHashTableOperate(cpolicy->mPolicy,
2010-07-14 23:19:36 -07:00
propertyKey,
PL_DHASH_LOOKUP));
}
if ((!ppolicy || PL_DHASH_ENTRY_IS_FREE(ppolicy)) &&
mDefaultPolicy->mWildcardPolicy)
{
ppolicy =
static_cast<PropertyPolicy*>
(PL_DHashTableOperate(mDefaultPolicy->mWildcardPolicy->mPolicy,
2010-07-14 23:19:36 -07:00
propertyKey,
PL_DHASH_LOOKUP));
}
}
if (!ppolicy || PL_DHASH_ENTRY_IS_FREE(ppolicy))
return NS_OK;
// Get the correct security level from the property policy
if (aAction == nsIXPCSecurityManager::ACCESS_SET_PROPERTY)
*result = ppolicy->mSet;
else
*result = ppolicy->mGet;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIFromScript(JSContext *cx, nsIURI *aURI)
{
// Get principal of currently executing script.
nsresult rv;
nsIPrincipal* principal = GetSubjectPrincipal(cx, &rv);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return rv;
// Native code can load all URIs.
if (!principal)
return NS_OK;
rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(principal, aURI,
nsIScriptSecurityManager::STANDARD);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
// OK to load
return NS_OK;
}
// See if we're attempting to load a file: URI. If so, let a
// UniversalXPConnect capability trump the above check.
bool isFile = false;
bool isRes = false;
if (NS_FAILED(aURI->SchemeIs("file", &isFile)) ||
NS_FAILED(aURI->SchemeIs("resource", &isRes)))
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
if (isFile || isRes)
{
if (SubjectIsPrivileged())
return NS_OK;
}
// Report error.
nsAutoCString spec;
if (NS_FAILED(aURI->GetAsciiSpec(spec)))
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
nsAutoCString msg("Access to '");
msg.Append(spec);
msg.AppendLiteral("' from script denied");
SetPendingException(cx, msg.get());
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
/**
* Helper method to handle cases where a flag passed to
* CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal means denying loading if the given URI has certain
* nsIProtocolHandler flags set.
* @return if success, access is allowed. Otherwise, deny access
*/
static nsresult
DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(nsIURI* aURI, uint32_t aURIFlags)
{
NS_PRECONDITION(aURI, "Must have URI!");
bool uriHasFlags;
nsresult rv =
NS_URIChainHasFlags(aURI, aURIFlags, &uriHasFlags);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (uriHasFlags) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
nsIURI *aTargetURI,
uint32_t aFlags)
{
NS_PRECONDITION(aPrincipal, "CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal must have a principal");
// If someone passes a flag that we don't understand, we should
// fail, because they may need a security check that we don't
// provide.
NS_ENSURE_FALSE(aFlags & ~(nsIScriptSecurityManager::LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT |
nsIScriptSecurityManager::ALLOW_CHROME |
nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT |
nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL |
nsIScriptSecurityManager::DONT_REPORT_ERRORS),
NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aPrincipal);
NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aTargetURI);
// If DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL is set, we prevent loading of URIs which
// would do such inheriting. That would be URIs that do not have their own
// security context. We do this even for the system principal.
if (aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL) {
nsresult rv =
DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(aTargetURI,
nsIProtocolHandler::URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
if (aPrincipal == mSystemPrincipal) {
// Allow access
return NS_OK;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> sourceURI;
aPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(sourceURI));
if (!sourceURI) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIExpandedPrincipal> expanded = do_QueryInterface(aPrincipal);
if (expanded) {
nsTArray< nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> > *whiteList;
expanded->GetWhiteList(&whiteList);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < whiteList->Length(); ++i) {
nsresult rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal((*whiteList)[i],
aTargetURI,
aFlags);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
// Allow access if it succeeded with one of the white listed principals
return NS_OK;
}
}
// None of our whitelisted principals worked.
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
NS_ERROR("Non-system principals or expanded principal passed to CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal "
"must have a URI!");
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
// Automatic loads are not allowed from certain protocols.
if (aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT) {
nsresult rv =
DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(sourceURI,
nsIProtocolHandler::URI_FORBIDS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
// If either URI is a nested URI, get the base URI
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> sourceBaseURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(sourceURI);
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> targetBaseURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(aTargetURI);
//-- get the target scheme
nsAutoCString targetScheme;
nsresult rv = targetBaseURI->GetScheme(targetScheme);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
//-- Some callers do not allow loading javascript:
if ((aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT) &&
targetScheme.EqualsLiteral("javascript"))
{
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
NS_NAMED_LITERAL_STRING(errorTag, "CheckLoadURIError");
bool reportErrors = !(aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::DONT_REPORT_ERRORS);
// Check for uris that are only loadable by principals that subsume them
bool hasFlags;
rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(targetBaseURI,
nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_SUBSUMERS,
&hasFlags);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (hasFlags) {
return aPrincipal->CheckMayLoad(targetBaseURI, true, false);
}
//-- get the source scheme
nsAutoCString sourceScheme;
rv = sourceBaseURI->GetScheme(sourceScheme);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
2008-03-27 20:46:15 -07:00
if (sourceScheme.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral(NS_NULLPRINCIPAL_SCHEME)) {
// A null principal can target its own URI.
if (sourceURI == aTargetURI) {
return NS_OK;
}
}
else if (targetScheme.Equals(sourceScheme,
nsCaseInsensitiveCStringComparator()))
{
// every scheme can access another URI from the same scheme,
// as long as they don't represent null principals...
// Or they don't require an special permission to do so
// See bug#773886
bool hasFlags;
rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(targetBaseURI,
nsIProtocolHandler::URI_CROSS_ORIGIN_NEEDS_WEBAPPS_PERM,
&hasFlags);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (hasFlags) {
// In this case, we allow opening only if the source and target URIS
// are on the same domain, or the opening URI has the webapps
// permision granted
if (!SecurityCompareURIs(sourceBaseURI,targetBaseURI) &&
!nsContentUtils::IsExactSitePermAllow(aPrincipal,WEBAPPS_PERM_NAME)){
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
// If the schemes don't match, the policy is specified by the protocol
// flags on the target URI. Note that the order of policy checks here is
// very important! We start from most restrictive and work our way down.
// Note that since we're working with the innermost URI, we can just use
// the methods that work on chains of nested URIs and they will only look
// at the flags for our one URI.
// Check for system target URI
rv = DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(targetBaseURI,
nsIProtocolHandler::URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
// Deny access, since the origin principal is not system
if (reportErrors) {
ReportError(nullptr, errorTag, sourceURI, aTargetURI);
}
return rv;
}
// Check for chrome target URI
rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(targetBaseURI,
nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE,
&hasFlags);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (hasFlags) {
if (aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::ALLOW_CHROME) {
if (!targetScheme.EqualsLiteral("chrome")) {
// for now don't change behavior for resource: or moz-icon:
return NS_OK;
}
// allow load only if chrome package is whitelisted
nsCOMPtr<nsIXULChromeRegistry> reg(do_GetService(
NS_CHROMEREGISTRY_CONTRACTID));
if (reg) {
bool accessAllowed = false;
reg->AllowContentToAccess(targetBaseURI, &accessAllowed);
if (accessAllowed) {
return NS_OK;
}
}
}
// resource: and chrome: are equivalent, securitywise
// That's bogus!! Fix this. But watch out for
// the view-source stylesheet?
bool sourceIsChrome;
rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(sourceBaseURI,
nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE,
&sourceIsChrome);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (sourceIsChrome) {
return NS_OK;
}
if (reportErrors) {
ReportError(nullptr, errorTag, sourceURI, aTargetURI);
}
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
// Check for target URI pointing to a file
rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(targetBaseURI,
nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_LOCAL_FILE,
&hasFlags);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (hasFlags) {
// resource: and chrome: are equivalent, securitywise
// That's bogus!! Fix this. But watch out for
// the view-source stylesheet?
bool sourceIsChrome;
rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(sourceURI,
nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE,
&sourceIsChrome);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (sourceIsChrome) {
return NS_OK;
}
// Now check capability policies
static const char loadURIPrefGroup[] = "checkloaduri";
ClassInfoData nameData(nullptr, loadURIPrefGroup);
SecurityLevel secLevel;
rv = LookupPolicy(aPrincipal, nameData, EnabledID(),
nsIXPCSecurityManager::ACCESS_GET_PROPERTY,
nullptr, &secLevel);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && secLevel.level == SCRIPT_SECURITY_ALL_ACCESS)
{
// OK for this site!
return NS_OK;
}
if (reportErrors) {
ReportError(nullptr, errorTag, sourceURI, aTargetURI);
}
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
// OK, everyone is allowed to load this, since unflagged handlers are
// deprecated but treated as URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE. But check whether we
// need to warn. At some point we'll want to make this warning into an
// error and treat unflagged handlers as URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD.
rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(targetBaseURI,
nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE,
&hasFlags);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (!hasFlags) {
nsXPIDLString message;
NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 ucsTargetScheme(targetScheme);
const PRUnichar* formatStrings[] = { ucsTargetScheme.get() };
rv = sStrBundle->
FormatStringFromName(NS_LITERAL_STRING("ProtocolFlagError").get(),
formatStrings,
ArrayLength(formatStrings),
getter_Copies(message));
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(
do_GetService("@mozilla.org/consoleservice;1"));
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(console, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
console->LogStringMessage(message.get());
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult
nsScriptSecurityManager::ReportError(JSContext* cx, const nsAString& messageTag,
nsIURI* aSource, nsIURI* aTarget)
{
nsresult rv;
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(aSource && aTarget, NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER);
// Get the source URL spec
nsAutoCString sourceSpec;
rv = aSource->GetAsciiSpec(sourceSpec);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// Get the target URL spec
nsAutoCString targetSpec;
rv = aTarget->GetAsciiSpec(targetSpec);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// Localize the error message
nsXPIDLString message;
NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 ucsSourceSpec(sourceSpec);
NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 ucsTargetSpec(targetSpec);
const PRUnichar *formatStrings[] = { ucsSourceSpec.get(), ucsTargetSpec.get() };
rv = sStrBundle->FormatStringFromName(PromiseFlatString(messageTag).get(),
formatStrings,
ArrayLength(formatStrings),
getter_Copies(message));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// If a JS context was passed in, set a JS exception.
// Otherwise, print the error message directly to the JS console
// and to standard output
if (cx)
{
SetPendingException(cx, message.get());
}
else // Print directly to the console
{
nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(
do_GetService("@mozilla.org/consoleservice;1"));
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(console, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
console->LogStringMessage(message.get());
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIStrWithPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
const nsACString& aTargetURIStr,
uint32_t aFlags)
{
nsresult rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> target;
rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(target), aTargetURIStr,
nullptr, nullptr, sIOService);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(aPrincipal, target, aFlags);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// Now start testing fixup -- since aTargetURIStr is a string, not
// an nsIURI, we may well end up fixing it up before loading.
// Note: This needs to stay in sync with the nsIURIFixup api.
nsCOMPtr<nsIURIFixup> fixup = do_GetService(NS_URIFIXUP_CONTRACTID);
if (!fixup) {
return rv;
}
uint32_t flags[] = {
nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAG_NONE,
nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAG_ALLOW_KEYWORD_LOOKUP,
nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAGS_MAKE_ALTERNATE_URI,
nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAG_ALLOW_KEYWORD_LOOKUP |
nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAGS_MAKE_ALTERNATE_URI
};
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < ArrayLength(flags); ++i) {
rv = fixup->CreateFixupURI(aTargetURIStr, flags[i], nullptr,
getter_AddRefs(target));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(aPrincipal, target, aFlags);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
return rv;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckFunctionAccess(JSContext *aCx, void *aFunObj,
void *aTargetObj)
{
// This check is called for event handlers
nsresult rv;
JS::Rooted<JSObject*> rootedFunObj(aCx, static_cast<JSObject*>(aFunObj));
nsIPrincipal* subject = doGetObjectPrincipal(rootedFunObj);
if (!subject)
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
if (subject == mSystemPrincipal)
// This is the system principal: just allow access
return NS_OK;
// Check if the principal the function was compiled under is
// allowed to execute scripts.
bool result;
rv = CanExecuteScripts(aCx, subject, true, &result);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return rv;
if (!result)
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR;
if (!aTargetObj) {
// We're done here
return NS_OK;
}
/*
** Get origin of subject and object and compare.
*/
JS::Rooted<JSObject*> obj(aCx, (JSObject*)aTargetObj);
nsIPrincipal* object = doGetObjectPrincipal(obj);
if (!object)
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
bool subsumes;
rv = subject->Subsumes(object, &subsumes);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && !subsumes) {
rv = NS_ERROR_DOM_PROP_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
return rv;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::CanExecuteScripts(JSContext* cx,
nsIPrincipal *aPrincipal,
bool *result)
{
return CanExecuteScripts(cx, aPrincipal, false, result);
}
nsresult
nsScriptSecurityManager::CanExecuteScripts(JSContext* cx,
nsIPrincipal *aPrincipal,
bool aAllowIfNoScriptContext,
bool *result)
{
*result = false;
if (aPrincipal == mSystemPrincipal)
{
// Even if JavaScript is disabled, we must still execute system scripts
*result = true;
return NS_OK;
}
// Same thing for nsExpandedPrincipal, which is pseudo-privileged.
nsCOMPtr<nsIExpandedPrincipal> ep = do_QueryInterface(aPrincipal);
if (ep)
{
*result = true;
return NS_OK;
}
//-- See if the current window allows JS execution
nsIScriptContext *scriptContext = GetScriptContext(cx);
if (!scriptContext) {
if (aAllowIfNoScriptContext) {
*result = true;
return NS_OK;
}
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
if (!scriptContext->GetScriptsEnabled()) {
// No scripting on this context, folks
*result = false;
return NS_OK;
}
nsIScriptGlobalObject *sgo = scriptContext->GetGlobalObject();
if (!sgo) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
// window can be null here if we're running with a non-DOM window
// as the script global (i.e. a XUL prototype document).
nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindow> window = do_QueryInterface(sgo);
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> docshell;
nsresult rv;
if (window) {
docshell = window->GetDocShell();
}
if (docshell) {
rv = docshell->GetCanExecuteScripts(result);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
if (!*result) return NS_OK;
}
// OK, the docshell doesn't have script execution explicitly disabled.
// Check whether our URI is an "about:" URI that allows scripts. If it is,
// we need to allow JS to run. In this case, don't apply the JS enabled
// pref or policies. On failures, just press on and don't do this special
// case.
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> principalURI;
aPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(principalURI));
if (!principalURI) {
// Broken principal of some sort. Disallow.
*result = false;
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
bool isAbout;
rv = principalURI->SchemeIs("about", &isAbout);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && isAbout) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIAboutModule> module;
rv = NS_GetAboutModule(principalURI, getter_AddRefs(module));
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
uint32_t flags;
rv = module->GetURIFlags(principalURI, &flags);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) &&
(flags & nsIAboutModule::ALLOW_SCRIPT)) {
*result = true;
return NS_OK;
}
}
}
*result = mIsJavaScriptEnabled;
if (!*result)
return NS_OK; // Do not run scripts
//-- Check for a per-site policy
static const char jsPrefGroupName[] = "javascript";
ClassInfoData nameData(nullptr, jsPrefGroupName);
SecurityLevel secLevel;
rv = LookupPolicy(aPrincipal, nameData, EnabledID(),
nsIXPCSecurityManager::ACCESS_GET_PROPERTY,
nullptr, &secLevel);
if (NS_FAILED(rv) || secLevel.level == SCRIPT_SECURITY_NO_ACCESS)
{
*result = false;
return rv;
}
//-- Nobody vetoed, so allow the JS to run.
*result = true;
return NS_OK;
}
///////////////// Principals ///////////////////////
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetSubjectPrincipal(nsIPrincipal **aSubjectPrincipal)
{
nsresult rv;
*aSubjectPrincipal = doGetSubjectPrincipal(&rv);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv))
NS_IF_ADDREF(*aSubjectPrincipal);
return rv;
}
nsIPrincipal*
nsScriptSecurityManager::doGetSubjectPrincipal(nsresult* rv)
{
NS_PRECONDITION(rv, "Null out param");
JSContext *cx = GetCurrentJSContext();
if (!cx)
{
*rv = NS_OK;
return nullptr;
}
return GetSubjectPrincipal(cx, rv);
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetSystemPrincipal(nsIPrincipal **result)
{
NS_ADDREF(*result = mSystemPrincipal);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::SubjectPrincipalIsSystem(bool* aIsSystem)
{
NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aIsSystem);
*aIsSystem = false;
if (!mSystemPrincipal)
return NS_OK;
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> subject;
nsresult rv = GetSubjectPrincipal(getter_AddRefs(subject));
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return rv;
if(!subject)
{
// No subject principal means no JS is running;
// this is the equivalent of system principal code
*aIsSystem = true;
return NS_OK;
}
return mSystemPrincipal->Equals(subject, aIsSystem);
}
nsresult
nsScriptSecurityManager::CreateCodebasePrincipal(nsIURI* aURI, uint32_t aAppId,
bool aInMozBrowser,
nsIPrincipal **result)
{
// I _think_ it's safe to not create null principals here based on aURI.
// At least all the callers would do the right thing in those cases, as far
// as I can tell. --bz
nsCOMPtr<nsIURIWithPrincipal> uriPrinc = do_QueryInterface(aURI);
if (uriPrinc) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal;
uriPrinc->GetPrincipal(getter_AddRefs(principal));
if (!principal || principal == mSystemPrincipal) {
return CallCreateInstance(NS_NULLPRINCIPAL_CONTRACTID, result);
}
principal.forget(result);
return NS_OK;
}
nsRefPtr<nsPrincipal> codebase = new nsPrincipal();
if (!codebase)
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
nsresult rv = codebase->Init(aURI, aAppId, aInMozBrowser);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return rv;
NS_ADDREF(*result = codebase);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetSimpleCodebasePrincipal(nsIURI* aURI,
nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
{
return GetCodebasePrincipalInternal(aURI,
nsIScriptSecurityManager::UNKNOWN_APP_ID,
false, aPrincipal);
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetNoAppCodebasePrincipal(nsIURI* aURI,
nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
{
return GetCodebasePrincipalInternal(aURI, nsIScriptSecurityManager::NO_APP_ID,
false, aPrincipal);
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetCodebasePrincipal(nsIURI* aURI,
nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
{
return GetNoAppCodebasePrincipal(aURI, aPrincipal);
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetAppCodebasePrincipal(nsIURI* aURI,
uint32_t aAppId,
bool aInMozBrowser,
nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
{
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(aAppId != nsIScriptSecurityManager::UNKNOWN_APP_ID,
NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG);
return GetCodebasePrincipalInternal(aURI, aAppId, aInMozBrowser, aPrincipal);
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetDocShellCodebasePrincipal(nsIURI* aURI,
nsIDocShell* aDocShell,
nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
{
return GetCodebasePrincipalInternal(aURI,
aDocShell->GetAppId(),
aDocShell->GetIsInBrowserElement(),
aPrincipal);
}
nsresult
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetCodebasePrincipalInternal(nsIURI *aURI,
uint32_t aAppId,
bool aInMozBrowser,
nsIPrincipal **result)
{
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aURI);
bool inheritsPrincipal;
nsresult rv =
NS_URIChainHasFlags(aURI,
nsIProtocolHandler::URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT,
&inheritsPrincipal);
if (NS_FAILED(rv) || inheritsPrincipal) {
return CallCreateInstance(NS_NULLPRINCIPAL_CONTRACTID, result);
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal;
rv = CreateCodebasePrincipal(aURI, aAppId, aInMozBrowser,
getter_AddRefs(principal));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
NS_IF_ADDREF(*result = principal);
return NS_OK;
}
nsIPrincipal*
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetSubjectPrincipal(JSContext *cx,
nsresult* rv)
{
*rv = NS_OK;
JSCompartment *compartment = js::GetContextCompartment(cx);
// The context should always be in a compartment, either one it has entered
// or the one associated with its global.
MOZ_ASSERT(!!compartment);
JSPrincipals *principals = JS_GetCompartmentPrincipals(compartment);
return nsJSPrincipals::get(principals);
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetObjectPrincipal(JSContext *aCx, JSObject *aObj,
nsIPrincipal **result)
{
JS::Rooted<JSObject*> obj(aCx, aObj);
*result = doGetObjectPrincipal(obj);
if (!*result)
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
NS_ADDREF(*result);
return NS_OK;
}
// static
nsIPrincipal*
nsScriptSecurityManager::doGetObjectPrincipal(JS::Handle<JSObject*> aObj)
{
JSCompartment *compartment = js::GetObjectCompartment(aObj);
JSPrincipals *principals = JS_GetCompartmentPrincipals(compartment);
nsIPrincipal *principal = nsJSPrincipals::get(principals);
// We leave the old code in for a little while to make sure that pulling
// object principals directly off the compartment always gives an equivalent
// result (from a security perspective).
#ifdef DEBUG
nsIPrincipal *old = old_doGetObjectPrincipal(aObj);
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(CheckSameOriginPrincipal(principal, old)));
#endif
return principal;
}
#ifdef DEBUG
// static
nsIPrincipal*
nsScriptSecurityManager::old_doGetObjectPrincipal(JS::Handle<JSObject*> aObj,
bool aAllowShortCircuit)
{
2008-01-29 13:11:24 -08:00
NS_ASSERTION(aObj, "Bad call to doGetObjectPrincipal()!");
nsIPrincipal* result = nullptr;
JSContext* cx = nsXPConnect::XPConnect()->GetCurrentJSContext();
JS::RootedObject obj(cx, aObj);
JS::RootedObject origObj(cx, obj);
// A common case seen in this code is that we enter this function
// with obj being a Function object, whose parent is a Call
// object. Neither of those have object principals, so we can skip
// those objects here before we enter the below loop. That way we
// avoid wasting time checking properties of their classes etc in
// the loop.
if (js::IsFunctionObject(obj)) {
obj = js::GetObjectParent(obj);
if (!obj)
return nullptr;
if (js::IsCallObject(obj)) {
obj = js::GetObjectParentMaybeScope(obj);
if (!obj)
return nullptr;
}
}
const js::Class *jsClass = js::GetObjectClass(obj);
do {
// Note: jsClass is set before this loop, and also at the
// *end* of this loop.
if (IS_WN_CLASS(jsClass)) {
result = nsXPConnect::XPConnect()->GetPrincipal(obj,
aAllowShortCircuit);
if (result) {
break;
}
} else {
nsISupports *priv;
if (!(~jsClass->flags & (JSCLASS_HAS_PRIVATE |
JSCLASS_PRIVATE_IS_NSISUPPORTS))) {
priv = (nsISupports *) js::GetObjectPrivate(obj);
} else {
priv = UnwrapDOMObjectToISupports(obj);
}
if (aAllowShortCircuit) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIXPConnectWrappedNative> xpcWrapper =
do_QueryInterface(priv);
NS_ASSERTION(!xpcWrapper ||
!strcmp(jsClass->name, "XPCNativeWrapper"),
"Uh, an nsIXPConnectWrappedNative with the "
"wrong JSClass or getObjectOps hooks!");
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIScriptObjectPrincipal> objPrin =
do_QueryInterface(priv);
if (objPrin) {
result = objPrin->GetPrincipal();
if (result) {
break;
}
}
}
obj = js::GetObjectParentMaybeScope(obj);
if (!obj)
break;
jsClass = js::GetObjectClass(obj);
} while (1);
if (aAllowShortCircuit) {
nsIPrincipal *principal = old_doGetObjectPrincipal(origObj, false);
// Because of inner window reuse, we can have objects with one principal
// living in a scope with a different (but same-origin) principal. So
// just check same-origin here.
NS_ASSERTION(NS_SUCCEEDED(CheckSameOriginPrincipal(result, principal)),
"Principal mismatch. Not good");
}
return result;
}
#endif /* DEBUG */
////////////////////////////////////////////////
// Methods implementing nsIXPCSecurityManager //
////////////////////////////////////////////////
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::CanCreateWrapper(JSContext *cx,
const nsIID &aIID,
nsISupports *aObj,
nsIClassInfo *aClassInfo,
void **aPolicy)
{
// XXX Special case for nsIXPCException ?
ClassInfoData objClassInfo = ClassInfoData(aClassInfo, nullptr);
if (objClassInfo.IsDOMClass())
{
return NS_OK;
}
//--See if the object advertises a non-default level of access
// using nsISecurityCheckedComponent
nsCOMPtr<nsISecurityCheckedComponent> checkedComponent =
do_QueryInterface(aObj);
nsXPIDLCString objectSecurityLevel;
if (checkedComponent)
checkedComponent->CanCreateWrapper((nsIID *)&aIID, getter_Copies(objectSecurityLevel));
nsresult rv = CheckXPCPermissions(cx, aObj, nullptr, nullptr, objectSecurityLevel);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
{
//-- Access denied, report an error
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 strName("CreateWrapperDenied");
nsAutoCString origin;
nsresult rv2;
nsIPrincipal* subjectPrincipal = doGetSubjectPrincipal(&rv2);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv2) && subjectPrincipal) {
GetPrincipalDomainOrigin(subjectPrincipal, origin);
}
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 originUnicode(origin);
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 className(objClassInfo.GetName());
const PRUnichar* formatStrings[] = {
className.get(),
originUnicode.get()
};
uint32_t length = ArrayLength(formatStrings);
if (originUnicode.IsEmpty()) {
--length;
} else {
strName.AppendLiteral("ForOrigin");
}
nsXPIDLString errorMsg;
// We need to keep our existing failure rv and not override it
// with a likely success code from the following string bundle
// call in order to throw the correct security exception later.
rv2 = sStrBundle->FormatStringFromName(strName.get(),
formatStrings,
length,
getter_Copies(errorMsg));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv2, rv2);
SetPendingException(cx, errorMsg.get());
}
return rv;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::CanCreateInstance(JSContext *cx,
const nsCID &aCID)
{
nsresult rv = CheckXPCPermissions(cx, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
{
//-- Access denied, report an error
nsAutoCString errorMsg("Permission denied to create instance of class. CID=");
char cidStr[NSID_LENGTH];
aCID.ToProvidedString(cidStr);
errorMsg.Append(cidStr);
SetPendingException(cx, errorMsg.get());
}
return rv;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::CanGetService(JSContext *cx,
const nsCID &aCID)
{
nsresult rv = CheckXPCPermissions(cx, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
{
//-- Access denied, report an error
nsAutoCString errorMsg("Permission denied to get service. CID=");
char cidStr[NSID_LENGTH];
aCID.ToProvidedString(cidStr);
errorMsg.Append(cidStr);
SetPendingException(cx, errorMsg.get());
}
return rv;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::CanAccess(uint32_t aAction,
nsAXPCNativeCallContext* aCallContext,
JSContext* cx,
JSObject* aJSObject,
nsISupports* aObj,
nsIClassInfo* aClassInfo,
2010-07-14 23:19:36 -07:00
jsid aPropertyName,
void** aPolicy)
{
return CheckPropertyAccessImpl(aAction, aCallContext, cx,
aJSObject, aObj, aClassInfo,
nullptr, aPropertyName, aPolicy);
}
nsresult
nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckXPCPermissions(JSContext* cx,
nsISupports* aObj, JSObject* aJSObject,
nsIPrincipal* aSubjectPrincipal,
const char* aObjectSecurityLevel)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(cx);
JS::RootedObject jsObject(cx, aJSObject);
// Check if the subject is privileged.
if (SubjectIsPrivileged())
return NS_OK;
//-- If the object implements nsISecurityCheckedComponent, it has a non-default policy.
if (aObjectSecurityLevel)
{
if (PL_strcasecmp(aObjectSecurityLevel, "allAccess") == 0)
return NS_OK;
if (cx && PL_strcasecmp(aObjectSecurityLevel, "sameOrigin") == 0)
{
nsresult rv;
if (!jsObject)
{
nsCOMPtr<nsIXPConnectWrappedJS> xpcwrappedjs =
do_QueryInterface(aObj);
if (xpcwrappedjs)
{
jsObject = xpcwrappedjs->GetJSObject();
NS_ENSURE_STATE(jsObject);
}
}
if (!aSubjectPrincipal)
{
// No subject principal passed in. Compute it.
aSubjectPrincipal = GetSubjectPrincipal(cx, &rv);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
if (aSubjectPrincipal && jsObject)
{
nsIPrincipal* objectPrincipal = doGetObjectPrincipal(jsObject);
// Only do anything if we have both a subject and object
// principal.
if (objectPrincipal)
{
bool subsumes;
rv = aSubjectPrincipal->Subsumes(objectPrincipal, &subsumes);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (subsumes)
return NS_OK;
}
}
}
else if (PL_strcasecmp(aObjectSecurityLevel, "noAccess") != 0)
{
if (SubjectIsPrivileged())
return NS_OK;
}
}
//-- Access tests failed
return NS_ERROR_DOM_XPCONNECT_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
/////////////////////////////////////////////
// Method implementing nsIChannelEventSink //
/////////////////////////////////////////////
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::AsyncOnChannelRedirect(nsIChannel* oldChannel,
nsIChannel* newChannel,
uint32_t redirFlags,
nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback *cb)
{
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> oldPrincipal;
GetChannelPrincipal(oldChannel, getter_AddRefs(oldPrincipal));
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> newURI;
newChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(newURI));
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> newOriginalURI;
newChannel->GetOriginalURI(getter_AddRefs(newOriginalURI));
NS_ENSURE_STATE(oldPrincipal && newURI && newOriginalURI);
const uint32_t flags =
nsIScriptSecurityManager::LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT |
nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT;
nsresult rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(oldPrincipal, newURI, flags);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && newOriginalURI != newURI) {
rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(oldPrincipal, newOriginalURI, flags);
}
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return rv;
cb->OnRedirectVerifyCallback(NS_OK);
return NS_OK;
}
/////////////////////////////////////
// Method implementing nsIObserver //
/////////////////////////////////////
const char sJSEnabledPrefName[] = "javascript.enabled";
const char sFileOriginPolicyPrefName[] =
"security.fileuri.strict_origin_policy";
static const char sPolicyPrefix[] = "capability.policy.";
static const char* kObservedPrefs[] = {
sJSEnabledPrefName,
sFileOriginPolicyPrefName,
sPolicyPrefix,
nullptr
};
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::Observe(nsISupports* aObject, const char* aTopic,
const PRUnichar* aMessage)
{
nsresult rv = NS_OK;
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8 messageStr(aMessage);
const char *message = messageStr.get();
static const char jsPrefix[] = "javascript.";
static const char securityPrefix[] = "security.";
if ((PL_strncmp(message, jsPrefix, sizeof(jsPrefix)-1) == 0) ||
(PL_strncmp(message, securityPrefix, sizeof(securityPrefix)-1) == 0) )
{
ScriptSecurityPrefChanged();
}
else if (PL_strncmp(message, sPolicyPrefix, sizeof(sPolicyPrefix)-1) == 0)
{
// This will force re-initialization of the pref table
mPolicyPrefsChanged = true;
}
return rv;
}
/////////////////////////////////////////////
// Constructor, Destructor, Initialization //
/////////////////////////////////////////////
nsScriptSecurityManager::nsScriptSecurityManager(void)
: mOriginToPolicyMap(nullptr),
mDefaultPolicy(nullptr),
mCapabilities(nullptr),
mPrefInitialized(false),
mIsJavaScriptEnabled(false),
mPolicyPrefsChanged(true)
{
Bug 895322 - Part 1: Replace the usages of MOZ_STATIC_ASSERT with C++11 static_assert; r=Waldo This patch was mostly generated by running the following scripts on the codebase, with some manual changes made afterwards: # static_assert.sh #!/bin/bash # Command to convert an NSPR integer type to the equivalent standard integer type function convert() { echo "Converting $1 to $2..." find . ! -wholename "*nsprpub*" \ ! -wholename "*security/nss*" \ ! -wholename "*/.hg*" \ ! -wholename "obj-ff-dbg*" \ ! -name nsXPCOMCID.h \ ! -name prtypes.h \ -type f \ \( -iname "*.cpp" \ -o -iname "*.h" \ -o -iname "*.cc" \ -o -iname "*.mm" \) | \ xargs -n 1 `dirname $0`/assert_replacer.py #sed -i -e "s/\b$1\b/$2/g" } convert MOZ_STATIC_ASSERT static_assert hg rev --no-backup mfbt/Assertions.h \ media/webrtc/signaling/src/sipcc/core/includes/ccapi.h \ modules/libmar/src/mar_private.h \ modules/libmar/src/mar.h # assert_replacer.py #!/usr/bin/python import sys import re pattern = re.compile(r"\bMOZ_STATIC_ASSERT\b") def replaceInPlace(fname): print fname f = open(fname, "rw+") lines = f.readlines() for i in range(0, len(lines)): while True: index = re.search(pattern, lines[i]) if index != None: index = index.start() lines[i] = lines[i][0:index] + "static_assert" + lines[i][index+len("MOZ_STATIC_ASSERT"):] for j in range(i + 1, len(lines)): if lines[j].find(" ", index) == index: lines[j] = lines[j][0:index] + lines[j][index+4:] else: break else: break f.seek(0, 0) f.truncate() f.write("".join(lines)) f.close() argc = len(sys.argv) for i in range(1, argc): replaceInPlace(sys.argv[i]) --HG-- extra : rebase_source : 4b4a4047d82f2c205b9fad8d56dfc3f1afc0b045
2013-07-18 10:59:53 -07:00
static_assert(sizeof(intptr_t) == sizeof(void*),
"intptr_t and void* have different lengths on this platform. "
"This may cause a security failure with the SecurityLevel union.");
}
nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::Init()
{
InitPrefs();
nsresult rv = CallGetService(NS_IOSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &sIOService);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundleService> bundleService =
mozilla::services::GetStringBundleService();
if (!bundleService)
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
rv = bundleService->CreateBundle("chrome://global/locale/security/caps.properties", &sStrBundle);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// Create our system principal singleton
nsRefPtr<nsSystemPrincipal> system = new nsSystemPrincipal();
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(system, NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
mSystemPrincipal = system;
//-- Register security check callback in the JS engine
// Currently this is used to control access to function.caller
rv = nsXPConnect::XPConnect()->GetRuntime(&sRuntime);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
static const JSSecurityCallbacks securityCallbacks = {
CheckObjectAccess,
ContentSecurityPolicyPermitsJSAction
};
MOZ_ASSERT(!JS_GetSecurityCallbacks(sRuntime));
JS_SetSecurityCallbacks(sRuntime, &securityCallbacks);
JS_InitDestroyPrincipalsCallback(sRuntime, nsJSPrincipals::Destroy);
JS_SetTrustedPrincipals(sRuntime, system);
return NS_OK;
}
static StaticRefPtr<nsScriptSecurityManager> gScriptSecMan;
nsScriptSecurityManager::~nsScriptSecurityManager(void)
{
Preferences::RemoveObservers(this, kObservedPrefs);
delete mOriginToPolicyMap;
if(mDefaultPolicy)
mDefaultPolicy->Drop();
delete mCapabilities;
}
void
nsScriptSecurityManager::Shutdown()
{
if (sRuntime) {
JS_SetSecurityCallbacks(sRuntime, nullptr);
JS_SetTrustedPrincipals(sRuntime, nullptr);
sRuntime = nullptr;
}
2010-07-14 23:19:36 -07:00
sEnabledID = JSID_VOID;
NS_IF_RELEASE(sIOService);
NS_IF_RELEASE(sStrBundle);
}
nsScriptSecurityManager *
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetScriptSecurityManager()
{
if (!gScriptSecMan && nsXPConnect::XPConnect())
{
nsRefPtr<nsScriptSecurityManager> ssManager = new nsScriptSecurityManager();
nsresult rv;
rv = ssManager->Init();
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return nullptr;
}
rv = nsXPConnect::XPConnect()->
SetDefaultSecurityManager(ssManager);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
NS_WARNING("Failed to install xpconnect security manager!");
return nullptr;
}
ClearOnShutdown(&gScriptSecMan);
gScriptSecMan = ssManager;
}
return gScriptSecMan;
}
// Currently this nsGenericFactory constructor is used only from FastLoad
// (XPCOM object deserialization) code, when "creating" the system principal
// singleton.
nsSystemPrincipal *
nsScriptSecurityManager::SystemPrincipalSingletonConstructor()
{
nsIPrincipal *sysprin = nullptr;
if (gScriptSecMan)
NS_ADDREF(sysprin = gScriptSecMan->mSystemPrincipal);
return static_cast<nsSystemPrincipal*>(sysprin);
}
nsresult
nsScriptSecurityManager::InitPolicies()
{
// Clear any policies cached on XPConnect wrappers
nsresult rv =
nsXPConnect::XPConnect()->ClearAllWrappedNativeSecurityPolicies();
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
//-- Clear mOriginToPolicyMap: delete mapped DomainEntry items,
//-- whose dtor decrements refcount of stored DomainPolicy object
delete mOriginToPolicyMap;
//-- Marks all the survivor DomainPolicy objects (those cached
//-- by nsPrincipal objects) as invalid: they will be released
//-- on first nsPrincipal::GetSecurityPolicy() attempt.
DomainPolicy::InvalidateAll();
//-- Release old default policy
if(mDefaultPolicy) {
mDefaultPolicy->Drop();
mDefaultPolicy = nullptr;
}
//-- Initialize a new mOriginToPolicyMap
mOriginToPolicyMap =
new nsObjectHashtable(nullptr, nullptr, DeleteDomainEntry, nullptr);
if (!mOriginToPolicyMap)
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
//-- Create, refcount and initialize a new default policy
mDefaultPolicy = new DomainPolicy();
if (!mDefaultPolicy)
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
mDefaultPolicy->Hold();
if (!mDefaultPolicy->Init())
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
//-- Initialize the table of security levels
if (!mCapabilities)
{
mCapabilities =
new nsObjectHashtable(nullptr, nullptr, DeleteCapability, nullptr);
if (!mCapabilities)
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
// Get a JS context - we need it to create internalized strings later.
AutoSafeJSContext cx;
rv = InitDomainPolicy(cx, "default", mDefaultPolicy);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
nsAdoptingCString policyNames =
Preferences::GetCString("capability.policy.policynames");
nsAdoptingCString defaultPolicyNames =
Preferences::GetCString("capability.policy.default_policynames");
policyNames += NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(" ") + defaultPolicyNames;
//-- Initialize domain policies
char* policyCurrent = policyNames.BeginWriting();
bool morePolicies = true;
while (morePolicies)
{
while(*policyCurrent == ' ' || *policyCurrent == ',')
policyCurrent++;
if (*policyCurrent == '\0')
break;
char* nameBegin = policyCurrent;
while(*policyCurrent != '\0' && *policyCurrent != ' ' && *policyCurrent != ',')
policyCurrent++;
morePolicies = (*policyCurrent != '\0');
*policyCurrent = '\0';
policyCurrent++;
nsAutoCString sitesPrefName(
NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(sPolicyPrefix) +
nsDependentCString(nameBegin) +
NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(".sites"));
nsAdoptingCString domainList =
Preferences::GetCString(sitesPrefName.get());
if (!domainList) {
continue;
}
DomainPolicy* domainPolicy = new DomainPolicy();
if (!domainPolicy)
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
if (!domainPolicy->Init())
{
delete domainPolicy;
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
domainPolicy->Hold();
//-- Parse list of sites and create an entry in mOriginToPolicyMap for each
char* domainStart = domainList.BeginWriting();
char* domainCurrent = domainStart;
char* lastDot = nullptr;
char* nextToLastDot = nullptr;
bool moreDomains = true;
while (moreDomains)
{
if (*domainCurrent == ' ' || *domainCurrent == '\0')
{
moreDomains = (*domainCurrent != '\0');
*domainCurrent = '\0';
nsCStringKey key(nextToLastDot ? nextToLastDot+1 : domainStart);
DomainEntry *newEntry = new DomainEntry(domainStart, domainPolicy);
if (!newEntry)
{
domainPolicy->Drop();
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
DomainEntry *existingEntry = (DomainEntry *)
mOriginToPolicyMap->Get(&key);
if (!existingEntry)
mOriginToPolicyMap->Put(&key, newEntry);
else
{
if (existingEntry->Matches(domainStart))
{
newEntry->mNext = existingEntry;
mOriginToPolicyMap->Put(&key, newEntry);
}
else
{
while (existingEntry->mNext)
{
if (existingEntry->mNext->Matches(domainStart))
{
newEntry->mNext = existingEntry->mNext;
existingEntry->mNext = newEntry;
break;
}
existingEntry = existingEntry->mNext;
}
if (!existingEntry->mNext)
existingEntry->mNext = newEntry;
}
}
domainStart = domainCurrent + 1;
lastDot = nextToLastDot = nullptr;
}
else if (*domainCurrent == '.')
{
nextToLastDot = lastDot;
lastDot = domainCurrent;
}
domainCurrent++;
}
rv = InitDomainPolicy(cx, nameBegin, domainPolicy);
domainPolicy->Drop();
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return rv;
}
// Reset the "dirty" flag
mPolicyPrefsChanged = false;
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult
nsScriptSecurityManager::InitDomainPolicy(JSContext* cx,
const char* aPolicyName,
DomainPolicy* aDomainPolicy)
{
nsresult rv;
nsAutoCString policyPrefix(NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(sPolicyPrefix) +
nsDependentCString(aPolicyName) +
NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("."));
uint32_t prefixLength = policyPrefix.Length() - 1; // subtract the '.'
uint32_t prefCount;
char** prefNames;
nsIPrefBranch* branch = Preferences::GetRootBranch();
NS_ASSERTION(branch, "failed to get the root pref branch");
rv = branch->GetChildList(policyPrefix.get(), &prefCount, &prefNames);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
if (prefCount == 0)
return NS_OK;
//-- Populate the policy
uint32_t currentPref = 0;
for (; currentPref < prefCount; currentPref++)
{
// Get the class name
const char* start = prefNames[currentPref] + prefixLength + 1;
char* end = PL_strchr(start, '.');
if (!end) // malformed pref, bail on this one
continue;
static const char sitesStr[] = "sites";
// We dealt with "sites" in InitPolicies(), so no need to do
// that again...
if (PL_strncmp(start, sitesStr, sizeof(sitesStr)-1) == 0)
continue;
// Get the pref value
nsAdoptingCString prefValue =
Preferences::GetCString(prefNames[currentPref]);
if (!prefValue) {
continue;
}
SecurityLevel secLevel;
if (PL_strcasecmp(prefValue, "noAccess") == 0)
secLevel.level = SCRIPT_SECURITY_NO_ACCESS;
else if (PL_strcasecmp(prefValue, "allAccess") == 0)
secLevel.level = SCRIPT_SECURITY_ALL_ACCESS;
else if (PL_strcasecmp(prefValue, "sameOrigin") == 0)
secLevel.level = SCRIPT_SECURITY_SAME_ORIGIN_ACCESS;
else
{ //-- pref value is the name of a capability
nsCStringKey secLevelKey(prefValue);
secLevel.capability =
reinterpret_cast<char*>(mCapabilities->Get(&secLevelKey));
if (!secLevel.capability)
{
secLevel.capability = NS_strdup(prefValue);
if (!secLevel.capability)
break;
mCapabilities->Put(&secLevelKey,
secLevel.capability);
}
}
*end = '\0';
// Find or store this class in the classes table
ClassPolicy* cpolicy =
static_cast<ClassPolicy*>
(PL_DHashTableOperate(aDomainPolicy, start,
PL_DHASH_ADD));
if (!cpolicy)
break;
// If this is the wildcard class (class '*'), save it in mWildcardPolicy
// (we leave it stored in the hashtable too to take care of the cleanup)
if ((*start == '*') && (end == start + 1)) {
aDomainPolicy->mWildcardPolicy = cpolicy;
// Make sure that cpolicy knows about aDomainPolicy so it can reset
// the mWildcardPolicy pointer as needed if it gets moved in the
// hashtable.
cpolicy->mDomainWeAreWildcardFor = aDomainPolicy;
}
// Get the property name
start = end + 1;
end = PL_strchr(start, '.');
if (end)
*end = '\0';
JSString* propertyKey = ::JS_InternString(cx, start);
if (!propertyKey)
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
// Store this property in the class policy
PropertyPolicy* ppolicy =
static_cast<PropertyPolicy*>
2010-07-14 23:19:36 -07:00
(PL_DHashTableOperate(cpolicy->mPolicy, propertyKey,
PL_DHASH_ADD));
if (!ppolicy)
break;
if (end) // The pref specifies an access mode
{
start = end + 1;
if (PL_strcasecmp(start, "set") == 0)
ppolicy->mSet = secLevel;
else
ppolicy->mGet = secLevel;
}
else
{
if (ppolicy->mGet.level == SCRIPT_SECURITY_UNDEFINED_ACCESS)
ppolicy->mGet = secLevel;
if (ppolicy->mSet.level == SCRIPT_SECURITY_UNDEFINED_ACCESS)
ppolicy->mSet = secLevel;
}
}
NS_FREE_XPCOM_ALLOCATED_POINTER_ARRAY(prefCount, prefNames);
if (currentPref < prefCount) // Loop exited early because of out-of-memory error
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
return NS_OK;
}
inline void
nsScriptSecurityManager::ScriptSecurityPrefChanged()
{
// JavaScript defaults to enabled in failure cases.
mIsJavaScriptEnabled = true;
sStrictFileOriginPolicy = true;
nsresult rv;
if (!mPrefInitialized) {
rv = InitPrefs();
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return;
}
mIsJavaScriptEnabled =
Preferences::GetBool(sJSEnabledPrefName, mIsJavaScriptEnabled);
sStrictFileOriginPolicy =
Preferences::GetBool(sFileOriginPolicyPrefName, false);
}
nsresult
nsScriptSecurityManager::InitPrefs()
{
nsIPrefBranch* branch = Preferences::GetRootBranch();
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(branch, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
mPrefInitialized = true;
// Set the initial value of the "javascript.enabled" prefs
ScriptSecurityPrefChanged();
// set observer callbacks in case the value of the prefs change
Preferences::AddStrongObservers(this, kObservedPrefs);
return NS_OK;
}
namespace mozilla {
void
GetJarPrefix(uint32_t aAppId, bool aInMozBrowser, nsACString& aJarPrefix)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(aAppId != nsIScriptSecurityManager::UNKNOWN_APP_ID);
if (aAppId == nsIScriptSecurityManager::UNKNOWN_APP_ID) {
aAppId = nsIScriptSecurityManager::NO_APP_ID;
}
aJarPrefix.Truncate();
// Fallback.
if (aAppId == nsIScriptSecurityManager::NO_APP_ID && !aInMozBrowser) {
return;
}
// aJarPrefix = appId + "+" + { 't', 'f' } + "+";
aJarPrefix.AppendInt(aAppId);
aJarPrefix.Append('+');
aJarPrefix.Append(aInMozBrowser ? 't' : 'f');
aJarPrefix.Append('+');
return;
}
} // namespace mozilla
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsScriptSecurityManager::GetJarPrefix(uint32_t aAppId,
bool aInMozBrowser,
nsACString& aJarPrefix)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(aAppId != nsIScriptSecurityManager::UNKNOWN_APP_ID);
mozilla::GetJarPrefix(aAppId, aInMozBrowser, aJarPrefix);
return NS_OK;
}