gecko/js/src/jswrapper.h

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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*-
* vim: set ts=4 sw=4 et tw=99:
*
* ***** BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK *****
* Version: MPL 1.1/GPL 2.0/LGPL 2.1
*
* The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version
* 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
* the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
* http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
*
* Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis,
* WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License
* for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the
* License.
*
* The Original Code is Mozilla SpiderMonkey JavaScript 1.9 code, released
* May 28, 2008.
*
* The Initial Developer of the Original Code is
* Mozilla Foundation
* Portions created by the Initial Developer are Copyright (C) 2010
* the Initial Developer. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Contributor(s):
* Andreas Gal <gal@mozilla.com>
*
* Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the terms of
* either of the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the "GPL"),
* or the GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1 or later (the "LGPL"),
* in which case the provisions of the GPL or the LGPL are applicable instead
* of those above. If you wish to allow use of your version of this file only
* under the terms of either the GPL or the LGPL, and not to allow others to
* use your version of this file under the terms of the MPL, indicate your
* decision by deleting the provisions above and replace them with the notice
* and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete
* the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under
* the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL.
*
* ***** END LICENSE BLOCK ***** */
#ifndef jswrapper_h___
#define jswrapper_h___
#include "mozilla/Attributes.h"
#include "jsapi.h"
#include "jsproxy.h"
namespace js {
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class DummyFrameGuard;
/* No-op wrapper handler base class. */
class JS_FRIEND_API(Wrapper) : public ProxyHandler
{
unsigned mFlags;
public:
unsigned flags() const { return mFlags; }
explicit Wrapper(unsigned flags);
typedef enum { PermitObjectAccess, PermitPropertyAccess, DenyAccess } Permission;
virtual ~Wrapper();
/* ES5 Harmony fundamental wrapper traps. */
virtual bool getPropertyDescriptor(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, jsid id, bool set,
PropertyDescriptor *desc) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool getOwnPropertyDescriptor(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, jsid id, bool set,
PropertyDescriptor *desc) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool defineProperty(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, jsid id,
PropertyDescriptor *desc) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool getOwnPropertyNames(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, AutoIdVector &props) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool delete_(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, jsid id, bool *bp) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool enumerate(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, AutoIdVector &props) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool fix(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, Value *vp) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
/* ES5 Harmony derived wrapper traps. */
virtual bool has(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, jsid id, bool *bp) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool hasOwn(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, jsid id, bool *bp) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool get(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, JSObject *receiver, jsid id, Value *vp) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool set(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, JSObject *receiver, jsid id, bool strict,
Value *vp) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool keys(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, AutoIdVector &props) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool iterate(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, unsigned flags, Value *vp) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
/* Spidermonkey extensions. */
virtual bool call(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, unsigned argc, Value *vp) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool construct(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, unsigned argc, Value *argv, Value *rval) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool nativeCall(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, Class *clasp, Native native, CallArgs args) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool hasInstance(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, const Value *vp, bool *bp) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual JSType typeOf(JSContext *cx, JSObject *proxy) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool objectClassIs(JSObject *obj, ESClassValue classValue, JSContext *cx) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual JSString *obj_toString(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual JSString *fun_toString(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, unsigned indent) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool regexp_toShared(JSContext *cx, JSObject *proxy, RegExpGuard *g) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool defaultValue(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, JSType hint, Value *vp) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool iteratorNext(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, Value *vp) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual void trace(JSTracer *trc, JSObject *wrapper) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
/* Policy enforcement traps.
*
* enter() allows the policy to specify whether the caller may perform |act|
* on the underlying object's |id| property. In the case when |act| is CALL,
* |id| is generally JSID_VOID.
*
* leave() allows the policy to undo various scoped state changes taken in
* enter(). If enter() succeeds, leave() must be called upon completion of
* the approved action.
*
* The |act| parameter to enter() specifies the action being performed. GET,
* SET, and CALL are self-explanatory, but PUNCTURE requires more explanation:
*
* GET and SET allow for a very fine-grained security membrane, through
* which access can be granted or denied on a per-property, per-object, and
* per-action basis. Sometimes though, we just want to asks if we can access
* _everything_ behind the wrapper barrier. For example, when the structured
* clone algorithm runs up against a cross-compartment wrapper, it needs to
* know whether it can enter the compartment and keep cloning, or whether it
* should throw. This is the role of PUNCTURE.
*
* PUNCTURE allows the policy to specify whether the wrapper barrier may
* be lifted - that is to say, whether the caller is allowed to access
* anything that the wrapped object could access. This is a very powerful
* permission, and thus should generally be denied for security wrappers
* except under very special circumstances. When |act| is PUNCTURE, |id|
* should be JSID_VOID.
* */
enum Action { GET, SET, CALL, PUNCTURE };
virtual bool enter(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, jsid id, Action act, bool *bp);
virtual void leave(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper);
static Wrapper singleton;
static JSObject *New(JSContext *cx, JSObject *obj, JSObject *proto, JSObject *parent,
Wrapper *handler);
static JSObject *wrappedObject(const JSObject *wrapper);
static Wrapper *wrapperHandler(const JSObject *wrapper);
enum {
CROSS_COMPARTMENT = 1 << 0,
LAST_USED_FLAG = CROSS_COMPARTMENT
};
static void *getWrapperFamily();
};
/* Base class for all cross compartment wrapper handlers. */
class JS_FRIEND_API(CrossCompartmentWrapper) : public Wrapper
{
public:
CrossCompartmentWrapper(unsigned flags);
virtual ~CrossCompartmentWrapper();
/* ES5 Harmony fundamental wrapper traps. */
virtual bool getPropertyDescriptor(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, jsid id, bool set,
PropertyDescriptor *desc) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool getOwnPropertyDescriptor(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, jsid id, bool set,
PropertyDescriptor *desc) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool defineProperty(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, jsid id,
PropertyDescriptor *desc) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool getOwnPropertyNames(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, AutoIdVector &props) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool delete_(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, jsid id, bool *bp) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool enumerate(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, AutoIdVector &props) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
/* ES5 Harmony derived wrapper traps. */
virtual bool has(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, jsid id, bool *bp) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool hasOwn(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, jsid id, bool *bp) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool get(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, JSObject *receiver, jsid id, Value *vp) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool set(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, JSObject *receiver, jsid id, bool strict,
Value *vp) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool keys(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, AutoIdVector &props) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool iterate(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, unsigned flags, Value *vp) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
/* Spidermonkey extensions. */
virtual bool call(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, unsigned argc, Value *vp) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool construct(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, unsigned argc, Value *argv, Value *rval) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool nativeCall(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, Class *clasp, Native native, CallArgs args) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool hasInstance(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, const Value *vp, bool *bp) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual JSString *obj_toString(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual JSString *fun_toString(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, unsigned indent) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool defaultValue(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, JSType hint, Value *vp) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool iteratorNext(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, Value *vp);
virtual void trace(JSTracer *trc, JSObject *wrapper) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
static CrossCompartmentWrapper singleton;
};
/*
* Base class for security wrappers. A security wrapper is potentially hiding
* all or part of some wrapped object thus SecurityWrapper defaults to denying
* access to the wrappee. This is the opposite of Wrapper which tries to be
* completely transparent.
*
* NB: Currently, only a few ProxyHandler operations are overridden to deny
* access, relying on derived SecurityWrapper to block access when necessary.
*/
template <class Base>
class JS_FRIEND_API(SecurityWrapper) : public Base
{
public:
SecurityWrapper(unsigned flags);
virtual bool nativeCall(JSContext *cx, JSObject *wrapper, Class *clasp, Native native, CallArgs args) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool objectClassIs(JSObject *obj, ESClassValue classValue, JSContext *cx) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
virtual bool regexp_toShared(JSContext *cx, JSObject *proxy, RegExpGuard *g) MOZ_OVERRIDE;
};
typedef SecurityWrapper<Wrapper> SameCompartmentSecurityWrapper;
typedef SecurityWrapper<CrossCompartmentWrapper> CrossCompartmentSecurityWrapper;
/*
* A hacky class that lets a friend force a fake frame. We must already be
* in the compartment of |target| when we enter the forced frame.
*/
class JS_FRIEND_API(ForceFrame)
{
public:
JSContext * const context;
JSObject * const target;
private:
DummyFrameGuard *frame;
public:
ForceFrame(JSContext *cx, JSObject *target);
~ForceFrame();
bool enter();
};
extern JSObject *
TransparentObjectWrapper(JSContext *cx, JSObject *obj, JSObject *wrappedProto, JSObject *parent,
unsigned flags);
// Proxy family for wrappers. Public so that IsWrapper() can be fully inlined by
// jsfriendapi users.
extern JS_FRIEND_DATA(int) sWrapperFamily;
inline bool
IsWrapper(const JSObject *obj)
{
return IsProxy(obj) && GetProxyHandler(obj)->family() == &sWrapperFamily;
}
// Given a JSObject, returns that object stripped of wrappers. If
// stopAtOuter is true, then this returns the outer window if it was
// previously wrapped. Otherwise, this returns the first object for
// which JSObject::isWrapper returns false.
JS_FRIEND_API(JSObject *) UnwrapObject(JSObject *obj, bool stopAtOuter = true,
unsigned *flagsp = NULL);
// Given a JSObject, returns that object stripped of wrappers. At each stage,
// the security wrapper has the opportunity to veto the unwrap. Since checked
// code should never be unwrapping outer window wrappers, we always stop at
// outer windows.
JS_FRIEND_API(JSObject *) UnwrapObjectChecked(JSContext *cx, JSObject *obj);
bool IsCrossCompartmentWrapper(const JSObject *obj);
} /* namespace js */
#endif