Files
shadow/docker/Dockerfile.debian
T
Pierre Warnier acc1771bc2 tests: exercise the PAM stack against known permit and deny services (#281)
The only PAM coverage was the deployment image authenticating a real
account. That cannot exercise a *refusal* without relying on a wrong
password being wrong, and it cannot tell a refusal apart from a
conversation that never reached the stack -- which is exactly the failure
that broke password changes earlier this week and took three rounds to
find.

The glibc images now define two throwaway services, one backed by
pam_permit and one by pam_deny, and shadow-core tests the wrapper against
both: the permit stack authenticates and passes account management, the
deny stack refuses with the stack's own answer rather than a conversation
error, and a service with no configuration at all does not authenticate.
The tests skip where the services are absent, which is any machine but
the containers.

CI also gains an all-features clippy pass. The completions feature and
the shadow-core feature gates were compiled by no job, so a lint or a
compile error in them could reach main unnoticed. make check runs it too.
2026-09-04 18:25:33 +02:00

48 lines
2.3 KiB
Docker

# shadow-rs development image — Debian Trixie (13)
#
# PAM: libpam0g-dev (Linux-PAM)
# SELinux: libselinux1-dev
# Default shell: /bin/bash
# Shadow-utils package: login + passwd
# Note: Trixie is now the default Debian for the Rust Docker image.
# Pinned: an unpinned tag lands a new toolchain on main with no PR signal,
# and clippy gains lints between releases. Renovate proposes the bump.
FROM rust:1.98-trixie
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
libpam0g-dev \
libselinux1-dev \
libaudit-dev \
pkg-config \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
RUN rustup component add clippy rustfmt
# Two throwaway PAM services so the PAM wrapper can be tested against a stack
# whose answer is known. Without them the only coverage is the end-to-end image
# authenticating a real account, which cannot exercise a *refusal* without
# depending on a wrong password being wrong.
RUN printf 'auth required pam_permit.so\naccount required pam_permit.so\npassword required pam_permit.so\nsession required pam_permit.so\n' > /etc/pam.d/shadow-rs-test-permit \
&& printf 'auth required pam_deny.so\naccount required pam_deny.so\npassword required pam_deny.so\nsession required pam_deny.so\n' > /etc/pam.d/shadow-rs-test-deny
# cargo-deny: pinned, checksum-verified prebuilt binary. The static musl build
# runs on glibc too, so every image shares one asset. Installing the binary
# (instead of `cargo install cargo-deny`) skips a multi-minute source compile.
ARG CARGO_DENY_VERSION=0.19.8
ARG CARGO_DENY_SHA256=70e769ae3872e34d45132b17040859175e11401dc12dddb0303e0b8c7d088f3f
RUN curl -LsSf "https://github.com/EmbarkStudios/cargo-deny/releases/download/${CARGO_DENY_VERSION}/cargo-deny-${CARGO_DENY_VERSION}-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl.tar.gz" -o /tmp/cargo-deny.tar.gz \
&& echo "${CARGO_DENY_SHA256} /tmp/cargo-deny.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c - \
&& tar zxf /tmp/cargo-deny.tar.gz -C /tmp \
&& install -m 0755 "/tmp/cargo-deny-${CARGO_DENY_VERSION}-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/cargo-deny" /usr/local/cargo/bin/cargo-deny \
&& rm -rf /tmp/cargo-deny.tar.gz "/tmp/cargo-deny-${CARGO_DENY_VERSION}-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl" \
&& cargo-deny --version
RUN useradd -m -s /bin/bash testuser \
&& useradd -m -s /bin/sh testuser2 \
&& groupadd testgroup \
&& usermod -aG testgroup testuser
WORKDIR /workspace
CMD ["/bin/bash"]