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shadow/README.md
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Pierre Warnier 881aad13c7 shadow-rs: drop the setuid privilege for applets that are not meant to have it (#239)
* shadow-rs: drop the setuid privilege for applets that are not meant to have it

The per-tool install marks only passwd, chfn, chsh and newgrp setuid; a
multicall install has to make the one binary setuid, which gave every
applet euid 0. Any local user could run 'shadow-rs pwck -s' or
'grpck -s' and have /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/group and /etc/gshadow
rewritten as root. Before an applet outside that set runs, the binary now
calls setuid(getuid()), so the real, effective and saved uid are all the
caller's and the two layouts share one privilege model. It fails closed if
the kernel does not take the privilege away.

Dispatch and --list are driven by one table instead of two hand-kept
lists, and an exit code outside 0..=255 no longer clamps to success.

The deployment test checks that testrunner's pwck -s and grpck -s leave
the files' inode and ownership untouched.

* docs: the multicall binary keeps euid 0 for the four self-service tools only
2026-09-04 10:24:35 +02:00

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shadow

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A memory-safe reimplementation of the Linux shadow-utils in Rust. shadow-utils (useradd, passwd, groupadd, etc.) is the suite of setuid-root tools that manages user accounts, passwords, and groups on every Linux system.

Why

shadow-utils runs as root or setuid-root on every Linux system. It parses user-supplied input, writes to /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/group, and has had recent CVEs (CVE-2023-4641: password leak in memory, CVE-2024-56433: subuid collision enabling account takeover). Before this project there was no Rust reimplementation — not in uutils, not in Prossimo/Trifecta, not on crates.io.

sudo-rs proved the model: an independent Rust rewrite of a privilege-boundary tool can go from zero to default-in-Ubuntu in under 3 years. This project follows that playbook.

Goals

  • Drop-in replacement: same flags, same exit codes, same output format as GNU shadow-utils. Differences are treated as bugs.
  • uutils compatible: built on uucore with the standard uumain() / uu_app() API contract. Designed to merge into the uutils ecosystem.
  • Memory safe: eliminate entire classes of vulnerabilities (buffer overflows, use-after-free, uninitialized memory) that affect the C original. Passwords zeroed in memory via zeroize.
  • Well-tested: unit tests, property-based tests (proptest), integration tests, fuzz targets for all parsers. Tested on Debian, Alpine (musl), and Fedora (SELinux).
  • Hardened: Landlock filesystem sandboxing, signal blocking during critical sections, core dump suppression, environment sanitization, privilege drop during PAM.
  • Auditable: small dependency tree, cargo-deny license and advisory checks, no GPL dependencies.

Status

Tool Status
passwd All 16 flags implemented. Drop-in for GNU passwd. PAM password change, Landlock sandboxing, --root, --quiet, --stdin. Output bit-for-bit identical with GNU.
pwck All checks implemented. Drop-in for GNU pwck. Bit-for-bit identical output.
useradd Implemented. UID/GID allocation, home dir + skel, shadow entry, group creation.
userdel Implemented. Remove from all system files, optional home/mail cleanup.
usermod Implemented. Modify all properties, group membership, lock/unlock, set pre-hashed password.
chpasswd Implemented. Batch password change from stdin.
chage Implemented. Password aging management, -l list mode.
groupadd Implemented. Auto GID allocation, system groups, force mode.
groupdel Implemented. Primary group usage check.
groupmod Implemented. GID change, rename, password.
grpck Implemented. Group/gshadow integrity verification.
chfn Implemented. GECOS sub-field modification.
chsh Implemented. Shell change with /etc/shells validation.
newgrp Implemented. Effective group change with crypt verification.

Building

Requirements

  • Rust (stable toolchain)
  • Linux (PAM headers, SELinux headers optional)
  • Docker + Docker Compose (for testing)

Build

git clone https://github.com/uutils/shadow
cd shadow
docker compose build debian
docker compose run --rm debian cargo build --release

Install

Default install: 14 standalone per-tool binaries with least-privilege setuid layout matching GNU shadow-utils. Only passwd, chfn, chsh, newgrp are installed setuid-root; the other 10 are plain 0755.

sudo make install PREFIX=/usr/local

Alternative: single multicall binary with symlinks. Smaller footprint (~14× disk savings). The binary is installed setuid-root so that passwd, chfn, chsh and newgrp can serve unprivileged callers; every other applet drops back to the caller's uid before it runs, so the privilege model is the same as the per-tool layout. Intended for container/embedded use cases.

sudo make install-multicall PREFIX=/usr/local

From a release archive

Each release publishes two archives, each with a .sha256 alongside. They contain the same shadow-rs multicall binary but are not interchangeable:

Archive libc Linking Use it for
uu_shadow-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz glibc dynamic Any regular distribution. This is the full build.
uu_shadow-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl-static.tar.gz musl static Minimal containers and embedded images: local /etc/passwd, no directory service, no PAM stack.

The static archive has no runtime dependencies, and pays for that with three capabilities a static binary cannot have — none of them cosmetic for account tools:

  • No PAM. passwd cannot change a password interactively, and chfn / chsh are root-only (they authenticate the caller through PAM and fail closed without it).
  • No NSS. Users from LDAP, SSSD, Active Directory or systemd-userdb are invisible to the five tools that look up the calling user.
  • No yescrypt ($y$). The default password hash on Debian 12+ and Ubuntu 24.04 can be neither verified nor produced.

If any of those matter on the host, use the glibc archive. docs/PLATFORM-SUPPORT.md explains each gap, what still works, and how the archive is built.

Either archive ships a plain binary — nothing is installed, symlinked, or made setuid by extracting it. To deploy it the same way make install-multicall would:

tar xzf uu_shadow-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz   # or the -musl-static one
sudo install -o root -g root -m 4755 \
    uu_shadow-*/shadow-rs /usr/local/bin/shadow-rs
for tool in passwd chfn chsh newgrp chage chpasswd groupadd groupdel \
            groupmod grpck pwck useradd userdel usermod; do
    sudo ln -sf shadow-rs "/usr/local/bin/$tool"
done

Mode 4755 is what the four self-service applets need; the others give the privilege up before running. Run shadow-rs --list to see the applets a given build contains, and sha256sum -c uu_shadow-*.tar.gz.sha256 to verify a download.

Test

All builds and tests run inside Docker containers to isolate from the host system. Three distros are tested to catch libc and PAM differences:

docker compose run --rm debian cargo test --workspace    # Debian Trixie (glibc)
docker compose run --rm alpine cargo test --workspace    # Alpine (musl libc)
docker compose run --rm fedora cargo test --workspace    # Fedora (SELinux enforcing)

Lint

docker compose run --rm debian cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
docker compose run --rm debian cargo fmt --all --check

Architecture

Cargo workspace monorepo built on uucore:

src/bin/shadow-rs.rs     multicall binary (dispatches by argv[0])
        |
src/uu/{tool}/           individual tool crates (passwd, useradd, ...)
        |
   ┌────┴────┐
uucore    shadow-core    shared infrastructure + domain library

Tools use uucore for the standard uutils API (UResult, #[uucore::main], show_error!) and shadow-core for domain-specific functionality.

shadow-core provides:

  • File parsers for /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/group, /etc/gshadow, /etc/login.defs, /etc/subuid, /etc/subgid
  • Atomic file writes (lock, write tmp, fsync, rename, unlock, invalidate nscd) that keep the file's mode, owner, group and SELinux label
  • PAM integration (feature-gated)
  • Username/groupname and field validation (no : or control characters can reach a record)
  • UID/GID allocation

Each tool crate exports uumain() and uu_app(), following uutils conventions exactly so a future merge is frictionless.

Docker Test Matrix

Target Base libc PAM SELinux
debian rust:latest (Trixie) glibc Linux-PAM headers
alpine rust:alpine musl Linux-PAM none
fedora fedora:latest glibc Linux-PAM enforcing

The alpine image tests musl with dynamic linking, PAM included. The static musl release archive is a different build — no PAM, no NSS, no yescrypt — and has its own CI job that builds it and runs shadow-core's unit tests against static musl on every pull request. See docs/PLATFORM-SUPPORT.md.

Credits

Security patterns from OpenBSD (ISC license). PAM integration patterns from sudo-rs (Apache-2.0/MIT). uutils infrastructure via uucore (MIT).

Contributing

See CONTRIBUTING.md for guidelines.

Important: uutils/shadow is developed under a strict GPL clean-room policy. Do not read, reference, or feed into an LLM any code from shadow-maint/shadow (GPL-2.0+). Reference only: POSIX specs, man pages, BSD-licensed implementations (FreeBSD, OpenBSD, musl), and sudo-rs.

License

uutils/shadow is licensed under the MIT License.

GNU shadow-utils is licensed under the GPL 2.0 or later.