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The only PAM coverage was the deployment image authenticating a real account. That cannot exercise a *refusal* without relying on a wrong password being wrong, and it cannot tell a refusal apart from a conversation that never reached the stack -- which is exactly the failure that broke password changes earlier this week and took three rounds to find. The glibc images now define two throwaway services, one backed by pam_permit and one by pam_deny, and shadow-core tests the wrapper against both: the permit stack authenticates and passes account management, the deny stack refuses with the stack's own answer rather than a conversation error, and a service with no configuration at all does not authenticate. The tests skip where the services are absent, which is any machine but the containers. CI also gains an all-features clippy pass. The completions feature and the shadow-core feature gates were compiled by no job, so a lint or a compile error in them could reach main unnoticed. make check runs it too.