diff --git a/CONTRIBUTING.md b/CONTRIBUTING.md
index 6b0bb86..bb2367e 100644
--- a/CONTRIBUTING.md
+++ b/CONTRIBUTING.md
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ Utilities must be embeddable. Return `UResult<()>` from `uumain`. The
 ### `unsafe`
 
 Denied at the workspace level (`unsafe_code = "deny"`). Only two FFI boundary
-modules are exempted: `shadow-core::pam` (PAM C library) and `shadow-core::crypt`
+modules are exempted: `shadow_core::pam` (PAM C library) and `shadow_core::crypt`
 (POSIX crypt(3)). Every `unsafe` block must have a `// SAFETY:` comment.
 
 ### `str`, `OsStr` & `Path`
diff --git a/docs/OPENBSD-REFERENCE.md b/docs/OPENBSD-REFERENCE.md
index 9c9916a..0b22c9f 100644
--- a/docs/OPENBSD-REFERENCE.md
+++ b/docs/OPENBSD-REFERENCE.md
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Source: `cvsweb.openbsd.org/src/usr.bin/passwd/` and `src/lib/libutil/passwd.c`.
 |---|---------|--------|
 | Signal blocking during file writes | #38 — `SignalBlocker` RAII |
 | Privilege drop during PAM conversation | #39 — `PrivDrop` RAII |
-| Environment sanitization | #40 — `sanitize_env()` |
+| Environment sanitization | #40 — `sanitized_env()` / `harden_process()` |
 | Landlock filesystem restriction | #41 — `apply_landlock()` in passwd |
 | Absolute paths for subprocesses | #20 — `/usr/sbin/nscd` |
 | Password zeroing | #7 — `zeroize` crate |
@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ Source: `cvsweb.openbsd.org/src/usr.bin/passwd/` and `src/lib/libutil/passwd.c`.
 | Resource limit hardening | #44 — `raise_file_size_limit()` in hardening.rs |
 | Zero-length output guard | #45 — in `atomic_write` |
 | setuid(0) consolidation | #47 — before file operations in passwd |
-| User enumeration prevention | #49 — constant-time PAM in passwd |
-| SIGINT handler during password input | #48 — "Password unchanged" + terminal restore |
+| User enumeration prevention | #49 — early permission check in passwd |
+| Password input interrupt handling | #48 — custom SIGINT handler removed; signal blocking covers critical sections |
 | Umask reset | #51 — `UmaskGuard` RAII in lock/tmp creation |
 
 ### Not Yet Implemented
diff --git a/docs/SECURITY-HARDENING.md b/docs/SECURITY-HARDENING.md
index c40fd77..b4042de 100644
--- a/docs/SECURITY-HARDENING.md
+++ b/docs/SECURITY-HARDENING.md
@@ -14,14 +14,14 @@ Techniques adopted from OpenBSD and best practices for setuid-root tools.
 - [x] PAM delegation (no custom password hashing)
 - [x] `TmpGuard` drop pattern (no leaked temp files)
 - [x] Signal blocking during file writes (#38 — `SignalBlocker` RAII)
-- [x] Environment sanitization (#40 — `sanitize_env()`)
+- [x] Environment sanitization (#40 — `sanitized_env()` / `harden_process()`)
 - [x] Privilege drop during PAM conversation (#39 — `PrivDrop` RAII)
 - [x] Core dump suppression (#43 — `suppress_core_dumps()`)
 - [x] Resource limit hardening (#44 — `raise_file_size_limit()`)
 - [x] Zero-length output guard (#45 — in `atomic_write`)
 - [x] setuid(0) consolidation (#47 — before file operations)
-- [x] SIGINT handler during password input (#48 — "Password unchanged")
-- [x] User enumeration prevention (#49 — constant-time PAM)
+- [x] Password input interrupt handling (#48 — custom SIGINT handler removed; signal blocking during file writes covers critical sections)
+- [x] User enumeration prevention (#49 — early permission check for non-root callers)
 - [x] O_CLOEXEC on file descriptors (#50)
 - [x] Umask reset (#51 — `UmaskGuard` RAII)
 - [x] Landlock filesystem restriction (#41 — `apply_landlock()` in passwd)