Pull structure randomization updates from Kees Cook:
"Now that IPC and other changes have landed, enable manual markings for
randstruct plugin, including the task_struct.
This is the rest of what was staged in -next for the gcc-plugins, and
comes in three patches, largest first:
- mark "easy" structs with __randomize_layout
- mark task_struct with an optional anonymous struct to isolate the
__randomize_layout section
- mark structs to opt _out_ of automated marking (which will come
later)
And, FWIW, this continues to pass allmodconfig (normal and patched to
enable gcc-plugins) builds of x86_64, i386, arm64, arm, powerpc, and
s390 for me"
* tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs
task_struct: Allow randomized layout
randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization
Add /proc/self/task/<current-tid>/fail-nth file that allows failing
0-th, 1-st, 2-nd and so on calls systematically.
Excerpt from the added documentation:
"Write to this file of integer N makes N-th call in the current task
fail (N is 0-based). Read from this file returns a single char 'Y' or
'N' that says if the fault setup with a previous write to this file
was injected or not, and disables the fault if it wasn't yet injected.
Note that this file enables all types of faults (slab, futex, etc).
This setting takes precedence over all other generic settings like
probability, interval, times, etc. But per-capability settings (e.g.
fail_futex/ignore-private) take precedence over it. This feature is
intended for systematic testing of faults in a single system call. See
an example below"
Why add a new setting:
1. Existing settings are global rather than per-task.
So parallel testing is not possible.
2. attr->interval is close but it depends on attr->count
which is non reset to 0, so interval does not work as expected.
3. Trying to model this with existing settings requires manipulations
of all of probability, interval, times, space, task-filter and
unexposed count and per-task make-it-fail files.
4. Existing settings are per-failure-type, and the set of failure
types is potentially expanding.
5. make-it-fail can't be changed by unprivileged user and aggressive
stress testing better be done from an unprivileged user.
Similarly, this would require opening the debugfs files to the
unprivileged user, as he would need to reopen at least times file
(not possible to pre-open before dropping privs).
The proposed interface solves all of the above (see the example).
We want to integrate this into syzkaller fuzzer. A prototype has found
10 bugs in kernel in first day of usage:
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/syzkaller/%22FAULT_INJECTION%22%7Csort:relevance
I've made the current interface work with all types of our sandboxes.
For setuid the secret sauce was prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 1, 0, 0, 0) to
make /proc entries non-root owned. So I am fine with the current
version of the code.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170328130128.101773-1-dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull scheduler fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"This scheduler update provides:
- The (hopefully) final fix for the vtime accounting issues which
were around for quite some time
- Use types known to user space in UAPI headers to unbreak user space
builds
- Make load balancing respect the current scheduling domain again
instead of evaluating unrelated CPUs"
* 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
sched/headers/uapi: Fix linux/sched/types.h userspace compilation errors
sched/fair: Fix load_balance() affinity redo path
sched/cputime: Accumulate vtime on top of nsec clocksource
sched/cputime: Move the vtime task fields to their own struct
sched/cputime: Rename vtime fields
sched/cputime: Always set tsk->vtime_snap_whence after accounting vtime
vtime, sched/cputime: Remove vtime_account_user()
Revert "sched/cputime: Refactor the cputime_adjust() code"
The task->il_next variable stores the next allocation node id for task's
MPOL_INTERLEAVE policy. mpol_rebind_nodemask() updates interleave and
bind mempolicies due to changing cpuset mems. Currently it also tries
to make sure that current->il_next is valid within the updated nodemask.
This is bogus, because 1) we are updating potentially any task's
mempolicy, not just current, and 2) we might be updating a per-vma
mempolicy, not task one.
The interleave_nodes() function that uses il_next can cope fine with the
value not being within the currently allowed nodes, so this hasn't
manifested as an actual issue.
We can remove the need for updating il_next completely by changing it to
il_prev and store the node id of the previous interleave allocation
instead of the next id. Then interleave_nodes() can calculate the next
id using the current nodemask and also store it as il_prev, except when
querying the next node via do_get_mempolicy().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170517081140.30654-3-vbabka@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dimitri Sivanich <sivanich@sgi.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently the cputime source used by vtime is jiffies. When we cross
a context boundary and jiffies have changed since the last snapshot, the
pending cputime is accounted to the switching out context.
This system works ok if the ticks are not aligned across CPUs. If they
instead are aligned (ie: all fire at the same time) and the CPUs run in
userspace, the jiffies change is only observed on tick exit and therefore
the user cputime is accounted as system cputime. This is because the
CPU that maintains timekeeping fires its tick at the same time as the
others. It updates jiffies in the middle of the tick and the other CPUs
see that update on IRQ exit:
CPU 0 (timekeeper) CPU 1
------------------- -------------
jiffies = N
... run in userspace for a jiffy
tick entry tick entry (sees jiffies = N)
set jiffies = N + 1
tick exit tick exit (sees jiffies = N + 1)
account 1 jiffy as stime
Fix this with using a nanosec clock source instead of jiffies. The
cputime is then accumulated and flushed everytime the pending delta
reaches a jiffy in order to mitigate the accounting overhead.
[ fweisbec: changelog, rebase on struct vtime, field renames, add delta
on cputime readers, keep idle vtime as-is (low overhead accounting),
harmonize clock sources. ]
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reported-by: Luiz Capitulino <lcapitulino@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Luiz Capitulino <lcapitulino@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <kernellwp@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498756511-11714-6-git-send-email-fweisbec@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull SMP hotplug updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"This update is primarily a cleanup of the CPU hotplug locking code.
The hotplug locking mechanism is an open coded RWSEM, which allows
recursive locking. The main problem with that is the recursive nature
as it evades the full lockdep coverage and hides potential deadlocks.
The rework replaces the open coded RWSEM with a percpu RWSEM and
establishes full lockdep coverage that way.
The bulk of the changes fix up recursive locking issues and address
the now fully reported potential deadlocks all over the place. Some of
these deadlocks have been observed in the RT tree, but on mainline the
probability was low enough to hide them away."
* 'smp-hotplug-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (37 commits)
cpu/hotplug: Constify attribute_group structures
powerpc: Only obtain cpu_hotplug_lock if called by rtasd
ARM/hw_breakpoint: Fix possible recursive locking for arch_hw_breakpoint_init
cpu/hotplug: Remove unused check_for_tasks() function
perf/core: Don't release cred_guard_mutex if not taken
cpuhotplug: Link lock stacks for hotplug callbacks
acpi/processor: Prevent cpu hotplug deadlock
sched: Provide is_percpu_thread() helper
cpu/hotplug: Convert hotplug locking to percpu rwsem
s390: Prevent hotplug rwsem recursion
arm: Prevent hotplug rwsem recursion
arm64: Prevent cpu hotplug rwsem recursion
kprobes: Cure hotplug lock ordering issues
jump_label: Reorder hotplug lock and jump_label_lock
perf/tracing/cpuhotplug: Fix locking order
ACPI/processor: Use cpu_hotplug_disable() instead of get_online_cpus()
PCI: Replace the racy recursion prevention
PCI: Use cpu_hotplug_disable() instead of get_online_cpus()
perf/x86/intel: Drop get_online_cpus() in intel_snb_check_microcode()
x86/perf: Drop EXPORT of perf_check_microcode
...
This marks most of the layout of task_struct as randomizable, but leaves
thread_info and scheduler state untouched at the start, and thread_struct
untouched at the end.
Other parts of the kernel use unnamed structures, but the 0-day builder
using gcc-4.4 blows up on static initializers. Officially, it's documented
as only working on gcc 4.6 and later, which further confuses me:
https://gcc.gnu.org/wiki/C11Status
The structure layout randomization already requires gcc 4.7, but instead
of depending on the plugin being enabled, just check the gcc versions
for wider build testing. At Linus's suggestion, the marking is hidden
in a macro to reduce how ugly it looks. Additionally, indenting is left
unchanged since it would make things harder to read.
Randomization of task_struct is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's
code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This marks many critical kernel structures for randomization. These are
structures that have been targeted in the past in security exploits, or
contain functions pointers, pointers to function pointer tables, lists,
workqueues, ref-counters, credentials, permissions, or are otherwise
sensitive. This initial list was extracted from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's
code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Left out of this list is task_struct, which requires special handling
and will be covered in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
We have been facing some problems with self-suspending constrained
deadline tasks. The main reason is that the original CBS was not
designed for such sort of tasks.
One problem reported by Xunlei Pang takes place when a task
suspends, and then is awakened before the deadline, but so close
to the deadline that its remaining runtime can cause the task
to have an absolute density higher than allowed. In such situation,
the original CBS assumes that the task is facing an early activation,
and so it replenishes the task and set another deadline, one deadline
in the future. This rule works fine for implicit deadline tasks.
Moreover, it allows the system to adapt the period of a task in which
the external event source suffered from a clock drift.
However, this opens the window for bandwidth leakage for constrained
deadline tasks. For instance, a task with the following parameters:
runtime = 5 ms
deadline = 7 ms
[density] = 5 / 7 = 0.71
period = 1000 ms
If the task runs for 1 ms, and then suspends for another 1ms,
it will be awakened with the following parameters:
remaining runtime = 4
laxity = 5
presenting a absolute density of 4 / 5 = 0.80.
In this case, the original CBS would assume the task had an early
wakeup. Then, CBS will reset the runtime, and the absolute deadline will
be postponed by one relative deadline, allowing the task to run.
The problem is that, if the task runs this pattern forever, it will keep
receiving bandwidth, being able to run 1ms every 2ms. Following this
behavior, the task would be able to run 500 ms in 1 sec. Thus running
more than the 5 ms / 1 sec the admission control allowed it to run.
Trying to address the self-suspending case, Luca Abeni, Giuseppe
Lipari, and Juri Lelli [1] revisited the CBS in order to deal with
self-suspending tasks. In the new approach, rather than
replenishing/postponing the absolute deadline, the revised wakeup rule
adjusts the remaining runtime, reducing it to fit into the allowed
density.
A revised version of the idea is:
At a given time t, the maximum absolute density of a task cannot be
higher than its relative density, that is:
runtime / (deadline - t) <= dl_runtime / dl_deadline
Knowing the laxity of a task (deadline - t), it is possible to move
it to the other side of the equality, thus enabling to define max
remaining runtime a task can use within the absolute deadline, without
over-running the allowed density:
runtime = (dl_runtime / dl_deadline) * (deadline - t)
For instance, in our previous example, the task could still run:
runtime = ( 5 / 7 ) * 5
runtime = 3.57 ms
Without causing damage for other deadline tasks. It is note worthy
that the laxity cannot be negative because that would cause a negative
runtime. Thus, this patch depends on the patch:
df8eac8caf ("sched/deadline: Throttle a constrained deadline task activated after the deadline")
Which throttles a constrained deadline task activated after the
deadline.
Finally, it is also possible to use the revised wakeup rule for
all other tasks, but that would require some more discussions
about pros and cons.
Reported-by: Xunlei Pang <xpang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
[peterz: replaced dl_is_constrained with dl_is_implicit]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@arm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luca Abeni <luca.abeni@santannapisa.it>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Romulo Silva de Oliveira <romulo.deoliveira@ufsc.br>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tommaso Cucinotta <tommaso.cucinotta@sssup.it>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5c800ab3a74a168a84ee5f3f84d12a02e11383be.1495803804.git.bristot@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull staging/IIO updates from Greg KH:
"Here is the big staging tree update for 4.12-rc1.
It's a big one, adding about 350k new lines of crap^Wcode, mostly all
in a big dump of media drivers from Intel. But there's other new
drivers in here as well, yet-another-wifi driver, new IIO drivers, and
a new crypto accelerator.
We also deleted a bunch of stuff, mostly in patch cleanups, but also
the Android ION code has shrunk a lot, and the Android low memory
killer driver was finally deleted, much to the celebration of the -mm
developers.
All of these have been in linux-next with a few build issues that will
show up when you merge to your tree"
Merge conflicts in the new rtl8723bs driver (due to the wifi changes
this merge window) handled as per linux-next, courtesy of Stephen
Rothwell.
* tag 'staging-4.12-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/staging: (1182 commits)
staging: fsl-mc/dpio: add cpu <--> LE conversion for dpaa2_fd
staging: ks7010: remove line continuations in quoted strings
staging: vt6656: use tabs instead of spaces
staging: android: ion: Fix unnecessary initialization of static variable
staging: media: atomisp: fix range checking on clk_num
staging: media: atomisp: fix misspelled word in comment
staging: media: atomisp: kmap() can't fail
staging: atomisp: remove #ifdef for runtime PM functions
staging: atomisp: satm include directory is gone
atomisp: remove some more unused files
atomisp: remove hmm_load/store/clear indirections
atomisp: kill off mmgr_free
atomisp: clean up the hmm init/cleanup indirections
atomisp: handle allocation calls before init in the hmm layer
staging: fsl-dpaa2/eth: Add maintainer for Ethernet driver
staging: fsl-dpaa2/eth: Add TODO file
staging: fsl-dpaa2/eth: Add trace points
staging: fsl-dpaa2/eth: Add driver specific stats
staging: fsl-dpaa2/eth: Add ethtool support
staging: fsl-dpaa2/eth: Add Freescale DPAA2 Ethernet driver
...
GFP_NOFS context is used for the following 5 reasons currently:
- to prevent from deadlocks when the lock held by the allocation
context would be needed during the memory reclaim
- to prevent from stack overflows during the reclaim because the
allocation is performed from a deep context already
- to prevent lockups when the allocation context depends on other
reclaimers to make a forward progress indirectly
- just in case because this would be safe from the fs POV
- silence lockdep false positives
Unfortunately overuse of this allocation context brings some problems to
the MM. Memory reclaim is much weaker (especially during heavy FS
metadata workloads), OOM killer cannot be invoked because the MM layer
doesn't have enough information about how much memory is freeable by the
FS layer.
In many cases it is far from clear why the weaker context is even used
and so it might be used unnecessarily. We would like to get rid of
those as much as possible. One way to do that is to use the flag in
scopes rather than isolated cases. Such a scope is declared when really
necessary, tracked per task and all the allocation requests from within
the context will simply inherit the GFP_NOFS semantic.
Not only this is easier to understand and maintain because there are
much less problematic contexts than specific allocation requests, this
also helps code paths where FS layer interacts with other layers (e.g.
crypto, security modules, MM etc...) and there is no easy way to convey
the allocation context between the layers.
Introduce memalloc_nofs_{save,restore} API to control the scope of
GFP_NOFS allocation context. This is basically copying
memalloc_noio_{save,restore} API we have for other restricted allocation
context GFP_NOIO. The PF_MEMALLOC_NOFS flag already exists and it is
just an alias for PF_FSTRANS which has been xfs specific until recently.
There are no more PF_FSTRANS users anymore so let's just drop it.
PF_MEMALLOC_NOFS is now checked in the MM layer and drops __GFP_FS
implicitly same as PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO drops __GFP_IO. memalloc_noio_flags
is renamed to current_gfp_context because it now cares about both
PF_MEMALLOC_NOFS and PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO contexts. Xfs code paths preserve
their semantic. kmem_flags_convert() doesn't need to evaluate the flag
anymore.
This patch shouldn't introduce any functional changes.
Let's hope that filesystems will drop direct GFP_NOFS (resp. ~__GFP_FS)
usage as much as possible and only use a properly documented
memalloc_nofs_{save,restore} checkpoints where they are appropriate.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix comment typo, reflow comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170306131408.9828-5-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Cc: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Cc: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
IMA:
- provide ">" and "<" operators for fowner/uid/euid rules
KEYS:
- add a system blacklist keyring
- add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, exposes keyring link restriction
functionality to userland via keyctl()
LSM:
- harden LSM API with __ro_after_init
- add prlmit security hook, implement for SELinux
- revive security_task_alloc hook
TPM:
- implement contextual TPM command 'spaces'"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (98 commits)
tpm: Fix reference count to main device
tpm_tis: convert to using locality callbacks
tpm: fix handling of the TPM 2.0 event logs
tpm_crb: remove a cruft constant
keys: select CONFIG_CRYPTO when selecting DH / KDF
apparmor: Make path_max parameter readonly
apparmor: fix parameters so that the permission test is bypassed at boot
apparmor: fix invalid reference to index variable of iterator line 836
apparmor: use SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK
security/apparmor/lsm.c: set debug messages
apparmor: fix boolreturn.cocci warnings
Smack: Use GFP_KERNEL for smk_netlbl_mls().
smack: fix double free in smack_parse_opts_str()
KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH
KEYS: Keyring asymmetric key restrict method with chaining
KEYS: Restrict asymmetric key linkage using a specific keychain
KEYS: Add a lookup_restriction function for the asymmetric key type
KEYS: Add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING
KEYS: Consistent ordering for __key_link_begin and restrict check
KEYS: Add an optional lookup_restriction hook to key_type
...
Pull livepatch updates from Jiri Kosina:
- a per-task consistency model is being added for architectures that
support reliable stack dumping (extending this, currently rather
trivial set, is currently in the works).
This extends the nature of the types of patches that can be applied
by live patching infrastructure. The code stems from the design
proposal made [1] back in November 2014. It's a hybrid of SUSE's
kGraft and RH's kpatch, combining advantages of both: it uses
kGraft's per-task consistency and syscall barrier switching combined
with kpatch's stack trace switching. There are also a number of
fallback options which make it quite flexible.
Most of the heavy lifting done by Josh Poimboeuf with help from
Miroslav Benes and Petr Mladek
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141107140458.GA21774@suse.cz
- module load time patch optimization from Zhou Chengming
- a few assorted small fixes
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/livepatching:
livepatch: add missing printk newlines
livepatch: Cancel transition a safe way for immediate patches
livepatch: Reduce the time of finding module symbols
livepatch: make klp_mutex proper part of API
livepatch: allow removal of a disabled patch
livepatch: add /proc/<pid>/patch_state
livepatch: change to a per-task consistency model
livepatch: store function sizes
livepatch: use kstrtobool() in enabled_store()
livepatch: move patching functions into patch.c
livepatch: remove unnecessary object loaded check
livepatch: separate enabled and patched states
livepatch/s390: add TIF_PATCH_PENDING thread flag
livepatch/s390: reorganize TIF thread flag bits
livepatch/powerpc: add TIF_PATCH_PENDING thread flag
livepatch/x86: add TIF_PATCH_PENDING thread flag
livepatch: create temporary klp_update_patch_state() stub
x86/entry: define _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK flags explicitly
stacktrace/x86: add function for detecting reliable stack traces
Pull locking updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes in this cycle were:
- a big round of FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI improvements, fixes, cleanups and
general restructuring
- lockdep updates such as new checks for lock_downgrade()
- introduce the new atomic_try_cmpxchg() locking API and use it to
optimize refcount code generation
- ... plus misc fixes, updates and cleanups"
* 'locking-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (38 commits)
MAINTAINERS: Add FUTEX SUBSYSTEM
futex: Clarify mark_wake_futex memory barrier usage
futex: Fix small (and harmless looking) inconsistencies
futex: Avoid freeing an active timer
rtmutex: Plug preempt count leak in rt_mutex_futex_unlock()
rtmutex: Fix more prio comparisons
rtmutex: Fix PI chain order integrity
sched,tracing: Update trace_sched_pi_setprio()
sched/rtmutex: Refactor rt_mutex_setprio()
rtmutex: Clean up
sched/deadline/rtmutex: Dont miss the dl_runtime/dl_period update
sched/rtmutex/deadline: Fix a PI crash for deadline tasks
rtmutex: Deboost before waking up the top waiter
locking/ww-mutex: Limit stress test to 2 seconds
locking/atomic: Fix atomic_try_cmpxchg() semantics
lockdep: Fix per-cpu static objects
futex: Drop hb->lock before enqueueing on the rtmutex
futex: Futex_unlock_pi() determinism
futex: Rework futex_lock_pi() to use rt_mutex_*_proxy_lock()
futex,rt_mutex: Restructure rt_mutex_finish_proxy_lock()
...
